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ABSTRACT
This thesis views the Angolan civil war as a conflict 
that resulted from both internal and external political factors. 
The war, fought in the period 1975-1976 between the MPLA and the 
FNLA-UNITA coalition to succeed Portuguese colonialism in Angola, 
involved the intervention of external powers on behalf of both 
sides. This study examines, in part, the relationships that were 
established between these international powers and the Angolan 
movements. Due to the way in which these external relationships 
modified the nature of the internal political dispute, they became 
an intricate part of the origins of the conflict itself.
The internationalization of the Angolan civil war was 
predicated, however, on an internal political conflict that 
emerged from a dynamic interaction of the effects of both 
Portuguese colonialism and divergent currents of Angolan anti­
colonialism. While the particularities of Portuguese colonialism 
and the Salazarist regime played their part in establishing some 
of the conditions within which Angolan anti-colonialism emerged, 
the latter was also a product of specific political choices on the 
part of the movements involved. In this interaction there can also 
be found the roots of the conflict between the Angolan movements.
This internal conflict was further exacerbated when the 
parties to it hoped to bolster their respective positions by 
establishing relationships with external powers. The establishment 
of these relationships was in part achieved by appealing to
external rivalries, in particular to that of the competition 
between the superpowers, but also to regional rivalries, such as 
that between Congo and Zaire and wider continental divisions. The 
interaction between the internal conflict and these external 
rivalries is shown to have contributed significantly to the 
origins of the civil war.
This thesis maintains its focus tightly on the specific 
question of the origins of the Angolan civil war. Those 
developments that led to the war, rather than the conflict itself 
are its main concern.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis looks at how the convergence of internal and 
external political factors led to the Angolan civil war. While the 
civil war has generally been considered to have been a case of ex­
ternal intervention in internal Angolan affairs, this thesis ex­
amines the relationship between the international factors and the 
internal conflict. Within this relationship these international 
factors were an intricate part of the origins of the conflict it­
self, rather than a series of events that occurred after, and in­
dependently of, the internal dispute.
It will be argued that the domestic political actors in 
the conflict in Angola actively sought to internationalize their 
dispute in such a way that the dispute itself took on different 
natures. Thus, the civil war ceased to be solely a struggle for 
post-colonial succession and became, inter alia, part of Por­
tuguese post-coup politics, a chapter in competition between 
African states, an incident in Sino-Soviet rivalry and a testing 
ground for post-Vietnam superpower competition. The MPLA and its 
rivals expressed their differences in ideological and political 
terms that served to establish their war as part of the wider 
global conflict between East and West.
The cold war was very much the context of the Angolan 
civil war, as it is for this study. The ideological and political 
competition between East and West was one of.the battlefields on
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which the Angolan adversaries sought to fight each other. The 
post-war bipolar international system formed the background to 
other levels of conflict which also played a part in the Angolan 
civil war. These other levels had, however, a dynamic of their 
own. The neighbourly rivalry between Zaire and the Congo 
(Brazzaville), which was itself set in the mould of the East-West 
schism, was also superimposed on the course of Angolan rivalry. In 
a similar way, the Sino-Soviet split was also present. Both Moscow 
and Peking are said to have become involved in Angola because of 
each other. These external conflicts will be shown to have become 
expressed in the Angolan civil war.
It will be contended that not only were other interna­
tional rivalries superimposed on the Angolan domestic dispute, but 
so too were the particularist interests of certain states, that 
were allowed to enter the civil war. South Africa's drive for 
regional hegemony, Cuba's internationalism and Zaire's attempts to 
establish influence in the area were examples of such.
How these external structures of conflict (East-West, 
Sino-Soviet, Zaire-Congo, Portuguese Left-Right) and the pursuit 
of particularist interests (Zaire, Cuba, South Africa) became part 
of the Angolan civil war, is the focus of this study. It will be 
argued that the domestic actors of the internal conflict actively 
sought the imposition of these external factors, which led to the 
internationalization of the war.
In this way, this thesis attempts to define a continuum 
on which lie both the internal and external determinants of the
12
\Angolan civil war, and on which there does not seem to be a clear 
separation between domestic politics and international relations.
This study focuses on the interaction between domestic 
political change and international politics; on what Little has 
called the 'third dimension' of the study of political behaviour.1 
This dimension of conflict is considered in the work of Rosenau 
and others to determine the role of internal wars in International 
Relations.2 Their work recognized the indisputable external causes 
and implications of civil wars, and other violent domestic politi­
cal transformations, which made them, in their very essence, in­
ternational events.
Rosenau recognized that, as a violent political conflict 
for power emerges within a state, so one, or more, of the parties 
involved seeks to internationalize the conflict in order to gain 
an advantage over their opponents. In all probability, especially 
in what Rosenau has termed 'structural internal wars’,3 this 
process of internationalization leads to some form of intervention 
by the relevant external powers. Intervention is made more likely
1. The first and second dimensions are respectively: political 
activity within the state; and relations between states. R
Little, Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars [1975], 
p. ix.
2. Namely J Rosenau, G Modelski, M Kaplan, and A Scott in J
Rosenau (ed.), International Aspects of Civil Strife [1964].
3. These are domestic civil wars which are fought to change not 
only the prevailing authority but also 'societal substructures' 
(such as the economy) and major domestic and foreign policies of
the state. J Rosenau, op.cit., p.63.
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when external rivalries are brought into play. This is par­
ticularly applicable in the international order that was dominated 
by East-West competition. The basis for this assumption is that 
the policy-makers of the superpowers saw political change within a 
state, such as that during a civil war, as a threat to shift the 
allegiance of this state from one bloc to another. To the super­
powers, intervention in such a conflict to prevent or to support 
such a shift was seen as justified. A domestic civil war fought to 
gain power, but expressed in terms of superpower bloc politics, 
can thus be externalized. In this way an internal struggle may 
provide the international system, dominated by the superpowers, 
with what Little has called the 'interventionary stimulus1.4
In the case of the superpowers, intervention in third 
states became part of the very structure of international politics 
which their rivalry had established in the post-war period. The 
Soviet Union had established unofficially, through its interven­
tions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, its perceived 
right (the Brezhnev doctrine) to intervene in what amounted to its 
sphere of influence. The United States, acting under a similar 
doctrine with regard to the western hemisphere, intimated an ac­
ceptance of this right by not reacting to these interventions. The 
reasons for this were clear. In effect, any intervention in such a 
case would have brought about a direct confrontation between them. 
Outside their respective spheres of influence, however, it was
4. R Little, op.cit., p.8.
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another matter. In a bid to avoid a nuclear catastrophe, the su­
perpowers, under the promise of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), 
were inhibited from facing each other down in Europe. But, as 
Windsor has argued, instead of lessening conflict between East and 
West, MAD may have actually increased the incidence of non-nuclear 
confrontation elsewhere, particularly in the Third World, by, 
ironically, "...shaping a world which is safer for conflict and 
intervention..."5 In fact, Rosenau suggests that superpower inter­
vention in the less-developed world may have actually been a per­
verse form of communication, or even co-operation, between them.6
Little has identified two opposing approaches to a 
definition of intervention which are particularly useful to an 
understanding of the dynamics of external intervention in civil
wars.7 The 'push-theory1, associated with views such as those held
by Morgenthau, identifies intervention as being "...a conflict 
relationship between two states and analysed in terms of 
power..."8 In this approach, the target and intervening states are 
the only actors involved, and intervention is defined as the 
latter's act to force the former's compliance with its wishes.
A second opposing approach is the 'pull-theory', which 
considers intervention in a more complex model involving internal
5. P Windsor 'Superpower Intervention1 [1984], p.48.
6. J Rosenau 'internal War as an International Event1 [1964], 
p.91.
7. R Little, op.cit., p.3.
8. R Little, ibid.
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as well as external actors. According to this view, external 
rivalries can be drawn in by parties in a civil war in an attempt 
to bolster their own conflict. Intervention here is defined as an 
external response to internal actors. Clearly the external actors 
will have their own interests to fulfill by their interventions 
but these also occur in, and tend to be framed by, the internal 
political context of the particular conflict. It is this second
approach, with its focus on the parallel national and interna­
tional levels of conflict, which seems to be the most appropriate 
to a consideration of the Angolan civil war.
The intervention of external actors in a domestic 
political conflict cannot but have an overwhelming effect on its
course and outcome. The effect can be fundamental. Modelski sug­
gests that "the success or failure of an internal war is always 
dependent upon the behaviour of the international system."9 Espe­
cially when, as in the case of Angola, there occurred a direct, 
and indirect,, military intervention in the form of Cuban and South 
African troops, and Soviet and American weapons. Modelski's argu­
ment that: "...external variables were primary determinants of the 
onset, course and termination of internal wars",10 is certainly ap­
plicable to the Angolan case. It is clear that bipolar interna­
tional intervention "...transforms a struggle inside one political 
system into a struggle between two political systems."11 This is,
9. G Modelski, 'The International Relations of Internal War1, 
[1964],, p.29.
10. J Rosenau, op.cit., p.7.
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in effect, a change in the very nature of the conflict. From a 
struggle for power within a state, intervention transforms the 
conflict into a bipolar contest which is expressed on two levels, 
both national and international. The 'pull-theory' referred to 
above seems to be applicable in this case.
An appropriate approach to achieve the aim of this study 
has been suggested by Rosenau. He believed that:
"the international aspects of internal wars cannot be analyzed 
apart from the conflicts that foster them...The interplay 
between the two sets of variables [external and internal] is 
continuous and complex, leaving the analyst no choice but to 
examine a broad range of political and social processes, from 
subnational to national to international."12
This study has adopted this approach and sets out to systemati­
cally analyse the conditions and factors that influenced the emer­
gence of a political and military conflict for power in Angola 
after the collapse of Portuguese colonialism. This is done by 
looking firstly at the development of the internal conflict and, 
subsequently, at the process by which this rivalry was interna­
tionalized.
The thesis is divided into four parts. Part One serves 
as a scene-setter and, in addressing the civil war itself rather 
than its origins, stands somewhat separately from the other parts. 
It provides a portrait of the Angolan civil war and particularly
of those developments the origins of which are considered
throughout the study. It provides an outline of the intervention
11. G Modelski, op.cit., p.21.
12. J Rosenau, op.cit., (1964), p.l.
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of the major external powers within the context of the escalation 
of hostilities between the Angolan movements. Before this, the 
events which precipitated the situation in Angola are considered. 
These are related to one event of paramount importance: the col­
lapse of the authoritarian regime in Portugal in April 1974. Only 
the withdrawal of Portuguese colonial authority created the oppor­
tunity for Angolan political conflict and the form that it took.
Thus, the first section of Chapter One focuses on the 
implications of the 25 April coup that toppled the regime in Lis­
bon. The development of post-coup politics in Portugal can be seen 
to have been partly responsible for the creation of the conditions 
that were favourable to intermovement rivalry in Angola as the 
process of decolonization was entered into. It will be shown that 
the relationship between politics in Lisbon and in Luanda was suf­
ficiently intimate for there to have been a discernible advantage 
provided to the MPLA in Angola by the dominant position held 
momentarily in Portugal by radical army officers. The section then 
turns to the international implications of the Portuguese 
withdrawal from Angola, with particular reference to what can be t 
seen to have been a breakdown in authority, and consequently the 
creation of a power vacuum with regard to internal as well as ex­
ternal sovereignty.
It was in this vacuum in 1975, that the major Angolan 
nationalist movements moved rapidly down the road towards confron­
tation. As political competition for the succession of Portuguese 
authority reached ever-increasing levels of hostility, further es-
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calations in the process of recruiting external backers were made. 
An arms race was entered into. The second section of Chapter One
retraces those steps that led to the civil war.
The main body of the thesis thus begins in Part Two.
From here, the origins of the civil war, as such, are the main
focus of the argument. The objective of Part Two is to identify
the internal origins of the political conflict in Angola. Although
the focus of this thesis is the struggle for succession the issue
of colonialism per se cannot be avoided. The Portuguese colonial
state and society imposed in Angola played an integral part in the
formation of the movements and of their protagonists, and must,
therefore, be looked at in order to understand the roots of the
conflict as well as the political parameters that framed the An­
golan civil war. A formative influence of equal importance was the 
resistance and challenge to the Portuguese colonial regime, a 
defiance that led to over a decade of war and was fundamental in 
determining the political options open to the movements. Chapters 
Two and Three address these two interlocking issues respectively: 
the formative influences of both colonialism and anti-colonialism 
on the development of the conflict. Together they will show the 
emergence of a political rivalry out of the interactive effects of 
Portuguese colonialism and Angolan anti-colonialism. This will lo­
cate the origins of the Angolan civil war within the context of 
domestic political change.
The Angolan civil war had an anti-colonial war in its 
origins. The movements that faced each other in 1975 had been,
19
only a few months earlier, engaged in a war to destroy colonialism 
and establish an independent Angola. It is important to keep in 
mind this matrix of conflict in Angola: on one axis, there was an 
anti-colonial war; on another, there was a civil war. But the ob­
jectives of each movement involved were the same in whatever 
conflict: to capture the Angolan state and establish their respec­
tive structures of government.
Part Two begins with a chapter on Portuguese colonialism 
in order to establish the context of the anti-colonial challenge. 
One of the factors conditioning the nature of the Angolan move­
ments was the intransigence of Portuguese colonialism. Its resis­
tance to any form of change in the colonies limited the political 
options available to anti-colonialists and drove the movements to 
incorporate a more radical approach to their anti-colonialism, 
both politically as well as in their military strategy. The stub­
born nature of Portuguese colonial policy was, in turn, linked 
very closely to the political stability of the Salazarist regime, 
and the first section of Chapter Two addresses this relationship. 
The chapter then turns to theme of colonial Angola itself and more 
specifically to the conditioning effects of Portuguese domination 
and policies on the economic development of the colony and on the 
formation of a colonial society. Within this colonial society lay 
part of the roots of the future conflict between the movements; 
and it was the particular conditions of Portuguese colonial rule 
in Angola as well as the general intransigent nature of the regime 
in Lisbon that partly determined the political and practical
20
choices of the anti-colonial movements.
Chapter Three focuses on the origins of modern Angolan 
anti-colonialism. Some of the more general issues of nationalism 
in Angola will be looked at, including the acceptance of the idea 
(framed under colonialism) of an Angolan nation, a factor which 
was central to the ethnocentric civil war as well as to the issue 
of sovereignty and international intervention. The remainder of 
Chapter Three will focus on the origins of the three movements 
that were involved in the Angolan civil war of 1975: the MPLA, the 
FNLA and UNITA. The origins of the MPLA are hotly disputed and 
part of the contribution of this chapter is to introduce new 
evidence on this question.
While the internal origins of the conflict will still be 
the focus of attention in Part Three, this will be done within a 
wider context of African politics. This part of the thesis 
restricts itself to the dynamics of the 'African' sphere of the 
politics of the Angolan nationalist movements. After the beginning 
of the anti-colonial war and the violent backlash of the Por­
tuguese regime, the MPLA and the FNLA were in exile abroad, fight­
ing for Angolan self-determination outside their country. In 1961, 
the focus of attention was Leopoldville, capital of the ex-Belgian 
Congo that shared a long border with northern Angola. Already 
well-established in Leopoldville circles, in 1962 the FNLA was 
joined there by the MPLA, and both movements sought to carry out 
their anti-colonial challenge from the Congo. It was during this 
period in Leopoldville, between 1962 and 1963, that the MPLA and
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the FNLA expressed and consolidated the rivalry between them that 
underscored the whole period of the anti-colonial war and that 
certainly reflected the conflict that led to the civil war in 
1975.
Chapter Four addresses this period of exile between 1962 
and 1963 wherein the MPLA and the FNLA jostled for power, each 
trying to gain an advantage over the other. This rivalry is the 
focus of the chapter and the forms in which it was expressed will 
be displayed, providing a portrait of one of the roots of the An­
golan conflict. Furthermore, it will be shown how the Congolese 
government’s favour for the FNLA, in direct opposition to the 
spirit of continental support for anti-colonial movements, not 
only provided another source of conflict between the MPLA and the 
FNLA but also gave the latter an advantage based purely on politi­
cal patronage.
How this advantage was capitalized upon is the subject 
of Chapter Five. It looks in particular at the issue of the recog­
nition of the Angolan movements by the OAU's organ, the African 
Liberation Committee (ALC). In 1963, both the MPLA and the FNLA 
sought to be deemed the sole representative of Angolan anti­
colonialism by the ALC, a status that delivered material assis­
tance to the chosen movement as well as a form of internal and ex­
ternal legitimacy. How the FNLA won the battle for recognition and 
how the OAU recognition almost destroyed the MPLA are shown in 
Chapter Five. It also reveals how a pattern of bipolarity in 
African politics, which would also emerge later in 1975 and 1976,
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reflected the increasing expression of Angolan politics in terms 
of the global ideological conflict between East and West.
The limited focus of Part Three is intended to reveal 
certain aspects of the history of the Angolan nationalist move­
ments that form the roots of the conflict that emerged in 1975. It 
intends to show how external factors, such as the favour of the 
host state and the institutionalization of African politics, af­
fected the course of the rivalry between Angolan nationalists.
The stagnation in post-coup Portuguese politics created 
a power vacuum in Angola that caused the implosion of the nego­
tiated independence accords and precipitated the civil war. This 
collapse of authority allowed the involvement of external actors 
as the Angolan movements looked outside for support for their 
respective bids for power. As the international backers entered 
the fray with political support, finance, arms, and troops, the 
Angolan civil war became a global conflict. By 1975, the succes­
sion of colonial power in Angola had become a matter of the cold 
war conflict between the superpowers.
Why this occurred is the subject of Part Four. The ef­
fects of international intervention in the Angolan civil war are 
portrayed in Chapter One. In Chapters Six and Seven, the other 
side of the coin is sought: the motivations for each international 
actor's intervention. While this study argues that the Angolan 
civil war was primarily a domestic conflict, it cannot ignore the 
fact that international actors were drawn into the conflict. But 
it is argued that a mixture of internal Angolan and external in­
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ternational pressures led to the major developments and the es­
calation of the civil war itself in 1975. That is to say that, as 
the movements sought to express their internal political struggle 
in a wider political and ideological conflict (at both a regional 
and a global level), the international actors in these conflicts 
were motivated by their own domestic and foreign policy considera­
tions. This interaction brought about the externalization of the 
Angolan civil war, to a global level.
Chapter Six considers the three major international ac­
tors that became involved in the civil war. Cuba and South Africa 
deployed military forces on Angolan soil and are thus defined as 
interventionary actors in the most orthodox sense. Their interven­
tion was linked to the wider context of the globalization of the 
war but was principally motivated by a dynamic mix of their own 
internal political factors. The Cuban intervention did converge 
with Soviet interests but, as a policy, it emerged from a process 
of political and ideological internal Cuban factors. In South 
Africa, the motivations for intervention lay in the very nature of 
the apartheid regime, while the implementation of the policy even­
tually emerged from governmental in-fighting in Pretoria. These 
internal factors led to the option of South African intervention 
although the common objective of anti-communism with Washington, 
among other conditions, created the opportunity for this.
Similarly, neighbouring Zaire, a long-standing actor in 
the Angolan conflict, deployed troops and provided the conduit for 
US assistance for the anti-MPLA forces. It was thus involved in
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the Angolan civil war within a wider context of East-West competi­
tion. But Kinshasa's own political and strategic interests formed 
the basis for its involvement. Furthermore, Zaire's contribution 
to the conflict was particularly important in that not only did it 
provide the structure for US intervention but also held up the 
lens through which the conflict in Angola was viewed in 
Washington.
The global actors are the subject of Chapter Seven: the
United States, the Soviet Union and China. Ultimately, the Angolan 
conflict worked its way into the context of East-West relations. 
In particular, the civil war became an arena where the rivalry be­
tween the Soviet Union and the United States was expressed, much 
as the internal Angolan conflict was itself portrayed in wider 
ideological terms, of communism versus anti-communism. The Angolan 
civil war in the history of the cold war is related to the end of 
detente and the beginning of a major Soviet profile in Africa. In 
this way, the Angolan civil war became another cold war incident. 
What will be considered is the manner in which this competition 
was imported into the internal Angolan conflict.
China's involvement in the civil war was far more cir­
cumspect as it only provided weaponry and training for the FNLA 
and thus does not seem to qualify for any more attention than say 
North Korea or Romania. But the far more important political role 
played by China, considering the implications of its involvement 
with regard to Soviet policy considerations, makes it a global ac­
tor in this case. Similarly, Peking's desire to challenge Moscow's
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leadership of the socialist and radical Third World blocs seems to 
have been a major motivation of China's involvement in the Angolan 
civil war. In this way, its interests in the conflict were not 
merely international but were set in the wider context of global 
rivalry with the Soviet Union.
These considerations and the involvement of these six 
states in Angolan political conflict is the subject of Part Four. 
In this way, the external factors of the Angolan civil war will be 
displayed; those inputs that were partly determined by, but essen­
tially separate from, the internal origins of the conflict. In 
this manner, this thesis will show how the domestic political con­
flict that emerged in Angola during colonialism acquired the in­
ternational dimensions that expanded the original conflict and 
gave it a wider, global significance.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR
(i) The Collapse of Portuguese Colonialism
The overthrow of the authoritarian regime in Lisbon, on 
25 April 1974, was the beginning of the end of colonialism in An­
gola. Superficially, anti-colonial warfare had, up to that point, 
achieved very little of concrete advantage for the prospective in­
dependence of the country. During the 1960s Portugal had begun a 
late process of industrialization, of some success, leading one 
academic later to compare it to a NIC.1 The Angolan colonial 
economy itself was experiencing a boom led by increased coffee 
production, which had created wealth and resulted in a late expan­
sion of colonial society. Despite the continued colonial wars in 
Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, the Portuguese regime, at 
the time, seemed not to have been directly threatened. Certainly 
in 1970, a US NSC2 study on Southern Africa (NSSM 39) ruled out 
the possibility of a collapse of Portuguese authority in Africa.3
1. G Clarence-Smith, The Third Portuguese Empire 1825-1975: A 
Study in Economic Imperialism [1985], p.193.
2. National Security Council.
3. The National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM 39) is discussed 
in Chapter Seven in a consideration of US foreign policy toward 
Angola.
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The military ineffectiveness of the anti-colonial move­
ments was considered to be partly responsible for the stagnation 
of the anti-colonial war in Angola.4 This relative failure can be 
attributed to a number of factors, not least of which is the very 
fact that the nationalist forces were divided into three, 
separate, rival movements. According to an ex-member of the MPLA, 
the military weakness of this movement was more than apparent in 
the face of Portuguese counter-insurgency operations.5 Despite the 
presence of its units on Angolan soil, there is little evidence to 
support the MPLA's claims that there existed 'liberated' 
territory: the Portuguese army controlled the borders and was free 
to move anywhere in the country. The other movements, UNITA and 
the FNLA, had not fared any better. Through the deployment of its 
armed forces the Portuguese regime had managed to retain effective 
as well as nominal sovereignty of the colony, despite the anti­
colonial challenge.
All this changed on 25 April 1974. Overall, the develop­
ment of political and economic forces in Portugal had outgrown the 
structure of authority so well-maintained for 40 years by Salazar. 
His successor, Marcello Caetano, had promised change but did (or 
could) not deliver it fast enough. The actual coup de grace was 
delivered by a malcontent officer class, the 'Captains' movement',
4. see M Newitt, Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years 
[1981], pp.240-241. For the MPLA see P Chabal, People's War, 
State Formation and Revolution in Africa: A Comparative Analysis 
of Mozambique, Guine-Bissau and Angola' [1983a].
5. Interview with Joao Van Dunem, 23 August 1991.
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but had been long in coming. The almost anachronistic nature of 
the New State6 would not have allowed this regime to survive. It 
was, aside from the anti-colonial challenge itself, the collapse 
of the Portuguese regime from within that directly resulted in An­
gola reaching the brink of independence in 1974. Nevertheless, it 
can be argued that, despite the fact that they had been unable to 
defeat the colonial regime, the movements had only to have waited 
patiently until it collapsed from within in order to succeed in 
their declared objectives. Consequently Mack's concept of asym­
metric conflict may be applicable in this case.7 The nationalist 
movements needed only not to lose in order to, eventually, win.
The overthrow of the authoritarian regime in Lisbon 
precipitated the collapse of Portuguese colonialism, although this 
did not occur immediately. Strictly defined, there was no process 
of formal decolonization in Angola; only a chaotic withdrawal of 
both state and colonial society that created havoc as well as a 
power vacuum. This absence of sovereignty was manifest internally 
as well as externally. Firstly, at the domestic level: political
6. After Salazar had established control of the government in 
1928, he oversaw the development of an authoritarian, semi­
corporate regime that was known as the New State (Estado Novo). 
See Chapter Two.
7. According to Mack, insurgent wars are examples of asymmetric 
conflict not only because of the differences in resources be­
tween the government and anti-government forces, but also be­
cause the nature of the war is different for each side: ie. it 
is total for the insurgents but limited for the incumbents. Fur­
thermore, the insurgents can never succeed militarily (because 
of the differences in resources). They can only affect the 
political capability of a regime. A Mack, 'The Politics of Asym­
metric Conflict' [1975].
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power in Angola was undetermined. Secondly, at the regional level: 
Portugal was no longer an African power. And finally at the in­
ternational level: the withdrawal of Portuguese authority allowed 
the superpowers to participate directly.
The externalization of the Angolan conflict, which al­
though related should not be confused with the previous interna­
tional aspects of the anti-colonial war, only occurred at this 
point; when Portuguese sovereignty and its structure of authority 
essentially began to collapse. This process of collapse took ap­
proximately 12 months, although it could be argued that it had, in 
essence, been completed by the time Portugal signed the indepen­
dence accords at Alvor in January 1975. Formally, however, Por­
tuguese authority remained in force until the collapse of the An­
golan transitional government in the summer of 1975. On 10 Novem­
ber 1975, the Portuguese High Commissioner lowered his country's 
flag for the last time in Angola. But when it is considered that 
in the run-up to independence day Portuguese authority was almost 
completely paralysed, unable to affect the course of the civil 
war, and the fact that the Portuguese representative transferred 
sovereignty to all Angolans and not to one specific movement, it 
must be concluded that, on that day, there was not a transfer of 
power from the recognised Portuguese authority to a particular 
state or government. In effect, the withdrawal of Portuguese 
authority, with the concurrent rescinding of responsibility of 
government, compounded by the wholesale abandonment of the country 
by most of colonial society and its economic agents, created a
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vacuum of power. What amounted to a de jure as well as a de facto 
absence of sovereignty in Angola.
The implications of the April coup for Angola were im­
mediately apparent to the nationalist movements that had spent the 
previous 13 years fighting a colonial and authoritarian regime 
that had stubbornly refused to accept the changes that had already 
taken place elsewhere on the African continent. Almost overnight, 
for the nationalists, the enemies in Lisbon and Luanda were re­
placed by friends. In particular, many in the MPLA leadership saw 
old friends and exile companions emerge in the new (and, in the 
case of the Portuguese Communist Party [PCP],8 not so new) parties 
that sprang to life, following the overthrow of the regime. Once 
the confrontation with the colonial regime had fallen away and it 
had become apparent that independence was approaching, the objec­
tives and the strategies of the rival Angolan organizations 
changed considerably. The competition for ascendancy between them, 
that had always underlied the anti-colonial war, now emerged as a 
priority. Shorn of the need to challenge colonial authority, the 
movements now sought to legitimize their respective statuses vis- 
a-vis each other. Whereas until then they had sought external as­
sistance to fight the Portuguese, they now sought aid to bolster 
their positions calculated against each other. Before, the MPLA 
had asked for assistance to fight colonialism; now it sought aid 
to fight neo-colonialism. The FNLA and UNITA had both sought aid
8. Partido Comunista Portugues.
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to fight colonialism. They now wanted assistance to counter com­
munism. As well as announcing the imminent transfer of internal 
sovereignty, the April coup also changed the very nature of the 
political life of the Angolan movements.
The withdrawal of Portuguese sovereignty from Angola 
also had international implications. Portugal had, until the April 
coup, played a prominent role in that region. In fact, it can be 
said that Portugal had been an African power. As will be seen in 
Chapter Six, Portuguese sovereignty in Angola and Mozambique 
played a prominent role in South Africa's defence and external 
strategies. Pretoria and the Portuguese colonial authorities had 
also co-operated on a number of other levels. They embarked on a 
number of joint ventures, such as the hydroelectric projects on 
the Cunene in Angola and at Cabora Bassa in Mozambique. The 
projects in these two countries would have resulted, if this had 
not in fact been the implicit intention, in the closer integration 
of these economies with that of South Africa. They also conducted 
joint security operations, along with Rhodesia, that sought to 
contain the activity of anti-colonial and anti-apartheid 
nationalists right across the southern African region. Certainly, 
South Africa had felt less isolated when Portugal was also being 
condemned by UN resolutions. Lisbon's stubborn rejection of the 
'winds of change' seemed to reinforce South Africa's own belief in 
the permanence of white minority regimes in Africa. Consequently, 
the April coup created a dangerous vacuum in South Africa's 
strategic vision which, among other things, may have reinforced
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its isolation and certainly led to a readjustment of its defence 
strategy in southern Africa. Furthermore, as developments in Por­
tugal and Angola made it clear that sovereignty was heavily con­
tested, it became apparent that Lisbon no longer held sway. This 
absence of authority may have helped South African policy-makers 
to believe that intervention was a feasible option. Had Portugal 
strictly enforced its authority until 11 November, the South 
African October invasion of Angola might have been ruled out of 
the question in Pretoria.
The withdrawal of Portuguese authority also had global 
implications. As demonstrated throughout the post-war period of 
the New State in Angola, neither of the superpowers had ventured 
to become directly involved in the challenge to Portuguese 
colonialism in Africa,9 and when they had it was on the suffi­
ciently unprovocative level of ideological solidarity or in the 
covert provision of just enough weapons to keep the movements 
afloat but not enough to mount a serious attempt at destroying the 
colonial regime. The importance of Portugal's membership of NATO 
cannot be overstated when considering this situation. As a member 
of the Western Alliance, Portugal was in Washington's sphere of 
influence, a fact which kept Moscow at bay when considering Soviet 
policy for both Portugal and its African colonies. However, once 
post-coup politics in Portugal had developed into a power struggle 
between radicals and moderates which resulted in the hurried and
9. See Chapter Seven.
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haphazard withdrawal from the colonies, the necessary gap for in­
tervention by the superpowers was created. Despite the requests 
for superpower assistance on the part of the Angolan movements, a 
more forceful process of decolonization by Portugal (ie. the main­
tenance of a structure of authority) might have closed this gap.
Of course, the breakdown in the process of decoloniza­
tion had not been intended by the post-coup leaders in Portugal. 
But part of the responsibility for this collapse resided in the 
very fact that in the months following the overthrow of the 
Caetano administration, authority in Portugal was at the very 
least ambiguous, if not divided.
The day after the April coup, General Antonio de Spinola 
emerged at the head of the ruling Council for National Salvation 
(JSN),10 a body intended for the administration of the country 
during a transitional period. The coup had been carried out by a 
group of mainly junior officers11 which called itself the Armed 
Forces Movement (MFA).12 They had placed the well-known Spinola in 
a leadership role due in part to his popularity and prestige. A
10. Junta de Salvagao Nacional.
11. Due to the fact that among these officers there were many 
with the rank of Captain, this group was also commonly known as 
the Captains' movement (Movimento dos Capitaes).
12. Movimento das Formas Armadas. According to a Le Monde 
report, at the time of the coup, the MFA numbered around 300 ac­
tivists, roughly 7 percent of the army officer corps. Cited in D 
Porch, The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution, [1977] 
p.94. The MFA and the JSN both sat on a second administrative 
body, the Council of State (Conselho do Estado) intended to be 
the ultimate consultative organ of government.
35
somewhat flamboyant figure, the General was one of the top Por­
tuguese military leaders with a high public profile. Immediately 
before the coup, Spinola had been fired from his post as Deputy 
Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff13 by Caetano following the pub­
lication of Portugal e o Futuro,14 in which he had openly chal­
lenged the decade-long official strategy of finding a military 
solution to the anti-colonial challenge in Africa:
"...as it is utopian to imagine that those powers would refuse 
their support as long as the masses prove themselves willing 
to fight, there remains only one way to end the conflict - 
and that an eminently political one. We can, therefore, come 
to the conclusion that, in any war of this type, a purely 
military victory is not possible."15
But General Spinola was not an anti-colonialist. Al­
though not favouring full independence, Spinola did, in his book, 
refer to the issue of self-determination in the colonies,16 which 
was in itself a break from the long-standing organic concept of 
Portuguese empire (see Chapter Two). The effects of Spinola1s book 
are said to have been inspirational. In the words of one naval of­
ficer quoted by Porch:
"Spinola had been the first general to say that the solution 
to the wars was political and not military. This had 
impressed many officers. When he was dismissed, we were
13. Vice Chefe do Estado Maior General das Forgas Armadas.
14. A de Spinola, Portugal and the Future [1974].
15. A de Spinola, ibid., p.20.
16. "The problem is how to give self-determination to overseas 
peoples yet keeping them a part of the Portuguese Republic, 
which is not easy." A de Spinola, ibid., p.91.
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indignant.1,17
This often-claimed influence of Spinola1s book on the 'Captains'
movement1 has, however, been denied by some of the protagonists:
"The book had no influence on the course of the Armed Forces 
Movement...That was already a developing force. There are 
many who cite General Spinola as a catalyst of the 
movement, but this is not true. Besides, many of us were not 
happy that the book was published at this time...The process 
leading to the 25 April [coup] was already underway.1118
Judging by the political gap that was subsequently opened between 
Spinola and the radicals of the MFA, it seems likely that the book 
did have little influence on the latter who were already preparing 
their action. Nevertheless, the book may have had the effect of
influencing the opinion of some of the more moderate elements in
the army, whose participation, or at least non-resistance during 
the night of 25 April, was crucial to the success of the coup.
On 14 May, Spinola was proclaimed President while a
provisional coalition government, under the centrist Palma Carlos, 
was sworn in the day after. But it soon became clear that Spinola 
was not in complete control, being discernibly limited by the more 
radical Co-Ordinating Committee (CCP)19 of the MFA. Barely a month 
after his appointment, Spinola and the MFA were already on a col­
lision course. On the one side stood Spinola, the more moderate
17. D Porch, op.cit., [1977], p.86.
18. Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho quoted by D Porch, op.cit., 
[1977], p.83.
19. Comissao Coordenadora do Programa do MFA.
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elements in the armed forces and the newly emerged political 
parties of the centre. Opposing them were the increasingly more 
influential left-wing officers in the MFA backed by a plethora of 
small radical political groups and the communist party.20 The 
MFA's power was further reinforced by the creation of the Opera­
tional Command for the Continent (COPCON),21 a very powerful organ 
capable of deploying military units anywhere in the country. This 
effectively placed military power at the direct disposal of the 
MFA, by-passing the main body of the armed forces and effectively 
creating a parallel structure of authority; what has already been 
called a state within a state.22 At the head of COPCON was Otelo 
Saraiva de Carvalho, the alleged operational leader of the 25 
April coup. Otelo became one of the leading figures in the MFA 
and, at the time, one of the most popular heroes of what was being 
called 'the Revolution1. The effect of his appointment to the COP­
CON was to tilt the balance of power in favour of the MFA radi­
cals.
At the end of June and the beginning of July, the col­
lapse of the deadlocked provisional government marked an attempt 
by Spinola to gain ascendancy over the MFA. But the latter had 
been reinforced in the Council of State and now wielded a majority
20. In this early period, the PCP remained largely outside the 
power struggle, concentrating instead on organisation and ex­
tending its limited popular appeal.
21. Comando Operacional do Continente.
22. D Porch, op.cit., [1977], p.107.
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in this body which effectively became the highest authority in the 
country. Under pressure, Spinola nominated a second provisional 
government on 18 July under a prominent member of the MFA, Vasco 
Gonsalves.23 The presence of five members of the MFA in this 
second government (including the Prime Minister), as opposed to 
none in the first, testifies to the sharp move left that occurred 
in Lisbon at this stage, and more specifically to the ascendancy 
in government of the military revolutionaries. Following this, the 
MFA became increasingly more powerful as well as more radical in 
its programme; and, as the summer ended, was more and more in­
volved in governing Portugal.
At the end of September 1974, there was one final con­
frontation between Spinola and the MFA radicals. A famous public 
argument between Spinola and Vasco Gonsalves at a bullfight seemed 
to personify the wider power clash between moderates and radicals. 
It was the latter that were successful in this confrontation. 
Spinola lacked confidence in his appeals to the 'silent majority1 
to come out and support his resistance to the radicalization that 
was occurring, and eventually he gave way. Without discernible 
political allies and no military backing, he resigned on 30 Sep­
tember. The moderates had temporarily lost the power struggle and 
Portugal moved left.
In many respects, Portugal's colonies were intimately 
tied to the collapse of authoritarianism in Lisbon, and to the
23. It is common knowledge that Vasco Gonsalves had strong ties 
to the PCP.
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subsequent power struggle between moderates and radicals. With 
regard to the former, the relationship between the anti-colonial 
wars in Africa and the April coup has often been the subject of 
attention, leading some to claim that the African wars had had an 
overwhelming influence on the military officers who overthrew 
Caetano. Certain factors emanating from the colonial wars do seem 
to have been significant in influencing the army in the build-up 
to the coup. Firstly, the strengthening of the armed forces by the 
old regime to enforce colonial authority and the subsequent 
problems in maintaining their morale, resulted in the reinforce­
ment of the very instrument that would lead to the regime's col­
lapse. Secondly, the immediate catalyst of the April coup was a 
general dissatisfaction in the army with a governmental decree 
concerning the status of conscripted officers for military serv­
ice. This decree would have given conscripted officers the same 
route to promotion and pay rises as that of their service 
counterparts; a move designed to attract flagging numbers but one 
that was a source of resentment for the incumbent officer class. 
General opposition to this decree allowed the malcontent officers 
to expand their base within the armed forces. Thirdly, on the per­
sonal level, it has been claimed that the radical orientation of 
the MFA officers was partly a result of having been exposed to the 
ideology of the anti-colonial movements, such as the MPLA, and the 
PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau.24 Otelo, while political officer for
24. The African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and 
Cape Verde was the most successful of all the anti-colonial 
movements in the ex-Portuguese colonies. It was founded and led
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Spinola when the latter was Governor-General of Guinea-Bissau, 
was, according to Chabal, influenced directly by Amilcar Cabral's 
revolutionary thought.25 In the words of Carlos Fabiao, member of 
the Council of the Revolution26 that later replaced the Council of 
State and the JSN in Portugal:
"The longer a subversive war lasts the more one assimilates 
the ideas of the enemy, the oppressed."27
The far more difficult function to discern, however, is 
the overall influence of the wars on the demise of the regime. 
Certainly the morale of the armed forces had been under strain 
after 13 years of war, and this war-weariness was also reflected 
in Portuguese society at large. But so was an underlying desire in 
the political and economic elites for modernization and change
by the Cape Verdean, Amilcar Cabral, a much-admired figure in 
the history of anti-colonialism, both for his concrete successes 
in the war (a high degree of political mobilization) in Guinea- 
Bissau, as well as for his intellectual contribution to a 
doctrine of National Liberation of his pragmatic and flexible 
developmental nationalism. One of his most original ideas was 
his suggestion that the vanguard leadership of a revolution 
should commit suicide as a class once the conflict had been won. 
Amilcar Cabral was assassinated in 1973, probably by opponents 
incited by the Portuguese PIDE. The PAIGC was the single party 
in power in both Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde after indepen­
dence from Portugal in late-1974 and July 1975 respectively. 
Unification was an aim. But in November 1980, an anti-Cape Ver­
dean coup in Guinea-Bissau placed this out of the question. In 
Cape Verde, the PAIGC was renamed PAICV.
25. P Chabal, Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and 
People's War [1983b], p.149.
26. Conselho da Revolu^ao.
27. Citation in P Chabal, op.cit., [1983b], p.149.
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towards some form of Western European democracy. Furthermore, the 
economic effects of the war and of late industrialization had 
resulted in rapid growth and accumulation of wealth, which had 
strained the inflexible corporate system established under the 
rule of Salazar. The result was an emerging spirit of change, 
given some vent in the false spring of Caetano's liberalization. 
Although the colonial wars became the touchstone of politics in 
the last days of the New State, the internal pressures for change 
made the collapse of the regime inevitable. As Newitt wrote:
"Although Portugal's position in the 1970s cannot be isolated 
from its African wars, it is possible to analyse the revolt 
of 1974 in such a way that...Africa plays only a peripheral 
role. What is incontestable, however, is that the revolution 
in Lisbon had the most profound effect on Africa."28
The fighting in Angola had not come to an end im­
mediately after the April coup. According to official Portuguese 
sources, 21 soldiers and 33 guerrillas were killed in fighting in 
Hay, and 18 Portuguese soldiers died in July.29 Initially, the 
Portuguese had insisted on holding a referendum on the future of 
Angola after the establishment of cease-fires; a proposal that had 
been rejected by all three movements. The MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA 
all demanded that the unconditional right to independence be af­
firmed by Portugal before any other steps were taken. In May, a
28. M Newitt, op.cit., [1981], p.245.
29. Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents
1974-1975 [1975], B530.
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tacit cease-fire was agreed between the Portuguese and the MPLA, 
which was only translated into an official cessation of hos­
tilities in October 1974.30 Increasingly, parts of the Portuguese 
army showed themselves to be unwilling to keep fighting. In 
Luanda, a rash of strikes had broken out and added to the in­
creased tension in the city as the uncertainty of what lay ahead 
set in. Eventually in July, after a 'trigger' incident, European 
vigilantes took the law into their own hands and entered the 
African suburbs (musseques)31 at night sowing violence. Riots fol­
lowed and led to the recalling of the first post-coup governor- 
general. The situation in Angola was extremely volatile as politi­
cal life there became dominated by the inevitibility of a 
decolonization process. How this process was defined clearly 
reflected the power struggle between the Spinolists and the MFA.
The political residue of the April coup became in­
strumental in the move towards independence in the African 
colonies. As has been stated above, full independence for the 
colonies was not a foregone conclusion in the immediate aftermath 
of the coup. Spinola maintained his preference for his somewhat 
utopian concept of a global Portuguese community of 'federal 
states':
30. Much criticised by the other two movements, UNITA signed 
earlier on 14 June; the FNLA eventually signed on 12 October and 
the MPLA on 21 October. Hostilities were, however, generally 
over by the end of May. K Somerville, Angola: Politics, 
Economics and Society [1986], p.41.
31. The musseques are sand slums on the periphery of Luanda in­
habited mostly by Africans.
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"Our theory is that our future is only possible in a wider 
context or plurality in a community which remains together as 
parts of a Portuguese whole, in accordance with political 
statutes. This is our creed and on this basis we define our 
objective: that is the country that will become the 
Portuguese united nation."32
This strategy clearly did not envisage full independence for the 
colonies and may even be seen to have been merely a modern version 
of previous Portuguese concepts of empire (see Chapter Two). The 
objective of Spinola1s federative view was to allow the autonomous 
development of the colonies, including the dominant European set­
tler societies, towards some form of self-determination within a 
global federal Portuguese community. Spinola favoured the parallel 
construction of liberal quasi-democracies in Portugal and the 
African colonies. But while this had certainly been an unorthodox 
position to take before the collapse of the regime, it took on a 
decidedly neo-colonial pallor in the pervasive socialist atmos­
phere that increasingly dominated Portuguese politics. Moreover, 
with the radical, sometimes Marxist, nationalist movements poised 
to succeed the Portuguese in all of the African colonies, this 
policy option verged on fantasy.
Opposing Spinola, was the MFA and all the political 
parties on the left, including the Socialists (PS),33 whose 
leader, Mario Soares, was Foreign Minister in Vasco Gonsalves' 
government. They sought to grant full independence to Portugal's
32. A de Spinola, op.cit., [1974], p.87.
33. Partido Socialista.
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overseas possessions. Furthermore, the more radical elements in
the MFA did not conceal the fact that they would prefer to hand
over sovereignty in each colony to the left-wing nationalist move­
ments. This was the case in Guinea-Bissau with respect to the 
PAIGC, and in Mozambique with FRELIMO,34 both of which were indis­
putably poised to inherit the mantle of government. But in Angola 
the radical MFA's support for the MPLA was not unopposed. The 
MPLA's rivals also had their supporters in the Portuguese leader­
ship as well as in the local settler community. The anti-communist 
FNLA was favoured by the Spinolists, while UNITA found some sup­
port in European society in Angola. Furthermore, not one of the 
three Angolan movements was in any dominant position that would 
justify it being chosen over the others.
The African territories, and in this case their 
decolonization, occupied a dominant position in the power struggle 
that followed the April coup. In the words of Admiral Rosa 
Coutinho, a member of the MFA:
"All the crises up to 25 November [coup in 1975 that displaced
the radical MFA] had, as a background, the decolonization 
problem."35
In fact, Portugal's decolonization programme closely mirrored the 
power struggle that was taking place at the same time in the 
leadership in Lisbon. The eventual conclusion of the process in
34. Frente de Liberta^ao de Mocambique.
35. Interview in H Gil Ferreira and M W Marshall Portugal's 
Revolution: Ten Years On [1986], p.169.
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Angola was extreme and chaotic; reflecting the political com­
plexion of the MFA radicals, who gained ascendancy in Lisbon 
during the most crucial months of decision-making on the colonies. 
Subsequently, despite the waning of the radical tendency, the 
process in Angola was incapacitated as a result of the semi- 
anarchic nature of post-coup politics. In Angola, this was the 
dynamic at work. Firstly, at particular stages, the MPLA was 
clearly favoured by the Portuguese authorities in Luanda and 
gained advantage from this in its bid to consolidate its power 
base in the capital. Secondly, the subsequent collapse of Por­
tuguese authority aided that movement that was better positioned 
in the capital and other urban centres, that is, the MPLA. All ac­
cepted the fact that control of the capital implied sovereignty.
Despite the differences between Spinola and the pro­
decolonization elements in the leadership, negotiations to reach 
cease-fire agreements were carried out with the Angolan 
nationalist movements on behalf of Portugal during his presidency. 
As one observer has pointed out,36 these were not so much nego­
tiations as celebrations, as Soares and the accompanying MFA of­
ficers reached agreements with the PAIGC and FRELIMO directly, 
which placed anything but the complete and direct handover of 
power to these movements out of the question. Even Spinola 
realised that full independence was inevitable.
36. Scenes of embracing and self congratulation broke out be­
tween the Portuguese delegation, led by Soares, and the PAIGC, 
astonishing their hosts who expected 'protocole a l'anglaise1. 
See D Porch, op.cit., [1977], p.113.
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This occurred on 27 July 1974 when Spinola announced, 
during a televised broadcast, that the overseas territories would 
be granted total independence.37 The communal violence of the sum­
mer in Luanda and the increasing power of the MFA forced a rever­
sal in the initial policy that sought to hold a referendum in An­
gola. This reversal was also precipitated by Major Carlos Fabiao, 
whom Spinola had appointed governor of Guinea-Bissau. Instead of 
following Spinola's directives Fabiao had hastened the process of 
full independence in Guinea-Bissau by making what amounted to a 
unilateral commitment to hand power over to the PAIGC. By Septem­
ber Guinea-Bissau had become independent, a development which, 
despite the less important nature of the colony to Portugal, was 
symbolically significant and heavily weighted opinion in favour of 
the nationalist movements in the other colonies that were as­
sociated with the PAIGC; in Angola this was the MPLA. In Mozam­
bique, there was a similar turn of events. FRELIMO was granted 
control of the transitional government, which effectively gave it 
complete sovereignty by the time the country was independent.
In Angola, Spinola's first envoy, General Silvino 
Marques, had not been welcomed by the movements. Silvino Marques 
had been a governor-general under Salazar between 1962 and 1966 
and cannot be considered to have been the most diplomatic of 
choices. He attempted to motivate local European and African 
elites to challenge the nationalist movements' monopoly on politi-
37. D Porch, op.cit., [1977], p.115.
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cal legitimacy. At the same time, he sought to outflank the MPLA 
by establishing links with the FNLA through the Zairean president, 
Mobutu Sese Seko.38 In July, the wave of strikes, riots and
European-African violence in Luanda coincided with the resignation 
of Palma Carlos from the provisional government in Lisbon. These 
events weakened Spinola's position and allowed the MFA officers to 
press for the replacement of Marques in Angola. He was replaced on 
25 July by Admiral Rosa Coutinho in the new role of High Commis­
sioner. This appointment marked the start of the MFA's direct in­
fluence on the process of change in Angola. Rosa Coutinho and his 
aides did not conceal their preference for Agostinho Neto's MPLA. 
According to Soares, "...[Rosa Coutinho] favoured the MPLA and 
gave it a military strength it had never had."39 He "...openly 
sympathized with Neto's MPLA as a 'left-leaning' movement of 
'progressive ideas.'"40
Spinola, on the other hand, did not favour Neto's move­
ment. In a televised interview given later in April 1975, Rosa
Coutinho stated that the ex-president had refused to negotiate 
with the MPLA "because this movement was getting instructions from 
Moscow."41 In a last-ditch attempt to make his mark on the process 
of decolonization in Angola, Spinola, with the help of the Zairean
38. D Porch, op.cit., [1977], p.116.
39. L Aguiar, Livro Negro da PescolonizaQao [197?], p.378. My
translation.
40. J Marcum, The Angolan Revolution Volume Two, [1978], p.252.
41. Reported in Diario de Noticias (Lisbon) 21 April 1975.
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President, hosted a secret meeting on Sal, in the Cape Verde is­
lands. The objective of this secret conference was to exclude 
Neto's movement from the political process in Angola. The meeting 
took place on 14 September and included the leaders of the FNLA 
and UNITA, Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi respectively, as well 
as two dissident leaders of the MPLA, Daniel Chipenda and Pinto de 
Andrade.42 At the Sal meeting, Spinola proposed the formation of a 
provisional coalition government that would include repre­
sentatives of those movements present as well as of tribal groups 
and of the white and coloured minorities in Angola. The exclusion 
of Agostinho Neto's MPLA, as well as the fact that the Spinola 
plan envisaged the maintenance of some political influence by set­
tler groups, infuriated the radical MFA officers including Rosa 
Coutinho, who, although High Commissioner in Angola, was not aware 
that the meeting was even taking place.43 The range of Angolan 
political representatives present at the Sal meeting might have 
produced a workable project of decolonization. But the impetus be­
hind the Sal agreement collapsed with Spinola1s resignation at the 
end of September.
42. Daniel Chipenda had been the MPLA commander of the Eastern 
Region. He had challenged Agostinho Neto's supremacy in a bid 
for power that was known as the Eastern Revolt (Revolta do 
Leste). Mario de Andrade was a founder member of the MPLA and 
had been in charge of its external relations. Father Joaquim 
Pinto de Andrade was released from Portuguese imprisonment after 
the April coup. He had been the MPLA's honorary president. The 
Andrade brothers and others challenged Neto style of leadership 
and were known as the Active Revolt (Revolta Activa).
43. D Porch, op.cit., [1977], p.117.
The radical MFA officers now had the upper hand with 
regard to determining the direction of Angola's future. The 
preference shown for the MPLA by some of the Portuguese military 
leaders became evident in concrete assistance in Angola and 
political support in Lisbon. It was not, however, officially 
expressed. As a result of consensus politics in Lisbon, the ini­
tial programme to transfer power in Angola consisted of bringing 
the nationalist movements together in a transitional government. 
According to this programme, Portugal would remain in the govern­
ment throughout the period of transition while a new constitution 
was drawn up and an administrative structure established. 
Demonstrating an admirable, but short-lived, degree of pragmatism 
the leaders of the three Angolan movements44 came together in Mom- 
bassa where they recognized each other's legitimacy. On 15 January 
1975, in Alvor, southern Portugal, the three movements signed an 
agreement with Portugal that seemed to promise peace and a work­
able political future for Angola.
The Alvor Agreement empowered a transitional government 
to administer Angola from 31 January 1975 until elections were 
held later that year to determine a new government that would ac­
cept the transfer of power from the Portuguese on 11 November 
1975. The transitional government consisted of a tripartite 
Presidency,45 a Defence Council and a Cabinet; the posts of which
44. Agostinho Neto led a reconciled MPLA, albeit without 
Chipenda. The FNLA was headed by Holden Roberto. The UNITA 
leader was Jonas Savimbi.
45. One post nominated by each of the three movements.
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were divided equally between the three movements and the offices 
of the Portuguese High Commissioner. Foreign affairs were Lisbon's 
sole responsibility. The three-headed Presidency and the High Com­
missioner all sat on the Defence Council, which was charged with 
the defence and internal security of Angola.46 At its disposal the 
Defence Council had Portuguese troops, the police and the 
nationalist forces. Perhaps unfortunately, none of the three 
leaders of the movements, Savimbi, Roberto or Neto, personally 
assumed the Presidency.
Significantly, Rosa Coutinho was replaced as High Com­
missioner at the end of January, just before the implementation of 
the transitional accord. The post was assumed by General Silva 
Cardoso, a more moderate figure whose term of office was charac­
terized by a rather vain attempt at demonstrating neutrality vis- 
a-vis the three movements.47 For all Silva Cardoso's impartiality, 
however, this posture came somewhat late to avoid the effects of 
Rosa Coutinho's quasi-anarchic administration in Angola. The 
latter's encouragement of revolutionary fervour within the local 
Portuguese authorities and particularly, within the armed forces, 
led to a near breakdown in the chain of command, between officers 
and soldiers, and between Lisbon and Luanda. This breakdown in the 
line of authority survived Rosa Coutinho's term and continued 
throughout the period of worsening violence until the wholesale
46. Details of Alvor agreement in Angola, Rumo a Independencia.
0 Governo de TransiQao; Documentos e Personalidades [1975].
47. D Porch, op.cit., [1977], p.119.
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withdrawal of the Portuguese and the outbreak of civil war. Ac­
cording to Savimbi, when the High Commissioner had wanted to act 
against the supply of Soviet weaponry to the MPLA or against the 
suspected presence of Cuban military advisors, Silva Cardoso's 
found that his hands were tied by the pro-MPLA elements that 
remained in the Defence Council.48
Army units stationed in Angola would sometimes refuse to 
act in any way against the fighting rival movements and pledged 
only to defend the Portuguese administration. One criticism that 
has been directed at the Portuguese armed forces in Angola during 
the period in which the civil war intensified has been that they 
did not adequately protect the settler population that was intent 
on abandoning the country. Partly responsible for this was the ex­
istence of friction between the Army and parts of the settler 
society, that continued despite the overthrow of the New State, 
and worsened as conservative settlers saw the radical officers 
hasten the end of empire. Conversely, the Army officers felt a 
considerable animosity to colonial whites whom they felt repre­
sented the harshest face of Portuguese colonialism, and with whom 
the Army had had a difficult relationship:
"I cannot forget that in general, the overseas white 
population were hostile to the Portuguese forces. This is 
something people forget very quickly."49
48. F Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa [1986], p.119.
49. Captain Sousa e Castro (MFA member of the Revolutionary 
Council that had assumed power in Lisbon after the failed coup 
attempt of 11 March 1975) on 2 January 1976. Citation in D 
Porch, op.cit., [1977], p.120.
52
Even before the April coup there had been fears that Angolan 
colonialists would attempt a Rhodesian-style unilateral declara­
tion of independence.50 After the fall of the regime, these fears 
were intensified whenever European-African violence erupted during 
this volatile time. The Army often did not feel it was there to 
defend the interests of colonial Angola.
The total effect of this internal semi-collapse of 
authority was a failure to impose the political solution that had 
been agreed upon at Alvor. In fact, it reinforced the turn to a 
military confrontation as a means of deciding which of the move­
ments would lead an independent Angola. According to the Por­
tuguese High Commissioner:
"...there was a crisis of authority in Angola making it 
difficult for anyone to establish any kind of order, despite 
what the Portuguese military or the leaderships of the rival 
liberation movements might ordain."51
It can be argued that the MPLA was the movement most 
favoured by this chaos. The role that Portugal was to have played 
in the transitional period was one of neutrality to, and of media­
tion between, the three movements in order to achieve a peaceful 
transfer of power The overall impression was, however, that the
50. In fact this had been a constant fear of successive Lisbon 
governments since the nineteenth century.
51. Antonio Silva Cardoso interviwed by Expresso, quoted in The
Times (London) 19 May 1975. Reproduced in full in Facts and
Reports Press Cuttings on Angola Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Por­
tugal and Southern Africa (Amsterdam: Angola Comite).
53
Portuguese adminstration was biased. According to a Western 
reporter: "...it is widely held in Luanda that the Portuguese have 
favoured the MPLA at the expense of the other movements."52 This 
fear of bias was somewhat justified: one prominent member of the 
Revolutionary Council, Pezarat Correia,53 made (not very) veiled 
criticisms of the FNLA and of the "intense greed of international 
and Portuguese capital interests.1,54 In August 1975, the Gongalves 
government was openly considering the direct transfer of power to 
the MPLA.55 Certainly, the FNLA did not consider Portugal to be an 
uninterested party:
"Given the evident partiality and lack of objectivity shown by 
certain members of the Government of Lisbon to our movement 
...the FNLA categorically refuses to take part in a meeting 
of the three Angolan movements with which a member of the 
Portuguese government will be associated."56
If Portuguese authority had been in place and if its 
commitment to the Alvor agreement had been maintained, the virtual 
MPLA take-over of the capital during the summer of 1975 should not 
have occurred. Had Portugal maintained its neutrality and its ac-
52. James MacManus writing in The Guardian (Manchester) 5 May 
1975. Reproduced in full in Facts and Reports op.cit. (Vol. 5, 
No.10, 17 May 1975), p.1.
53. Pezarat Correia had been in Angola with Rosa Coutinho.
54. Diario de Noticias (Lisbon) 4 May 1975.
55. C K Ebinger, 'External Intervention in Internal War: The 
Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan Civil War* [1976], p.690.
56. Holden Roberto in Tunis, 11 May 1975, quoted by The Times
(London) 12 May 1975.
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cessibility to all the Angolan movements, it is conceivable that 
some negotiated settlement might have been reached. Instead, the 
breakdown in Portuguese authority in Angola, as a result of the 
combined lack of will and political chaos in Luanda and Lisbon, 
had a direct effect on the civil war. Its failure contributed to 
the outbreak of fighting as an instrument of political rivalry in 
the first place, and, subsequently, to the escalation of the con­
flict as external backers entered the fray.
The internal political divisions of Portugal's post-coup 
leadership were partly responsible for Lisbon's failure to disarm 
the movements and establish order in Angola. At the heart of this 
failure was not only a lack of political will but also a certain 
incapacity to act decisively. At one point during May 1975 the 
Foreign Minister, Melo Antunes, was openly contemplating Por­
tuguese military intervention in Angola for "pacification".57 By 
June, Lisbon was threatening to call for the United Nations to 
send a peace-keeping force to Angola.58 In Luanda, however, the 
Portuguese authorities had drifted further away from government 
into what Neto referred to as "criminal neutrality",59 reluctant 
or unable to enforce their will:
"The High Commissioner, General Silva Cardoso...said that 
under the terms of the [Alvor] agreement, the High Commis­
sioner could not intervene in domestic politics."60
57. Diario de Noticias (Lisbon) 16 May 1975.
58. The Economist 14 June 1975.
59. Guardian (Manchester) 30 May 1975.
60. Report in Portuguese Africa reproduced in Facts and Reports
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When the Revolutionary Council attempted to send more troops from 
Portugal to Angola to enforce Lisbon's authority, a mutiny of 60 
soldiers revealed that the army was unwilling to return to 
Africa;61 furthermore, it called into question Portugal's military 
capacity to enforce order. It had became clear that due to both a 
lack of will and ability, Lisbon was unable to do anything to 
change the course of events in Angola. In late August the Alvor 
agreement was formally annulled.62
On the eve of 11 November 1975, the Angolan capital was 
controlled by the MPLA. The High Commissioner hurriedly folded the 
Portuguese flag and with undisguised bitterness transferred 
sovereignty, internal and external, to the Angolan people. In Por­
tugal, the days of the radical left in government were numbered. 
Two weeks later on 25 November, in the name of moderate politics 
the Portuguese Army clamped down on its hitherto dominant radical 
wing. The time of the MFA, which had played such an influential 
role in Angola, was over. The independent state of Angola declared 
by the MPLA on 11 November was only recognized by Portugal on 22 
February 1976.
[Vol. 5, No. 11, 31 May 1975], p.16.
61. Financial Times (London) 9 June 1975.
62. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.271.
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(ii) International Intervention in the Angolan Civil War
It is difficult to avoid forming a picture of reaction 
and counterreaction as the principal pattern of international in­
tervention in Angola. This pattern has been used to point the 
finger of responsibility at one or another of the intervening 
parties; for having instigated the conflict, for having per­
petuated it, for having provoked a reaction, and so on. Certainly, 
this study also draws similar conclusions from this pattern. It 
will be argued, however, that international intervention in the 
civil war was predicated on an internal political conflict that 
emerged in Angola. Parties to this conflict, the Angolan 
nationalist movements, actively sought the externalization of 
their dispute; resorting ever more to sources of larger arms sup­
plies to better or equal those of their opponents. This is not to 
say that Washington, Moscow, Pretoria, Havana, Peking and Kinshasa 
did not all have very real interests and intentions behind their 
interventions in the Angolan civil war. This mixture of internal 
and international politics came together to produce the parameters 
of that terrible conflict.
The three liberation movements that survived the anti­
colonial war, the MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA, did not have sophisti­
cated fighting machines. As they emerged from exile and the hin­
terland in the latter half of 1974, they were little more than 
guerrilla forces. There is no record of their respective arsenals 
at this time but these were certainly made up of small weapons. A
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year later, however, columns of motorized armoured carriers, large 
mortars, rocket launchers, tanks and jet fighters were all in ac­
tion as the MPLA faced the combined forces of the FNLA and UNITA. 
In the intervening period, an arms race was entered into by these 
adversaries, one which had escalated exponentially as the lines 
of political rivalry were drawn; dividing communities into three, 
and eventually two, irreconcilable sides. International interven­
tion in the Angolan civil war is revealed in the course of this 
arms race.
After the Portuguese coup, the MPLA managed to build it­
self up to a position of strength that placed it on a par with its 
major rival, the FNLA. From military ineffectiveness and internal 
disarray in 1973 and early 1974, the MPLA had, by early 1975, un­
der a far more cohesive leadership, established its influence in 
most of the cities, including the capital, Luanda. This transfor­
mation was achieved by a dynamic merger of both internal and ex­
ternal factors.
The internal workings of the MPLA are anything but 
transparent. Throughout the leadership of Agostinho Neto, from 
1962 until independence, the movement experienced three major 
splits. The first, in 1963, will be addressed later in Chapter 
Four. The other two occurred simultaneously during 1973 and 1974. 
The reason for giving attention to these dissensions is that they 
were, like the wider conflict between the movements, interna­
tionalized beyond their purely domestic components. More specifi­
cally, the challenges to Neto's leadership have, in one way or
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another, been related to the state of affairs between the MPLA and 
Moscow. This is the case with the two very different dissensions 
that occurred in 1973 and 1974: the Eastern Revolt was a challenge 
to Neto's leadership by a rival, Daniel Chipenda; the Active 
Revolt was a political critique of the substance of Neto's leader­
ship. It should be emphasised that both the scope and the nature 
of the challenges were very different. While the Eastern Revolt 
led to open hostilities, with Chipenda eventually transferring his 
forces to the FNLA, the Active Revolt was an attempt to change the 
direction of the MPLA on the part of intellectuals, most of whom 
remained within the movement after Neto's authority was imposed.
The Chipenda challenge was, according to Van Dunem, es­
sentially personal and not political.63 He had been the commander 
of the MPLA's guerrilla forces in the Eastern region of the 
country, where a military front had been opened in the late 1960s 
in response to activity in that area by UNITA. To all intents and 
purposes, Chipenda was the highest authority in that area; whose 
charisma had earned him a certain amount of popularity. In the 
early 1970s, military reverses at the hands of the Portuguese had 
spread discontent amongst the guerrillas. Inside Angola, the guer­
rilla units tended to stagnate, awaiting instructions from the 
leadership outside the country; directives that sometimes never
63. Interview with Joao Van Dunem, London, 23 August 1991. Joao
Van Dunem was active in the MPLA and in 1975 was with the Press
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the MPLA's army, FAPLA
(Formas Armadas Populares de Liberta^ao de Angola). See Appen­
dix.
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arrived.64 Increasingly dispersed among various African capitals, 
the MPLA leadership's lines of communication to the fronts were 
inefficient and partly responsible for the military setbacks. This 
fed a growing resentment with the leadership among the partisans, 
which reached a high point on the Eastern Front. In an attempt to 
restore the profile of his leadership, Neto visited that region 
where he was openly challenged by a member of an audience who 
claimed not to recognize his authority.65 This challenge was later 
generalized by Daniel Chipenda, whose substantial military force 
threatened Neto's group after an open split had been declared by 
1973.
Some reports have claimed that during 1972 and 1973, 
Soviet assistance for the MPLA was reduced to a negligible 
trickle.66 Legum considered this to have been a reflection of the 
fact that Moscow had switched its backing to Chipenda hoping that 
the battle commander would be easier to deal with than the 
"touchy" Neto.67 This slowdown in Soviet aid is said to have 
preceded a total cut-off in all arms deliveries to the MPLA in 
March 19 7 4 , 68 only a month before the coup in Portugal. Con-
64. Aware of the resentment, Neto chastised this lethargy in a 
message delivered on 1 January 1970. Reproduced in English in 
MPLA 1970. p.8.
65. Interview with Joao Van Dunem, London, 23 August 1991.
66. Van Dunem has backed these reports. Interview with Joao Van 
Dunem, London, 23 August 1991.
67. C Legum, After Angola: The War Over Southern Africa, [1978],
p.11.
68. G Golan, The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements
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tradicting this version, other sources have claimed that Chipenda 
may have turned to Peking after his break with Neto.69 Whichever 
the case, the Soviet Union did reduce its flow of funds to Neto's 
group during the Eastern Revolt, while the movement appeared to be 
split and militarily ineffective.70
The freezing of the conduits from Moscow did not last 
long. After the coup in Lisbon, the scenario had changed sig­
nificantly for Soviet policy-makers. Furthermore, Neto had managed 
to recapture the initiative within the MPLA by outmanoeuvring the 
Revolts.71 The leadership of the movement was now in the hands of 
a tightly-knit ten-member Political Bureau, loyal to Neto.72 Ac­
cording to Van Dunem, the Soviets decided to reactivate their sup­
port after Neto had regained control.73 Furthermore, a cease-fire 
with the Portuguese signed in October 1974 had relieved the 
military pressure on the movement. A year earlier it had seemed
in the Third World, [1988], p.270.
69. M Simpson, The Soviet Union and Afro-Marxist Regimes: The 
Path to the Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation [1989], 
p.191.
70. The Soviet action was apparently taken after a negative 
report on the operation of the MPLA given by Victor Lewin. G 
Bender, 'Kissinger in Angola: Anatomy of Failure', [1978a] p.69.
71. At an MPLA conference in Lusaka in Autumn 1974, Neto forged 
an alliance with the activists of the First Military Region of 
the MPLA against the Active and Eastern Revolts. These young 
guerrillas, who included Nito Alves, and Neto walked out of the 
conference in Lusaka and reconstituted the MPLA within Angola.
72. The Political Bureau was made of Agostinho Neto, Lopo do 
Nascimento, Lucio Lara, Carlos Rocha, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, 
Joaquim Kapango, Rodrigues Joao Lopes, Pedro Maria Tonha 
(Pedale), Jacob Caetano Joao (Monstro Imortal) and Henrique 
Teles (Iko) Carreira. J Marcum, op.cit., [1978], p.252.
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that Neto was on the way out. Internally challenged and abandoned 
by his major external backer, recovery seemed out of the question. 
Yet this was what occurred. The event that did most to help Neto 
achieve this was, of course, the April coup in Lisbon. As a result 
of this, the situation in Angola from Moscow's perspective trans­
formed itself from being 'whom to support in a protracted and in­
definite anti-colonial war1 to one that provided it with an oppor­
tunity to help establish a very friendly regime in an independent 
Angola.
The long-standing association between the MPLA and Por­
tuguese communists provided the link to the Kremlin. This 
relationship came to its fruition after the April coup had brought
the radical left-wing tendency to power in Lisbon; and especially,
%
as described above, in Rosa Coutinho's chaotic term as High Com­
missioner from June 1974 to January 1975. The MPLA benefited 
directly from the favour shown to it by the Goncalves governments. 
Indirectly also, the MPLA accrued to itself a further predisposi­
tion on the part of the Soviets to favour this movement as a 
result of the close ties between some of the radical Portuguese 
officers and Moscow. These ties were consummated principally 
through the Portuguese Communist Party. According to Ebinger, it 
was the leader of the PCP, Alvaro Cunhal, who had personally 
recommended that Moscow resume its arms deliveries to the MPLA.74
The date of the resumption of Soviet arms deliveries to
73. Interview with Joao Van Dunem, London, 23 August 1991.
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the MPLA has been variously cited as being sometime between August 
and October 1974, in the middle of Rosa Coutinho's term.75 The 
supplies were routed through Brazzaville, which had been the 
MPLA's principal base since 1964, and included, according to US 
government sources, "...thousands of AK-47s." These weapons were 
distributed by the MPLA "...in the Luanda musseques where they 
proved useful in skirmishes between MPLA and FNLA partisans begin­
ning in November 19 7 4.1,76 One report, attributed to British intel­
ligence sources, claims that the MPLA received "...million dollars 
worth of Soviet weapons..." in the last four months of 1974.77 In 
December, the MPLA sent 250 of its cadres to Moscow "...for 
military training."78
The effect of this resumption of Soviet military aid was 
to expand the MPLA's military capacity, perhaps fourfold. Accord­
ing to Marcum, who quoted figures presented by the US State 
Department during Congressional Hearings,79 the military force of 
the MPLA-Neto faction after the Chipenda split did not number more 
than 1,500 soldiers. By January 1975, however, the MPLA could, ac­
74. C K Ebinger, op.cit., [1976], p.688.
75. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.253; B D Porter, 
The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in 
Local Wars 1945-1980, [1984], p.156; M Simpson, op.cit., [1989], 
p.199; J Valenta, *The Soviet-Cuban Intervention in Angola 1975' 
[1978], p.10.
76. J Marcum, op.cit. Volume Two, [1978], p.253.
77. Fred Bridgland, op.cit., [1986], p.116.
78. B D Porter, op.cit., [1984], p.156.
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cording to the same US sources, arm a force numbering 5,000-7,000. 
This assessment of the strengthening of the MPLA may not be far 
off the mark. The Alvor agreement had stipulated that the respec­
tive military forces of each movement could number no more than
8,000.80 According to a Portuguese military source, the MPLA could 
count on a force of 5,500, but an American researcher cited by 
Marcum put the number as high as 8,000.81 Even taking a conserva­
tive estimate as a basis, it is clear that the MPLA's strength had 
multiplied significantly during the latter half of 1974, before 
the Alvor accords were signed. Although this reinforcement only 
served to bring the movement closer to the far greater military 
strength of the FNLA,82 it also revealed two realities. Firstly, 
that the MPLA under Neto was a competitor for power in Angola; and 
that, secondly, this bid was backed by Moscow.
According to one point of view Soviet policy in the An­
golan civil war was influenced by the action of China in support 
of the FNLA:
"The animosity between China and Russia over Angola exceeded 
anything either might have felt about US and other Western 
intervention.1183
79. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.253.
80. Angola, Rumo a Independencia. 0 Governo de Transiqao: 
Documentos e Personalidades, [1975], p.49.
81. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.257.
82. In January 1975, the FNLA army was said to total 21,000. 
This was made of 9,000 stationed in Angola and 12,000 waiting in 
Zaire. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.257 notes 128 
and 129.
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The involvement of Peking in the conflict was marked by the ar­
rival of 112 Chinese military advisors at the FNLA's Zairean base 
at the end of May 1974, carrying 450 tonnes of arms. This is said 
to have been the red rag for the Soviet bull, leading Moscow to 
resume its shipments of arms to Neto.
The effects of Chinese support on the FNLA are difficult 
to judge although it must surely have played a part in the 
military consolidation of northern Angola by the movement in the 
latter part of 19 7 4 . 84 The establishment of FNLA influence in the 
zones where the movement was ethnically based but had not wielded 
authority to any significant degree throughout the colonial 
period, was instrumental in bolstering the confidence of its 
leader, Holden Roberto. By the end of 1974 the FNLA was in a 
strong negotiating position.
The strength of the FNLA was further enhanced when the 
US began a covert programme of support for this movement in 
January 1975. An ex-CIA operative who took part in the operation 
in Angola, John Stockwell, has claimed that the US intelligence 
agency had already reactivated its payments to Holden Roberto in 
July 1974.85 At the same time as the Alvor agreements were being
83. C Legum, op.cit., [1978], p.22.
84. Although one source has attributed this consolidation by the 
FNLA to a secret deal struck between Spinola and Mobutu, in a 
attempt to favour the FNLA. Africa Confidential [18 October 
1974], p.8.
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signed in Portugal, the US Forty Committee86 met in Washington to 
consider a CIA proposal that sought to endow the FNLA with US$
300,000. There and then, the proposal was approved by the chair of 
the committee, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Later Kissinger 
would argue that the funds were only intended for organizational 
purposes and not for the purchase of arms. Furthermore, he argued, 
the endowment was significantly less than the Soviet funds that 
had been channelled to the MPLA. This may well have been the case, 
but when relative strengths are considered, the MPLA was sig­
nificantly weaker than the FNLA in mid-1974. Thus, the bolstering 
of the FNLA at that stage could have been considered to have been 
an escalation in the superpower levels of aid for the Angolan 
nationalist movements. Furthermore, these funds were only part of 
the total US aid received by the FNLA. US arms were also provided 
to this movement indirectly through the replacement of weapons 
supplied by the Zairean regime.87
The relative effect of the US funds on the strength of 
the FNLA cannot be exactly quantified, as Roberto's movement was 
supported by two other major backers, Zaire and China. Yet it must 
be assumed that the US covert funds were responsible for suffi­
ciently bolstering the confidence of the FNLA leader for the lat­
ter to move troops into Luanda. This ocurred once a wide zone of
85. J Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story [1978], p.67. 
The CIA had payed the leader of the FNLA a retainer since the 
early 1960s. See Chapter Seven.
86. The Forty Committee brought together the disparate parts of
the US Administration's foreign policy-making structure to
decide on covert operations. See Chapter Seven.
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influence had been established by the movement in northern 
Angola.88 Furthermore, the FNLA embarked on an ostentatious bout 
of spending in Luanda; which included the purchase of a television 
station (renamed FNLA-TV) and the leading daily newspaper.89 Amid 
rumours of US covert support, this level of exposure could not 
have failed to have imparted an impression of confidence on the 
part of the FNLA. Its overall military strength was increased in 
February when Chipenda announced, after being attacked by the 
MPLA, the merger of his force of around 2,000 with that of the 
FNLA.90 Combined with an alleged display of militarism, these fac­
tors helped to stoke a fear in Luanda that the FNLA would not 
necessarily keep to the programme of transition that had been es­
tablished at Alvor.91 This was a time when there were periodic 
confrontations between all sides; and when members of the respec­
tive movements attended meetings with pistols at their belts.92 It 
must have been difficult to escape the conclusion that the situa­
tion was worsening and that greater violence was not far off. Al-
87. S Weissman 'The CIA and US Policy in Zaire and Angola' 
[1978], p.406.
88. J Marcum, op.cit., [1978], p.246.
89. 0 Seculo (Lisbon) 24 March 1975, in Facts and Reports [Vol.
5, No.7, 5 April 1975], pp.19-20.
90. T Hodges, 'How the MPLA Won in Angola1 [1978], p.49. As the 
Chipenda forces were not included in the Alvor agreements, con­
flicts between factions of the MPLA were considered 'internal'.
J Marcum, op.cit., [1978], p.258. As the conflict escalated this 
peripheral role almost certainly drove Chipenda to join the 
FNLA.
91. Interview with Joao Van Dunem, London, 23 August 1991.
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though in February and March there had not yet been a discernible 
effect of the US programme of covert assistance, the burgeoning 
strength and confidence of the FNLA and the rumours that suggested 
the CIA was backing Holden Roberto created the impression that the 
conflict was about to escalate to another more bellicose level.
At the same Forty Committee meeting, Kissinger turned 
down a separate CIA proposal to fund UNITA to the order of US$
100,000. It has been suggestes that the reason for this decision 
was that the US had always supported the FNLA and would not, 
therefore, change horses in midstream.93 It is more likely, 
however, that the explanation for this lies in the special 
relationship between Washington and Kinshasa. As will be seen 
later, the importance of Zaire to the US was an important input in 
the American decision-making process on Angola. Consequently, the 
funding of the FNLA was also a gesture to the latter1s ally, 
President Mobutu of Zaire. By July, the Forty Committee was ready 
to respond to UNITA's solicitations for weapons.94 The US 
proclivity to support UNITA was influenced by the preoccupations 
that had been voiced to Washington by Zaire and Zambia about the
92. J Marcum, op.cit., [1978], p.258.
93. G Bender, op.cit., [1978], p.78.
94. By this time, UNITA was considering moving from a posture of
nonviolence to entering the fray between the MPLA and the FNLA.
Consequently, it had made its desires for the purchase of 
weapons known. The Agence France Press reported that the UNITA 
military commander, Samuel Chiwale, visited Peking on 20 March, 
presumably to request military aid. AFP report in Facts and
Reports [Vol. 5, No.7, 5 April 1975], p.17. According to a later
report, however, this fund-raising trip was not as successful as
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worsening situation in Angola.95 However, the US only began to arm 
Savimbifs movement from September.96 With the FNLA, UNITA became a 
recipient of US covert assistance in a bid to dislodge the MPLA
from Luanda. Estimates made by the US Congress conclude that total
US aid, including that sent to replace Zairean and Zambian war 
materiel given to the FNLA and UNITA, amounted to US$ 64 million; 
a figure that was double the official cost given at US$ 32 
million.97
By March 1975, the MPLA was beginning to receive major 
Soviet arms shipments. According to official US estimates, the to­
tal amount of arms shipments between April and October 1975, 
before the South African intervention, were 27 shiploads and 30 to 
40 air missions.98 According to one report, Soviet weapons and am­
munition were sufficient to equip 20,000 men in Luanda.99 This 
major input in armaments coincided with, or may have actually 
helped to feed, the increasingly heavier confrontations between 
the movements in Luanda. The Alvor agreement was falling apart as
Savimbi may have wished. Afrique-Asie 19 May 1975.
95. J Marcum, op.cit., [1978], p.262.
96. G Bender, op.cit., [1978], p.79.
97. J Marcum, op.cit., [1978], p.263.
98. B D Porter, op.cit., p.160. These figures should be compared 
to those covering the period of heaviest fighting, between 
November 1975 and March 1976: 19 shiploads and 70 air missions. 
There was an obvious need for urgency in the flights; but the 
figures show also that a significant amount of Soviet weaponry 
had already been transferred to the MPLA before October 1975.
99. J Valenta, 'The Soviet-Cuban Intervention in Angola 1975'
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the FNLA attacked the MPLA-Neto, which in turn attacked both the 
MPLA-Chipenda and the FNLA. Only UNITA, whose leader did not go to 
Luanda until 25 April, managed to remain outside the fighting at 
this stage.
According to Joao Van Dunem, who at this time was active 
in the MPLA’s military command, the Neto leadership decided to em­
bark on an attempt to reinforce the movement's position and estab­
lish political influence in the major cities and towns of the 
country, including the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda.100 This 
process led increasingly to confrontation and violence in the 
cities. It is difficult to claim that these objectives were 
decided upon with Moscow's input. However, Soviet weapons gave the 
MPLA a viable fighting force which was used to sustain its bids 
for political influence among urban populations. The Soviet arms 
shipments to the MPLA at this stage were a significant escalation 
in the arms race.
In the period after the April coup, there had already 
been a number of clashes between rival supporters of the move­
ments, especially between those of the MPLA and the FNLA, as well 
as violent confrontations between Europeans and Africans in the 
musseques. Throughout this period, however, the violence was not 
considered 'official'; Lucio Lara, of the MPLA, is said to have 
dissociated the movement from the violent acts of its supporters 
at the end 1974.101 But on 23 March 1975 the FNLA attacked the
[1978], p.11.
100. Interview with Joao Van Dunem, London, 23 August 1991.
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MPLA's headquarters at Vila Alice with hand grenades.102 This in­
cident can be used to mark the beginning of the semi-open phase of 
the civil war. Attacks and counter-attacks followed as an extra 
500 FNLA troops were brought into the city at the end of the 
month. After a brief lull, clashes re-emerged at the end of
April. During this period, violent confrontations between the MPLA
and the FNLA flared up regularly in most of the towns, and espe­
cially in Luanda. Despite several attempts at establishing cease­
fires, these rapidly collapsed after their signing. According to 
one estimate, by June 1975 this violence had left 5,000 dead.103 
The Alvor accords were all but defunct as each movement attempted 
to strengthen its own position. Only UNITA attempted to stay out 
of the fighting and pressed for the retention of the transitional 
process agreed at Alvor. Its military power was much more limited 
and could not have stood up against the other two movements at 
this stage. Before receiving US arms supplies, UNITA's best 
chances lay in its formalized role under the aegis of Alvor.
The direct motivations behind this increased tempo are
difficult to pin down categorically. The MPLA, increasingly more 
influential in the urban areas and more consolidated internally, 
had been receiving a clearly enhanced flow of weapons from the
101. F Bridgland, op.cit., p.112.
102. J Marcum, op.cit., p.258.
103. Estimate given by J Bergerol Financial Times (London) 14 
June 1975. Cited in F Bridgland, op.cit., p.119. Another es­
timate reported by The Guardian (Manchester) correspondent in 
Luanda states that 700 had been killed by 5 May. Report in Facts
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Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states. This reinforcement may 
have prompted the FNLA to move against the MPLA with a pre-emptive 
objective in mind. On the other hand, boosted by the support Hol­
den Roberto believed he had in Kinshasa and now Washington, the 
FNLA may have acted against the MPLA in order to establish the 
former's own predominance by military means where it had little 
political influence. Whatever the reason, an arms race between the 
movements had begun and, as violence between their supporters took 
on epidemic proportions, military power was increasingly seen to 
be the main political instrument in Angola
The MPLA's military strength was further reinforced by 
the recruitment of a contingent of anti-Kinshasa gendarmes from 
Katanga numbering between 3,500 and 7,000. This force had been 
exiled in Angola since the failure of the secession of Katanga 
from the Congo and the rise of Mobutu.104 They had previously been 
used by the Portuguese against the Angolan nationalist movements, 
but the gendarmes' anti-Kinshasa posture was now exploited by the 
MPLA to recruit them for its own conflict with the Kinshasa-backed 
FNLA.
Adding to its increased manpower and armaments, the MPLA 
also began to receive military assistance from Cuba. According to 
one source that quoted Luanda Radio, the first Cuban military ad­
visors began to arrive in Angola around 7 May. At this time an 
MPLA representative journeyed to Havana while the Cuban ambassador
and Reports [Vol. 5, No.10, 17 May 1975], p.1.
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to Kinshasa was on a visit to Luanda.105 A meeting between Neto 
and the Cuban military commander in Brazzaville is said to have 
taken place some time in May. At this meeting an initial programme 
of logistical and strategic co-operation between the MPLA and Cuba 
was drawn up and commenced. The date of arrival of 230 Cuban 
military advisors has not been agreed upon by observers of the 
conflict,106 but is placed sometime in May or June. Official US 
sources reveal that Washington first detected the presence of 
Cubans on 25 July.107 It is reasonable to assume that sometime in 
early summer is a likely date for the arrival of this contingent 
of Cuban military technicians. The multiplicity of reports and 
sighting of Cubans in Angola that followed, precludes the pos­
sibility, advanced by some sources, that this first Cuban contin­
gent did not arrive until August.
The primary task of this contingent was to set up and run 
training camps for the MPLA's military arm, FAPLA. Some reports 
have claimed, however, that Cubans were involved in fighting by 
the end of May, or at the very least by June.108 Even if the first 
Cubans were not involved in the fighting, their presence shifted 
the balance of the movements' forces. Once again, compared to the 
military makeup of the MPLA twelve months before, it represented a
104. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.259.
105. J Valenta, op.cit., p.11.
106. See Chapter Six.
107. See Footnote 256 in J Marcum, op.cit., p.273.
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significant reinforcement of its forces as well as an indication 
that the confrontation with the FNLA was more rather than less 
likely. In addition, it raised the prescient spectre of a Cuban- 
Soviet operation of support for the MPLA. As was subsequently 
revealed, the Cuban advisors did not only provide basic military 
training but also instructed the FAPLA troops in the use Soviet 
weaponry that was being delivered to the MPLA.
Also at around this time, perhaps a little later in July 
when the MPLA's control of Luanda was practically absolute, a num­
ber of Soviet military advisors arrived in Angola. The Portuguese 
news agency reported, on 25 April 1975, the approaching visit of a 
Soviet delegation that "...will hold talks with the MPLA regarding 
material aid and training of cadres."109 According to Van Dunem, 
there were more than 10 but less than 50 Soviet military personnel 
with the MPLA, up to and including the rank of colonel in the 
Soviet Army.110
As will be shown later, the FNLA benefitted most from 
its rather amorphous relationship with Zairean regimes, par­
ticularly with that of Mobutu Sese Seko. Some analysts have gone 
so far as to say that the movement was no more than an instrument 
of Zairean foreign policy.111 If all things are considered, it can 
be seen that the FNLA did not ever clash with Zaire over conflict-
108. J Valenta, op.cit., p. 11.
109. Reported in Facts and Reports [Vol. 5, No.10, 17 May 1975],
p.21.
110. Interview with Joao Van Dunem, London, 23 August 1991.
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ing interests. Mobutu's regime did seem to be pursuing a parallel 
agenda to that of the FNLA. At the heart of this Zairean agenda 
was a desire for a friendly regime in Angola; one that shared 
Mobutu's anti-communist posture and, at the same time, undoubtedly 
a keen interest in the oil-rich Cabinda enclave. The fact that 
Zaire seemed to be pursuing a particularist set of interests when 
supporting the FNLA does not preclude the existence of very real 
internal sources of the conflict in Angola. Even considering that 
the FNLA seems to have been more at home in the Zairean capital 
than in Angola, this movement represented, as will be seen later, 
an integral part of the process of Angolan independence.
Nevertheless, Zaire's support for the FNLA was crucial 
in making the movement a competing force in 1975. The Zaire factor 
already allluded to is seen to have been an important input in the 
US decision-making process on the Angolan civil war. The close 
relationship of the regime in Kinshasa with the FNLA was fundamen­
tal to the latter's access to US support. The flow of US arms to 
Roberto's movement was conducted principally through Zaire, where 
the weapons would either replace Zairean army supplies already 
provided to the FNLA or would easily cross the border into Angola 
to resupply FNLA forces already deployed. As well as providing a 
haven for its leadership, redirecting the US covert operation and 
providing diplomatic backing for the FNLA, Zaire also intervened 
militarily in the Angolan civil war to aid Roberto's movement in 
its conflict with the MPLA. Reports of Zairean troops alongside 
FNLA forces112 begin to emerge even before the total collapse of
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the Alvor accords. According to an Observer report, 1,200 Zairean 
army soldiers were operating inside Angola as of mid-May.113 Mar­
cum claims that this deployment was in reaction to the recruitment 
by the MPLA of the anti-Kinshasa Katangese gendarmes, an action 
which had "...incensed President Mobutu..."114 The presence of 
Zairean troops on the side of the FNLA served to further rein­
force the impression that this movement was a threat to the MPLA 
and its power base in the cities. The FNLA's opportunity lay in 
its fighting capacity. According to Heimer:
"...the FNLA...was convinced that its military strength would 
in the end permit it to grab the whole cake."115
The deployment of Zairean troops represented an escalation in the 
conflict and hastened the process of disintegration that was 
taking place in the fragile structure for decolonization estab­
lished at Alvor.
Despite claims to the contrary and well-intentioned at­
tempts to patch up the tripartite accord, such as the Nakuru 
agreement,116 it was more than clear to most that a full-scale
 ___  m
111. C K Ebinger, op.cit., p.674.
112. One source states that in April, the FNLA forces numbered 
between 15,000 and 20,000 elements. Africa Confidential [11 
April 1975], p.1.
113. C Legum in Observer (London) 18 May 1975. Reproduced in 
Facts and Reports [Vol.5, No.11, 31 May 1975], p.1.
114. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.259.
115. F W Heimer, The Decolonization Conflict in Angola: 1974—
1976, [1979], p.65.
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civil war was being prepared for in Angola. According to Roberto, 
on 29 July: ‘'We have signed a number of agreements, all of which 
have been violated by MPLA. Now we will no longer be tricked. Now 
we will go forward." In a similarly defiant tone, Nito Alves, of 
the MPLA, declared on 27 July: "We are 100 percent enemies and can 
never come to any agreement. Our fight must go on until FNLA is 
defeated as the American imperialists were in Vietnam."117
The steady process of confrontation had resulted in the 
creation of virtual spheres of influence for each of the move­
ments. Thus, the FNLA controlled the north while the MPLA tended 
to hold sway in the capital and in the ports along the coast. 
Heavy fighting broke out on 9 July and within a week, after a 
well-executed and resourced offensive, the MPLA had expelled the 
FNLA from Luanda and established its control in other towns. The 
MPLA now controlled the capital of Angola. As the government col­
lapsed, the transitional process agreed at Alvor had all but been 
discarded at a time when Portugal still maintained nominal 
sovereignty.
116. Neto, Savimbi and Roberto met at Nakuru, Kenya, from 16 to 
21 June 1975, chaired by Kenyatta. There they signed the Nakuru 
agreement (without the Portuguese) which reaffirmed the terms of 
the Alvor accords with regard to the transitional government and 
the holding of elections. One of the clauses referred to the 
disbanding of the Katangese gendarmes, which were, by this time, 
fighting for the MPLA. Two days after the signature, there was 
more shooting between the FNLA and the MPLA in Luanda. On 9 
July, major fighting broke out once again. For details of the 
Nakuru agreement see reproduction of text in Africa Contemporary 
Record 1975-1976, p.C80.
117. Both quotations in T Hodges, op.cit., p.53.
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Also at this time, the exodus of the European population 
had escalated considerably. The abandonment of Angola by the ex­
colonial society en masse served to contribute to the climate of 
violence and instability, and to emphasise the disintegration of 
authority.118 According to the Angolan Minister of Social Com­
munication, speaking at a press conference in mid-June, about
200,000 Angolan residents were awaiting repatriation.119
Fighting continued throughout July and it was the MPLA 
that seemed to have the upper hand. As a result of its July offen­
sive, the MPLA controlled 11 out of the 15 provincial capitals. 
Furthermore, earlier in June, the MPLA had managed to establish 
its influence in the important enclave of Cabinda. Clearly, the 
delivery of Soviet weapons and the Cuban training had been benefi­
cial to the MPLA.
Hitherto adept at side-stepping the confrontation be­
tween the MPLA and the FNLA, UNITA could not, however, avoid the
fighting after the breakdown of the Nakuru agreement. In what had
been a last-ditch push in favour of a political solution, Savimbi 
had apparently worked tirelessly for the Nakuru meeting.120 With 
far less military capabilities than the other two movements, UNITA 
had a much better chance of participating in a post-independence
118. Reports of the sabotage, looting and transfer to Portugal 
of capital goods abounded, and underlied the bitter tension be­
tween the communities.
119. Diario de Noticias (Lisbon) 13 June 1975.
120. T Hodges, op.cit., pp.51-52.
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government if elections were carried out:
"The possible outcome of elections held in 1975 was thus 
almost exclusively a function of the relative demographic 
weight of the different population segments. The FNLA, count­
ing mainly on the Bakongo and on part of the whites, would 
certainly not have obtained more than 20% of the votes, and 
probably substantially less. The MPLA, having the support of 
the Akwambundu, and of the majority of the urbanized non­
whites as well of the eastern tributary societies, might have
got 35 to 40%. The sheer number of the Ovimbundu, plus part
of the whites, of the southern/south-eastern tributary
societies, and of the Cabindans, would have guaranteed UNITA
a relative majority of 40 to 45%.1,121
But an alleged massacre of about 50 UNITA recruits by the MPLA in 
early June, soured UNITA's mediatory stance. According to one 
source, this attack was an attempt to force Savimbi's hand by the 
more radical elements in the MPLA,122 following attempts in mid- 
June between the leaderships of the MPLA and UNITA to establish a
union of sorts.123 As the war between the MPLA and the FNLA esca­
lated, UNITA was caught in the fighting. As one source puts it,
UNITA officially entered the fray on 4 August, after Savimbi had
met with Kaunda in Lusaka.124
The breakdown of the transitional government has been 
attributed most often to the Soviet arms-backed MPLA push to stamp 
its sole authority on the upcoming transfer of sovereignty.
121. F W Heimer, op.cit., [1979], p.64.
122. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.260.
123. Reports in Provincia de Angola 15 and 17 June 1975. Cited 
in Facts and Reports [Vol. 5, Nos.13/14, 12 July 1975], p.28.
124. F Bridgland, op.cit., p.127.
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There is little doubt that the MPLA had achieved significant suc­
cesses by the summer, and that this was the result of a qualita­
tive and quantitive improvement in its military power thanks to 
Soviet aid, and an extension of its political organization in the 
major urban areas. But whether this situation was the result of a 
conscious decision to grab power or, alternatively, a consequence 
of the dynamic escalation of political irreconciliability between 
the MPLA and the FNLA, is difficult to say.
While unable to deny the fact that the FNLA's aggression 
in the spring had contributed to the escalation of the conflict, 
Valenta, however, points to the elections that had been set by the 
Alvor agreements and confirmed in the Nakuru meeting, as the major 
stimulus for the MPLA's July offensive. In April, senior MPLA 
leaders had not concealed their opposition to elections and argued 
for the creation of a "socialist council of state11.125 On 22 
April, Neto had predicted that the elections "...may be 
cancelled.11126 The transitional government itself had been an ob­
ject of criticism from the more radical groups in the MPLA. Ac­
cording to a press report, the MPLA Popular Committees (Comites 
Populares) in Luanda held an anti-government demonstration in 
early March.127 Taking into account the above predictions as to 
the relative electoral strengths of the movements, it is not un-
125. J Valenta, op.cit., p.12.
126. 0 Seculo (Lisbon) 23 April 1975.
127. L'Opinion (Morocco) 10 March 1975 in Facts and Reports 
[Vol. 5, No.7, 5 April 1975], p.1.
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reasonable to consider that part of the intention behind driving 
the FNLA and UNITA out of Luanda in the summer was to destabilize 
the transitional government and, therefore, avoid elections. These 
the MPLA may have feared would not have provided it with suffi­
cient or, more likely, the total power that it had concluded the 
movement could obtain by other means.
Valenta's analysis also concludes that it is likely that
by the summer, once it was in virtual control of Luanda, the MPLA
had communicated its intentions to Moscow, Havana and Brazzaville, 
and obtained a contingency plan to shore up its hold if
necessary.128 These conclusions that point to the conscious im­
plementation of a bid for power by the MPLA are supported by Van 
Dunem who was active in the capital.129 According to him, the mood 
in Luanda was defiant and the MPLA was determined not to share 
power. After the MPLA had signed the Nakuru agreement on 21 June, 
Jose Van Dunem, the Political Commissar of the FAPLA command, told 
his brother while returning from Kenya that to the MPLA leadership 
the agreement had been purely tactical.130 There was no intention 
of keeping to the transitional process.
The military strengths of the three movements in the 
summer are difficult to assess due to the lack of reliable es­
timates. According to an April report in a Portuguese daily, UNITA
128. J Valenta, op.cit., p.13.
129. Interview with Joao Van Dunem, London, 22 August 1991.
130. Interview with Joao Van Dunem, London, 22 August 1991.
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had 40,000 troops at its disposal.131 Since only a month or two 
before this UNITA's forces had been quoted as being no more than a 
thousand-strong, this figure is almost certainly an exaggeration. 
In the north of the country, a later report places the FNLA's 
strength at around 17 , 0 0 0,132 reinforced by 1,200 to 1,300 Zairean 
army regulars.133 Estimates of the MPLA's strength are few and far 
between. One observer has placed its guerrilla strength in the 
spring at 6 , 000,134 but this is almost certainly underestimated.
At this stage, the FNLA was being supplied by Zaire, 
China and, covertly, the United States. In July, the Forty Com­
mittee had agreed a further sum of aid, US$ 60 million for the 
FNLA. Now aware of UNITA1s potential, Washington also began to 
fund Savimbi's movement that was backed by Zambia. The MPLA was 
receiving weapons from the Soviet Union and training from Cuba. 
The arms caches of all three movements were further increased when 
a Portuguese para-military organization, the OPVDCA,135 was dis­
banded by the High Commissioner in April. According to Diogenes 
Boavida, of the MPLA and Minister of Justice in the transitional 
government, the well-stocked arsenal of this organization, of over
131. Diario de Noticias (Lisbon) 23 April 1975.
132. Diario de Noticias (London) 15 July 1975 cited in T Hodges, 
op.cit., p.52.
133. J Marcum, op.cit., p.269.
134. T Hodges, op.cit., p.50.
135. The Provincial Organization of Volunteers for the Civil 
Defence of Angola.
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40,000 weapons, was plundered by members of the three 
movements.136
The lines were now drawn and the war was open. According 
to the FNLA "only an all-out war will once and for all finish the 
continual attacks by the MPLA..."137 In control of Luanda and the
major towns, the MPLA seemed to be in the most favourable
position; and its heavily reinforced military power was success­
fully matching the FNLA's forces in the north of the country. Ac­
cording to Kissinger’s testimony, it was at this stage that Zaire 
and Zambia138 approached Washington requesting US aid for the FNLA 
and UNITA in their joint effort to defeat the MPLA and challenge 
the Soviet bid for influence in the region.139 According to 
Nathaniel Davis, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Af­
fairs, it was on or about 17 July that the US administration took 
the decision in favour of a sustained covert military 
intervention.140 The successes of the MPLA had escalated the con­
flict to a new level where periodic clashes were no longer effec­
tive. All that remained was an all out war between armies. At the
136. Interview in Expresso (Lisbon) 3 May 1975.
137. 0 Seculo (Lisbon) 9 June 1975.
138. The Kaunda regime's intervention in the Angolan conflict in
this way stems from the importance of the Angolan Atlantic ports 
in the export of Zambian copper. The MPLA's control of Lobito, 
and therefore, the terminal of the Benguela railway put Zambia 
under pressure.
139. C K Ebinger, op.cit., p.689.
140. N Davis, 'The Angola Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir' 
(1978), p.121,
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end of the summer, the FNLA and UNITA were faced with the task of 
dislodging the MPLA from the positions it held in the towns, and 
particularly, in Luanda. Taking the capital became the principle 
military objective. The joint FNLA-UNITA offensive was, however, 
not launched until mid-October, by which time a new international 
actor, South Africa, had entered the Angolan conflict, while 
another, Portugal, with little authority remaining, had withdrawn 
its troops far ahead of the timetable established at Alvor.
After the MPLA had consolidated its positions in the 
summer, the FNLA had attempted to march on Luanda but had been 
stopped by MPLA forces at Quifangondo, no more than 15 miles from 
the capital. And yet, in the following months, it could not get 
closer to Luanda than this point, as the movements' respective
forces held each other down.141 The period between the end of July 
to September was characterized by a relative lull in the fighting 
with no substantial change in the overall balance, which was 
tilted in favour of the MPLA.
The intervention of South Africa marked a further phase 
in the civil war. Pretoria had already demonstrated its preoccupa­
tion with the Angolan conflict, and its willingness to deploy
military forces inside that country: in August the South African 
Defence Force (SADF) moved to positions around the Cunene River 
hydroelectric project which South Africa had co-financed with the
Portuguese. According to the South African government, the SADF
141. T Hodges, op.cit., p.55.
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forces were deployed to protect those installations, but by early 
September they were moving further into Angolan territory. It is 
clear that both UNITA and the FNLA had established contact with 
Pretoria and that South Africa began to provide the badly-armed 
UNITA with a source of weapons and by late August had set up 
training camps for both movements.142 What is not clear, however, 
is when a co-ordinated strategy to challenge the MPLA was agreed 
upon by the disparate parts of the anti-MPLA alliance.
After the spring of 1975, UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi 
had been making pronouncements on the positivity of co-operation 
with South Africa and on the 'responsible' nature of Vorster's 
leadership.143 Militarily the weakest of the three movements, 
UNITA had been searching for a source of armaments as it became 
clear that force was going to be used to solve political dif­
ferences in Angola. Savimbi's alliance with South Africa, un­
doubtedly a tactical one, was, however, against the grain of con­
tinental politics. Certainly a number of African leaders that had 
favoured Savimbi could not continue to support UNITA once it had 
been revealed that the South African army was fighting alongside 
their forces. Despite this political fall-out, the South African 
intervention tipped the military balance in favour of the anti- 
MPLA forces. In early October, South Africans were already in ac­
tion alongside UNITA in fighting against the MPLA in Huambo (ex-
142. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, p.269.
143. 'Vorster is Hailed by Savimbi' in Star Weekly 
(Johannesburg) 3 May 1975.
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Nova Lisboa), an important town on the Benguela railway.
The main South African intervention began on 14 
October.144 An armoured column (code-named Zulu) made of up Bush­
men, ex-Portuguese army officers and a 1,000-strong force ceded by 
Chipenda, under South African command crossed into Angola from 
Namibia. The column engaged the MPLA at Pereira de Eca and moved 
north and was joined on 23 October by South African units and a 
Portuguese right-wing force (ELP)145 numbering a few hundred. 
Well-supplied by air, and accompanied by helicoptor gunships, the 
South African column, made up of 1,500-2,000 regular SADF troops, 
moved north and soon reached Novo Redondo, on the coast about 200 
miles south of Luanda. The Zulu column had covered 500 miles by 
mid-November. Reinforced by US covert supplies, the FNLA and UNITA 
moved against the MPLA from the north and south. By November, the 
MPLA had lost all its summer gains and was practically reduced to 
its positions in Luanda and along a corridor of territory that cut 
across central Angola. At this stage, the anti-MPLA alliance 
seemed to have regained the advantage. The strength of the South 
African column seemed to augur badly for the MPLA, some of the 
leadership of which considered abandoning Luanda. According to Van 
Dunem, however, a certain defiant courage was the order of the day
144. Details of the South African military operation in J Mar­
cum, op.cit., Volume Two, p.269.
145. The Popular Liberation Army (Exercito de Libertagao 
Popular) was made up of ex-Portuguese army, ex-PIDE and other 
dissatisfied whites. Another ELP unit was said to be fighting 
the MPLA with the FNLA in the north. F W Heimer, op.cit., 
pp.70,75,77
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in the besieged capital.146 .
The approaching day of independence, marked yet another 
turn in the course of the civil war. As the last Portuguese High 
Commissioner, Leonel Cardoso,147 transferred the sovereignty of 
Angola to all its people and put centuries of Portuguese authority 
to an official end, the civil war was raging on the battlefield. 
What this event did, however, in conjunction with the anti-MPLA 
coalition's declared objective of taking Luanda, was to provide 
the MPLA with an opportunity to interpret the civil war as the 
defence of the newly-independent state from an interventionary 
force payrolled by Washington. It is not even important that the 
intervention of Cuban troops certainly occurred before 11 Novem­
ber, or, for that matter, that civil war had been raging since the 
first half of that year. From then on, for the MPLA, the conflict 
was framed in terms of the defence of Angolan independence. Thus, 
the People's Republic of Angola was declared on 11 November, and a 
government was formed, one that was recognised by a number of com­
munist countries, as well as by authoritarian Brazil, in itself a 
diplomatic coup. The subsequent deployment of several thousand 
Cuban troops was always justified in this post-independence con­
text. It was justified as an act designed to support a recognized 
government.
The Cuban intervention, along with the massive flow of
146. Interview with Joao Van Dunem, London, 23 August 1991.
147. Silva Cardoso had been replaced in August.
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Soviet weaponry had an overwhelming military impact on the civil 
war. According to South African claims, their forces did not take 
Luanda from the south because Washington "...had pleaded" against 
such a move.148 Presumably, it was preferred that an Angolan 
force, that of the FNLA in the north, be the first to arrive in 
the capital. The problem was that the FNLA was unable to achieve 
this. Already stalemated outside Luanda for weeks, the FNLA army 
did not improve its position when well-supplied MPLA forces moved 
against them. But as the date of independence approached, an im­
patient Roberto wanted his movement installed in the capital. Ap­
parently disregarding his American, South African and Portuguese
military advisors, Roberto ordered a single column of troops down
the road to Luanda.149 This was a fatal mistake. The column disen- 
tegrated under fire, especially from Cuban-operated mobile 122mm 
rocket launchers (known as 'Stalin's organs'), that screeched and 
terrified the approaching FNLA troops. With the newly-arrived 
Cuban expeditionary force, the heavily-armed MPLA150 managed to 
push the FNLA forces back until, completely demoralized, they fled 
with the Zairean troops just ahead of them. By January, the 
military threat to the MPLA from the north was negligible.
148. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, footnote 261, p.274.
149. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, p.274.
150. "By mid-January 1976, the MPLA was reported to be supported 
by 9,000 Cuban troops, 6,500 Katangese gendarmes and 400 Russian 
advisors. The movement had large numbers of 'Stalin's Organs',
68 PT-76 light amphibious tanks, 10 T-54 tanks, 20 T-34 tanks,
12 MiG-21 jets and 3 FIAT 91 jets." Africa Contemporary Record 
[1975-1976], p.B432.
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The defeat of the FNLA marked the military turning-point 
of the civil war. If the central objective of the anti-MPLA opera­
tion had been for the FNLA to take Luanda by or around the date of 
independence, when this was not achieved the remaining parts of 
the coalition were left high and dry. Certainly the political al­
liance between the FNLA and UNITA led to nothing, as can be seen 
by the failure of the rival proclamation of independence.151 With 
the defeat of the FNLA in the north, the Cuban-backed MPLA turned 
south against Chipenda's forces and UNITA. Apart from a few skir­
mishes of which there is little information, there was no major 
confrontation with the South African forces in 1976. Despite 
Savimbi1s requests, on 4 February, Pretoria announced, after nego­
tiations with the MPLA, that the SADF forces had withdrawn to 
within fifty miles of the Namibian border.152 Practically alone 
against the MPLA-Cuban forces, UNITA was routed.
Two external developments of significance also in­
fluenced the course of the civil war. The first was the effects of 
the public disclosure of the US covert operation in Angola. In the 
US, this occurred only on 14 December 1975 when the operation was 
advanced as the cause of Nathaniel Davis' resignation.153 Sub-
151. The Democratic People's Republic of Angola was declared 
with: two capitals, Ambriz in the north and Huambo in the south; 
a rotating premiership and unintegrated armies. It was never 
recognized and rapidly collapsed.
152. African Contemporary Record [1975-1976], p.B432.
153. N Davis, op.cit., p.119. Earlier reports, on 25 September 
and 3 and 4 November, of the US covert operation in Angola ap­
parently provoked none or little public reaction in the US.
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sequently, the US Congress did turn its attention to covert fund­
ing of the CIA Angola programme. On 19 December, the Senate passed 
the Tunney Amendment prohibiting all further funding of the anti- 
MPLA forces in Angola. From this point on the balance of forces 
changed significantly. It left the FNLA and UNITA without their 
principal financier and arms supplier. Furthermore, this anti-MPLA 
coalition was left in the lurch allied to South Africa, un­
doubtedly a political liability but even more so once the US had 
withdrawn from the conflict. On the other hand, the Congressional 
rein on the US administration boosted the confidence of the MPLA, 
and its backers in Moscow and Havana, solidifying their resolve in 
the use of Cuban troops to ensure an MPLA victory.
The second development of significance, which effec­
tively came to mark the end of the Angolan civil war, was the 
recognition of the MPLA government by the OAU. Singularly ineffec­
tive under Idi Amin's chairmanship, the OAU's emergency summit be­
tween 10 and 13 January, showed the continent to be split down the 
middle as to which of the sides in the Angolan civil war they 
would recognise. A crucial development was Nigeria's recognition 
of the MPLA in late November, allegedly as a result of South 
Africa's intervention. Followed by a number of other African 
states, this important show of support eventually led to the 
breaking of the deadlock on 2 February 1976. On 10 February, the 
People's Republic of Angola was recognized by the OAU. Wholesale 
recognition followed and, apart from a stubborn US administration, 
the sovereignty of the MPLA's government and state was globally
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accepted.
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CHAPTER TWO
PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM IN ANGOLA
(i) Colonial Policy and the Portuguese New State
To begin a look at Portuguese colonialism in Angola it 
is essential to establish the importance of Angola as a colony 
to the Portuguese state, in both economic and political terms. 
Taking the latter first, this study will address the link be­
tween colonialism and the Salazarist regime, known as the New 
State, in power between 1928 and 1974. Colonial policy under 
Salazar and his successor, Marcello Caetano, consisted of, in 
its most basic characterization, maintaining the integrity of 
Portugal's overseas possessions, while all around them others 
were losing their own. This apparently anachronistic stance was, 
however, determined by the importance that Angola, in par­
ticular, and the Portuguese empire, in general, played in sup­
porting the authoritarian regime established by Salazar. Whereas 
other colonial powers were able to withdraw from their dominions 
without generally suffering major internal costs,1 the 
Salazarist regime could not have decolonized and survived as 
the power in Portugal, as a result of this political and 
economic dependence on the colonies. For this regime then, basic
1. One exception is, of course, France and the independence of 
Algeria.
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colonial policy was thus always the defence of colonial 
authority, if necessary to the very end, as the "loss" of the 
colonies would have signified the end of the New State.
Since the much lamented "loss" of Brazil to indepen­
dence in 1822, Angola had replaced the South American giant at 
the centre of affections of the idealists of Portuguese gran­
deur. This very large, underpopulated territory in south-west 
Africa held the aspirations of those that still believed in the 
possibility of a return to past greatness that had, since the 
seventeenth century, become more and more elusive for Portugal. 
The wealth and potential of Brazil had been lost, but was, by 
the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, being sought after 
in Angola.
Actual pursuit of a development of wealth in Angola 
during the nineteenth century was, however, a poor reflection of 
the achievements claimed by successive metropolitan regimes 
anxious to impress their more powerful European neighbours. 
These attempts to hide a somewhat mismatched share of African 
territory, notoriously mal-administrated, were not simply a 
product of grandiose empire-fantasy ideology, but were an 
intrinsic part of an astute diplomacy intent on defending 
Portugal's already diminished role in a world of rapacious 
politics, if not actually fighting to preserve its very indepen­
dence in Europe. The complex turn-of-the-century arena of al­
liances often threatened to dismember the Portuguese territories 
in Africa and distribute the parts between the major powers.
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Despite singularly humiliating incidents,2 this diplomacy was 
largely successful.3 By acting as a buffer between Britain, 
France and Germany, Portugal managed to maintain Angola and 
other overseas territories into the twentieth century.
When the Berlin conference of 1884-1885 sought to 
determine the European spheres of influence in Africa, it also 
set down the new rules of imperialism. No longer was colonial 
rule to be defined by historical rights. The "General Act" of 
the conference, that claimed to define a "new colonial public 
law,"4 determined that only effective occupation would con­
stitute effective colonial sovereignty. This "Act" was un­
favourable to the small and poor colonizers such as the Por­
tuguese and placed Lisbon under pressure to extend their 
hitherto largely coastal administration of colonies to the hin-
2. The British issued Portugal with an ultimatum in January 1890 
which forced Lisbon to desist from its dreams of establishing a 
trans-African empire, linking Angola to Mozambique, one that 
would have conflicted with Rhodes' own dream of "British 
dominion from the Cape to Cairo".
3. This was usually due to a deft ability to play the major 
European powers off each other. For example, Portugal managed to 
fight off Bismark's claims to its territories by enlisting 
French support, the latter being interested in containing German 
expansion. Similarly, the British could be counted on in dis­
putes with either the French or the Germans. By appealing to 
British interests Lisbon managed to ward off Boer designs on the 
Lourengo Marques (now Maputo) port. This small-state diplomacy 
was no easy task for the nineteenth century Portuguese govern­
ments, that faced, at all times, the threat of financial col­
lapse, which would have delivered the colonies to the great 
powers on a platter.
4. A H de Oliveira Marques, History of Portugal Volume II: From 
Empire to Corporate State [1972], p.111.
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terland in order to establish effective occupation, or else risk 
losing the colonies. Despite not having the funds or the man­
power to achieve this objective, the government in Lisbon or­
ganized a number of expeditions between 1885 and 1890,5 in a 
vain attempt to "pacify" the colonies and meet the conditions 
set by the "imperial club".
Colonial "pacification" (the enforcement of colonial 
control, both military and financial, through the establishment 
of an administrative unit) had not been a characteristic of Por­
tuguese colonial policy until this time. The greater part of 
Portuguese intercourse with the territories it controlled had 
been dominated by trade. In Angola, this was carried out by the 
various traders based in the coastal ports of Luanda and Ben- 
guela, who would trade with the interior African kingdoms, 
through intermediaries. After the Berlin conference, the com­
mercial nature of Portuguese contact in Africa, once informal, 
became increasingly inserted into a framework of colonial con­
trol and administration. Despite centuries of its presence in 
Africa, Portugal only began to establish a colonial state 
towards the end of the nineteenth century as a result of pres­
sure from the Great Powers that threatened to push the Por­
tuguese out of Africa.
In Portugal, the pressure to colonize, that is to es­
tablish full control of the overseas territories and establish a
5. A H de Oliveira Marques, ibid.
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colonial state, then became part of political discourse. Even 
before the fall of the monarchy in 1910, reformers were already 
campaigning for the development of autonomous colonies, with a 
large degree of administrative and financial independence from 
the metropole.6 To achieve this stage, however, it was believed 
that the military conquest of the colonies was required, a task 
of such expense that would involve dispatching large military 
forces to Africa. The monarchy, already on very shaky ground, 
could not afford this, either financially or politically.
With the advent of the Portuguese Republic in October 
1910, this reform agenda was expanded and taken on by the new 
Republican governments. In keeping with the modernist and en­
lightened ideology of the new republic, the rational exploita­
tion of colonialism was called for, so that the potential of the 
colonies could be developed for Portugal's benefit. This 
Republican model of colonialism, somewhat inspired by the im­
perialism of the Great Powers, involved the conquest, or 
pacification of the territory, its taxation, the cultivation of 
viable produce, the practice of enforced labour and the im­
plementation of a statute of the status of the colonial popula­
tion distinguishing the civilized from the natives.7 For the
6. Reformers such as Mouzinho de Albuquerque and Antonio Enes 
emphasised that colonial policy should focus on decentraliza­
tion, development and autonomy, see M Newitt, Portugal in 
Africa: The Last Hundred Years [1981], p.177.
7. see G Clarence-Smith, The Third Portuguese Empire 1825-1975:
Study in Economic Imperialism [1985], p.12.
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Republicans, the colonies, in as much as they were, like Por­
tugal, potential targets for the application of a theory of a 
rational society,8 were as important to their idea of Portuguese 
nation as they subsequently became under Salazar.
Colonial policy under the Republic, during the period 
between 1910 and 1925, can be described as having been over- 
ambitious if not even utopian. Much of the grand legislature 
that was aimed to develop the overseas Portuguese empire 
remained on paper. Difficulties in stabilizing the metropolitan 
economic and political environment were as, if not more, respon­
sible than Republican rationality for the resulting decentral­
ized rule in the colonies. Increasingly acute budget crises and 
political instability crippled governments in Lisbon, and 
colonial administrations were given wide powers to administrate 
their territories almost independently.
In Angola, the Norton de Matos era9 characterized the 
high level of authority that was then increasingly installed in 
each colony. As the highest authority in the territory he could 
rule by decree and even solicit international loans indepen­
dently of Lisbon. Norton de Matos carried out frantic develop­
ment projects based on deficit financing. These projects in­
cluded transport networks which sought to attract the settler
8. The Republican view of the colonies was influenced by the ap­
plied enlightened rationality of the secular regime, in essence, 
no more than a modernist variation on the "civilizing mission".
9. 1921-1923 as High-Commissioner, and earlier, 1912-1915, as 
Governor.
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society, which the Republic (and all Portuguese regimes) dreamed 
would thickly populate the overseas empire. Although the 
colonies were, during this time, thrown open to foreign invest­
ment, the Portuguese Republic was considered a risk liability in 
an unsympathetic Europe and there was not much incoming invest­
ment capital. Levels of colonial trade actually fell during the 
Republic although this can be attributed to the crackdown on 
slavery and the profitable alcohol trade, and by the stagnant 
pace of economic development in Portugal itself.10
But despite metropolitan instability and meagre 
economic development, Republican policy and Norton de Matos' 
proto-Keynesianism did establish the basic pillars on which the 
Angolan economy later emerged: a significant road and railway 
network, the encouragement of cash crop production and the con­
tracting of labour (wage-earning). The minor, but nevertheless 
increased, levels of capital investment helped to attract higher 
numbers of metropolitan immigrants.
The Republican regime was short-lived. The financial 
chaos in Portugal crippled government after government, and con­
servative forces had been long in waiting for the opportunity 
to strike back at the Republicans. In a climate of political 
instability,11 bombings, strikes, high inflation, corruption,
10. G Clarence-Smith, op.cit., p.116 and p.120.
11. Between 1920 and 1928 there were 29 inaugurated heads of 
government, 15 of which were in the twelve-month period of 1920- 
21. see A H de Oliveira Marques, Historia de Portugal, Vol. Ill: 
Das Revolugoes Liberais aos Nossos Dias [1981], p.611-12.
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the Republic was an easy prey for the concerted revenge of the 
dispossessed Catholic church, of landowners fearing the reform 
of the feudal system they relied upon, of monarchists, and of 
industrialists fearing the radicalization of the working 
classes. The constant disruptive activity of anarcho-nihilists 
helped to send the worried urban middle classes (hitherto the 
backbone of the Republican experiment) and the frustrated 
military into the waiting arms of the right. A coup destroyed 
the Republic on 28 May 1926.
In the throes of a financial crisis, the new regime of 
General Oscar Carmona invited a popular right-wing academic, 
Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, to solve the mounting problem of 
the budget deficits that Portugal and its colonies were in the 
grip of. Lisbon feared that its bankruptcy would lead to, among 
other things, the loss of the colonies.12 Balancing the books 
was a priority for the new regime and it handed Salazar, the new 
finance minister, the absolute powers he demanded as a condition 
for "saving" Portugal. Once he had obtained absolute veto over 
the budgets of every single government department, Salazar 
implemented his long standing doctrine of balancing the budget, 
and clearing the deficit. This policy was also applied to the
12. The government had investigated the possibility of securing 
a loan from the League of Nations. The conditions demanded by
the League were that Portugal be submitted to international 
financial controls, which implied that Portuguese Africa might 
be transferred to international political control, see David M 
Abshire, "From the Scramble for Africa to the 'New State1",- 
[1969], p.85.
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colonies including Angola, where the colonial government had 
began to build up chronic deficits.13 His immediate success (the 
1928-1929 domestic budget showed a surplus, the first for 15 
years),14 gave Salazar wide support, and allowed him to extend 
his claim to intervene in other aspects of government other than 
finances.
This was the beginning of Salazar's process of regime- 
building, using the military coup of 1926 as a basis, that cul­
minated in what was known as the New State. While the regime was 
supported by a number of right-wing factions, monarchist groups 
and the church, only the latter was given any significant amount 
of its demands. Salazar managed to allay, and not meet, the 
demands for either the restoration of the monarchy or for a more 
dynamic commitment to fascism. Only the church saw its role in 
society restored as the spiritual partner of the regime in the 
other world. This may have been partly the result of Salazar's 
own devout faith, which undoubtedly accounted for much of his 
popularity in the country. The church had been the only effec­
tively organized political opposition to the Republicans and 
Salazar owed his own rise to power to his political prominence 
within this circle. When the army moved in to wrench power from 
the Republicans, the choice of Salazar resulted as much from his
13. By 1931, Angola's accumulated debts amounted to ESC$ 
300,000,000, the servicing of which consumed half of the 
colonies' income, see M Newitt, op.cit., p.178.
14. see A H Oliveira Marques, op.cit., [1981], p.371.
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powerful position as a political actor for the church as from 
his academic prowess. But he never returned the bishops to 
political power, giving them instead absolute sovereignty of 
cultural life.
Despite never having visited any of the Portuguese 
colonies, Salazar gave paramount importance to the notion of em­
pire in the political constitution of the New State. In this no­
tion, the proclamation of the indivisibility of the Portuguese 
'nation' contrasted sharply with the constitutional detachment 
of Britain from its own colonial empire. This link between the 
empire and Salazar's own domestic political power was cast at 
the level of historical myth-making. It was weaved in to the 
very origins of Portuguese independence, characterized heroi­
cally by the maritime discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries. This adventurous and worldly image of Portugal was 
paradoxically espoused by the New State, contrasting with its 
somewhat isolationist, nationalist economic and foreign 
policies. In political discourse, the Portuguese colonies were 
an integral part of the nation, and tied to the very structure 
of Salazar's regime.
The principal pillars of Salazar's power were the 
bureaucracy, which was mostly created to fill all the institu­
tions of state, and the armed forces, which had established the 
conditions that brought him to power in the first place. The 
security of these two groups guaranteed, and were themselves 
guaranteed by, the functioning of the New State. Salazar's
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authoritarian regime was based on taking over each and every in­
stitution. By establishing each public institution as a govern­
ment department populated by a loyal bureaucracy which imposed 
mounds of paperwork on the Portuguese and the colonies, Salazar 
did more to suffocate resistance than by just using outright 
force. Undoubtedly, part of the security of the regime lay in 
the repression of individuals on the mainland as well as in the 
colonies by the use of the political police PIDE (later DGS).15 
But the successful control of all information, a steady flow of 
propaganda and the 'statification1 of any institution in the 
public domain, even in the economic sphere did as much, if not 
more, in perpetuating the survival of the regime for nearly 50 
years.
The structure of the New State regime has been 
described as an organic socio-political state that directly 
implemented Salazar's economic directives. Salazar was careful, 
however, never to challenge the security of the industrial and 
financial families that had dominated these sectors. Associa­
tions for employers (Gremios) and syndicates for workers were 
created for most sectors of private and public enterprise, and 
agricultural production, the resulting effect being the imposi­
tion of a centralized order. The institutionalization of all 
sectors of society in this manner, under the direct control of
15. International and Defence of the State Police (Policia In- 
ternacional e de Defesa de Estado) and Security Directorate 
(Direc^ao-Geral de Seguran^a).
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the government via the bureaucracy, ensured authority and 
stability. This control was complemented by economic interven­
tion according to a central logic by the imposition of price 
controls and production quotas on private enterprise, and by na­
tionalized control wherever necessary, which completed the prac­
tically full command of the economy by the New State.
In large sectors of industry, shipping and banking, a 
few corporations had acquired what amounted to monopoly control. 
These were the domain of the social and political strata of 
Salazar's immediate support. The economic power of the country 
was centralized in the hands of a small number of families that 
had dominated each particular economic sector. During the 
depression, a large amount of bankruptcies resulted in the fur­
ther concentration of capital in an even smaller number of 
hands, which further reinforced the old system of oligopolistic 
control of the economy under the monarchy. This control in the 
metropole, more often than not, resulted in the primacy of these 
family-controlled financial and industrial groups in the 
colonies as well. This economic control was further complemented 
by the occupation of the top political and state jobs by members 
of these extended families. In this way, Salazar not so much as 
established a new state as institutionalized an oligopolistic 
society that had its roots in the nineteenth century. The New 
State perpetuated the traditional political and economic order 
that had been developed previously and was temporarily 
threatened by the jacobite interruption of the Republic.16 In
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these terms, the only originality (and perhaps the reason for 
its durability) of Salazar's New State was in the systematic 
process of institutionalizing these social relationships.
Despite the creation of a one-party political environ­
ment, the National Union (Uniao Nacional), and the activity of 
a crypto-paramilitary organization, the Portuguese Legion 
(Legiao Portuguesa), and even a youth movement, the Portuguese 
Youth (Mocidade Portuguesa), there was little else in the way of 
creating a fascist movement by the New State. The mythology of 
nation was promoted, especially through the concept of empire 
(as Mussolini had sought to invoke the Roman empire), but the 
order over which Salazar presided was fundamentally a conserva­
tive one, both politically and socially. The catholic and 
nationalist bases of the regime's ideology were not compatible 
with any new-fangled ideas of social-Darwinism that may have 
been promulgated by other dictatorships in Europe at the time. 
If anything, Salazar was trying to ride what he saw was the wave 
of authoritarian change that was spreading throughout Europe in
16. It is interesting to take this opportunity to dispel any 
conceptions of the Republican period as being an attempt to es­
tablish democracy. It was also a period of one-party rule: the 
Portuguese Republican Party, and later, the Democratic Party, 
also represented an option for the armed forces. The Republicans 
systematically enforced their revolution quashing any organized 
opposition, including socialists and syndicalists, unleashing a 
period of arbitrary state terror. See Vasco Pulido Valente, 0 
Poder e o Povo: A RevoluQao de 1910, [1974]. Only when, in the
wake of the collapse of the monarchic opposition in 1919, the 
conservative groups had found their organization and political 
destiny in the church did the army find a more suitable, that is 
more stable, framework for a new order.
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the interwar period, putting paid to what he considered to be 
the dangerous ideas of liberalism, a precursor to socialism be­
cause it would be unable to defend itself from communism. 
Salazar believed, however, that fascism was too progressive and 
too atheistic.17 Salazar's political discourse harked back to a 
pre-industrial revolution era in both social as well as economic 
terms. For the regime, the paternalist ideology of god and na­
tion sought to hold the mass of the populace to the semi-feudal 
economic order that Salazar had institutionalized. The colonies 
and the images of empire played a central role in this political 
ideology of the New State.
Salazar's priority with regard to the colonial ter­
ritories was to reaffirm Portugal's ability to run an empire. He 
apparently held a mistrust of Great Power intentions; a 
mistrust that may have helped to propel his overwhelmingly 
nationalistic development policies for both Portugal and the 
colonies. According to Salazar's early policies, all colonial 
territories were to be principally developed by Portuguese capi­
tal. Tight exchange controls were placed on trading, a practice 
that was similar to the mercantilism of the monarchy,18 while at
17. According to Oliveira Marques, Salazar spoke against 
totalitarian regimes and criticised both the Italian Fascists 
and the German Nazis. In 1931, Salazar defined the goals of his 
regime as the establishment of a "well-understood political, 
economic and social nationalism, controlled by the unques­
tionable sovereignty of the strong state." A H de Oliveira 
Marques, op.cit., [1972], p.181.
18. G Clarence-Smith, op.cit., p.146.
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the same time the access of foreign capital to the economy in 
general was greatly limited, although it continued to have 
access to those industries, such as diamonds and other mining 
activity, where foreign technological know-how was essential. 
This development strategy was based on a strategy of in­
dustrialization which sought to utilize internally generated 
resources. Under this same strategy, Portugal's own economy was 
not seen in a separate light from that of the colonies. On the 
contrary, under Salazar's directed economy, all the so-called 
provinces of Portugal (a term which included the colonies) were 
to be fused into "...an integrated Lusitanian world economy;"19 
the central prerogative of which was, however, to provide for 
the requirements of industrializing Portugal.
Thus, in Salazar's economic strategy, the colonies, 
and Angola in particular, were to play a subsidiary role to the 
planned semi-autarchic development of Portugal in the inter-war 
years. But as well as this economic role the colonies also rep­
resented what Duffy has called "a living link with the past."20 
Already in the early 1930s, Salazar was expounding his soon-to- 
be-perfected myth of empire, based solidly on the exploits and 
adventures of the navigators and discoverers of a far-off age. 
For the Portuguese, the remaining territories, a historical 
legacy of these times, were hard evidence that their nation was
19. M Newitt, op.cit., p.121.
20. J Duffy, Portuguese Africa [1959], p.269.
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still great:
"We must always keep alive in the Portuguese people the dream 
of the beyond-the-seas [Ultramar] and the consciousness and 
pride of empire. Africa is more than a land to be 
exploited...Africa is for us a moral justification and a 
'raison d'etre' as a power. Without it we would be a small 
nation; with it we are a great country."21
Thus waxed the editorial of 0 Mundo Portugues in the mid-1930s, 
on the occasion of the first of a number of cruises to Angola
and the islands designed to inculcate a sense of duty in the
young students they carried. The organizer of these cruises was 
Marcello Caetano, later to succeed Salazar and inherit his 
state.
What played a part in attempts to aggrandize the
country's importance on the world stage also began to play a 
part in underlying the legitimacy of the regime at home. The 
territories became central to an intensely nationalistic ideol­
ogy of society based on a spiritual sense of civilizing duty. 
When confronted with a changing world in which the early gran­
deur of the country was mostly recalled when reciting at school 
the epic poem, os Lusiadas, the New State ideologues clung 
desperately to the colonial world as the extension of the 
regime, as its legitimization in the proclamation of a 
Lusitanian world. This sense of an organic nation in which the 
country of Portugal is treated in abstract to include the
21. 0 Mundo Portugues,II (1935), p.218, quoted in J Duffy,
ibid., p.276.
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widespread territories under its rule was the main mythical 
theme used in the expression of colonial policy under the New 
State. This nationalistic, almost isolationist, tendency became 
even more emphatic and important when the regime reacted to 
negative international public opinion in the post-war world of 
changed ideas about colonialism, but it had its roots and jus­
tification in the ideology of nation proclaimed by Salazar for 
his state.
The New State's colonial policy had a number of dis­
tinct names throughout its lifetime but only two really separate 
tendencies. The first period, lasting from the late 1920s to the 
late 1950s, was principally characterized by a reversal of the 
Republican drives for decentralized autonomy and the firm estab­
lishment of the colonies in Lisbon's administrative orbit. The 
second period began at the end of the 1950s, but was more 
noticeable in the early 1960s, particularly after the uprisings 
in Angola in February and March 1961, and went on until the col­
lapse of Marcello Caetano's government in April 1974. The main 
drive of colonial policy during this period was towards the fur­
ther administrative integration of the colonies with the 
metropolis, as well as a speedy implementation of development 
programmes especially of a social nature (particularly education 
and social services), but also agricultural and industrial, 
designed to assimilate the African population as much as pos­
sible in the colonial economy. In both periods, however, 
colonial policy related directly to the economic needs of the
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metropolitan country, and was, furthermore, ultimately linked to 
the political survival of the regime.
The first period of colonial policy emerged from the 
collapse of the republican experiment and of all its ideals for 
a rational exploitation of empire. Emanating from the central 
hub of the capital, the needs of the new regime were placed 
above all and the surrounding periphery, including the colonies 
and the mainland regions were placed at the economic disposal of 
the centre. Administratively, the Colonial Ministry was reac­
tivated and given all financial and political authority for the 
colonies. The once powerful position of governor was reduced to 
a role of formal representation devoid of any space for lateral 
initiative. Under Salazar, the colonial budgets were now to be 
balanced by direct decree from Lisbon, and any loans were to be 
procured only by the ministry in Portugal.
Colonial policy, like economic policy as a whole, 
reflected the progression of the regime in the metropolis. With 
the consolidation of power by the regime in ever more overlap­
ping circles of institutionalized public life, colonial policies 
also sought to achieve the collusion of the colonial state to 
the metropolitan one; the two becoming one. The legislation and 
implementation of policy in the colonies thus became centralized 
in the metropolitan state. In the mid-1950s, the chain of com­
mand could be seen to run directly from Salazar to the 
African:22
22. A description of the colonial structure of authority in the
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Salazar
Colonial/Ovejseas Minister
Administrative - Governor General - Legislative 
Council . . I Council
District Governors
'Concelho' Administrator
'Circunscrigaj1 Administrator
'Chefe do Posto1 (Outpost Head)
'Regulo' (African Chief)
Head Man
African
All the intermediary positions were no more than a bureaucratic 
administration for the implementation of the directives of the 
governor-general, who, in turn, had little room for manoeuvre 
outside that which was approved by the Colonial Ministry in Lis­
bon. In the colonial minister lay all powers of legislation, 
loan procurement and appointments.23 Should the governor have 
exceeded the expenditure authorized by the minister he would 
have been liable to prosecution. The legislative council (which 
included members chosen by an electoral college) had little 
power beyond minor local-policy legislation, serving more as a 
safety valve for local issues that arose among the European 
population. In this way the colonial state as an administrative 
unit, was linked directly to the source of government in the 
metropolis, with budgetary control, economic policy and practi­
cally all legislative authority determined in Lisbon,
This structure of state power was rooted in the legis­
lative promulgations of the government, through the lame Na-
1950s taken from J Duffy, op.cit., pp.283-288.
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tional Assembly. In 1930, with an already firm grip over the 
emerging regime, Salazar legislated a bill for the colonies, 
later appended to the Constitution of 1933, where the par­
ticularities of the first period of colonial policy are evident: 
the proclamation of the abstract Portuguese nation including its 
empire, the primacy of Portuguese over foreign capital and the 
use of forced labour.24 This bill was sufficient to support 
colonial policy until after the end of the Second World War.
Portugal’s position after the war had improved sig­
nificantly with regard to political and economic stability. Lis­
bon had profited from its neutrality throughout the war, but for 
a regime that had access to colonial raw materials, the post-war 
boom in commodity prices was even more of a windfall. This 
economic success for Portugal was also changing the availability 
and disposition of Portuguese capital to colonial investment, 
and in a rare display of foresight, the early 1950s saw a legis­
lative accommodation to the changing times.
Despite the emergence of an eventually overwhelming 
flow of pro-decolonization forces in international fora, the 
Portuguese government firmly maintained its conviction as to the 
right of maintaining a colonial empire. While Britain and other 
European colonial powers, were slowly losing, albeit under pres­
sure, their own economic and political belief in the immortality 
of empire, the Portuguese closed ranks around the concept of im­
23. M Newitt, op.cit., p.186.
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perial nation. From 1951, the "colonies" ceased to exist in the 
public lexicon and the empire was conceptually replaced by a 
Portuguese nation made up of continental and "overseas" 
provinces.25
This was followed in 1954 by a statute which enshrined 
the rights of indigenous populations and emphasized the pursuit 
of a cultural assimilation policy for the integration of non- 
Europeans in the colonial economy and society. The assimilation 
policy imposed by Salazar was fundamentally a return to the 
basic tenets of its Republican precursor in which certain 
requirements26 made it possible for Africans to achieve the 
rights and duties endowed on Portuguese citizens. Demanding 
literacy from Africans as a precondition for being considered 
"civilized" was not convincing coming from a regime in Portugal 
where an illiteracy rate of 40 per cent had been officially 
registered in 1950. Nevertheless, the colonial ideologues of the 
New State hid behind this seemingly humanist approach to its 
civilizing mission where the superiority of their administration 
was couched not in racial terms but in equally discriminating 
cultural ones. As with all the New State's colonial initiatives,
24. A H de Oliveira Marques, op.cit., [1981], pp.521-2.
25. This constitutional reform was designed to by-pass 
Portugal's obligations under UN Article 73, under which Lisbon 
would have been forced to provide information on its "non-self- 
governing territories" to the UN. With the designation of 
colonies as provinces, Lisbon was able to shirk these respon­
sibilities. J Freire Antunes, Kennedy e Salazar: o Leao e a 
Raposa [1991], p.39.
26. The ability to read and write, paid employment and no
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this assimilation policy became part of the ideological jus­
tification for maintaining Portugal's overseas possessions. They 
argued that there was now no empire only an extended Portuguese 
"nation", populated by aspiring Portuguese "citizens".
In the 1960s, a more fundamental shift in the New 
State's colonial policy became clearer. By the beginning of 
1962, 'late colonialism', a radically different colonial policy 
involving a greater role for foreign capital, full-scale 
development plans, the encouragement of colonial-specific 
production and a large increase in settler population had begun 
to be implemented. This shift is usually explained away as the 
reaction of a dying regime to the internal anti-colonial chal­
lenge, in an attempt to, rather belatedly already, postpone the 
inevitable. Because development in the colonies had emerged in 
strength in the 1960s, this has been attributed to the events of 
February and March 1961, which marked the beginning of the anti­
colonial war in Angola. That is, the colonial development 
policies were part of the Portuguese regime's attempts to appeal 
to the "hearts and minds" of the population and crush the anti­
colonial challenge. There are both economic and political 
reasons to claim that this was not solely the case.
Firstly, as Newitt has shown, the shifts in economic 
policy had already taken place in the mid-1950s as a reaction to 
the take-off of the Portuguese economy and, therefore, did not 
emerge as a reaction to the anti-colonial challenges of the 
1960s. Newitt argues convincingly that Portugal was entering a a
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modern economic phase. With high industrial growth rates of 9% 
per annum (mid 1960s) and expanding international economic rela­
tions with Europe, the times were demanding a different approach 
to the economy, distinct from the self-sufficiency of the first 
Salazarist period. It was, therefore, the needs of the expanding 
Portuguese economy that spurred plans for a limited in­
dustrialization of the colonies,27 before the anti-colonial 
challenge in Angola emphasized the need for change and rein­
forced this underlying tendency.
The New State was already under strong internal 
political pressure to change before the Angolan uprising.28 The 
February 1961 attacks in Luanda followed by the March violence 
in the Northern coffee growing areas, marked the start of the 
war for independence in Angola. But in fact, these incidents, 
followed as they were, by a military clamp-down and a long 
period of eclipse for the movements, may have, perversely as 
Newitt says, not so much spelled the end of the regime as ac­
tually prolonged its life for another 13 years.
Opposition forces in Portugal, effectively quelled 
during most of Salazar's rule, came to exploit the limited 
relaxation of authority surrounding the 1958 presidential cam­
paign, expressing both their number and passion. Standing 
against Salazar's candidate was General Humberto Delgado, a
criminal record.
27. M Newitt, op.cit., pp.220-1.
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product of the regime, who had collected around him broad sup­
port across the political spectrum, from communists to monar­
chists. Inevitably, Delgado was not elected but demonstrated to 
Salazar that the regime was not unassailable. Increasingly, the 
call for political modernization was heard. At the end of 
January 1961, the hijacking of the liner Santa Maria by an anti- 
Salazarist, Captain Henrique Galvao, attracted world attention 
to the regime in Lisbon as well as to Portuguese colonialism in 
Africa.29 Of further worry to Salazar was a threat from senior 
military figures, allegedly with support from elite sectors of 
society and the US embassy in Lisbon.30 In April 1961, the pro- 
American Defence Minister, General Botelho Moniz, planned a 
palace coup. He was, however, outmanoeuvred by Salazar.
Nevertheless, Salazar's authority was under threat, 
but Newitt argues that the nationalist revolt in Angola may 
paradoxically have given Salazar and the New State a political 
reprieve. The wars of independence in the colonies (Guinea- 
Bissau and Mozambique following in 1963 and 1964 respectively) 
came to represent a political crusade for Salazar that may have
28. M Newitt, ibid.
29. The flamboyant Captain Galvao and a small force took control 
of the Santa Maria in the Caribbean, and were lost for a number 
of days. The liner was finally located by the US Air Force. Un­
der the glare of the world press, Galvao declared the political 
status of his act and intimated that the liner might set sail 
for Angola. From there, he intended to base an anti-Salazarist 
challenge, but did not foresee decolonization. The adventure 
finally ended in surrender in Brazil and the Santa Maria was
returned to Portugal.
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salvaged his tottering regime and led the Portuguese to rally 
around their own nationalist cause. A jingoistic campaign to 
defend the colonies came at the right moment to postpone the 
downfall of the regime that seemed to have been announced at the 
end of the 1950s. Once again, the colonies played an ideological 
function in the definition of nation for the regime and, at the 
same time, played a political role in maintaining the authority 
and control of the state.
On the other hand there is nothing to show that the 
replacement of Salazar would have necessarily led to a reform of 
the New State. In fact, as the ailing of Salazar in 1968 showed, 
the perpetuation of the regime was in-built and, under Caetano, 
certainly no change to the colonial status of Angola and the 
other territories was envisaged. While the underlying economic 
changes should be recognised, as should the political pressures 
of Portuguese society, a major part of the responsibility for 
the increased pace of colonial development in the 1960s was in 
the nationalist revolts of 1961 in Angola. As Heimer has put it, 
the period of 'late colonialism1 in Angola:
"...was originally economic in nature, but became 
predominantly political within the framework of a colonial 
'counter-insurgency strategy1."31
The New State also found itself under pressure inter­
nationally. In the 1960s, the intransigent Portuguese colonial
30. J Freire Antunes, op.cit., [1991].
31. F W Heimer, The Decolonization Conflict in Angola 1974-1976:
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empire stuck out in an overwhelmingly pro-decolonization inter­
national environment. Nevertheless, at no time did the Por­
tuguese regime ever consider or assume the future possibility of 
decolonization. Even when confronted with inevitable transforma­
tions, Lisbon reacted with an inability to accept such a change. 
When its willingness to renounce long-range administrative con­
trol was shown to be absent, newly-independent states began to 
take matters into their own hands. In 1960, Dahomey requested 
that Lisbon renounce its sovereignty over a fort at Sao Joao de 
Ajuda on its coastline. It was clear that Portugal could not 
maintain its control, and yet, the Portuguese government ignored 
calls for a formal hand-over. The governor returned to Portugal 
after having petulantly set fire to the fort. On the Indian sub­
continent, Portugal had the administration of Goa and two other 
enclaves.32 Having made its intentions perfectly clear, in 1961 
the Indian government sent its army in and took control of the 
Portuguese territories. Salazar never accepted the loss of Goa, 
and despite the fact that it was administrated by India, a rep­
resentative for Goa continued to sit at the National Assembly. 
The Portuguese territories in India were referred to as tem­
porarily occupied. To Salazar, Goa had unfortunately, but only 
temporarily, succumbed to the designs of another power, com­
parable perhaps to the temporary occupation of Luanda by the 
Dutch in the middle of the seventeenth century.
An Essay in Political Sociology [1979], p.12.
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This intransigence and inability to accept change must 
be emphasized as it reflects the structural relationship between 
the Portuguese regime and its colonial possessions that has been 
described above. The New State believed perhaps correctly that, 
once the principle of decolonization was accepted anywhere (such 
as Goa for example), the consequences for the other colonies (in 
particular, Angola) would have been fatal. Subsequently, this 
collapse would have been felt overwhelmingly in Salazar's domes­
tic authority. The New State was partly built on the economic 
and political pillars of colonial rule and its very authority 
based on a mythical idea of empire. It was therefore inevitable 
that it not accept the nationalist urge for change and self- 
determination in Angola and the other colonies. Consequently, 
faced with an intransigent metropolitan and colonial state, the 
Angolan nationalists were forced to consider and eventually opt 
for the violent expression of anti-colonialism. In turn, as will 
be shown later, this eradication of political choice, but for 
that of guerrilla warfare, may have had a profound radicalizing 
effect on the organization and the nature of the nationalist 
movements.
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(ii) Portugal and the Economy of Colonial Angola
Colonial Angola also played an economic role for 
Salazar's regime. The economic relationship between Portugal and 
Angola, that is between the metropole and the colony, was, in 
many ways, central to the New State's own economy. This was 
especially the case during the period of Salazarist rule before 
the onset of what has been called late colonialism. Throughout 
the whole of the modern colonial period, the Angolan economy 
functioned as an exporter of agricultural and mineral raw 
materials.33 Alongside this role, Angola, as with the other 
colonies, provided a market for the sale of Portuguese products, 
such as textiles and wine.
The rationale of this colonial commercial relationship 
(that is, the exchange of raw materials for manufactured goods) 
sought to meet the specific needs of Portugal's own internal 
economy. The regime used exchange fund restrictions and fixed 
prices, as well as obligatory production and purchase quotas to 
orchestrate this system in accordance to domestic needs, accom­
modating wherever necessary the interests of Portuguese domestic 
industry.34
32. Diu and Damao.
33. Coffee, cotton, sisal, sugar, timber, maize and diamonds, 
iron, manganese, copper, ferro-manganese.
34. When sales of Angolan maize threatened metropolitan 
producers, the application of a strict sales quota and a low 
fixed price, ran the Angolan producers down. Consequently, sales 
of Angolan maize, unlike other agricultural exports to Portugal,
120
The local Angolan economy was actively encouraged to 
purchase manufactured Portuguese products. Exporters were en­
ticed to sell to the metropolis by government fixed prices that 
were generally above the average on the world market, as well as 
by incentives such as tax rebates (50 to 60 per cent) on sales 
to Portugal. Furthermore, colonial exchange funds were created 
to support Angolan purchases of metropolitan goods. The foreign 
exchange revenue of local exporters was sunk into this fund and 
emerged as Portuguese escudos, good for purchases in the 
metropolis.
As well as providing a captive market for Portuguese 
products, Angola also provided the raw materials for a number of 
industries, which helped to spur the metropolitan economy. Por­
tuguese manufacturing industries were supplied with raw 
materials from Angola, and other colonies, at beneficial prices, 
and would then offer the finished product for sale to the 
colonies. A case in point was the revival of the metropolitan 
textile manufacturers. Transforming the cheap colonial raw cot­
ton, these Portuguese firms spun out fabrics and clothes for 
resale to the colony.35 As with any other raw 
material/manufactured product ratio, however, this trade did not 
give equal benefits. The relative profit levels of Angolan 
producers and Portuguese manufacturers can be deduced from the
fell dramatically. G Clarence-Smith, ibid., p.148.
35. By 1960, over 90 per cent of cotton goods imported by An­
gola, Guinea, Cape Verde and Sao Tome were of metropolitan 
origin. This represented, however, only 30 per cent of cotton
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following figures describing the price rises between 1939 and 
1949: profits of colonial raw cotton purchased by the metropolis 
rose by 61 per cent; profits of metropolitan cotton textiles 
sold in the colonies rose by 224 per cent.36
Even more dependent on sales to the colonies were the 
wine producers in Portugal. As the main suppliers of raw 
materials to Portugal in Brazil were gradually replaced by those 
in the colonies, the revenues of wine sales to Brazil fell dras­
tically, threatening to bankrupt the Portuguese vinicul- 
turalists. With the help of the government, they established the 
colonies as exclusive markets, inviolable even to local 
producers. The result was a very substantial market to support 
domestic wine consumption. In 1960, Angola took 53 per cent of 
all Portugal's exports of wine.37
Local industry in Angola had little opportunity to get 
off the ground in this first period. Attempts to establish a 
cotton mill in Angola were bitterly resisted by metropolitan 
competitors until 1943.38 Only those domestic industries that 
had control of part, if not all, of the Portuguese market could, 
during this time, venture into colonial production of manufac­
tures. Where national capital was unavailable (or not enough), 
or where technology was insufficient, the largest investments
manufactures sales, see G Clarence-Smith, op.cit., p.159.
36. G Clarence-Smith, ibid., p.160.
37. Ibid., p.162.
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were held by foreign interests, this despite a legal stipulation 
that half an enterprise's capital be of national origin. The 
Benguela Railway and Diamang, the diamond extraction juggernaut, 
were the biggest examples of this period. Despite strict con­
trols on foreign capital and a personal aversion to its foment, 
Salazar insured that these, and other, enterprises were not 
stampeded out of the colonies and authorized the repatriation of 
their profits without too much bother. Furthermore, these large 
enterprises were exempt from contributions to the colonial ex­
change fund.
In 1957, the export of primary commodities accounted 
for 71.1 per cent of Angola's total exports.39 This general 
ratio was maintained in subsequent years:
TABLE 1
Value of Total Angolan Exports by Origin 1961 and 1962 
(to the nearest Million escudos)
1961 1962
Product Sector ESC$ Mil. % ESC$ Mil. %
Agricultural or vegetable
origin................... . 2,285 59.0 2,802 65.7
Industrial products of
agricultural origin...... . 243 6.3 223 5.2
Mineral extraction....... . 882 22.8 761 17.9
Fishery products......... . 289 7.4 235 5.5
Animal Husbandry......... . 57 1.5 51 1.2
Various.................. . 117 3.0 192 4.5
(Source: SituaQao Economica de Angola no ano de 1962 [1963], 
p.12. Number of ESC$ to US$ between 1950 and 1970, roughly 
29.)40
38. Ibid., p.164.
39. A Castro, 0 Sistema Colonial Portugues em Africa [1980], 
p.164.
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Table 1 shows that nearly two-thirds of Angolan exports were of 
an agricultural or vegetable origin, making the economy sig­
nificantly dependent on the fluctuations of world commodity 
prices. In 1966, the primacy of raw materials in Angolan exports 
was still maintained as Table 2 shows in greater detail:
TABLE 2
Main Angolan Export Commodities (in Millions of Dollars) 1966
Product Value Percent of Total
Coffee 107.2 48.1
Diamonds 39.4 17.6
Fish Products 14.1 5.8
Sisal 10.5 4.7
Iron Ore 4.7 2.0
Timber 4.3 2.0
Maize 4.1 2.0
Cotton Fibre 3.7 1.7
Other 34.8 16.1
Total 222.8 100.0
j m i n ntm(Source: F Brandenburg 'Development, Finance and Trade' [1969], 
p.241.)
Although sales of the above goods to Portugal were an 
important part of the latter's supplies of raw materials, they 
were only a minor proportion of total Angolan exports. In the 
early 1960s, only around 20 per cent of Angolan exports were 
transferred to Portugal.41 Overall, however, the sale of Angolan 
exports earned important revenue for Portugal. In 1957, accord-
40. G Clarence-Smith, op.cit., [1985], Annex 2, p.228.
41. In 1962, the major proportion of Angolan sales were to the 
US (25.15%) and to Europe (16.5% to EFTA and 24.74% to EEC).
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ing to one source, Angolan exports accounted for nearly 40 per­
cent of Portugal's total foreign trade sales.42
In conclusion then, Angolan production and export of 
raw materials was mostly subjugated to metropolitan industrial 
and consumer needs, while, providing, at the same time, a sig­
nificant proportion of Portugal's foreign exchange earnings.
Portuguese colonial rule had vast formative effects on 
the economic structure of Angola. During almost 50 years of 
Salazarist rule, Portugal imposed, extended, and developed a 
wide process of economic moulding which went to great extremes 
in the restructuring of the economic, and consequently social, 
relationships of indigenous Angolan societies.
In very general terms, the effects of colonialism on 
Angolan society were instrumental in establishing certain 
economic production regimes that were inherently distinct from 
those of traditional societies. The introduction of wage-earning 
and of cash-crop production radically changed the rural subsis­
tence life-style of the great majority of the population. Cer­
tain indigenous groups had benefited in previous centuries from 
a trading relationship with the Portuguese, especially in 
slaves. But by the twentieth century economic interaction be­
tween the Portuguese and indigenous groups had surpassed its 
early commercial nature.
SituaQao Economica de Angola no ano de 1962 [1963], p.14.
42. In 1957, Portugal's exports totalled ESC$ 8,253,000,000 of 
which ESC$ 3,328,000,000 were of Angolan origin. A Castro,
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The cultivation of cotton was an example of the radi­
cal change colonialism brought to the the rural hinterland. A 
very exploitative system of contract farming was imposed whereby 
the growth of anything but cotton was prohibited, and the sale 
of all produce dictated and determined by the dealers. This sys­
tem was in force in the Baixa do Cassanje area and may have been 
at the root of the violent anti-colonial disturbances of 1960- 
1961. The cotton revolt had not been organized nor was it ap­
parently politically motivated, seeming to emerge partly as a 
reaction to the extreme conditions of poverty as a result of the 
imposition of that cash-crop economy. Later that year, similar 
sentiments of revolt were exposed during the March violence 
against settlers in the north. Although not overwhelmingly 
during this period, the imposition of contract labour on a 
population for the cultivation of cash crops, changed the basic 
economic structures of many areas. Independent African farmers 
exceeded cultivation at subsistence levels in order to sell to 
the Portuguese, while others were contracted, with or without 
force, as wage labour.
These general characteristics of the Angolan economy 
remained in place until after the end of the Second World War. 
After this time, the Angolan economy exploded into growth, 
partly the result of the growth of one single commodity: coffee. 
According to Paige:
"...the modern economic history of [Angola] did not begin 
until the rise of the coffee economy in the 1950s...[that] 
radically changed the internal economy of Angola, altered its
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relationship with the metropolitan and world economies...[and] 
converted the colony into a mono-cultural export economy."43
The dominant role in Angolan exports played by coffee by 1966 
can be seen above in Table 2, when it accounted for nearly half 
of the total value of sales abroad. Between the early 1950s and 
the early 1960s, Angola experienced a coffee boom, the effects 
of which laid down the bases for the economic and social 
development experienced under the period of late colonialism.
The neutrality maintained by Portugal throughout World 
War II had been very profitable. With its production and dis­
tribution undisturbed it could continue to supply colonial raw 
materials at the then much higher prices as a result of the war. 
The shortages of raw materials continued into the period of the 
Korean War and helped to sustain a period of generally high com­
modity prices. The value of Angolan sales of coffee, one of the 
most important commodities in world trade after crude petroleum 
or grains,44 multiplied dramatically. Increased revenues on 
coffee plantations soon attracted metropolitan cultivators want­
ing to make their fortune, while existing African and European 
production was vastly expanded with the increased profits. The 
result was a rocketing of production, quadrupling harvests in 
the space of 15 years, making Angola the third or fourth largest
op.cit., p.165.
43. J Paige, Agrarian Revolution [1975], pp.212,226,227.
44. I S van Dongen, "Agriculture and Other Primary Production"
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supplier of coffee in the world by 1967.45 Table 3 shows the ex­
pansion of Angolan coffee exports between 1948 and 1970. The 
steep rise in price between 1948 and 1952 clearly multiplied, by 
more than twice, the value of the coffee sold abroad, while in 
actual fact less of it was sold. The high prices continued until 
about the end of decade, when they collapsed world-wide. But the 
effect of about a decade of high prices led to an increase in 
Angolan production which was eventually noticeable in the in­
creased export tonnages of the 1960s.
TABLE 3
Coffee Exports from Angola 1948-1970
Year
ports
Value 
(Mil Esc)
Weight 
('000 tons)
Price 
(Esc per Kilo)
% of
Agric
Exports
% of 
Total 
Ex-
1948 459.8 53.4 8.61 39.6 30.9
1952 1137.6 47.7 23.83 53.3 41.3
1955 1275.6 60.1 21.22 62.8 45.5
1958 1539.4 79.6 19.33 67.5 41.7
1961 1398.5 118.1 11.84 57.5 36.1
1964 2859.1 138.7 20.61 71.8 48.7
1967 3546.8 196.5 18.04 88.3 51.9
1970 3880.0 180.6 21.48 61.0 31.9
(Source: J Paige Agrarian Revolution [1976], p.227)
Coffee production in Angola jumped from not more than 50,000
tonnes or so in 1948 to over 200,000 tonnes a year by 1965.46
[1969], p.255.
45. I S van Dongen, op.cit., p.255. van Dongen placed Angolan 
coffee's share of the world market in 1967 at 6.1%, behind the 
Ivory Coast, at 8.1%, the largest African producer.
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The increased production of coffee signified a 
dramatic change for Angola, especially in the northern regions. 
Paige considered the northern province of Uige as a not- 
uncharacteristic example, and calculated that in 1958, over 75 
per cent of the local male African working population was in­
volved in the production of coffee.47 A highly labour-intensive 
production, the coffee boom multiplied exponentially the effects 
of the colonial regime by bringing even more of the population 
into the cash-crop and wage-earning agricultural economy.
The growth of coffee by African producers accounted 
for nearly 40 per cent of the total in 1941. By 1958, the expan­
sion of massive European estates, the largest of which employed 
over 11,000 Africans, had reduced this participation to 26 per 
cent.48
One of the effects of this new production regime was 
somewhat negative with regard to ethnic divisions. The high 
demand for labour was often met by contracting in the south and 
centre of the country, among the Ovimbundu. Intercommunal fric­
tion was common between the northern peoples, of a Bakongo or 
Mbundu background, and the Ovimbundu, among whom UNITA was later 
based. In 1961, during the UPA March attacks in the north, it 
has been noted by a number of sources that the Ovimbundu con­
tract workers were also victims chosen by the Bakongo of the
46. I S van Dongen, op.cit., p.255.
47. J Paige, op.cit., p.247.
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UPA, partly because they were considered to be beneficiaries of 
colonialism and because many were participating in its 
defence.49 Whether or not a deep ethnic rivalry emerged from the 
production regimes established under the coffee boom is, 
however, difficult to say.
At the same time as Angola was experiencing a coffee- 
led boom, Portugal itself was beginning to take a relatively 
faster track towards industrial development. The war profits, 
expanded colonial trade and Lisbon's own state development plans 
had resulted in a certain amount of growth by the end of the 
1950s. But it was the burgeoning trade with Europe, that 
provided the basis for this economic drive. The increased 
economic dynamism provided, in turn, large amounts of investment 
capital that began to look towards Africa, and Angola in par­
ticular, for capitalization. It was at this time, during the
mid-1950s, that the regime began to modify its policies and
ushered in a new direction in colonial development.
Large conglomerates of Portuguese capital were in a 
position to provide the investment capital to finance such a 
change in economic direction. In the long term, the colonial 
economy would move from primary production to industrial 
development based on import substitution. This transformation 
would theoretically be achieved with financing from mainly Por­
tuguese but also foreign, capital sources. And thus, state and
48. J Paige, op.cit., pp.230,228.
49. D L Wheeler and R Pelissier, Angola [1971], pp.178 and 182;
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private capital began to pour into Angola, framed by the ever­
present hand of the regime in the form of two five year plans: 
1953-1958 and 1959-1964. These were the beginnings of the final 
period of colonial rule under the New State, a period described 
as late colonialism.
During late colonialism, there occurred a basic rever­
sal of the regime's previous colonial policies. Angola became 
less and less a subsidiary part of the metropolitan economy. The 
separate industrial development of the Angolan economy, at this 
time, more widely penetrated by foreign capital,50 became the 
basis of what seemed to a development policy for the colony. It 
was no longer primarily subjugated to the economic necessities 
of the Portuguese economy, but seemed to be following its own 
path of development. This would be achieved by both the public 
and the private sectors. The State planned to finance the 
development of infrastructures such as roads,51 port 
facilities52 and hydroelectric projects to supply cheap 
energy,53 all for the projected take-off of industrial develop-
J Paige, op.cit., pp.249-250.
50. Restrictions on foreign capital were lifted in 1965.
51. Paved roads increased from 250 miles in 1960 to 2,200 miles 
in 1967. F Brandenburg 'Transport Systems and Their External 
Ramifications', [1969], p.326.
52. The natural facilities and increased capacities at the ports 
at Lobito, Luanda and Mogamedes were sufficient to cope with the 
increased international traffic, including minerals from the 
Katanga copper region of Zaire and Zambia. See F Brandenburg, 
ibid., pp.321-322.
53. In 1965, the Portuguese and the South African government
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ment. This state investment was complemented by the larger cor­
porate conglomerates in Portugal. The opportunities in diver­
sifying, vertical integration, relocation and in supporting this 
new industrialization were looked upon kindly by leading in­
dustrialists. In encouraging the major financial-industrial 
groups to invest in Angola, the State provided these with 
privileged, and many times monopolistic, positions in both the 
colonial and metropolitan economies.
In Table 4, the levels of investment in Angola under 
the Portuguese development plans can be seen. The source of 
these figures is not unbiased and is identified closely with the 
MPLA. Furthermore, these figures are not attributed to any 
primary source. Nevertheless, here they serve only to indicate 
the general increasing trend of investment in Angola:
TABLE 4
Investment levels in Angola
1959-1964 1965-1967 1968-1973
Total Investment 4,714 7,210 25,045
Million Escudos
(Source: Revolution in Angola [1972], p.61.
It is ironic that, the realignment of political and 
economic factors that provided an opportunity for a more exten-
reached agreement to expand the Cunene river project to result 
in an Angolan-South West African power grid. D M Abshire 
'Minerals, Manufacturing, Power and Communications' [1969],
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sive colonial commitment in the 1960s, was in fact facing in 
another direction. These new factors were partly a result of 
better trade relations with Europe,54 and the ever-burgeoning 
remittances of emigration, both of which, in turn, relegated 
colonial trade to a relatively less important role in the Por­
tuguese balance of payments. On the one hand, a relatively sig­
nificant strategy for colonial development, comparable to other 
colonial powers,55 was being implemented in Angola. This 
markedly transformed production regimes and their social 
frameworks, and linked the Angolan economy more emphatically 
with more diverse markets. But on the other hand, the colonies 
themselves became, although more profitable, actually less 
economically necessary for Portugal and its own expanding 
economy.56
(iii) The Policy of Assimilation and the Formation of Colonial 
Society in Angola
The basis of Portugal's proclaimed civilizing mission
p.303.
54. Portuguese sales increased 400% (between 1957 and 1970) 
after membership of EFTA. J Marcum, The Angolan Revolution Vol 
II: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, [1978], p.22.
55. Amounts invested by the state in the colonies under the 
plans were broadly comparable with those invested by other 
colonial powers in the same period:
1953-1958 1959-1964
Mozambique //20m //41m
Uganda //16m //30m
Tanganyika //17m //18m
see: M Newitt, op.cit., p.196.
56. G Clarence-Smith likens Portugal's development to that of a
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of achieving a multiracial society in Africa was broadly similar 
to the French attempts at assimilation in their own territories. 
Rather than placing a time limit on colonial tutelage as the 
British eventually assumed in their imperial policies, this 
stance envisioned an infinite imperial existence for mainland 
Portugal and its overseas provinces by the extension of the 
spiritual nation to include all peoples under its sovereignty. 
According to the Portuguese colonial minister in 1933:
"We don't believe that a rapid passage from their African 
superstitions to our civilization is possible. For us to 
have arrived we we are presently, hundreds of generations 
before us fought, suffered and learned, minute by minute, 
the most intimate secrets in the fountain of life . It is 
impossible for them to traverse this distance of centuries 
in a single jump."57
The colonial policy behind this multi-cultural fan­
tasy, however, may have had the unintended effect of creating 
some of the very conditions in which Portuguese sovereignty
could subsequently be challenged. Despite its ethnically 
divisory nature, Portugal's colonial policy in Angola produced 
an indigenous colonial class that, on the one hand, may have 
come to both accept and expect the economic and social rewards
of joining the central colonial society,58 while on the other
NIC. see op.cit., p.193.
57. Armindo Monteiro, quoted by G Bender, Angola under the 
Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality [1978c], p.150.
58. This perspective of Angolan colonial society has been use­
fully developed by F W Heimer, op.cit. Heimer calls the core 
European society, central, which provided the colonial state and 
economy. Access to it was limited and required the acceptance of
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began to frame a collective definition of a wider Angolan na­
tional identity rather than maintaining their narrower ethnic 
loyalties. This process of assimilation, furthermore, may have 
been responsible for the creation of an intellectual class that 
could interpret and express this latent nationalism and even­
tually direct it against colonial rule.
The process of assimilation as envisaged by the Por­
tuguese colonial vision was based fundamentally on the 
'lusofication' of Africans. According to the colonial ideology 
of the regime, the empire (now simply Portugal and its overseas 
provinces) was to be populated by a culturally-defined Por­
tuguese. As described above, this policy had a political 
rationale; what better way to defend the possession of overseas 
territories than to proclaim them as an organic part of the na­
tion. The uplifting image of the timeless Portuguese voyager as 
the modern colonizer was now fed by the imputation of an even 
more ephemeral and mythical quality, that of non-racism, and by 
the definition of Portuguese nationality as not being that of 
race or territory but as existing on a spiritual plane somewhere 
between the end of the world and heaven itself. This may seem to 
be an exaggeration but when the theory of lusotropicalism is 
considered, wherein a historically unique absence of racism in
colonial norms. Outside central society were the ethnically 
centralized tributary societies. Centred around traditional 
political and social hierarchies, they represented the 
'uncivilized' legacy which Africans had to renounce to be con­
sidered Portuguese. Central society was fundamentally coastal, 
urban and industrially based, while tributary societies remained 
confined to the hinterland. Overlapping occurred when labour was
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the Portuguese is identified,59 the above characterization of 
Portuguese social colonialism is not far off the mark:
"...if one day the Lusotropicology here suggested is 
developed into a science, one of its main objects of study 
will be this process of the surpassing of the ethnic condi­
tion by the cultural, by virtue of which the blackest of 
blacks of tropical Africa is considered Portuguese without 
having to renounce any of his dearest habits of an ecologi­
cally tropical man."60
Before 1961, the assimilation of Africans into 
colonial society was to be achieved by the recognition of the 
'civilized1 status of prospective Portuguese citizens among the 
African population. African offspring from European parentage 
could expect immediate citizenry but the remainder of the 
African population had to prove their deserving status. The pre­
requisites to obtaining rights before the law were ironic if 
compared to the social reality of Portugal. Demanding that an 
African read and write, have the means to support himself and 
his family and sport an impeccable civil record before he could 
be considered 'civilized1, was farcical when illiterate, 
unemployed and convicted Portuguese moved about the colony un­
fettered. But even leaving this contradiction aside, the process
sought or when cash crops were grown for sale to central 
society.
59. Interestingly, lusotropicalism is derived from the socio- 
anthropological work done in Brazil in the 1930s concerning mis­
cegenation in that country. For a critical view of 
lusotropicalism see Chapter One of G J Bender, op.cit.
60. Gilberto Freyre, Brazilian sociologist whose work was very 
prominent in both Portugal and Brazil. Reproduced in R H Chil-
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of assimilation in Angola was anything but an attempt at multi- 
culturalism. The clause which allowed 'civilizado' status to be 
endowed only if the vaguely defined 'proper' qualities of Por­
tuguese civilization were held by the 'candidate', made this 
process largely arbitrary in Angola.61 Furthermore, despite the 
possible attractions of holding Portuguese citizenship, not many 
ventured to achieve this privileged status. In 1950, out of a 
total number of over 4 million Africans, only 30,089 (including 
dependents) were registered as 'assimilados'. One reason for 
this low number may have been the desire to avoid taxation, 
which would have been incurred by the newly civilized.62
TABLE 5
Angolan Population by Race and 'Civilized Status' 1950
Total Total Per Cent Per Cent
Race Population 'Civilized' 'Civilized' 'Civilized'
___________________________________________________ 1940___
African 4,036,689 30,089 0.7 0.7
Mestizo 29,648 26,335 88.8 82.9
White 78,826 78,826 100.0 100.0
(Source: G Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese: The Myth and the 
Reality [1978c], p.151.)
In 1961, Portuguese law was changed and this pater­
nalistic method of assimilation was dropped in favour of a 
blanket declaration of citizenship. It is, therefore, difficult
cote, Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa: Documents
[1972], p.19.
61. In Cape Verde, Macau and Goa all inhabitants were given full 
Portuguese citizenry.
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to assess the overall impact by this time. However, judging by 
the complete lack of improvement between 1940 and 1950, as seen 
in Table 5, it can only be assumed that the already negligible 
percentage of the 'civilized' African population, was not in­
creased significantly, certainly not enough for Angolan society 
to have been described as multiracial. Only within the mestizo 
population can there be assumed to have been the development of 
a sense, however limited, of participation in and belonging to 
central colonial society.
What the figures in Table 5 do show is that the Por­
tuguese policy of assimilation, despite the lack of legislative 
discrimination as trumpeted by the apologists of Portuguese 
colonialism, managed to produce a tiered colonial society, by 
driving a wedge between traditional African societies and those 
that were allowed to join the colonial society. This conclusion 
seems to be justified further when nationalist politics are con­
sidered. Specifically, friction between mestizos and assimilados 
on the one hand and non-co-opted Africans on the other emerged 
as one of the characteristics of MPLA-FNLA rivalry. Furthermore, 
the educational formation of those inside central colonial 
society separated them even further from Angolans outside the 
sphere of privilege. This is how the FNLA saw the MPLA in 1962:
"[The MPLA]...especially recruited their members from the 
Angolan population classed as 'civilized' by the colonial 
regime; i.e. the half-castes and the assimilados...But they 
never got very far in [the regions around the urban 
centres]. Their lack of support was principally due to the 
privileged position granted to the half-castes and the
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assimilados by the colonialists (education, exemption from 
forced labour, official recognition of property ownership 
and of liberal professions, existing civil rights, and a 
standard of living far superior to that of the exploited 
peasant mass). This ordinance [granting these privileges] 
dug a social and psychological trench between them and the 
oppressed peasant mass.”63
Critical references to the cultural superiority of the MPLA 
leaders betrayed a sense of inferiority on the part of the FNLA. 
It can only be concluded that Portuguese colonial policy served 
to divide a small elite of Angolans from the majority, a schism 
that subsequently emerged in Angolan politics and, in par­
ticular, in the rivalry between the MPLA and the FNLA. But 
Savimbi, the UNITA leader, also revealed the importance of this 
racial issue when he referred to the domination of the MPLA by 
mesti£Os:
"It may sound like racialism, and it is certainly not the way 
we feel today because we have learned a lot. But it is a 
fact that it was very difficult at that time for blacks to 
understand why mestizos should be leading a liberation 
movement to fight the Portuguese. It was not clear to us 
that mestizos were suffering in Angola; they were privileged 
people."64
62. A H de Oliveira Marques, op.cit., [1981], p.525, states that 
thousands avoided 'civilizado1 status for this reason.
63. 'Glimpses of the Angolan Nationalist Organizations'. GRAE 
(FNLA) Press Release (Leopoldville, 11 December 1962. Reproduced
in R H Chilcote op.cit., pp.150-151.
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TABLE 6
Racial Composition of Angolan Population 1777-1970
YEAR
WHITE 
No. %
MESTIQO
No. %
BLACK
No. %
TOTAL
No. %
1777 1,581 - 4,043 - - - - -
1845 1,832 0.03 5,770 0.10 5,378,923 99.9 5,386,525 100
1900 9,198 0.20 3,112 0.06 4,777,636 99.7 4,789,946 100
1920 20,700 0.48 7,500 0.18 4,250,000 99.3 4,278,000 100
1940 44,083 1.20 28,035 0.75 3,665,829 98.1 3,737,947 100
1950 78,826 1.90 29,648 0.72 4,036,687 97.4 4,145,161 100
1960 172,529 3.60 53,392 1.10 4,604,362 95.3 4,830,283 100
1970 290,000 5.10 — — ---- 5,673,046 100
(Source: G Bender, Angola under the Portuguese: The Myth and the 
Reality [1978c], p.20.)
The racial composition of the population of Angola did 
not alter significantly until the last two decades of colonial 
domination. As Table 5 has shown before, no more than a negli­
gible percentage of the African population had ever achieved the 
'assimilado' status and gained access to central colonial 
society. This signifies, if we consider the figures for 1960 in 
Table 5, that before the period of late colonialism, no more 
than five per cent of the Angolan population was ever able to 
obtain direct access to the privileges of colonialism. Until the 
early 1960s, over 95 percent of the Angolan population had 
remained outside the hub of colonial life.
In the period of late colonialism, Angola experienced 
an explosion of social reform and economic development, such as 
the abolition of different racial statutes and the extensive
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development of health and educational services available to 
African populations, which altered the picture shown above. The 
growth of the Angolan economy had transformed its requirements. 
The new industries now needed a semiskilled, semi-urban mobile 
work force. Initially, this new labour force was drawn from the 
African population, and education, social services and 
benefits, training, et cetera, began to become available to a 
certain number of a growing African bourgeoisie. According to a 
survey carried out by Heimer in 1970, 74 per cent of Luanda slum 
children aged 6 to 12 were attending or had attended school.65
These centrifugal economic forces, drew more and more 
Africans into urban colonial society and began to create a semi­
industrial class which began to supplement its traditional 
tribal identity with a wider sense of community. The 1950s had 
seen the nationalist challenge grow in the British and French 
colonies. The emergence of self-determination forces in neigh­
bouring colonies was not lost on an increasingly nationally- 
minded Angolan bourgeoisie. As the economy provided more 
benefits, and a place in urban colonial life, a sense of Angolan 
nationality began to emerge, without, however, the total dis­
solution of a tribal and racial identification. According to 
Heimer:
"...it is not much of an exaggeration to say that only by the 
beginning of the seventies had one all-encompassing, though 
still very loose and highly heterogeneous, Angolan social 
formation been brought into existence. One of the ideologi-
64. F Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa [1986], pp.45-
46.
cal consequences was that, for the first time, important 
numbers of Africans in the central society (and not just 
small segments) had begun to think of themselves as Angolans 
instead of, or, more frequently, as well as, members of a 
given ethnic group...And even in an increasing number of 
tributary societies, a kind of a 'secondary identification' 
with Angola as a whole had begun to take place."66
Thus it may be possible to claim that the consolida­
tion of a national identity was partly rooted in the formative 
influence of colonial society, but also, as will be shown later, 
in the nationalist anti-colonial challenge. In the early 1960s, 
by the time the nationalist movements had organised, they and 
their leaderships already had a basic political character that 
had been formed in the 1940s and 1950s. Thus, by the 1970s, the 
'Angolan social formation1 referred to by Heimer was not only 
still very loose and in an initial phase, but must also be con­
sidered to have been partly the result of the political choices 
made by Angolan nationalists.
The post-war coffee boom in Angola and the growth of 
the economy introduced a new conditioning factor in this period 
of late colonialism. The colonial industrialization programme of 
the New State for Angola included plans to significantly in­
crease white immigration to the colony.
65. F W Heimer, op.cit., p.13.
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TABLE 7 
White Population in Angola
1940 44,083
1950 78,826
1960 172,529
1970 290,000
1973 335,000
(Source: M Newitt, [1981], p.164.)
For the ideologues of the regime, the settlers represented a 
second wave of discoverers and navigators, who braved the 
unfriendly seas (in this case the international mood of pro­
decolonization) to live and work in the tropics, once more em­
phasising the unique Portuguese way. For the industrialists they 
represented a potential work-force, much needed as the Angolan 
economy expanded. For the colonial developers they represented a 
settler class ready to spread out over Angola, to continue the 
unfinished job of 'pacification'. Despite considerable 
expense,67 the immigration was an apparent success for Lisbon, 
at least quantitatively.
The effects of this increased immigration were, 
however, less than desired. The great majority of this immigra­
tion had a very low level of education or training. In the 
period between 1965 and 1972, over 55 per cent of Portuguese
66. F W Heimer, ibid., p.14.
67. The cost of transplanting a family from within a village 
community to Angola was put at US$ 100,000. see G Clarence-
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emigrants to Angola, over the age of seven, had no years of 
education whatsoever.68 Furthermore, only a few chose to settle 
in rural areas and attempt agricultural activities. Most had 
wanted to escape that same life in Portugal and chose instead to 
settle in the cities and towns. The result was the flooding of 
the lower end of the urban job markets by a labour-force with 
little or no skills. Moreover, the market was racially weighted 
in their favour. Despite claims of impartiality, it was dif­
ficult to see an employer picking an African over a European for 
most jobs. Despite the availability of opportunities for trained 
Africans, the predominance of uneducated whites at the lower end 
of the market began to eat into the newly-promised life-style 
opportunities of the African urban populations.
From 1961, there were also increased attempts at es­
tablishing multiracial settlements in Angola by directing 
emigrants from Portugal and Cape Verde, usually of mixed extrac­
tion, into the rural hinterland. Bender has concluded that this 
policy was a failure:69 From 1961 to 1968, the directed settle­
ment programme cost over US$ 100 million, and out of the 
original number of settlers less than half remained at the end 
of this period. Those settlers that abandoned attempts to popu­
late rural Angola, did not, however, leave the country. They 
moved to the cities and towns and, basically unskilled and
Smith, op.cit., p.177.
68. G Bender, op.cit., p.230.
144
uneducated, added to the already crowded 'lower strata1 compet­
ing with Africans for jobs and living space.
According to Heimer, this had far-reaching effect as 
this denial or displacement of privileges anticipated under late 
colonialism may have provided a disgruntled support for the 
emerging nationalist anti-colonial challenge:
"The petty bourgeoisie was primarily motivated [to protest] 
by its frustration over a manque a gagner - an economic 
'upward mobility' and an equality of social treatment it 
aspired to, but which it was denied by a racial barrier 
reinforced by the ongoing immigration of 'poor whites1."70
Furthermore, the majority of the poor whites, perhaps 
as a result of the competitive job market, tended to wield their 
racial power to ensure that African challenges to the colonial
regime were put down. This was the case in 1961 and on sub­
sequent occasions when reactionary groups of white vigilantes 
would carry out terror raids of the slums in Luanda, or when 
groups of farmers carried out revenge attacks in the north after 
the March attacks by the FNLA. Apart from few individual excep­
tions, most white sympathizers of Angolan self-determination
tended to be of an educated background. But over 83 per cent of
white immigration to Angola in the period between 1965 and 1972, 
had had less than four years of education.71 This pool of anti- 
African-nationalism emerged again in Luanda after the 1974 coup
69. G Bender, op.cit., [1978c], pp.107-131.
70. F W Heimer, op.cit., p.20.
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when over a hundred people are said to have been killed in 
black-white violence in July. The influence of the settler 
majority in the civil war cannot be easily judged although their 
mass exodus between 1974 and 1975 was partly a result of, but 
almost certainly helped to feed, the chaotic and disorderly 
situation that characterized the breakdown of Portuguese 
colonialism.
The Angolan colonial experience of the Portuguese 
policy of assimilation, seems to have had two major aspects 
which are related to the emergence of the political conflict be­
tween the nationalist movements that led to the civil war in 
1975. Firstly, the process of 'civilization' created a tiered 
society in which the privileged centre was separated from and 
resented by those who remained outside. This segregation of 
privilege also tended to be identified in racial terms. Mesti£OS 
and educated Angolans were the object of criticism from other 
Africans. This division was a facet of the MPLA-FNLA rivalry. 
Secondly, the assimilation policy helped to create in the 
privileged centre not only an acute sense of national identity, 
as will be shown later, but also the enhanced expectation of 
material and political benefits. The frustration of these expec­
tations, by the local colonial society and by an intransigent 
regime in Lisbon, helped to feed an already growing sense of 
nationalism and anti-colonialism in Angola.
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CHAPTER THREE
ANGOLAN ANTI-COLONIALISM
"It is important to recognize that the liberation movements 
are forming rather than expressing a national consciousness"1
The formation of a colonial state and society in 
Angola by the Portuguese went far and deep to determine the
parameters within which modern Angolan politics has been carried
out. As we have seen in Chapter Two, the concept of an Angolan 
nation-state and the imposition of economic and authority 
structures that shaped political and social forces and set up 
conflicts between these, for example, are partly the legacy of 
the colonial regime. But modern Angolan nationalism was not a 
creation of colonialism. It emerged from the political choices 
taken by different groups of people, in different parts of the 
country, for differing reasons but with one single objective: to 
end Portuguese rule in Angola.
The intransigence of the Portuguese colonial regime in 
denying political expression and representation in Angola, was, 
however, intimately linked to the choices made by all three 
movements. It is argued that the authoritarian nature of the New 
State impeded the development of nationalist political parties 
along the lines of those that emerged in British colonialism. 
Suppression and repression of Angolan nationalism led to the
1. M de Lucena, A Evolugao do Sistema Corporativo Portugues Vol
1_ [1976], p.94. My translation.
147
narrowing of options available to anti-colonialists. Thus, the 
resort to clandestinity and the subsequent adoption of guerrilla 
warfare as the form of challenging Portuguese rule can be seen 
as having been inevitable choices under the circumstances. Even 
the ideological outlook of a movement may be influenced by the 
willingness of the colonial regime to accommodate its political 
challenge. The realization that intransigence to nationalist 
demands would result in a more radical anti-colonial challenge 
was seemingly apparent to the British. Sir Andrew Cohen believed 
that successful co-operation with nationalism would be the best 
bulwark against communism in Africa.
In the same way, the Algerian nationalists resorted to 
an armed challenge after France showed itself unwilling to 
consider independence. On the other hand, nationalists in other 
parts of French Africa achieved independence organized in 
unarmed political parties. What is argued here, is that the 
extremity of resorting to armed force in the early 1960s was 
long-lasting, to the point of partly determining the form of 
conflict taken in 1975. The choice of warfare as the instrument 
to achieve independence from the Portuguese must have been 
partly responsible for changing the very nature of political 
life in Angola, one in which the armed liberation movements (the 
MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA) resorted more readily to force in 1975 
to achieve their aims than would otherwise have been the case 
had they, for example, have developed as unarmed mass parties.
This chapter will show how the general stream of
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Angolan nationalism developed an anti-colonial challenge by 
looking at the origins of the three movements. Their composition 
and political outlooks will be shown while at the same time 
considering the internal and external influences each may have 
had in the early stages.
(i) The Origins of Angolan Nationalism
Colonial authority in Angola emanated fundamentally 
from a coastal administration, that had been extended inland, 
mostly during the early twentieth century. The so-called 
'pacification' of the colonies sought to secure, and therefore, 
claim their territorial integrity and Portuguese sovereignty, 
meeting the 'rules' of imperialism established at the Congress 
of Berlin. As elsewhere, however, the colonial boundaries, cut 
across and included within them a number of different ethno- 
linguistic groups and indigenous political communities. 
Nevertheless, despite this fact, out of heterogeneous ethnic 
societies there emerged a current of Angolan nationalism, which 
upheld the political goal of self-determination for Angola and 
its people as a whole.
Partly formed by the colonial experience, the national 
integrity of the Angolan state, both in territorial and 
populational terms, was eventually accepted and espoused by all 
three anti-colonial movements. The MPLA programme, as published 
sometime in 1962 or 1963, stated that the:
"Sovereignty of the Angolan state will belong entirely and
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solely to the Angolan people, without distinction as to the 
ethnic origin, class, sex, age, political leanings, 
religious beliefs or philosophical convictions."2
The FNLA emerged as a front around a group led by Holden 
Roberto, the Union of the Peoples of Angola (UPA)3 . The UPA's 
motto was: "for the national, territorial and social liberation 
of Angola."4
Finally, UNITA too framed its political identity and objectives 
in a national idea of Angola. According to a later UNITA 
publication:
"The peculiar social situation of Angola calls for harmonious 
co-existence of all ethnic groups and races that are the 
components of the Angola nation."5
Despite the universal acceptance of an integral nation and 
state, the origins of these three movements are, however, set in 
that very 'peculiar social situation of Angola.16 As will be
2. MPLA Statuts et programme Leopoldville 196? Translated and 
reproduced in R Chilcote Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese 
Africa: Documents [1972], p.229. It can be deduced that the date 
of publication must have been sometime between 1962 and 1963, as 
this was the period during which the MPLA leadership was based 
in Leopoldville.
3. Uniao das Populagoes de Angola.
4. Statutes of the UPA reproduced in R Chilcote, ibid., p.101.
5. UNITA [1984], p.61.
6. The universal acceptance of national integrity refers to the 
movements that contested power in 1975. Separatism was, however, 
not absent from Angolan politics. In the Cabindan enclave, a 
separatist movement, the Mouvement de Liberation de l1Enclave de 
Cabinda (MLEC) developed a campaign in favour of Cabindan 
independence from 1960 onward. In 1963, under the aegis of the
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shown below, the origins of the MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA emerge 
not only from the political consequences of challenging 
colonialism but also from specific ethnic and social 
circumstances.
The main thrust of Portuguese colonial conquest, or 
'pacification1, had destroyed beyond recognition the Ndongo 
kingdom, the principal pre-colonial Mbundu political 
organisation. The Mbundu, numbering about 700,000 in the 1960s,7 
were generally located around the Kuanza river, in an area that 
runs inland from Luanda to the Cassanje highlands in the 
northeast.8 The Mbundu had had the longest contact with the 
Portuguese, as the area they occupied was the most 
geographically propitious corridor linking the interior to the 
coast, which made it the main trading route for, principally but 
not exclusively, slaves.
To the north of the Mbundu area is the Bakongo
Congolese President, Fulbert Youlou, three pro-separatism 
groups, including MLEC, merged in Brazzaville to form the Front 
pour la Liberation de 1'Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) which 
continued to press for the independence of Cabinda. See J 
Marcum, op.cit., Volume One, pp.172-175, and op.cit., Volume 
Two, pp.123-125. The FLEC resolution no. 1, drawn up at the 
August 1963 congress in Brazzaville, began in following manner: 
"The people of Cabinda, holding fast to the reaffirmation of 
their right to self-determination and to total, immediate and 
unconditional independence..." FLEC Resolutions reproduced in R 
Chilcote, op.cit., p.128.
7. D Wheeler and R Pelissier, Angola, [1971], p.8.
8. The Mbundu are also known as Kimbundu which refers 
specifically to the language group spoken.
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homeland which extends ethnically over the border into Zaire, 
and to the Cabinda enclave, which is separated from Angola by 
Zaire.9 This was the area of the ancient Kongo kingdom, which, 
unlike the Ndongo kingdom, had retained some of its structures 
of authority throughout Portuguese colonial rule. A Kongo king, 
Dom Pedro VIII, was enthroned in 1962. These institutions were, 
of course, maintained under strict control by the Portuguese but 
remained a focus for Bakongo political life. In the 1960s, the 
Bakongo population numbered approximately half a million.10
The Ovimbundu, numbering over 1,700,000, are the 
largest ethno-linguistic group in Angola, and mainly occupy the 
plateau highlands, south of Luanda. Occupying the north-eastern 
and central parts of Angola, are the Lunda-Chokwe, who like the 
Ovimbundu, are primarily migratory.
These major ethno-linguistic groups in Angola are 
generally seen to be the main streams from which emerged the 
nationalist movements. Marcum's important work on the Angolan 
movements constructed their political constituency and 
historical significance from their ethno-linguistic origins.11 
In this approach, the MPLA was seen as primarily a Luanda-Mbundu 
movement in terms of its ethnic constitution, and as having
9. The Bakongo are also known as Kikongo which also refers to 
the language group spoken by this ethnie.
10. J Marcum, The Angolan Revolution Volume One, [1969], p.50.
11. J Marcum, The Angolan Revolution Volumes One and Two [1969 
and 1978].
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established links with historical Mbundu resistance against 
colonialism. Similarly, UPA, and later the FNLA, established 
itself around the modern political issues of the Kongo kingdom. 
While UNITA was seen, first and foremost, as representing the 
interests of the Ovimbundu and the Lunda-Chokwe.
But while they are undoubtedly significant in tracing 
the origins of each movement, the ethno-linguistic foundations 
of each movement need not be seen as having been overbearing in 
the political conflict that emerged. Certainly in other 
Portuguese colonies, such as Mozambique for instance, it was 
possible for one nationalist pan-tribal movement to emerge more 
powerfully than others, despite the undoubted stratification 
between different ethnic groups. In the case of Angola, the 
leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, of Ovimbundu origin, was a 
leading member of the UPA and the FNLA before returning to the 
south and establishing UNITA. Similarly, Daniel Chipenda, an 
Ovimbundu, was a prominent military leader in the MPLA before 
defecting to the FNLA in 1975. Both of these examples of many 
such cases seem to testify against an overwhelming reliance on 
the ethnic determinant in Angolan politics. While undoubtedly a 
factor in the Angolan conflict, especially in pin-pointing the 
identity of the rival constituencies and when used to draw upon 
loyalty, ethnicity does not seem to be able to completely 
explain the origins of the conflict itself. That is to say, 
Angolan ethnicity may have been exploited by movements and 
personalities in their political conflicts but the latter do not
153
emerge solely from the differences between the ethnies.
The concurrent development of Angolan anti-colonialism 
and nationalism within two practically separate social and 
political communities, that were generally speaking the Bakongo 
and the Mbundu, gave rise to two well-rooted movements. But the 
conflict between them cannot be seen to have emerged solely or 
even mainly from their ethnic differences. Other equally 
important influences such as race, education, personality 
clashes and basic political choices must be looked at to 
understand the roots of the civil war.
The origins of modern Angolan nationalism are set in 
two interrelated streams of protest, one pre-colonial, the other 
colonial. The history of pre-colonial Angola and especially of 
incidences of resistance to Portuguese military conquest played 
an important symbolic role in the anti-colonial war. For 
example, the resistance of the warrior Queen Jinga in the 
seventeenth century and of the warriors of the Dembos became 
part of the military and political ethos of the MPLA guerrilla 
groups of that area. This historical link between the modern 
anti-colonialists and the African resistance to the Portuguese 
was referred to by the leader of the MPLA, Agostinho Neto, who 
set the two different eras, past and present, in the same 
continuous framework of resistance to colonialism:
"For Angolans, clandestine action means the resumption of a 
long battle against Portuguese domination. From the time of 
Portuguese penetration, our history has been marked by great 
feats of resistance."12
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In a very different way, the restoration of the glory days of 
the Kongo kingdom also played an important historical role for 
political constitution and military ethos of the FNLA. But in 
this objective, however, a separatist programme can be 
discerned, which places itself awkwardly with subsequent claims 
of the FNLA to having a national programme. The restoration of 
the Kongo kingdom was very clearly the focus of Bakongo politics 
in the mid to late 1950s in which the Union of the Peoples of 
Northern Angola (UPNA),13 the precursor to the UPA (and, in 
turn, the FNLA), was heavily involved. In fact, the 'northern 
peoples’ referred to in the title of the movement belies its 
limited scope; that is: to the Kikongo-speaking peoples. Only 
when Holden Roberto, the leader of the UPNA (and subsequently of 
the UPA and the FNLA), was allegedly convinced of the evils of 
tribalism and the virtues of maintaining the territorial 
integrity of ex-colonies,14 was the title of the movement 
changed to UPA in order to impart a broader appeal.
12. A Neto, 'Angola in Historical Perspective1 Speech 
Leopoldville April 1963. Reproduced in R Chilcote, op.cit., 
p.213.
13. Uniao das Popula£6es do Norte de Angola.
14. Apparently this occurred at the All-African People's 
Conference held in Accra, December 1959, were there was, 
according to Marcum, an "exuberant pan-African spirit". [J 
Marcum, op.cit., Volume One, pp.67-68.] In Ghana, Holden Roberto 
met, among others, Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, George Padmore, 
Patrice Lumumba and Frantz Fanon. To these, and within pan- 
Africanism, tribalism and the idea of resurrecting the Kongo 
kingdom were not in step with the prevailing ideas of anti­
colonial struggle.
As well as drawing upon references to historical
resistance against Portuguese rule, the anti-colonial movements 
were also able to draw upon a more modern body of protest that
had emerged in Angola during what Wheeler has called the
"stirrings" phase of Angolan nationalism.15 During this time
there developed, in Angola, a stream of political life that can 
be seen to be a direct precursor to the anti-colonial movements 
of the 1960s. This political activity covered a period that 
coincided with an era of (relatively) free press from the 1880s 
to the end of the Republic in 1925, and was expressed most 
emphatically by the 'assimilado' and mestizo sectors within 
colonial society, particularly in the urban port areas of Luanda 
and Benguela. These two urban and commercial centres had been 
the focus of colonial trade for most of the period of Portuguese 
presence. Despite the low numbers of white settlers in the 
colony as a whole, Luanda and Benguela were active metropoli 
due to their status as trade entrepots. Until the early 
twentieth century, there had been a low level of white female
immigration to Angola, a fact that had helped to create a
mestizo class, one that generally tended to fill the economic 
space between the Portuguese and the Africans. Accorded a higher 
status in pre-New State colonial society, this mestizo class was 
often educated and formed part of the colonial administration 
and the trading structure with the interior, acting as
15. D L Wheeler, 'Origins of African Nationalism in Angola:
Assimilado Protest Writings, 1859-1929', [1972], p.69.
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intermediaries. Trading success and the benefits of colonial 
society gave the mestizos, along with established 'assimilado' 
African families a relatively significant social and economic 
niche in the coastal societies of Luanda and Benguela.
By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
this urban mestizo and assimilated class had developed modest 
and moderate political expression, most accentuated during the 
Republican interregnum, between 1910 and 1925. Associations such 
as the Angolan League (1912),16 among perhaps a dozen,17 and the 
free press environment allowed for a brief flourish of political 
expression during this period. According to Wheeler, the goals 
of the Angolan League were:
"(i) to fight for the general interests of Angola; (ii) to 
further African education; (iii) to defend the interests of 
their members and protect their rights; and (iv) to 
establish physical education classes."18
Although some members were more radical than others, their 
general approach was not anti-colonial but co-operative and pro- 
Republic and sought mainly to advance the 'assimilado' within 
colonial society. Access to white collar jobs by mestizos and 
'assimilados' was being challenged by increased white 
immigration, and this early twentieth century political protest 
in the form of such associations and publishing focused on the
16. Liga Angolana.
17. D L Wheeler, op.cit., [1972], p.73.
18. D L Wheeler and R Pelissier, Angola [1971], p.117.
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increased frustration felt by the mestizos and 'assimilados1 in 
being displaced from the promised rewards of colonial society.19
African political activity also emerged at this time 
in Lisbon, predating the later anti-colonialists who met, 
organised and developed their challenges to colonial rule from 
within the heart of the regime. The African League,20 
established in 1919, and the African National Party (PNA),21 in 
1921, were self-proclaimed non-violent lobby groups, with an 
'assimilado' membership, that sought to represent "...the 
progress, rights and interests of the masses of Africans..."22 
in the Portuguese colonies as a whole. During this time, these 
groups become linked to the wider streams of pan-Africanism and 
pan-Negroism that were emerging at the time. W E B  DuBois held 
the second session of the Third Pan-African Congress in Lisbon 
in 1923.23
Although this 'assimilado' political activity in 
Angola and Lisbon was generally non-confrontational,24 the
19. D L Wheeler, op.cit., [1972], p.75.
20. Liga Africana.
21. Partido Nacional Africano.
22. D L Wheeler and R Pelissier, op.cit., [1971], p.118.
23. The African League was closer to Dubois, and was host to 
this part of the congress. The PNA apparently leaned more 
towards Marcus Garvey. D L Wheeler and R Pelissier, op.cit., 
[1971], p.119.
24. The Angolan League was provocatively called the 'association 
of white killers', and combined with alleged reports of 
'assimilado' participation in revolts between 1913 and 1917, and 
a number of other incidents (the murder of a European clerk and
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associations were rapidly snuffed out once the New State began 
to emerge at the end of the 1920s. These associations, and even 
their more sterile successors under the New State, such as the 
Angolan National League (LNA),25 played an important role in the 
development of Angolan nationalism and anti-colonialism. They 
provided a forum for an exchange of views and an expression of 
dissatisfaction with colonial society and the Portuguese regime. 
They were built on and helped to develop a form of protest, 
which took as its subject and victim, the African Angolan. For 
example, in the protest writings of Jose de Fontes Pereira in 
the last decades of the nineteenth century and in Voz d1Angola 
clamando no deserto,26 a collection of Luandan press articles, 
the issue of race and its exploitation is brought to the fore, 
one which is subsequently central to the political expression of 
the anti-colonialists in the late 1940s and 1950s.
One final stream of political activity worth 
mentioning relates to European opposition in Angola to mainland 
regimes. On the one hand, a reactionary class of settlers and 
traders had developed in the coastal towns which lived mainly 
off the commercial links established directly with Brazil. Their
the discovery of an arms cache) led to a clamp-down by the 
authorities in the summer of 1917. Dozens of assimilados were 
thrown into gaol without trial. D L Wheeler, op.cit., [1972],
p.81.
25. Liga Nacional Angolana.
26. 'The voice of Angola crying in the desert1.
159
political complexion was often anti-metropolitan, and Angolan 
autonomy sometimes a goal, but were very much against African 
self-determination. A number of groups threatened to secede from 
Portugal, but were never sufficiently organized to bring this 
about. They expressed a mainly reactionary and poor white 
constituency. This stream of Angolan settler nationalism is 
somewhat reinforced throughout the twentieth century especially 
as a result of increased poor white immigration, and emerged 
violently against the anti-colonial movements, and Africans in 
general, in 1961 and later in 1974. According to Heimer, there 
is evidence of at least four underground organizations 
constituted to resist and "finish off" the nationalists.27 These 
groups sought a 'Rhodesian solution' for Angola and were 
"...supported by, and recruited from, 'petty whites' and 
financed by less competitive Angolan capital."28 The Popular 
Liberation Army (ELP),29 a Portuguese 'counter-revolutionary' 
military force that joined the South African offensive in 
October 1975, benefited from this stream of settler 
nationalism.30
27. These groups were: Frente de Resistencia Angolana (FRA); 
Resistencia Unida de Angola (RUA); Exercito Secreto de 
Intervengao Nacional de Angola (ESINA) and Exercito Secreto de 
Angola (ESA). F W Heimer, op.cit., [1979], p.42 note 165.
28. F W Heimer, ibid., p.42.
29. The Exercito de Libertagao Popular was the military branch 
of the Spinolist Movimento Democratico de Libertagao Popular 
(MDLP) which sought to counter the MFA in Portugal.
30. The ELP "...attracted deserters from the Portuguese 
army...ex-PIDE men, Angolan whites who had often held sympathies
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Within European colonial society, there developed 
also, in parallel, a radical body of opposition that derived its 
support from the white liberal, professional and 
semiprofessional classes. After the end of the Second World 
War, literature on fascism and Marxism was brought into Angola, 
especially from Brazil,31 and was particularly prevalent in 
white anti-Salazarist circles that were active in the main urban 
areas of Luanda and Benguela. There was a significant 
interaction, if not overlapping, between these circles and those 
of 'assimilado' and mestizo protest that were becoming 
increasingly radical by the end of the 1940s.
(ii) Urban Radicalism and the MPLA
By the late 1940s, small clandestine groups of 
opposition to colonialism had begun to form in the urban centres 
of Luanda and Benguela. Once again, the composition of these 
groups was mainly of mestigo and 'assimilado' origin: educated
Angolans who had a place in colonial society. Furthermore, the 
issues focused by their political criticism were long-standing 
ones: race, exploitation and colonialism. But reform was no
longer the main political objective. Increasingly, a radical 
anti-colonial programme was being developed, one that was
for FRA [see note above], and some Portuguese from Portugal and 
South Africa." F W Heimer, op.cit., [1979], p.70.
31. P McGowan Pinheiro, 'Politics of a Revolt* [1962], p.107.
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couched in the political language of Marxism, and sought the end 
of Portuguese rule. This fact took these groups further and 
further away from the previous non-violent streams of Angolan 
nationalism (often espoused by previous generations of families 
of these new urban radicals) that sought to achieve a negotiated 
settlement of those political questions with the Portuguese. 
This new generation of Angolan nationalists did not differ from 
previous generations in their social and racial background. They 
continued, furthermore, the development of an Angolan African 
national identity, attempting to break out of the Portuguese 
rationalization of colonial assimilation policies. But by the 
early 1960s their anti-colonial challenge, expressed in the 
programme and policies of the MPLA, had become violent in method 
and revolutionary in intent.
The intellectual starting point of this new radicalism 
was, however, still the idea of Angola and the Angolan. The 
clandestine protest literature assumed and continued to 
stimulate a national identity. In 1948, a group of Luandans 
linked to an authorised association, the Regional Association of 
the Angolan-born (ANANGOLA),32 published a literary review 
called Mensagem, with the motto 'Let Us Discover Angola.1 In its 
poetry and prose, young 'assimilados' and mestizos expressed 
outrage and bitterness at the submissive status of the 
colonized. They focused on bringing to the fore a sense of the
32. Associagao Regional dos Naturais de Angola. D L Wheeler and 
R Pelissier, op.cit., [1971], p.162.
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'Africanness1 of Angolans. As in other colonies on the continent 
at the time, their literature sought to assert an identity, one 
that was both African in race and Angolan in nationality. 
According to Marcum:
"They featured poetry that not only invoked Angola's African 
heritage but called upon Angolan poets to create an 'Angolan 
language1...[editor Viriato da Cruz's] work reflected what a 
leading commentator on Portuguese Negro poetry, Alfredo 
Margarido, has termed a 'new awareness of the motives behind 
the exclusion of the Negro from colonial society.' Such 
poetry produced a new internal freedom that was, Margarido 
predicted [in 1962], 'bound to be externalised eventually by 
means of revolt against the established order.'"33
Despite having only been published twice (it was banned by the 
colonial authorities in 1950), Mensagem is seen, particularly by 
the MPLA, as a formative stage in the development of modern 
Angolan anti-colonialism. Its young editor was Viriato da Cruz, 
a young mestizo intellectual who subsequently played a crucial 
role in the development of the Marxist tendency of Angolan 
nationalism in the MPLA.
Between the late 1940s and the mid-1950s a flurry of 
clandestine political organizing was experienced in the main 
urban centres. Small groups of intellectuals and students met in 
secret and discussed colonialism and its demise. They would 
exchange radical literature, produce their own, name and rename 
their discussion group, but little else was done. According to 
Van Dunem:
33. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume One, p.25.
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"They believed that to fight against Portuguese colonialism 
all was needed was a conspiracy on the part of 
intellectuals. They believed that all people needed to do 
was get together in somebody’s house one day, and, the next 
day, colonialism would collapse."34
The most pervasive political influence during this 
time was undoubtedly Marxism, and, despite the following claim 
of Viriato da Cruz it can be concluded that Portuguese 
communists were an important element in its development within 
Luandan anti-colonialism:
"The Communist Party of Portugal has...had no appreciable 
influence in either the preparation or the launching of the 
Angolan revolutionary movement".35
The PCP was the only anti-Salazarist opposition which had 
managed to remain intact throughout the period of the New State. 
According to Pelissier, the PCP had succeeded in infiltrating 
the authorised colonial associations, the Angolan National 
League (LNA) and the ANANGOLA. In 1961, a prominent MPLA 
leader, Mario de Andrade, in an article published in Pravda,36 
may have confirmed this 'penetration' when he referred to the 
'revolutionary character1 of the LNA, the ANANGOLA and a third 
group, the African Association of Southern Angola (AASA).37 One
34. Interview with Joao Van Dunem, London, 3 October 1990.
35. 'Problems of the Angolan Revolution1. Article that appeared 
in Revolution (January 1964) reproduced in R H Chilcote, 
Documents, [1972], p.207.
36. 'Freedom Shall Come to Angola Too1 Pravda 6 September 1961, 
reproduced in R H Chilcote, op.cit., [1972], p.194.
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of the first overtly Marxist groups to be constituted was the 
Angolan Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party, established 
sometime in 1948. The links between the PCP and the MPLA are 
clearly long-standing. Some of the members of the contemporary 
PCP are originally from that group of anti-Salazarist whites in 
Angola.38
From this group of Angolan nationalists and people 
linked to Portuguese communists emerged the Angolan Communist 
Party (PCA)39 in 1954. According to Van Dunem, the party was 
formed by "...four or five people...," Among whom was Ilidio 
Machado who was "...the thinker in the PCA."40 Ilidio Machado is 
considered to be one of the founder members of the MPLA. Yet 
according to Van Dunem, Machado denied this. Even if he was not, 
his influence on Viriato da Cruz and others who subsequently did 
become members of the MPLA, makes it possible to see the PCA as 
a precursor to the movement. Subsequent MPLA historiography,41 
however, omits references to the PCA, probably in the interests 
of appearing to be a broader political movement in order to 
appeal to a wider range of internal and external support.
37. Associagao Africana do Sul de Angola.
38. Julieta Gandara, Angelo Veloso and his wife, Maria da Luz 
Veloso, all active in the south of Angola. Interview with Joao 
Van Dunem, London, 3 October 1990.
39. Partido Comunista Angolano.
40. Interview with Joao Van Dunem, London, 3 October 1990.
41. Mario Pinto de Andrade, in 1963, refers only to "other 
organizations". M de Andrade, 'Angolan Nationalism1 [1963]
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It is important to point out here that the mestigo and 
assimilated semi-middle classes were not homogeneously 
developing a Marxist challenge to Portuguese colonialism. On the 
contrary, the young intellectuals espousing Marxism must 
certainly have been a thorn in the side of the more conservative 
elements, many times within their own families, who had achieved 
a significant position of social and economic importance within 
Luandan and Benguelan societies and were not particularly 
receptive to ideologies that called for the end of private 
property, even if they were promising the demise of colonialism.
In parallel to the clandestine activity conducted in 
Luanda, Angolan nationalists were also organizing in Lisbon; the 
destination for those Angolans who wanted to complete university 
degrees. A small number of mestigo and assimilated Africans went 
to Portugal to study. There, they came into contact with 
Portuguese political opposition, mostly the PCP, as well as with 
students from other Portuguese colonies. Among those Angolans 
studying in Lisbon and Coimbra during the mid-1950s were Mario 
Pinto de Andrade (MPLA founder), Agostinho Neto (MPLA leader and 
first Angolan president), Lucio Lara (MPLA ideologue) and Jonas 
Savimbi (UNITA leader). From Mozambique, there was Marcelino dos 
Santos (FRELIMO) and from Guinea-Bissau, Amilcar Cabral (PAIGC). 
Later, these contacts would become very useful to the MPLA 
leaders when deep in their conflict with the FNLA. Through 
interterritorial organizations such as the Conference of the 
Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP),42
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the MPLA benefited internationally from its association with 
the PAIGC and FRELIMO, whose own positions were uncontested.
While each pursued their own studies, they congregated 
in places such as the Home for Students from the Empire,43 an 
official hall of residence for colonial students. While Mario 
Pinto de Andrade44 and Lucio Lara tended to concentrate more on 
the intellectual facet of the anti-colonial challenge, Agostinho 
Neto was more active. He was a member of MUD Juvenil (the youth 
section of a movement very close to the communist party), and 
was arrested a few times. Neto had also established close links 
with an association of Angolan sailors as well as with other 
students. The regular voyages of Angolan sailors on the merchant 
ships back and forth between Portugal and Angola, provided a 
makeshift transmission belt that informed Angolans, in Lisbon 
and in Luanda of what the others were doing.45 According to Van 
Dunem:
reproduced in R H Chilcote, op.cit., [1972], p.187.
42. Conferencia das Organizagoes Nacionalistas das Colonias 
Portuguesas.
43. Casa dos Estudantes do Imperio.
44. According to Samuels, Andrade joined the PCP while in 
Lisbon. M A Samuels 'The Nationalist Parties' [1969], p.391.
45. Andre Franco de Sousa, an alleged founder of the MPLA,
describes how in 1957 Lucio Lara sent from Lisbon a home-made
copier. It was transported to Luanda on board a merchant navy 
ship by a sailor, named Gomes. The sailor handed a package to 
Franco de Sousa containing the copier and many issues of PCP 
publications, Avante and 0 Militante. A Franco de Sousa, 
'Mukanda ao Meu Irmao' (10 December 1990), p.6.
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"The axis was, therefore: Mario Pinto de Andrade (students in 
Lisbon), Agostinho Neto (sailors), Ilidio Machado and 
Viriato da Cruz (Luanda)"46
This axis was not so much a formal structure of organization as 
a network of exchange which carried news and ideas about the 
anti-colonial stirrings. Later, however, it formed the skeleton 
of the MPLA.
The clear expansion of nationalist activity, even if 
limited and clandestine, was rapidly picked up on by the 
colonial authorities. Sometime in 1957 or 1958, Lisbon decided 
to move to Angola a section of the regime's political police, 
the PIDE.47 To all accounts the PIDE established a good 
underground network of informants that managed to penetrate many 
of the Luandan groups. In whatever way it was done, the results 
were spectacular. A wave of arrests in 19 5 9 , 48 decimated the
46. Interview with Joao Van Dunem, London, 3 October 1990.0d
47. Wheeler says 1958. D L Wheeler, op.cit., [1971], p.146. 
Andrade says 1957. M de Andrade, 'Angolan Nationalism' [1963] 
reproduced in R H Chilcote, op.cit., [1972], p.188.
48. The famous Trial of Fifty resulted from these arrests on 
March 29 and further arrests in July, 1959. The defendants were 
identified by three lists of names which belied the almost
complete absence of African names. Apart from foreigners such as 
an American, George Barnett, almost all were of European, 
assimilated or mestizo origin. Another interesting factor is the 
listing of the defendants' occupations. The mestizos, concurrent 
with their higher status, were mainly civil servants, 
bookkeepers or banking clerks. Those of African origin but of 
assimilado status were in less prestigious occupations, with a 
large number of them in the nursing profession. This occupation 
was open to assimilados and had travel privileges, making it a 
de facto transmission belt for this early period of nationalist 
organization, see J Marcum, op.cit., Volume One, pp.33-34, and W 
Burchett, Southern Africa Stands Up, [1978], p.4.
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nationalist clandestine network, depleting it of its most 
prominent leaders either by prison or by pushing them 
underground and into exile. Ilidio Machado and Agostinho Neto, 
among many others were in prison by I9 6 0 . 49 Mario Pinto de 
Andrade and Lucio Lara had left Lisbon and were by this time in 
Paris. The regime had made it perfectly clear that it would not 
tolerate nationalist political activity. During 1960 the 
military presence of the colonial power was also significantly 
stepped up. In March the air force transferred a district base 
to Angola, marking their arrival with a bombastic air drop of 
troops over Luanda. A few weeks later, an extra 2,000 
infantrymen reinforced the 20,000-strong army.50
The colonial authorities' clamp-down on the 
nationalists was as much a reaction to the increase in local 
activity as it was a reflection of the New State's preoccupation
49. Mario de Andrade's brother, Father Joaquim Pinto de Andrade 
who was influential in catholic mestizo circles (D L Wheeler and 
R Pelissier, op.cit., [1971], p.163) was arrested on 25 June 
1959. Earlier, on 8 June, Agostinho Neto had been arrested at 
his medical practice, apparently by the Angolan PIDE chief, Joao 
Jose Lopes, in person (A M Khazanov, Agostinho Neto, [1986], 
p.86). Reports emerged later of deaths following a protest 
against his imprisonment held in his home village of Bengo. A 
contingent of 200 troops reportedly fired on the demonstrators 
killing 30 and injuring 200 (J Marcum, op.cit., Volume One, 
p.39). In August, Neto was transferred from Luanda, first to 
Aljube in Lisbon and then later in the year to the Cape Verde 
islands. The colonial authorities were obviously wary of the 
inflammatory consequences of holding a popular figure such as 
Neto. His poetry and constant sojourns in prison had fomented an 
image of political martyrdom, particularly in European circles.
50. B Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm [1975], pp.163-4, and J
Marcum, op.cit., Volume One, p.35.
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with the changing map of Africa. It was, to some extent, 
influenced by events in the neighbouring Belgian Congo. Perhaps 
encouraged by de Gaulle's offer of independence to the French 
Congo just across the river, anti-colonial agitation in the 
Belgian Congo had resulted in the announced withdrawal of the 
colonial power.51 The capitulation of the Belgian colonial 
resolve worried the Portuguese authorities.
Despite the fact that nationalist politics in Africa 
were about to reach a boiling point, the 1950s had been a period 
of relatively secure European colonial control. Before 1960, 
only ten African countries were independent and only two 
(excluding South Africa) of these were below the Sahara.52 It 
was at the turn of the decade that the full force of the 
decolonization process was delivered. In 1960 alone, 17 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa became independent. The effects 
of this process in general, and of events in the Belgian Congo 
in particular, was to help to accentuate in the Portuguese 
authorities a genuine fear of a possible nationalist challenge 
to its continued colonial rule.
It was clear that the colonial authorities were wary
51. Riots in January 1959 had turned Leopoldville upside down. 
There was a massacre of Africans by Belgian police, which led to 
international condemnation of the colonial regime. This forced 
the Belgian king to announce reform measures which led to 
independence in 1960.
52. Ghana had emerged from the Gold Coast under the aegis of 
Kwame Nkrumah in 1957, and Sekou Toure had called de Gaulle's 
bluff on the 1958 referendum and reluctantly opted out of the 
French orbit.
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of a nationalist challenge, but, apparently not from the urban 
groups. Leaked official documents which reported propaganda 
infiltration and armed attacks from the north of Angola, gave 
testimony to this fear of nationalist fervour, despite the fact 
that these documents were, in all probability, "instructional 
wargames" for the colonial authorities.53 Even if they were not 
genuine reports, they revealed that the colonial regime clearly 
identified any nationalist threat as coming from infiltration 
from the Congo and not from an internal uprising. The ethnic 
commonality that linked the Bakongo across the Angola-Congo 
border was perceived by the Portuguese as being dangerously 
permeable.
Following the colonial authorities1 clamp-down at the 
end of the 1950s, most of the urban nationalists were either in 
prison or abroad in exile. The intransigence and repressive 
efficiency of the colonial authorities had made staying in 
Angola an impossible option. Harassed by the PIDE, Viriato da 
Cruz had left Angola and joined Mario de Andrade and Lucio Lara 
abroad. These three intellectuals (the first two were mestizo 
and Lucio Lara, white) worked from Paris, from where they 
attempted to further the cause of Angolan anti-colonialism. 
Working under a general denomination, the Anti-Colonial Movement
53. J Marcum, op.cit. Volume One, p.35. The documents were 
handed to two members of the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) 
by Joaquim Pinto de Andrade in February 1960. The ACOA was a
liberal foundation based in New York. The documents were leaked
to the New York Times. J Freire Antunes, op.cit., [1991], p.84
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(MAC),54 they, and other leading nationalists from Portuguese 
colonies such as Amilcar Cabral and Marcelino dos Santos, were 
active in the left-wing political and literary circles of 
Western Europe. It was mainly from here that the MPLA emerged.
The creation of the MPLA is currently a subject of
controversy.55 At the heart of the dispute lies the question of 
the historical legitimacy of the movement, an issue that was to 
play an important role in the subsequent internationalization of 
the Angolan coonflict. Here, the two competing versions will 
only be summarized.
The 'official' version, which has been written into 
much of the material relating to the MPLA, contends that the 
MPLA was founded on 10 December 1956 by Ilidio Machado (PCA), 
Viriato da Cruz (Mensagem), Matias Migueis, Higino Aires and
Andre Franco de Sousa. This version has recently been vigorously
reaffirmed in an open letter by the single surviving member of 
this group, Andre Franco de Sousa.56 According to Franco de 
Sousa, the founding members met in Luanda at Ilidio Machado's 
house where a manifesto of political action was drawn up and the 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular 
para a Libertagao de Angola) was established. From here, the
54. Movimento Anti-Colonial.
55. See, in particular, articles in Expresso (Lisbon) 'MPLA: a 
Controversia da Fundagao', 1 December 1990, p.B7, and 2 February 
1991, pp.8R-15R.
56. A Franco de Sousa Mukanda ao Meu Irmao Angolano 10 December
1990.
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MPLA expanded inside the country only to fall foul of the
colonial backlash at the end of the 1950s. Still according to
this version, the MPLA then moved abroad, first to Guinea and
later to Leopoldville (Kinshasa). Then on 4 February 1961, the
remaining activists that were not either in prison or in exile, 
mounted an attack on the gaols of Luanda, that, although 
unsuccessful, was considered the start of the MPLA's anti­
colonial war against the Portuguese.
But this account of the foundation of the MPLA is now 
openly challenged by a number of people, including Joaquim Pinto 
de Andrade, the brother of Mario Pinto de Andrade and a so- 
called honorary president of the MPLA. According to him there 
was no constituted movement known as the MPLA at this time. He 
told Expresso that "before 1960 there was no document that
referred to the MPLA."57 Joaquim Pinto de Andrade claims that in 
1956 he had read a manifesto drawn up by Viriato da Cruz but
stresses that it had only been a declaration of intent to form a
movement and not the actual foundation itself. During this 
period, he states:
"...there were countless groups of 3-4 people [in Luanda] 
that would emit pamphlets abroad, to seem like many. There
was the PLUA, MIA, MINA, MNA58 But these were all
acronyms without programmes, without founders."59
57. Expresso (Lisbon) 1 December 1990.
58. Partido da Luta Unida [dos Africanos?] de Angola. Movimento 
para a Independencia de Angola. Movimento para a Independencia 
Nacional de Angola.
59. Expresso 1 December 1990.
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But those who stick to the original version maintain that the 
MPLA was not known nor referred to at this time because it was 
secret. According to Andre Franco de Sousa, after the foundation 
of the MPLA, it was decided that this acronym would be kept 
secret and reserved for later use. In the meantime, they would 
call themselves the Movement for the Independence of Angola 
(MIA).60 Joaquim Pinto de Andrade rejects this outright:
,,x...at the time, the MPLA did not exist, even secretly.1 
If it had existed, he went on, he would have known of it, 
since he was active in MIA, the very same cell in which 
Andre Franco de Sousa was."61
The revised history of the foundation of the MPLA, as defended 
by Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, an unnamed source in the Expresso 
article, and others,62 can be summarized in the following 
manner. Having left Luanda under pressure, Viriato da Cruz 
joined Mario Pinto de Andrade and Lucio Lara in Paris in 1957. 
In Angola, small cells remained which were active but dispersed. 
The exiles discussed the need for one broad movement, and, 
according to one source,63 it was only at the end of 1958 at the 
All-African Conference held in Accra that this core in exile
60. Movimento para a Independencia de Angola.
61. Expresso (1 December 1990).
62. See interviews with Manuel Santos Lima and Joao Van Dunem in 
Appendix.
63. Unnamed in Expresso (1 December 1990).
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decided to create the MPLA. Subsequently, Viriato da Cruz drew 
up the statutes and programme of the movement allegedly based on 
those of the Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF). The 
movement was to be named according to a phrase with which 
Viriato da Cruz had ended his 1956 document appealing for the 
creation of a broad popular movement.64 Establishing themselves 
in Conakry,65 sometime in 1959 or 1960, the MPLA had yet to act 
but now had a structure of leadership. The Directing Committee 
was made up of Mario Pinto de Andrade (president), Viriato da 
Cruz (secretary-general), Lucio Lara, Azevedo junior, Matias 
Migueis, Eduardo dos Santos and Hugo de Menezes.66 This 
revisionist version claims that far from being inspired by the 
MPLA, the attack on 4 February 1961 was a spontaneous, somewhat 
suicidal (although necessary) action carried out by elements at 
the time unconnected to the MPLA. What then occurred was the 
claiming of the attack by the newly-constituted MPLA in exile. 
According to the words of Mario de Andrade, conveyed by his 
brother:
"I arrived at the MPLA office and I come across Lucio Lara, 
who was permanently listening for news, and he told me that 
there had been an uprising in Luanda. I was amazed; I 
considered it for a while and then I turned to Viriato Cruz
64. "... a creagao de um amplo movimento popular para a 
libertagao de Angola."
65. According to Samuels, the Soviet ambassador to Guinea, 
Daniel Semenovich Solod, was very active in promoting Conakry as 
a centre for African liberation movements. M A Samuels 'The 
Nationalist Parties' [1969], p.391.
66. Expresso 1 December 1990.
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and told him: 'Viriato. Write! We have to claim that act!1 
And so he wrote: 'On the morning of 4 February, the Angolan 
patriots, led by the MPLA...'"67
According to Lima:
"...when the attack on the prisons takes place, the exiles 
have to admit that the people are moving faster than they 
are. We were intellectuals, students, moving in environments 
outside the country, while inside the country, people felt 
the necessity to turn to action. In order not to be left 
behind, it was necessary to transform that spontaneous 
movement and give it a voice, and a direction.1168
Subsequently, the movement backdated its origins in order to 
situate its birth earlier, in 1956, and inside the country. This 
was done in order to legitimize its constitution. If this was 
indeed the case, the MPLA must have feared that any movement led 
by mestizos in exile and hurriedly exposed after a suicidal 
attack on Luandan gaols which had left many dead, would not have 
been accepted, either externally or, more importantly,
internally.
If this new version is indeed accurate, then the
establishment of the MPLA may well have taken place outside
Angola and not inside, and three maybe four years after it has
hitherto been claimed. In fact, a press report of statements 
made in July 1962 by Jonas Savimbi in London, while still a UPA 
leader seem to support this revised version of the MPLA's 
origins:
67. Expresso 2 February 1991.
68. Interview with Manuel Santos Lima, Lisbon, 14 January 1991.
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"The MPLA are a party of students and intellectuals in exile: 
their movement was started in Paris."69
This revision of its origins contests the legitimacy of the 
MPLA's claims to having launched the anti-colonial war, when it 
was the heroic but unorganized act of desperate nationalists. 
According to Mendes de Carvalho, who was one of the prisoners 
they sought to release, the men who attacked the prison knew 
nothing of the MPLA and were shouting the name of its rival: 
"UPA.. .UPA!",70 at the time the most prominent Angolan movement, 
and the precursor to the FNLA.
What this reveals is that already at the birth of the 
MPLA, the competitive pressures of legitimization wielded an 
overwhelming influence. These pressures to endow the movement 
with an internal and external validity are also the driving- 
force behind the subsequent alliances made by the movement, not 
only to help fight colonialism, but also to legitimize their 
identity vis-a-vis their rivals.
Although this controversy has emerged and it becomes 
important to document the origins of the MPLA as accurately as
69. West Africa 14 July 1962. Reproduced in Africa Digest Volume 
X No.1, p.29.
70. Expresso 2 February 1991. The principal motivator of the 
action on 4 February was Canon Manuel das Neves. Although 
allegedly unconnected to either the MPLA or UPA, Canon Manuel 
das Neves was linked to the Protestant Church that looked in 
turn to Leopoldville, where Holden Roberto and UPA held sway. 
Later in 1962, when the FNLA(UPA) forms the GRAE, a 'Mgr. Manuel 
das Neves' is listed as the 2nd Vice Prime Minister of the 
government-in-exile. R H  Chilcote, op.cit., p.112.
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possible, the fact is that by claiming the act of 4 February for 
itself and by giving it the symbolic value it has hitherto 
maintained, the MPLA has, in effect accrued the responsibility 
of the act to itself, even if it did have nothing to do with it. 
It signified that Neto could claim in 1964 that:
"Incontestably, that date marked the first phase of armed 
fighting against Portuguese colonialism."71
Despite the fact that the existence of the MPLA proper 
in 1956 has been contested in this way, those now credited with 
its foundation formed the political and manpower structure that 
would subsequently constitute the movement. This means that the 
basic compostion and ideological orientation of the MPLA remains 
constant despite the discrepancies of dates and locations in its 
origins.
An attempt to pin-point the ideological influences of 
the MPLA results in two influential currents being identified: 
nationalism and Marxism. The issue of Angolan nationalism has 
already been referred to above in general terms. The important 
aspect to note is that the idea of Angolan nationality was part 
of the literature and political lexicon utilised by the MPLA and 
its precursors. The issue of Marxism in the MPLA takes on a 
similar hue as it does in other anti-colonial wars, where 
revolutionary Marxism was allied with anti-colonial nationalism.
71. A Neto 'Angola in Historical Perspective1 (April 1963) in R 
H Chilcote, op.cit., p.215.
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Marcum points out that it may have been a natural consequence of 
their mestizo origins that a political prism such as Marxism was 
favoured by the leaders of the MPLA, as it was an ideology that 
focused on class, rather than racial, conflict.72 The Ottaways 
support this conclusion:
"[The racial] characteristics of the MPLA help explain why 
Marxism held a special appeal for its leaders. By stressing 
class conflict over all others, it provided the urban 
mestizos and 'assimilados' with an ideology that transcended 
race and allowed co-operation between them and the black 
workers and lumpenproletariat of the musseques."73
Such a conclusion would apply equally to the case of assimilated 
Africans, caught socially and culturally between two worlds. But 
it is not solely orthodox Marxism, as a theory of class 
struggle, that forms the ideological constitution of the MPLA 
before 1975 but the doctrine and practice known as National 
Liberation.
Anti-colonialism in the Third World emerged as the 
dominant political objective of the post-war era. The politics 
of the end of colonial rule and the self-determination of 
national sovereignty swept the European overseas dominions for a 
number of reasons derived from the course of the Second World 
War. The war against 'fascism' and for 'freedom1 had left an 
indelible mark on the subject peoples who felt that this 
struggle for ideals also applied to their situation.
72. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume One, p.20.
73. D and M Ottaway, Afrocommunism [1986], p.99-100.
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Furthermore, the European defeats at the hands of the Japanese 
had helped to crack the myth of the invincibility of the white 
man. Finally, post-war international politics had developed 
with two superpowers at opposing poles, and both the US and the 
Soviet Union defended anti-colonial positions, albeit from 
different perspectives. The effect of these factors, among 
others, helped to impel nationalists throughout Africa to make 
anti-colonialism an, eventually, overwhelmingly pervasive 
political objective.
Despite these external factors, however, self- 
determination emerged principally from the reaction of the 
colonized. According to an MPLA leader: "We are humiliated as 
individuals and as a people."74 The desire to constitute an 
independent political entity became the common denominator of 
anti-colonial movements throughout the continent. This was the 
main political objective of the 'first wave' of decolonization, 
although some did defend a more radical approach than merely the 
achievement of independence.75 Independence on its own was 
insufficient for the critics of this search for an African
74. M de Andrade in "Angolan Nationalism" (1963) in R H 
Chilcote, [1972], p.188.
75. The ideological nature of many of these newly-independent 
states was known as African Socialism. Resulting from broadly- 
based mass parties and embodying a nationalist coalition, 
radical regimes such as that of Sekou Toure in Guinea, Leopold 
Senghor in Senegal, Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, Julius Nyerere in 
Tanzania, and to a certain extent that of Kwame Nkrumah in 
Ghana, all imposed a form of socialist society in a post­
independence state.
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Socialism.
The search for political independence was merely the 
launching-pad for the doctrine of National Liberation. This is 
where Marxism, as an interpretive and political instrument, 
enters the anti-colonial stream, as a much broader definition of 
colonial domination is considered. One of the most influential 
factors on the development of revolutionary anti-colonialism was 
the experience of the Chinese Communist Party, although it 
occurred in a semi-colonial country. In fact, the doctrine of 
Maoism can be seen to be the core of National Liberation. In 
this case, what Maoism and the Chinese Revolution helped to 
foment was the concept of economic independence as well as that 
of political self-determination. The introduction of a Marxist 
analysis to anti-colonialism is what distinguishes National 
Liberation from anti-colonialism (as it is anti-colonial 
nationalism that distinguishes National Liberation from Marxism- 
Leninism) . No longer was the end of the colonial authority a 
sufficient objective; the economic structure must also be 
overturned, or else colonial control would not be terminated. 
What had to be confronted, the Maoists claimed, was "...the 
double-edged sword of imperialism.1,76 In its declarations the 
MPLA clearly used a similar prism:
"The MPLA is a revolutionary movement. The MPLA plan aims at 
the complete destruction of the colonial machinery and of 
all forms of domination."77
76. S N Macfarlane, Superpower Rivalry and Third World 
Radicalism: The Idea of National Liberation] [1985] pp.45-46.
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Thus, in the Third World, Marxism "...had... march[ed] from a 
theory of the self emancipation of the industrial working class 
to a voluntaristic recipe for rural insurrection followed by 
state planning and capital accumulation".78 Liberation movements 
adopted the revolutionary transformation to socialism as a model 
of development, ignoring the succession of historical stages 
determined by orthodox Marxism.79 National Liberation "...has 
become a vehicle for radical nationalism in non-industrial 
societies."80
National Liberation was, however, much more than a 
modified Marxist doctrine of development. The experience of 
those movements that adhered to National Liberation created a 
world-wide stream of revolutionary anti-colonialism, to which 
the MPLA, like other movements, turned and felt part of:81
"We know that victory in the righteous struggle of our people 
is not far off now...Guaranteeing this is the unswerving 
desire of the Angolan people for freedom, the powerful 
national liberation movement (and) the support of all
77. MPLA Program of Action (December 1962) in R H Chilcote, 
op.cit., p.258.
78. I Roxborough, Theories of Underdevelopment, [1979], p.134.
79. see G White, 'Revolutionary Socialist Development in the 
Third World: an Overview', [1983]: "In consequence, rather than
being an historical successor to capitalism, socialism has 
become an historical substitute." p.3.
80. G White, ibid.
81. See G Therborn, 'From Petrograd to Saigon' in New Left
Review, 48.
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progressive humanity."82
During the course of the anti-colonial war in Angola, and 
particularly in the late-1960s, it was with the body of National 
Liberation that the MPLA most closely identified with. The 
experience of other so-called national liberation wars, such as 
those in Algeria and Vietnam, were held up as examples to 
emulate. According to Lucio Lara, the principal ideologue of the 
MPLA:
"The Vietnamese armed struggle was very human, a blend of 
political and military action which became our model. In 
drawing up our MPLA programme, we were strongly influenced 
by the Vietnamese experience. Obviously we also studied 
their military tactics, their concepts of people's war."83
The purpose of this summary of the doctrinal core of 
National Liberation and of its relevance to the MPLA is to 
situate the ideological co-ordinates of the movement in the 
stream of post-war anti-colonialism. In the intransigence of the 
colonial regime, there was undoubtedly an internal motivation 
for the radicalization of the movement, by foregoing other forms 
of achieving a negotiated settlement with the colonial power 
when turning to warfare. It is, however, impossible to ignore 
the ideological outlook of the MPLA as it was almost certainly a
82. M de Andrade, 'Freedom Shall Come to Angola Too1 in R H 
Chilcote, op.cit., p.195.
83. September 1976. Cited by Kevin Brown 'Angolan Socialism1 in 
C G Rosberg and T M Callaghy (eds.), Socialism in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: A New Assessment, [1979], p.301.
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conditioning factor in the external links the movement 
established, in particular with the Soviet Union and Cuba. In 
ideological terms, despite doctrinal differences, the MPLA stood 
clearly in the Socialist camp.
(iii) Holden Roberto and Bakongo Nationalism
A particularity of modern Angolan politics is the role 
played by Angolan nationalists who operated principally from 
neighbouring Congo-Leopoldville. As has already been discussed, 
the Kikongo-speaking ethnic communality that straddles the 
border between the two countries is an important factor in the 
development of one strand of Angolan nationalism, and eventually 
in the development of one of the strongest anti-colonial 
movements, the FNLA, that in 1975 made a bid for power against 
the MPLA. The FNLA has often been subject to criticism which 
assumes that its tribal nature casts doubt on the legitimacy of 
its bid to represent Angola and not just one part of it. It was, 
however, one of the signatories to the Alvor accords which 
recognized three movements as being the legitimate 
representatives of the Angolan people. Furthermore, the FNLA 
itself disclaimed any separatist objectives and claimed to act 
within a nation-wide scope. The movement, led by Holden Roberto, 
acted under a number of constraints, mostly connected to 
Congolese (Zairean) factors, the nature of which will emerge 
when the origins of the FNLA are considered.
In the 1960s, after the independence of the Belgian
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Congo, there were as many as 58 Angolan nationalist 
organizations in Leopoldville (Kinshasa).84 They strove for 
political representation amongst the Angolan expatriate 
population, manoeuvred for official Congolese backing and 
eventually paraded for continental African support. Amongst 
these was the movement that later formed the core of the FNLA. 
The Uniao das Populates de Angola (UPA), was the most powerful 
movement representing the Kikongo-speaking peoples, and its 
leader, Holden Roberto, was for long the only face of Angolan 
nationalism. In 1961, when the anti-colonial war against the 
Portuguese began, the UPA was the leading champion of Angolan 
self-determination.
Despite having been born in Angola, Holden Roberto was 
raised in Leopoldville and was, according to all accounts, much 
more at home in that city's political scene. His rise to 
prominence in the UPA occurred under the protective wing of his 
uncle, Barros Necaca. Originally, the association was known as 
the Uniao das Populates do Norte de Angola (UPNA), and Barros 
Necaca was its president. Their political constituency were the 
Baxikongo tribe, whose leaders were Baptists and Kongo 
royalists.85
84. As well as 26 associations of a social or trade union 
character. These numbers include all movements monitored from 
the beginning of nationalist activity to 1967. In D L Wheeler 
and R Pelissier, op.cit., [1971], p.220.
85. In the conflict over the succession of the Kongo throne, 
based in Sao Salvador do Congo over the border in Angola, in 
1955 and in 1957, the UPNA fielded a Protestant candidate for 
the crown. These moves were predictably blocked by the
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The UPNA organised around their professed aim of 
restoring the ancient kingdom of the Kongo to full independence. 
The hypothetical result of such an aim would have been the
constitution of a separate Bakongo state, which would have
changed Angolan borders. On 20 May 1956, Roberto was one of the 
young Baxikongo who co-signed a letter to a visiting US State 
Department official, in which the separate nature of the Kongo 
was emphasised, and called for the end of Portuguese rule, but 
only with regard to the Kongo. A year later, a letter appealed 
to the UN Secretary-General for the restoration of the 
independent Kongo kingdom.86 The formative influence of this 
early political objective on the FNLA and Roberto should not be 
overestimated, yet it does reveal the limited scope of their 
political constituency.
As his ascendancy within UPNA prevailed, Roberto was 
chosen to carry out a mission to Accra, Ghana to attend the 
first All-African conference held in December of 1958. It was at 
this conference (where Roberto established contacts with 
nationalists such as Patrice Lumumba, Kenneth Kaunda and Franz 
Fanon) that the separatist nature of the UPNA was cast aside in 
favour of a total Angolan identity. According to reports, 
Roberto was convinced in meeting leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah 
and Sekou Toure, and Pan-Africanists such as George Padmore, 
that the organization should be modernized and should drop the
Portuguese who did not want anyone but a Catholic on this
figure-head throne.
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"tribal anachronism" of its restorational aims.87 Thus, a 
manifesto in the name of UPA calling for the liberation of all 
Angola made its first appearance at the Accra conference.
In the following two years, Roberto toured 
international circles and published damning articles on 
Portuguese colonialism, steadily increasing the profile of his 
own movement. He visited Accra, Conakry, Brazzaville, Tunis, 
Monrovia and New York. In August of 1959, he attended a foreign 
minister's Conference of Independent African States held in 
Monrovia. In September 1959, while associated to the Guinean
mission at the United Nations, Roberto put the case in favour of
assigning Portugal's African territories to UN jurisdiction. 
While in New York, he established a wide range of American 
contacts with the help of the American Committee on Africa 
(ACOA). Also reinforcing his prominence among African leaders, 
Roberto took part as an observer at the second Conference of 
Independent African States which was held in Addis Ababa in June 
I9 60 . 88 By the end of the 1950s, while the leadership of the 
MPLA was dispersed and barely constituted, Roberto was a well- 
known figure in the African political arena and had already
established good links with groups in the US.
It is important to note that this activity was partly 
political strategy but also partly enforced. The Belgian
86. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume One, [1969], pp.62-63.
87. J Marcum, ibid., p.67.
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colonial authorities had clamped down hard on Angolan 
nationalists following the Bakongo-led riots in Leopoldville of 
January 1959. The arrest of several hundred Angolans by the 
Belgian police was partly a result of Portuguese pressure to 
come down hard on Angolan nationalist activity, as well as their 
own belief that Angolan emigres had participated in the rioting. 
However, the result of the arrests was the repatriation of the 
alleged nationalists, which may have had a negative effect, at 
least from the perspective of the Portuguese colonial regime. 
The reintegration of ex-emigres who transmitted nationalist 
ideas as well as talking of higher wages over the border was not 
what the Portuguese had wanted. The UPA later claimed these 
extraditions enabled the infiltration of the colony by 'cells' 
that would prepare the groundwork for the March 15 uprising.89
By July 1960, Roberto had returned to Leopoldville 
where he was warmly received. His international prestige had 
helped to make this a period of expansion in the fortunes of the 
UPA. It was also the time in which Roberto began to consolidate 
his own dominance of the movement. In the heady summer months 
of Lumumba's rule, Roberto disseminated the cause of the UPA and 
challenged, in writings and broadcasts, the Portuguese colonial 
administration. He was already working with those that would 
form his very personalized structure of command. Most prominent 
among these were Jose Manuel Peterson and Johnny Edouard, son of
88. J Marcum, op.cit., p.84.
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Eduardo Pinock, a veteran of the Protestant challenge to the 
Kongo succession.
Roberto's rising star was momentarily eclipsed, 
however, by the dismissal of Patrice Lumumba by President 
Kasavubu, in September 1960. His past association with Lumumba 
allowed his political opponents to accuse him of being a 
communist. Roberto fled to Ghana (where he was spurned by 
Nkrumah's government and accused of being "...in the pay of 
America."90), and from there to New York where he attended the 
15th UN General Assembly. While he was in New York, there
developed a situation that might have marked the end of his rise 
to prominence within the UPA, and consequently changed the
course of Angolan politics.
While Roberto was in the United States, the UPA 
Steering-Committee remaining in Leopoldville had committed the 
movement to a loose coalition of Angolan parties, known as the 
Common Front of the Political Parties of Angola.91 The other 
parties involved were: a local MPLA committee led by a Bakongo, 
Antonio Josias; ALIAZO, an association representing the Bazombo 
tribes; and a Cabindan group, the AREC.92 The UPA 
representatives that had committed themselves to the Front were 
apparently 'moderates' that were attempting to challenge
89. J Marcum, ibid., p.71.
90. J Marcum, ibid., p.96.
91. Front Commun des Parties Politiques de l'Angola. J Marcum, 
ibid., p.95.
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Roberto's predominance.93
This challenge to Roberto's leadership was written off 
as a conservative reaction to his tendency to increasingly move 
away from non-violence towards direct action against 
colonialism. On the other hand, it may also have represented the 
first of what were to be many dissensions from Roberto's 
allegedly autocratic style of leadership. What was later 
revealed through the many abandonments of the FNLA was that 
Roberto was unwilling to dillute his own power at the head of 
the movement. Linking up with other Angolan nationalist groups, 
unless they were dissolved into his structure of authority, 
represented an unacceptable threat to Roberto. According to the 
US State Department, Roberto was "...inflexible, resolute, anti­
communist and incapable of delegating authority."94
Willing to defend his position, Roberto hastened back 
from New York to see the challenge off. The ensuing power 
struggle resulted in a major split: 17 resignations out of the 
20 members of the UPA Steering-Committee, including Roberto's 
uncle and initial patron, Barros Necaca. From this point 
onwards, Holden Roberto became the uncontested leader of the 
UPA. His first act was to withdraw the UPA from the Front, the 
latter subsequently collapsing.95
92. Association des Ressortissants de l'Enclave de Cabinda.
93. The 'moderates' had planned to hold elections for the 
leadership in November while Roberto was away in New York.
94. J Freire Antunes, Kennedy e Salazar: o Leap e a Raposa
[1991], p.86.
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By the beginning of 1961, Roberto was very much in 
control of the UPA. He had firmly established himself at the 
centre of power and placed members of his own tribe and family 
in the most important executive posts. Hitherto, the political 
activity of the movement had been to develop a public campaign 
against Portuguese colonialism:
"Today, the UPA, aware of the responsibilities it is assuming 
toward the Angolan people, toward Africa and toward history, 
makes a solemn appeal to the Portuguese government and 
people to agree to negotiate as soon as possible on ending 
the colonial regime and recognizing national Angolan 
sovereignty."96
The movement's internal and external profile was relatively 
pronounced, and it may be claimed that it was, at this time, the 
best known Angolan nationalist group. In fact, judging by the 
aforementioned Portuguese 'wargames' documents, an attack by the 
UPA into northern Angola from the Congo was the nationalist 
challenge most feared by the colonial regime. Furthermore, as 
has been testified by participants in the 4 February 1961 attack 
in Luanda, the UPA was, at this time, considered to be the main 
Angolan nationalist movement even in the capital which
95. The Front continued as a coalition between the MPLA 
committee and ALIAZO until February 1961. The Conakry office of 
the MPLA, however, sent two officials that declared that the 
local committee had exceeded its authority in committing itself 
to the Front, an act which thereby undermined the legitimacy of 
the local committee and its leader, Antonio Josias. J Marcum, 
ibid., p.99.
96. Holden Roberto Press Conference 10 June 1960. Reproduced in 
R H Chilcote, op.cit., p.66.
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eventually, it can be said, became MPLA 'territory1.
At the beginning of 1960, the second All-African 
People's Conference was held in Tunis, which seems to mark a 
watershed in the choice of strategy of the Angolan nationalist 
movements. The search for a negotiated decolonization, as 
experienced elsewhere on the continent, had hitherto been the 
objective of Angolan nationalists, as can be seen in the UPA 
appeal cited above.
The MPLA had also been appealing for a negotiated
settlement. The nucleus in exile had been busy making contacts
and putting across the case against the colonization of Angola. 
A war of communiques and newspaper replies marked the 
confrontation with the Portuguese colonial authorities. A
process of peaceful self-determination was, however,
increasingly put in doubt as the Portuguese press transmitted 
the determination of the Salazar regime to refuse even the 
discussion of self-government. In reply the nationalists warned 
of the responsibility the Portuguese government would bear for 
the "bloody conflict" that would ensue from this 
intransigence.97 But even as late as 1960, the resort to armed 
action was not an obvious development. According to the first 
MPLA military leader:
"...Mario de Andrade himself hesitated considerably before 
taking the option of armed struggle. When this was talked 
about in terms of political speculation, I remember Mario de 
Andrade until 1960, Mario was very hesitant."98
97. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume One, p.44.
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According to one interpretation," this began to 
change at the All-African meeting in Tunis, where both the MPLA 
and the UPA were present. With the Algerian war of independence 
in full flow, Franz Fanon cast an authoritative shadow over the 
workings of the conference. Among others, he called for the 
peaceful option to be cast aside in favour of direct action. 
What was being called for was the launching of the Angolan war 
of independence. This vision was contested by Mario de Andrade 
who held that war was not necessarily essential for the anti­
colonial process.100 This resistance by the MPLA to Fanon's calls 
for a war may explain the support then given to the Holden 
Roberto's UPA by the Algerian National Liberation Front 
(FLN).101
By 1961 then, the MPLA and the UPA seemed to be going 
in opposite directions. The latter, internally cohesive, was 
considering the launching of direct military action against 
Portuguese colonialism, while the former was still attempting to 
consolidate its organization. For this reason, the MPLA can be 
seen to be somewhat fortunate to have been credited with the
98. Interview with Manuel Santos Lima, Lisbon, 14 January 1991.
99. J Marcum, op.cit.
100. see A M Khazanov, Agostinho Neto (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1986), p.83.
101. Front de Liberation National. B Davidson, In the Eye of the
Storm, [1974], p.201.
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initiation of anti-colonial war on 4 February 1961. As displayed 
above, the attacks in Luanda in February seem to have forced the 
movement's hand in opting for a military strategy. By claiming a 
role in the beginning of armed conflict against the Portuguese, 
the MPLA made an important move placing it somewhat on a par 
with the UPA, when the latter unleashed the attacks of 15 March 
1961.
The combined impact of the.February and March anti­
colonial violence propelled Angolan nationalism towards a 
significantly increased level of international attention. The 
sheer violence of the UPA attacks and of the colonial backlash 
marked a new phase in nationalist anti-colonialism.102 
Furthermore, the attacks had been timed to coincide with a UN 
Security Council debate on Portuguese colonialism. The 
announcement that a revolt had begun in Angola sharpened the 
debate and helped to produce a report critical of the
Portuguese. During the course of 1961, both the desperate bid 
for self-determination and the intransigent nature of the 
colonial regime were revealed.103
102. The eight month-long uprising resulted in thousands of
deaths: various sources placed the numbers at 8,000, 25,000, and 
50,000. D L Wheeler and R Pelissier, op. cit., p.191. Marcum
quotes figures advanced by Ralph E Dodge in November 1961.
African deaths: 45,000; European deaths: 250 to 1000. in J
Marcum, op.cit., Volume One, p.150. Davidson quotes the figure 
advanced by the British Baptist Missionary Society: 20,000. in
op.cit., p.191. See also Africa Digest Volume VIII No.6, p.248.
103. As well as military reprisals, the colonial authorities
carried out further arrests, specifically targeted at educated
and 'assimilado' people. Africa Digest Volume IX, No.1, p.26.
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At first, Roberto denied that the UPA had been 
responsible for the attacks.104 Subsequently, however, the 
attacks have entered the historiography of the FNLA, and even 
Angolan nationalism as a whole, as the beginning of the end of 
Portuguese colonialism. Considering Roberto's belief that 
Portuguese colonialism would become diplomatically isolated if 
there was an Angolan uprising,105 it can be concluded that the 
intention behind the attacks was to create a situation of 
extreme terror and violence which would provoke a negative 
international reaction to Portuguese colonialism. This would, in 
turn, lead Lisbon to consider renouncing sovereignty while the 
violence would impel the European settler population to give up 
and leave Angola. This scenario seems to have been modelled 
closely on what occurred in the Belgian Congo, and it does not 
seem far-fetched to claim that Roberto believed that this 
experience could be repeated in Angola. The differences between 
Portuguese and Belgian colonialism, however, produced another 
result altogether.
The 1961 anti-colonial actions did not manage to drive 
away Portuguese colonialism. Instead, the regime in Lisbon sent 
troops106 and proclaimed its determination in holding on to
104. D L Wheeler and R Pelissier, op.cit., p.181.
105. "Portugal will have no support, for its colonial system is 
known for being one of the most retrogade." Cited in J Marcum, 
op/cit., Volume One, p.69.
106. 17,000 by July 1961. Observer 2 July 1961.
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colonial control. Even diplomatic isolation did not seem to 
bother the Portuguese regime. When, it had become clear that the 
Kennedy administration was taking an anti-Portuguese position in 
the United Nations, the United States embassy in Lisbon was 
stoned.107 When the US approved a UN Security Council resolution 
that condemned the Portuguese colonial authorities' repression 
of the nationalist actions in Angola,108 all this seemed to do 
was to reinforce the regime's resolve to resist change. While 
the Portuguese representative at the UN inferred that the US was 
merely courting the Third World vote, Salazar told the National 
Assembly:
"The United States is pursuing in Africa, although with other 
intentions, a policy which is parallel to that of 
Russia...[one that is] incompatible with what she is trying 
to achieve through the North Atlantic Treaty."109
As has been shown in Chapter Two, it was also at this time that 
the effects of 'late colonialism' were beginning to emerge, 
while colonial development policies were implemented that 
envisaged an even greater fusion of Angola with metropolitan 
Portugal. Despite this, the 1961 actions, in particular those of 
the UPA in the north of the country, marked the launch of armed 
conflict against the Portuguese.
Shortly following the March action, Roberto and the
107. Africa Digest Volume VIII, No.6, p.247.
108. S/4835. Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council
1961.
109. The Times 1 July 1961.
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UPA's privileged position in Leopoldville became momentarily 
threatened. Congolese fears of Portuguese retaliation led 
President Kasavubu to consider expelling Roberto and his 
movement from Leopoldville. Kasavubu was a leader of the 
Congolese Abako party, which was in direct competition with the 
UPA in the Bakongo constituency. By putting pressure on Roberto 
to please the Portuguese, the Congolese president would have 
been killing two birds with one stone.110 However, by the 
summer, and despite the continuing rivalry with Abako and even 
outright antipathy from Kasavubu in the presidency, the 
Congolese political climate changed significantly in favour of 
Roberto. In July 1962, his old friend and fellow footballer, 
Cyrille Adoula, was appointed as Prime Minister; an appointment 
that gave the UPA a very secure political presence in 
Leopoldville. The Adoula-Roberto link, like the Mobutu-Roberto 
axis that followed it, provided the UPA (and later the FNLA) 
with a secure base across the border from Angola, to which the 
movement had privileged access. Furthermore, Adoula favoured the 
UPA in its bids to gain the allegiance of the Angolan emigres of 
Leopoldville, the numbers of which had swollen considerably 
after the 1961 violence.111
110. The UPA's difficulties with Abako were testified to by the
Abako leadership of the Lower Congo's ban on Roberto's entry to
that province.
111. According to D L Wheeler and R Pelissier (op.cit., p.190), 
some 300,000 had abandoned the northern area of Angola after the
1961 attacks and colonial backlash, most of which streamed over
the border to Leopoldville, "...a stream of refugees that was to 
pour 150,000 uprooted Angolans into the Congo before the end of
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In early 1962, the UPA was a founder member of a front 
that in effect replaced it as the vehicle for Holden Roberto's 
political power. On 27 March 1962, the National Front for the 
Liberation of Angola (FNLA) was formally established. Despite 
the fact that the FNLA's political structure became, in effect, 
dominated by Roberto's own personal power network, it was based 
on a genuine political union: an alliance between the UPA and 
another large Kikongo-speaking movement, the Aliazo. Essentially 
a tribal association to further the interests of the Bazombo, 
Aliazo had protest roots in the religious activity of an anti­
colonial but somewhat obscurantist group in 1949-1950: the Simao 
Toco sect. Like the UPNA before it, Aliazo broadened its 
political horizon and renamed itself the Democratic Party of 
Angola (PDA).112 Its main constituency was, like all other 
Angolan parties in the Congo, in the emigre community of 
Leopoldville. Within the FNLA decision-making structure, the PDA 
retained the power of veto. This was, however, meaningless as 
Roberto avoided using FNLA institutions and processes in order 
to wield almost complete power.113
The creation of the FNLA sought a very clear objective. 
While being able to maintain predominance within his political
[1961]." J Marcum, op.cit., Volume One, p.145. By December 1963, 
the refugee population in the Congo reached 300,000. J Marcum, 
The Angolan Revolution Volume Two, p.355, note 80.
112. Partido Democratico de Angola.
113. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, p.38.
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constituency, the creation of a front, of more than one movement 
or party, permitted Roberto to claim that that it represented an 
attempt to unite anti-colonial Angolans, and therefore, spurn 
increasing pressures to unite with the MPLA. The following are 
the first two decisions of the creators of the FNLA:
"1) To unite our forces in one national liberation front to 
hasten the independence of the country.
2) To group in an Angolan national liberation front, all 
organisations truly representative of the Angolan people who 
accept the general policies of the front."114
With the creation of the FNLA, Roberto almost certainly sought 
to capture the support of international and continental backing 
for his movement's armed challenge to Portuguese colonialism, as 
it became increasingly apparent that the issue of rivalry for 
legitimacy to represent Angolan nationalism and the resulting 
attempts and failures to constitute a common front was going to 
dominate the anti-colonial war.
Earlier, during 1961, the UPA had attempted to expand 
beyond its Bakongo base with the appointment of Jonas Savimbi as 
secretary-general of the party. The appointment of Savimbi, of 
Ovimbundu origin, was an influential factor in leading other 
Angolan students in Europe to join the UPA. Earlier, the 
inclusion of Rosario Neto, a Luanda-Mbundu, in the UPA 
leadership was also an attempt by the party to transcend its
114. Establishment of the FNLA 27 March 1962. R H Chilcote,
op.cit., pp.103-104.
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Bakongo image. To all appearances, after the psychological 
success115 of the March attacks (militarily they were quite 
unsuccessful), the party was attempting to throw off its tribal 
image and expand into a all-encompassing Angolan nationalist 
force. It was these political and military actions that provided 
the UPA with the opportunity to grow larger, and helped to 
bring the PDA to join it in an alliance. The prestigious 
military actions and the broadening of the ethnic make-up of the 
UPA leadership, established the strength of the party and of 
Roberto which was at the core of the FNLA.
On 5 April 1962, after barely a week in existence, the 
FNLA formed a self-proclaimed Angolan government-in-exile 
(GRAE).116 The rationale behind the government-in-exile seemed 
to be a concerted effort by Roberto's leadership to proclaim its 
predominant role in Angolan nationalism. Undoubtedly taking 
inspiration from the success of the Algerian FLN's experience 
with its own government-in-exile, the establishment of the GRAE 
seemed to be as much a political and diplomatic weapon to fight 
for primacy among Angolan nationalists, as it was a strategy for
115. The violent actions against Portuguese colonialism were 
politically legitimizing for the nationalist movements. Those 
associated with direct action against colonialism (the FNLA and 
eventually the MPLA), went far ahead in the field of Angolan 
political groupings.
116. The government was initially known as the Governo da 
Republica de Angola no Exilio but was later changed to read 
Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio. Its make-up was as 
follows: President, Holden Roberto; Vice-President, E Kunzika 
(PDA leader); Foreign Minister, Jonas Savimbi.
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fighting the Portuguese colonial system. The Algerian 
government-in-exile had bestowed authority and legitimacy on the 
FLN and it must be concluded that this was what was being sought 
in the creation of the GRAE. By the time the MPLA was beginning 
its first major phase of political existence in Leopoldville at 
the end of 1962, Angolan nationalism was primarily expressed in 
the activity of Holden Roberto and the UPA/FNLA/GRAE. Any 
attempts to challenge this predominance made some form of 
conflict inevitable.
An assessment of the ideological orientation of Holden 
Roberto and the FNLA is not an easy task. In the early stages of 
the anti-colonial war, the predominant political currents were 
anti-communism and African nationalism. Like the MPLA, and as 
already referred above, the FNLA claimed as its objective the 
liberation of the Angolan land and people from colonialism. But 
unlike the MPLA, it also peppered its public pronouncements with 
liberal amounts of anti-communism.117
"It is common, on the other, hand, for some colonists to try 
to prove to the African people that nationalism and the 
fight for dignity are identified with Communism. They even 
went so far as to make this convincing to certain Africans, 
who thus let themselves be seduced by Marxist and Communist 
ideology.
In some places, many of those brother Africans say they 
would prefer this to colonialism. But the great majority of 
those who fight for the liberty of their country have no 
ideology save that of human dignity. It is universally 
accepted that Africa is imprisoned by its land and its 
religion, whatever it may be. It knows no other ideology 
other than patriotism— and it is this which the West calls
117. According to Savimbi, Roberto "...took a persistent anti­
communist line..." F Bridgland, op.cit., p.45.
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nationalism.
Let all who want to safeguard their friendship with the 
peoples of Africa— with the people of Angola— know that we 
are determined to be not only Africans but also masters of
our destinies and lands, and that we will not allow
ourselves to be seduced by any foreign propaganda.1,118
While carefully placing itself outside the socialist bloc, the 
FNLA attempted nevertheless to place itself within the 
prevailing strain of African anticolonialism. It referred often 
to the national liberation struggle, and even ventured to 
propose a somewhat progressive programme although this was 
suitably vague. The declaration of the FNLA's constitution 
claimed that "agrarian reform" and "a planned economy" would be 
instituted by the "democratic regime" that would replace 
colonialism.119 In the early 1960s it can be argued that Roberto
and the FNLA tried to stand, as much as possible, in the anti­
colonial camp without, however, compromising its appeal to anti­
communist circles, particularly in the US.120
Of course, like all anti-colonial movements, the 
FNLA's survival was a predominant objective which led it 
sometimes to compromise its ideological posture. This resulted, 
on occasions, in a shift of allegiance. In early 1964, Roberto 
announced that the GRAE would "...accept aid from Communist
118. UPA newspaper, A Voz da Na^ao Angolana 30 September 1960. R 
H Chilcote, op.cit., p.145.
119. Establishment of the FNLA. R H Chilcote, op.cit., p.104.
120. See Chapter Seven.
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China and 'other Communist countries." According to Roberto:
"Until now we have kept out of the cold war and within the 
framework of African politics (but) we are now at a point 
where a radical change of policy is imperative for us to 
make headway in our struggle."121
By this time, the benevolence shown by the Kennedy regime had 
waned and it had become clear that Portugal's membership of NATO 
was going to provide it with a certain amount of security. This 
approach to the socialist bloc also came after the recognition 
of the GRAE by the OAU (see Chapter Five). With this, the 
GRAE(FNLA) may have been trying to capitalize on this advantage 
over the MPLA, the latter seeming close to extinction, and 
garner the support of the socialist countries. According to one 
report, Roberto stated that he envisaged a one-party state for 
Angola after the rebel war.122
In early 1962, Roberto's movement, now the FNLA, was 
acting as a government-in-exile, and had been carrying out a 
year of guerrilla warfare against the Portuguese colonial 
regime. It had a pronounced international profile and was the 
Angolan nationalist movement most favoured by the Leopoldville 
government. At the time, it would have been difficult to avoid 
giving a positive assessment of its future.
121. West Africa 11 January 1964. Africa Digest Volume XI No.4, 
p.114
122. Daily Nation 27 December 1963. Africa Digest Volume XI 
No.4, p.115.
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(iv) Savimbi and UNITA: the Third Force
Although UNITA was established later than the MPLA and 
the FNLA, and was a smaller military and organizational unit, it 
sought to represent the largest ethnic constituency of Angola: 
the Ovimbundu. The fact was that in the mid-1960s, after the 
anti-colonial war against the Portuguese had commenced, only the 
Kikongo- and Kimbundu-speaking peoples felt that their 
nationalism was being expressed. Despite the fact that both the 
FNLA and the MPLA espoused a total Angolan nationalism and that 
the MPLA was led by detribalized mestizos, both movements did 
have a very particular geographical and ethnic implantation. 
Outside the urban centres and the northern part of the country, 
it is true to say that there was no anti-colonial 
representation. Furthermore, the Ovimbundu had been singled out 
as an ethnic group that co-operated with Portuguese colonialism. 
Ovimbundu labourers were brought to the north especially to work 
on the coffee plantations. During the March 1961 attacks, 
Ovimbundus were singled out as collaborators and victimized by 
the UPA.123 In 1966, UNITA came to fill this gap in leadership 
among the Ovimbundu and draw this largest ethnic group into the 
stream of Angolan anti-colonialism.
The leadership of UNITA and the FNLA shared a 
characteristic by being based around a very personalized power
123. D L Wheeler and R Pelissier, op.cit., [1971], p.178.
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structure. In the case of UNITA, this revolved around Jonas 
Savimbi. By origin an Ovimbundu from the Huambo area (along the 
Benguela railway), Savimbi had what Marcum has called a 
"...latent political appeal among Angolans from central and 
southern areas."124 This commonality gave Savimbi an opportunity 
to organize and gather support in these areas. According to 
Bridgland, "...Savimbi used his fluent traditional Umbundu to 
court and win chiefs and elders."125
In 1958, Savimbi managed to obtain a scholarship to 
continue his studies in Portugal where, like other Angolans he 
rapidly came into contact with anti-colonial nationalists and 
anti-Salazarist communists. According to his own testimony, 
Savimbi arrived in Lisbon after reading "...books on Marxism and 
by Marcus Garvey..."126 After coming to the attention of the 
PIDE due to some clandestine political activity, Savimbi was 
smuggled out of Portugal. But not before he had met Neto, who 
was by the late 1950s one of the most prominent Angolan 
nationalists. Savimbi's admiration of Neto was, however, 
tempered. According to Bridgland:
"...Neto made a mistake which would contribute to an eventual 
estrangement from the young Ovimbundu and grow into an epic 
enmity. The assumption of many Kimbundu people, like Neto, 
from Luanda and its hinterland was that the Africans of 
central and southern Angola were comparatively backward:
124. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, p.164.
125. F Bridgland, op.cit., [1986], p.29.
126. Ibid., p.35.
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they also regarded them as collaborators with the Portuguese 
because the Ovimbundu formed the majority of contract 
labourers on the coffee plantations of the north. When 
Savimbi said he came from near Nova Lisboa, Neto said it was 
impossible that a militant as bright and brave as he could 
have emerged from the south: surely his family originally 
came from the north? Savimbi was hurt by these remarks of 
Neto...11127
According to the same account, however, in the early 1960s 
Savimbi's sympathies were with the MPLA. Initially unimpressed 
by Roberto, he stated that he found the MPLA's "...philosophy 
attractive and saw nothing in it to support Roberto's allegation 
that the MPLA were Communists."128
Despite invitations Savimbi did not join the MPLA. 
Instead, putting aside his reservations over the ideological 
vacuum of Roberto's movement, he joined the UPA, apparently 
after some urging on the part of the Kenyans, Tom Mboya and Jomo 
Kenyatta. Savimbi recalled Mboya's argument:
"The MPLA are mestizos and Communists, so you cannot play any 
useful role there; the UPA is the organisation for black 
people, so that's the one you should join."129
A meeting with Kenyatta reinforced this inclination towards the
UPA:
"I protested that Roberto had no programme and seemed to be a 
very ignorant man. 'OK, ' Kenyatta said, 'that's one very 
good reason to join because you have ideas and can produce a 
programme.' That's when I decide to join the UPA. That's how 
it was."130
127. F Bridgland, op.cit., p.41.
128. F Bridgland, op.cit., p.46.
129. F Bridgland, ibid., p.49.
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In February 1961, one month before the unleashing of the March 
attacks against the Portuguese, Savimbi flew to Leopoldville 
where he joined the UPA. Appointed secretary-general of the 
movement, he was responsible for the reorganization of its 
administration.
According to his testimony, Savimbi believed that the 
March armed revolt against Portuguese colonialism was 
sufficiently important to put aside the fact that the attacks 
had also resulted in the killing of Ovimbundu people by the UPA. 
Allegedly instrumental in the creation of the FNLA, Savimbi 
argued, however, against the establishment of the GRAE (although 
he did accept the post of 'foreign affairs minister') because, 
states Bridgland, "...he thought it important first to step up 
the fighting and begin moving leaders into Angola rather than 
take on the trappings of government in a foreign land."131 
Relations between Roberto and Savimbi deteriorated and the 
latter began to distance himself from both the FNLA and GRAE. 
Using to his advantage the OAU heads-of-state summit in Cairo, 
Savimbi announced his resignation from the GRAE and the FNLA on 
16 July 1964.
In a resignation speech that emphasized the need for 
unity among Angolan nationalists, Savimbi chastised the 
ineffectiveness of the GRAE.132 Subsequently, Savimbi provided
131. F Bridgland, op.cit., p.56.
132. Resignation Statement 16 July 1964. Reproduced in R H
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an explanation of his reasons for leaving the FNLA, which ranged 
from charges of "American imperialism within the UPA and the 
GRAE" to the military failures of the FNLA to the nepotism and 
despotism of Roberto's leadership.133
Following his dramatic resignation in Cairo, Savimbi 
then either flew directly from Cairo to Brazzaville to see Neto 
and the MPLA, and then undertook a "journey in support of 
international support,"134 or, according to Marcum, first 
visited Algeria, China, North Vietnam, North Korea and Eastern 
Europe before then going to Brazzaville in the autumn of that 
year.135 Whichever the case, the 'Far East1 tour achieved 
little of substance. It was largely unsuccessful as a fund­
raiser as it was in obtaining firm support for the new Angolan 
nationalist movement which Savimbi later claimed he already had 
in mind. Peking did agree to train him and a small number of his 
supporters in the art of guerrilla warfare.
Despite later denials,136 it seems likely that Savimbi
Chilcote, op.cit., p.154.
133. Where is the Angolan Revolution? October 1964. Reproduced 
in R H Chilcote, op.cit., pp.155-161. Interestingly, both this 
document and the aforementioned statement of resignation were 
published in 1964 by the MPLA in Algiers, movement to which 
Savimbi turned after leaving the FNLA.
134. According to Bridgland, Neto offered Savimbi the post of 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, but the latter did not accept. F 
Bridgland, op.cit., p.64. The MPLA leader responsible for 
Foreign Affairs had been Mario de Andrade who had left the 
movement in July 1962 and did not rejoin until October 1964.
135. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, pp.160-161.
136. "To tell the truth I never intended to belong to that
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did consider joining the MPLA at this stage. The ineffectiveness 
of the FNLA and the rather despotic leadership of Roberto had 
made the GRAE an unviable option for Savimbi and his supporters. 
On the other hand, the MPLA in Brazzaville had helped a number 
of Savimbi1s supporters, who had followed him out of the FNLA, 
escape across the river from Leopoldville, and co-operation 
ensued between these. Furthermore, the MPLA had by the end of 
1964 begun its recovery from near-extinction (see Chapters Four 
and Five) and must have been seen as a possibility for Savimbi 
and his followers. From here the choice became either joining 
the MPLA or forming a third movement. But adding another rival 
to the already fratricidal divisions in the Angolan nationalist 
camp required some justification, if only to convince external 
supporters that UNITA was not simply a vehicle for Savimbi's 
personal ambitions. This was explained by pointing to the 
stagnation in the military challenge of both the MPLA and the 
FNLA. The former had not managed to progress very far in its 
campaign in Cabinda (see Chapters Four and Five), while the 
latter had been carrying out a rather ineffective border war, 
and was riddled with problems of discipline. According to 
Bridgland, Savimbi had visited the MPLA base at Dolisie in 1964, 
and returned disillusioned with their military capacity:
"The MPLA had only 30 men there, and between five and ten of 
them might go into Cabinda at a time...There was no real 
fighting going on and Daniel Chipenda was drinking too much 
and so were all his men."137
movement." J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, p.161, footnote 218.
Invoking the example of George Washington, Savimbi defended the 
return from exile as the only postive action then open to 
Angolan nationalists.138
By early 1966, with a small military cadre known as 
the 'Chinese Eleven1 already being trained at the Nanking 
Academy, Savimbi felt ready to launch his own Angolan liberation 
movement. By 1966 he had brought together in Lusaka the 
following three strands of supporters that formed UNITA.
After Zambian independence, Roberto had attempted to 
establish a GRAE delegation in Lusaka. However, this operation 
had subsequently collapsed under the centrifugal pressure 
applied by the FNLA leader from Leopoldville. According to one 
observer, Roberto’s style of leadership ignored all other 
potential sources of authority to the point of estrangement.139 
The GRAE office in Lusaka was consistently spurned by the 
leadership in Leopoldville until its frustration with Roberto 
worked in Savimbi's favour to provide the latter with one of the 
pillars of the new movement. The other two pillars were made up 
of Savimbi's supporters in Brazzaville,140 and among students
137. F Bridgland, op.cit., p.65.
138. F Bridgland, op.cit., p.67. More recent UNITA material also 
refers to this invocation. UNITA [1984], p.5.
139. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, p.164. This seems to have 
been the common reason for the countless defections from the 
FNLA, among whom was Savimbi.
140. These had grouped together under the acronym AMANGOLA
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abroad, especially in the National Union of Angolan Students 
(UNEA)141 which he had established while secretary-general of 
the UPA. The leader of UNEA, Jorge Valentim, joined Savimbi and 
others in Zambia, where the Preparatory Committee for Direct 
Action (CPAD),142 was formed in January 1966.
The function of the CPAD was to prepare and carry out 
the formal foundation of UNITA inside Angola. This occurred on 
15 March 1966, at Muangai, 250 kilometres inside the country.143 
Barely functioning and still without a major military force,144 
UNITA was nevertheless inside Angola where it intended to 
develop an armed challenge to Portuguese colonialism.
A crucial factor in the creation of UNITA was the 
implicit benevolence of Zambia that had become independent in 
1964. The initial Zambian policy of prohibiting the use of its 
territory for guerrilla operations against neighbouring 
countries, gave Savimbi an opportunity to make a virtue out of a
(Amigos do Manifesto Angolano): Friends of the Angolan
Manifesto. They co-operated with the MPLA for a short time, but 
resisted the MPLA's demands that they join the movement. J 
Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, pp.161-162.
141. Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes Angolanos.
142. Comite Preparatorio da Ac^ao Directa.
143. According to Bridgland, Savimbi himself was not present at 
the foundation and did not enter Angola until 26 October 1966 (F 
Bridgland, op.cit., p.70). An official UNITA publication claims, 
however, that he entered Angola in March and carried out the 
foundation himself (UNITA [1984], p. 5) as does J Marcum, 
op.cit., Volume Two, p.166.
144. The 'Chinese Eleven1 were unable to enter Angola until
October 1966.
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necessity and spurn the luxury of exile in favour of the 
austerity and risk of an internal base. Possibly by virtue of 
alleged friendships with governmental ministers,145 Zambia 
allowed Savimbi to prepare for the launch of UNITA. But its 
extreme economic dependence on export routes, such as the 
Benguela Railway to the Angolan coast, led Zambia to act 
reticently over Savimbi's attempts to bring his Nanking-trained 
guerrillas into the country,146 until in October 1966 Lusaka 
finally lifted its restriction on the operation of liberation 
movements in its territory.
At the end of 1966, Savimbi went into Angola where he 
remained for a few months. The new UNITA mounted a number of 
attacks, at Cassamba and Teixeira de Sousa, on the eastern 
border with Zaire, and along the Benguela railway. Although 
largely unsuccessful they were a measure of the determination of 
the movement to break the mould of Angolan nationalist politics:
"John Edlin of the Zambia News cited Savimbi as an example to 
those freedom fighters in Lusaka who did 'little else than 
produce dozens of pamphlets condemning the regimes of 
Portugal, South Africa or Rhodesia.1 He told them: 'Go into 
your country and see for yourself what is happening. Then 
fight. Others will follow.1"147
What the operation of UNITA inside Angola did was to change the
145. F Bridgland, op.cit., p.69.
146. One was arrested as an attempt was made to smuggle them 
through Zambia from Tanzania.
147. J Marcum 'Three Revolutions' [1967], p.13.
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priorities of all the Angolan nationalist movements. It hastened 
the rush to change the character of a movement from that of a 
political exile group to that of a guerrilla movement, working 
inside the country. Two months after UNITA1s foundation, the 
MPLA moved to establish its presence inside eastern Angola.148
But Zambian benevolence did not last. When Savimbi 
emerged from the Angolan underground in February 1967, UNITA's 
profile had been enhanced by its internal activity but the 
Zambian government was preoccupied with the effects of UNITA1s 
raids on the Benguela railway. It could ill afford the 
disruption of the transportation route of its copper exports. 
Although Savimbi had agreed to comply with Lusaka's request to 
refrain from disrupting the railway, the line was attacked twice 
by UNITA during his absence.149 When Savimbi returned to the 
Zambian capital in July 1967, he was arrested and UNITA was 
banned. After six days, the leader of the new Angolan movement, 
having extolled the virtues of internal bases, was on his way to 
Cairo for another stint of exile. Returning to Angola in June 
1968, Savimbi proceeded to build on the core of the movement 
that had survived. With more emphasis on internal than external
148. The eastern region became the MPLA's third front. The 
resisitance of those groups in the Dembos, outside Luanda and 
its activity in Cabinda, from a base in the Congo (Brazzaville), 
constituted the other two fronts. The FNLA was active mainly in 
the northern areas adjacent to the border with Zaire, where it 
was based.
149. Savimbi was in Cairo to attend a meeting of 'progressive' 
African leaders. J Marcum, The Angolan Revolution Volume Two, 
p.192.
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structures, UNITA developed into the third force of Angolan 
anti-colonialism.
The issue of race in Angolan nationalism has already 
been touched upon, particularly the antagonism raised by the 
mesti^o-assimilado domination of the MPLA. This was emphasized 
by both Roberto and Savimbi, and it is reasonable to assume that 
this issue was used in the consolidation of internal support for 
their respective movements. The reference to race must have been 
used as an instrument of political mobilization. In this 
respect, UNITA differs little from the FNLA and much from the 
MPLA, that emphasized a multiracial view of Angolan nationalism.
Clearly, UNITA was also exploiting the ethnic 
commonality of its leaders and the Ovimbundu in the central and 
southern areas of Angola, hitherto somewhat unrepresented. 
Nevertheless, UNITA emphasized that it sought a national 
expression and, like the FNLA and the MPLA, did not challenge 
the territorial definition of colonial Angola. Furthermore, it 
tried to dispel its regional identification by giving prominent 
posts to non-Ovimbundus, such as Miguel N'Zau Puna, a Cabindan, 
who was secretary-general of UNITA and the 'general political 
commissar1 of its military forces.150
The ideological characteristics of UNITA are hard to 
assess but seem to be have been developed within a context of 
the Sino-Soviet dispute of the 1960s. In terms of external
150. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, p.194.
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support, Savimbi and UNITA had a number of sympathetic ears but 
no firm source of hard military or financial contributions. The 
fund-raising route to the two major poles of the East-West 
conflict was travelled by UNITA1 rivals; while in Africa, this 
pattern tended to be repeated. To maintain an identity and seek 
external support, UNITA had to tread a thin, ambiguous line that 
divided nationalist politics into two camps. On the one hand 
UNITA claimed to be an anti-communist movement, but the 
realities of anti-colonial politics in the mid-1960s made some 
radicalism necessary. On the other, the appeal to China by 
Savimbi was an attempt to take advantage of any motivations 
Peking might have had in wanting to support a rival of Moscow's 
Angolan movement.
While railing against the 'revisionism' and 'social 
imperialism' of the Soviet Union, and placing itself in a 
somewhat anti-communist posture, it praised, on the other hand, 
the virtues of Maoism, the teachings of which UNITA claimed to 
be applying directly, only in an Angolan context. Rather deftly, 
Savimbi turned the reality of UNITA's rather isolated position 
into a defiant image wherin UNITA was seen to be implementing a 
doctrine of self-reliance. Far more than the other two 
movements, UNITA focused its political programme on the 
peasantry, which according to it would have to be mobilized 
against colonialism and would form the basis of a future 
independent Angola. Furthermore, on these basic postures, the 
movement used a loose mixture of terms such as 'socialism',
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'liberation' and 'freedom' that betrayed a rather broad 
ideological scope, somewhat lacking in cohesiveness.
By the early 1970s, UNITA had had a significant 
military impact on the anti-colonial war to have been singled 
out as one of three major Angolan nationalist movements. Its 
ethnic implantation was far too great to be ignored. Although 
its diplomatic recognition was long in coming, by the time of 
the Portuguese coup UNITA considered itself equal in stature to 
the FNLA and the MPLA. More than the other movements it favoured 
a unification of the anti-colonial forces which, if carried out 
in accordance to its national appeal, might have resulted in a 
significant role for Savimbi and UNITA. Similarly, after the 
Portuguese coup, UNITA's preference for general elections rather 
than a civil war to sort out the divisions among the movements 
betrayed a confidence, perhaps misplaced, in this proportional 
domination of UNITA.
Despite its declared preference for peaceful political 
processes, UNITA entered the civil war in 1975. Its major 
contribution to the conflict was its co-operation with the South 
African invasion. This alliance with a regime that was a 
political liability in African politics may reflect a general 
trend within UNITA which places a greater value on the 
achievement of its aims than on the means by which these are 
achieved. Earlier, during the anti-colonial war, UNITA had been 
widely accused of collaboration with the Portuguese colonial 
forces. The so-called 'Operation Timber' affair alleges that
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Savimbi and the Portuguese military regularly came to tacit and 
not-so-tacit cease-fire agreements, during which the spoiling of 
MPLA operations by both sides was prevalent. A leading 
Portuguese military figure, General Costa Gomes supports these 
allegations.151 In an interview given in 1988, Costa Gomes 
claims that before the Portuguese coup Savimbi had let it be 
known that he did not want to be targetted.152 Considering that 
"at that time the danger did not come from UNITA's forces but 
from those of the MPLA," the Portuguese Army struck a 'non- 
hostility' accord with Savimbi.153 In return Savimbi, according 
to Costa Gomes, provided information on the movements of MPLA 
squads.154 These allegations are denied by Savimbi and UNITA.
By the mid 1960s, Angolan nationalism had crystallized 
into three rival movements. They all shared common values of 
previous anti-colonial expressions, and also emerged out of a 
common reaction to Portuguese colonialism. The intransigence of
151. Francisco Costa Gomes was Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
of the Armed Forces (Chefe do Estado Maior das Formas Armadas) 
immediately before the 25 April coup. He was pushed out along 
with Spinola. He was a major figure in the regime, close to 
Botelho Moniz, the Minister of Defence who had tried to oust 
Salazar in 1961. Costa Gomes was then known as pro-American. 
After the April 1974 coup, he was President of the Republic 
during the most radical period of the MFA until 25 November 
1975. During this time he was considered to be pro-Moscow.
152. Interview in Expresso (Lisbon) 8 October 1988.
153. Ibid.
154. Ibid. Costa Gomes alleges also that Savimbi's father was 
released after an accord.
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the Salazarist regime had helped to influence the political 
choices of the anti-colonialists by restricting the expression 
of self-determination to that of a violent challenge. But the 
origins of each movement are also based on the development of a 
particular dynamic wherein personalities and political choices 
played a very important role. The movements worked to express, 
in their respective political prisms, their particular view of 
Angolan nationalism. A view that ultimately did not consider the 
possibility of power-sharing. Furthermore, the violence of over 
a decade of anti-colonial war could not have failed to 
exacerbate the political conflict in Angola.
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PART THREE
CONTINENTAL POLITICS AND ANGOLAN RIVALRY 1961-1968
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CHAPTER FOUR
EXILE POLITICS IN THE CONGO 1962-1963
I
It can be argued that the Angolan civil war of 1975 
began in Leopoldville in 1962. Already at that time, two of the 
protagonists of that war, the MPLA and the FNLA, were engaged in 
a political rivalry that was often expressed with violence. By 
the end of 1961, the MPLA had decided to move closer to Angola 
by establishing itself in the Congolese capital. The proximity 
of the Angolan border and the presence of a large Angolan 
refugee community in Leopoldville,1 made it the logical choice 
for the MPLA to establish an external base from which to launch 
its own armed anti-colonial challenge. But from the very 
beginning the movement ran up against difficulties that resulted 
from the fact that the FNLA was already far better rooted in 
Leopoldville's political circles.
The MPLA established itself in Leopoldville some time 
in late 1961 or early 1962.2 After Mario de Andrade had 
established the Directing Committee in Conakry, and had claimed
1. According to Red Cross estimates there were over 200,000 
Angolan refugees in Congo Leopoldville in 1962. Expresso 
(Lisbon) 2 February 1991.
2. A contemporary account claims that "...the MPLA's 
headquarters were officially transferred to Leopoldville..." on 
30 October 1961. P McGowan Pinheiro 'Politics of a Revolt1 
[1962], p.113.
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the 4 February attack for the MPLA, the movement was ready to 
enter into action. The political leadership moved to 
Leopoldville to establish its first major headquarters. There, 
the MPLA received its first military force which had been 
organized by Manuel Santos Lima and trained in Morocco.3
According to one account, there had already been
attempts to promote a pro-Luanda group in Leopoldville before 
this. In June 1960, Mario de Andrade had apparently approached 
Rosario Neto, a prominent Mbundu that had been active in 
Leopoldville, with a view to joining the MPLA. But Rosario Neto 
turned down the offer of association and joined the UPA 
leadership instead. One local group, led by a Kikongo-speaker, 
Antonio Josias, did have links with the MPLA intellectuals. The 
ethnic origin of Josias helped this group to gain access to the 
mainly Bakongo community in Leopoldville. This established an 
important foothold for the MPLA among the Angolan refugees. 
However, when the MPLA leadership came to Leopoldville, Josias 
was cast aside and the local structure was taken over.4
The MPLA's move to Leopoldville was made after having
consolidated a certain amount of international support,
3. Interview with Manuel Santos Lima, Lisbon, 14 January 1991.
4. Also displaced by the incoming leadership was Jose Bernardo 
Domingos, the vice president of the group. The Aliazo (soon to 
be the PDA) took this attitude by the MPLA (in dislodging a
respected figure) to be evidence of the need to doubt the good 
faith of the movement. This may have affected the PDA's decision 
to merge with UPA. see J Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Volume 
One, [1969], pp.204-5.
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particularly in Western Europe, but also in some African 
capitals, such as Conakry and Accra. Mario de Andrade's links to 
French intellectual and political circles helped give the MPLA 
an authoritative profile as representatives of a progressive 
Angolan nationalism. At the same time, groups of pro-MPLA 
students, in countries including the UK, Brazil, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Italy, the Scandinavian countries and West and East 
Germany,5 campaigned for the cause of Angolan anti-colonialism, 
as personified by the MPLA. In Africa, the MPLA leaders found 
sympathy generally in those countries known as the Casablanca 
group: Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the United Arab 
Republic. The MPLA also found favour in Senegal, due to a 
personal relationship between Mario de Andrade and Leopold 
Senghor, that had its origins in the work both had done in Paris 
for the publication Presence Africaine.
The central core that established the MPLA consisted
of Mario de Andrade, Lucio Lara and Viriato da Cruz. But by May
1962, Viriato da Cruz had been ousted from his post of 
secretary-general, and by December, Mario de Andrade had ceded 
the presidency of the movement to Agostinho Neto. At the heart
of this change in the leadership was a dispute related to an
internal power struggle; but it also derived from an attempt by 
the movement to overcome what it perceived to be shortcomings in 
its external image.
5. J Marcum, ibid., Volume One, pp.200-202.
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The MPLA had already been characterized by this time 
as a Marxist movement. The links made by Mario de Andrade, Lucio 
Lara and Viriato da Cruz with both the Portuguese and the French 
communist parties, were well-known. During this period up to 
1964 (the time when a concrete link was established with
Moscow), the MPLA tried to play down its radical nature in order 
to appeal to a broad international audience. Well known as a 
Marxist,6 Viriato da Cruz may have been a victim of these 
attempts to recreate the image of a non-"pro-communist" MPLA.7 
In 1963, the US State Department considered Viriato to be one of 
the "genuine communists in the MPLA."8 When he was expelled from 
the movement, Washington seemed to have been sufficiently 
impressed by this act to give the benefit of the doubt to the
professed neutrality of the MPLA. US embassies in Africa were
instructed not to spurn this movement.9
But recent testimony has attributed Viriato's
6. "Dr Cruz has been regarded as a member of the extremist wing 
of the MPLA." West Africa (9 May 1964) in Africa Digest [1964],
p.188.
7. In an interview given during a trip to the US in late 1961, 
Mario de Andrade stated that his group was not "pro-communist" 
(Marcum, op.cit., Volume One, p.220). These attempts to present 
a neutral position, outside a cold war context, were projected 
by the MPLA, in particular, to the US and the UN during this 
time. Mario de Andrade's trip to Moscow to address the World 
Congress for General Disarmament and Peace on 12 June 1962 seems 
to have been an exception. J Marcum, ibid., p.255.
8. J Freire Antunes, Kennedy e Salazar: o Leao e a Raposa
[1991], p.87.
9. J Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Volume Two, [1978], p.16.
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marginalization to a conscious decision to dispel accusations 
levelled at the movement concerning its mestigo-dominated 
leadership.10 Mario de Andrade and Viriato da Cruz were both 
mestigo, and so it was decided that the leadership of the 
movement would be reserved for an African; for somebody that 
could repel the racial allegations, as well as fit more 
appropriately as the leader of an African nationalist movement; 
for somebody like Agostinho Neto. According to Van Dunem:
"So [Neto] came to the front of the movement. Viriato da 
Cruz's handicap was that he was a 'mulato' (mestigo), and 
Neto was black."11
There can be little doubt that when Neto took over the 
movement, this caused a split in the original leadership. He had 
not had any links to the movement per se until he escaped from 
prison in 1962.12 He was, however, one of the best known Angolan 
nationalists. Mario de Andrade was intent on having Neto as the 
MPLA's leader. His stints in prison and his poetry had created a 
mythological figure that was popular among Angolans as well as
10. Interview with Joao Van Dunem, London, 3 October 1990.
11. Interview with Joao Van Dunem, London, 3 October 1990.
12. In July 1962, Neto returned to Leopoldville having escaped 
prison in Portugal. His escape across the straits to Morocco was 
apparently achieved in part by the assistance given by elements 
of the Portuguese democratic opposition that were based, at 
that time, in Algiers. These ranged from supporters of General 
Humberto Delgado (opposition presidential candidate in 1958, 
later murdered in 1965, allegedly by the PIDE) to the highly 
disciplined Portuguese Communist Party, and were (temporarily) 
united in a front in exile. D L Wheeler and R Pelissier, Angola, 
[1971], p.213.
224
among international sympathizers.13 Neto's return to 
Leopoldville was apparently held in great expectation by many 
other Angolans. Many felt that it would signal the unification 
of all Angolan nationalists.14
Despite this optimism, however, Neto's initial form at 
the head of the movement was apparently more noticeable for its 
lack of experience than for its vision. According to Van Dunem, 
Neto constantly, but covertly, sought the aid of Viriato da Cruz 
in the day-to-day running of the movement.15
The distancing of Viriato da Cruz (and the subsequent 
resignation of another prominent MPLA activist, Gra£a da Silva 
Tavares), despite its diplomatically useful consequence in 
giving the MPLA a less radical image, led to the first of a 
number of splits in the MPLA. The very public exposure of 
differences in the movement gave a negative counter-image of 
disunity at a time when the MPLA was attempting to launch a 
serious anti-colonial challenge; an image that Neto and Andrade 
wanted to avoid, especially when courting sensitive Western 
sources. At the same time, in March 1962, the UPA had merged to 
create the FNLA and the GRAE and seemed to be going from 
strength to strength. It became imperative for the MPLA to act 
or else it would lose the race at the starting line.
13. A petition for the release of Neto had been signed by the 
cream of French left-wing political and literary circles.
14. J Marcum, op.cit. Volume One, [1969], p.264.
15. Interview with Joao Van Dunem, London, 3 October, 1991.
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What resulted from these internal and external 
pressures was a constitutive conference held by the MPLA during 
the first three days of December 1962. The main outcome of the 
conference was the consolidation of Agostinho Neto's leadership 
of the movement. Viriato da Cruz considered that the MPLA had 
been taken over:
"The representatives of the new arguments and tactics finally 
took over the effective domination of the organisation, 
seizing the funds of the MPLA and legalising their new 
situations at the national conference held in Leopoldville 
in December 1962."16
The leadership of the movement now lay in the overlapping 
Steering and Politico-Military committees. The Steering 
Committee numbered ten members.17 A larger 70-man council cf 
delegates was formed for the purposes of the conference but was 
to never meet again. The MPLA was now effectively under Neto's 
leadership.
The new era in the MPLA was begun by an attempt at
16. V da Cruz 'Problems of the Angolan Revolution' (1964j. 
Reproduced in R H Chilcote, Documents, [1972], p.210. In this 
document, Viriato da Cruz gives his view of the failures of the 
MPLA and what led him to leave the movement.
17. Agostinho Neto (president), Matias Migueis (vice-president), 
Rev. Domingos da Silva (vice-president), Manuel Santos Lina 
(war), Mario de Andrade (external relations), Lucio Lara 
(organis
zation and training of cadres), Anibal de Melo (UPA defector, 
information), Deolinda Rodrigues de Almeida (social affairs), 
Desiderio da Graga (finance and economy) and Henrique (Ike) 
Carreira (security). Those underlined made up the Politico- 
Military Committee which formed the inner core of the 
leadership. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, pp.29-30, footnote 
130.
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establishing a cathartic break with the past and laying down the 
maxims for the future priorities of the movement. Although this 
was mostly an exercise in establishing the ideological character 
of the movement, this process of 'restructuring' addressed, 
somewhat ironically, some of the very problems that would 
subsequently emerge from Angolan rivalry in exile.18
In his conference speech, Neto stressed that the
movement should now hold as a major priority the establishment
of military action in the interior of the country over and above
the previously predominant activity of garnering external
support. This was one of the HPLA's major problems: the weakness 
of its military operations which, on a number of occasions, led 
to it being cast aside in favour of its rivals, most notably in 
mid-1963 when the OAU recognized the GRAE as the sole
representative of Angolan nationalism (see Chapter Five). In 
accordance with this new priority, the newly-formed military 
wing of the movement, the Popular Army of the Liberation of
Angola (EPLA),19 with a core of about 300 soldiers trained in 
Ghana and in Morocco on Algerian bases,20 was given the task of 
opening and operating a military front in the Cabindan
18. The First National Conference of the MPLA is the first
document which attempts a comprehensive definition of the
constitution, ideology and objectives of the MPLA. Reproduced in 
R H Chilcote, op.cit., pp.251-265.
19. Exercito Popular de Libertagao de Angola.
20. J Marcum, op.cit. Volume One, [1969], p.302. Interview with 
Manuel Santos Lima, Lisbon, 14 January 1991.
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enclave.21
However, despite this emphasis on the importance of 
armed action within Angola, the first few months of 1963 saw 
Neto undertake a tour of the United States, North Africa and 
Europe. The ostensible aims of this tour were to disseminate the 
cause of the new MPLA under Neto. In the US, the main objective 
of visits to New York and Washington seemed to have been to 
counter the charges of being a pro-communist movement. Despite 
the ideological leanings of the MPLA, the US was viewed as a 
potentially important source of anti-colonial support. 
Criticized for propping up the Salazar regime through NATO 
structures, Washington was nevertheless a major stop-over for 
the nationalist movements when touring the globe for support. At 
this time, anti-colonial movements found that when asking for 
official or institutional US assistance, one credential above 
all others was required: anti-communism. As with other
movements, the MPLA considered that the needs of the anti­
colonial conflict required some flexibility, even if this 
implied concealing its ideological nature.
The US was, however, Roberto's constituency. Since
21. Militarily, the MPLA were never very successful in Cabinda. 
Despite the advantages given by the terrain (the mountains and
thick forests protected MPLA units from Portuguese retaliation),
they never achieved a significant military gain in the enclave. 
One reason for this may be related to Cabindan separatist claims 
which diverted support away from the MPLA. Another may have been 
the poor military calibre of the EPLA, whose commander, Manuel 
Santos Lima, left the MPLA in 1963 and was replaced by Daniel 
Chipenda.
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1959, yearly visits by the UPA leader had given the American 
public and press a face for Angolan nationalism. It was 
difficult for Neto to break this familiarity. Roberto's links 
within the US administration,22 and some private organizations23 
favoured the UPA (see Chapter Seven). To all these sources of 
support, Roberto's attraction was undoubtedly his strong anti­
communist stance.
Despite this distinct advantage held by the UPA 
leader, Neto's 1963 trip to the US was reasonably successful. 
The purge of Viriato da Cruz had apparently impressed the US 
State Department, as is shown by the following memorandum 
circulated in July setting down US policy on Angolan movements:
"US has been under impression GRAE and Roberto represented a 
pro-Western stand in resistance movement...MPLA has 
received Communist support and has some Communist 
sympathisers in it. However in the last ten months, some 
extreme leftists have been removed. Recent expulsion da 
Cruz and Migueis and Neto visit US and Western Europe last 
year indicate MPLA seeking contacts with West. US policy is 
rpt ( sic) not to discourage MPLA (Neto-Andrade faction) 
move toward West and not to choose between these 
movements."24
22. A M Khazanov, (Agostinho Neto, [1986], p.63), claims the CIA 
supported Roberto from 1962 onwards. W Burchett, (Southern 
Africa Stands Up, [1978], p.26), claims the CIA supported 
Roberto from 1961, providing a monthly retainer of US$ 10,000. J 
Stockwell (In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story, [1978], p.64. 
calls the CIA's relationship with Roberto historic.'
23. In the US, Roberto was supported by: the American Committee 
on Africa and the Baptist Church (D L Wheeler and R Pelissier, 
op.cit., p.169); the Ford Foundation; and the AFL-CIO, the US 
trade union federation (M A Samuels, 'The Nationalist Parties', 
[1969], p.392). The AFL-CIO was apparently used by the CIA to 
infiltrate labour groups in Western Europe. J Freire Antunes, 
op.cit., [1991], p.100.
24. S Weissman 'The CIA and US Policy in Zaire and Angola1 in R
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After addressing the UN General Assembly, Neto 
travelled to Washington accompanied by a Methodist bishop, Ralph 
Dodge, who gave Neto access to Protestant circles where he fund- 
raised for Angolan refugees.25 During this tour, Neto also 
stopped off at some European capitals to reinforce his links of 
authority with pro-MPLA student groups in these cities.26
From Europe, Neto then proceeded to Algeria to open an 
MPLA office there and attempt to swing official allegiances 
towards the MPLA. During the Algerian war, the National 
Liberation Front (FLN) had been a guest of both the Moroccan and 
Tunisian governments. The FLN had pledged assistance to both the 
MPLA and to the UPA, both diplomatically and by providing 
military training for the officer groups of both movements. The 
UPA had been trained by the Boumedienne-led group in Tunisia 
while Ben Bella's faction had trained the MPLA cadres in 
Morocco. The matrix of Angolan rivalry was therefore placed on 
an Algerian one. When Algeria became independent in July 1962, 
competition between the two Angolan movements was stepped up in
Lemarchand (ed.) American Policy in Southern Africa: The Stakes 
and the Stance, [1978], p.400.
25. A M Khazanov, op.cit., p.143.
26. Pro-MPLA student groups were active in the Netherlands, 
France, West Germany, Belgium, Italy and Sweden. Many Angolans 
in the UK were also sympathetic to its cause. J Marcum, op.cit., 
Volume Two, [1978], pp.14,15.
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order to gain exclusive favour with the new regime in Algiers. 
Mario de Andrade's close links with Ben Bella, the new leader of 
independent Algeria, seemed to favour the MPLA. At this time, 
however, the advantage held by the MPLA was small. The rivalry 
between the Angolan nationalists was rapidly becoming a
continental political issue and Algerian policy was one of
placing pressure on the MPLA and the FNLA to form a common
front.
There were attempts to unite the MPLA and FNLA at this 
time. In a press conference, Mario de Andrade stressed the 
MPLA's commitment to forming a united front.27 But judging by 
the exchange of personal letters between Roberto and Neto, a
peaceful merger of the two movements under their leadership 
would have been out of the question. In August 1962, Roberto
answered Neto:
"It is regrettable that one day after contact had been made 
between the FNLA and your party, the MPLA, a letter in 
directly taking up again the serious, calumnious and biased 
accusations that have always kept us apart should come to 
me, thus destroying the hope that had arisen from our first 
meeting, in which it had been decided to establish a 
committee to study the eventual collaboration of our 
respective parties...in the light of the insulting terms of 
your letter, allow me to tell you that the invitation you 
sent to me is, at the very least, inopportune for the time 
being."28
At this stage, it is difficult to apportion
27. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume One, [1969], p.204.
28. H Roberto 'Letter to Neto1 9 August 1962. Reproduced in R H 
Chilcote, op.cit., p.80.
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responsibility for the failure to form a common front. The MPLA 
almost certainly did not consider diluting its organization in 
the FNLA under Roberto's leadership. Similarly, the FNLA was 
well-placed in Leopoldville and saw no reason to doubt that it 
could survive or even succeed without the MPLA. Furthermore, 
despite the attempts by the MPLA to lower its radical profile, 
ideology remained an important factor in the MPLA-FNLA rivalry. 
In an article published on 5 February 1962, a PDA leader, 
Matumona, charged that the UPA had been receiving nearly all its 
material and financial support from the American Committee on 
Africa and that a condition for this support was that it should 
in no way ally itself with the 'pro-communist' MPLA.29 The MPLA 
accused the UPA of using blocking tactics to avoid forming a 
common front, and criticized Roberto's personal ambition. The 
MPLA's criticisms focused on the fact that Roberto was not 
really an Angolan, a charge that the Portuguese had often 
levelled.30
Up to this point, the dispute between the FNLA and the 
MPLA had been essentially political. As their rivalry became 
more assiduous, however, the expression of differences became 
more violent. For the most part, these differences dwelt on the 
question of race. The MPLA characterized the UPA as being a 
racist organization because of the latter's's criticism of it as
29. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume One, p.250.
30. J Marcum, op.cit. Volume One, [1969], p.249.
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a movement dominated by mestizos. In return, the MPLA would 
chastise the UPA for being uni-racialist (pro-Bakongo) and 
therefore unrepresentative. As 1962 progressed it became clear 
that a common front was out of the question. The 
unreconciliability of the MPLA and the FNLA should have been 
apparent. Yet if the MPLA wanted to operate a serious military 
challenge against the Portuguese at this stage, it was important 
for it to come to terms with the FNLA. The reason for this was 
the very favourable conditions under which the FNLA operated in 
Leopoldville.
The FNLA was very well connected within Congolese 
political circles. It was fundamentally a Leopoldville movement, 
far more at home (and influenced by its politics) in the 
Congolese capital than in Angola. Furthermore, as has been 
emphasized, the origins of the movement lay in the Bakongo 
constituency, an ethnic group that straddles the border and 
plays an important political role in the Congo. In August 1962, 
the Congolese government placed at the FNLA's disposal a 
military training camp at Kinkuzu, south of Leopoldville on the 
way to the Angolan border.31 It was manned by a new officer 
cadre, trained in Tunisia by the Algerians, which had returned 
to Leopoldville in June. These FLN-trained guerrillas formed the 
core of the Army of the National Liberation of Angola (ELNA),32
31. According to one account, this base had been granted in 
exchange for Roberto's promise to President Kasavubu that the 
UPA was about to form a front with the MPLA. W Burchett, 
Southern Africa Stands Up [1978], p.16.
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which, according to claims, blossomed into a 25,000-strong 
military arm of the FNLA.33
Additionally, Roberto was politically favoured by the 
Congolese government, as a result of the personal friendship 
between him and the prime minister, Cyrille Adoula. According to 
most accounts they played football together and had had a long­
standing association. One of the main consequences of this 
favour was the FNLA being granted an all-important unfettered 
access to the Angolan border. Through this access, the movement 
could infiltrate its units into Angola, support focuses of 
resistance and claim to the world that it was engaged in an 
anti-colonial military uprising against the Portuguese. The 
FNLA’s claims that it operated inside Angola were followed up 
with well-publicized trips to selected bases.34 The MPLA could 
not do the same and had difficulty in disseminating its image as 
a military movement.
When the MPLA did attempt to conduct military
32. Exercito de Libertagao Nacional de Angola.
33. For all the claims about the strength and loyalty of the 
ELNA, the history of this army is riddled with incidents of 
revolt, mutiny, desertions and allegations of poor fighting 
capacity. Commenting on the fact that ELNA elements were only 
paid after having raided Angola, Savimbi declared that it was 
not, therefore, very surprising that the units never strayed 
very far across the border for fear of not being able to return 
for their pay, becoming, in effect, no more than a border army. 
W Burchett, op.cit., p.31. Other observers have commented on the 
ELNA's distinct preference for parades over hard military 
operations. D L Wheeler and R Pelissier, op.cit., p.206.
34. Unfortunately, as reports about these bases emerged in the 
press, the Portuguese would systematicaly utilize them to help 
locate and militarily neutralize such bases. D Wheeler and R
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operations, the likelihood of failure was increased by the 
multiple risks its units had to take. They had to contend with 
an unfriendly Congolese army, outrightly hostile UPA units as 
well as, of course, the Portuguese army. During this period 
there were a number of incidents between rival partisans inside 
Angola that became central to the rivalry between the MPLA and 
the FNLA. Direct fighting between MPLA and UPA units was common 
and their political rivalry developed into outright aggression.
One such incident, in late 1961, involved the alleged 
interception, imprisonment and execution of a twenty-man MPLA 
squad by the UPA. The MPLA unit was led by Tomas Ferreira which 
had been sent into Angola to reinforce the pro-MPLA leadership 
of a resistance group in the Dembos.35 According to one analysis 
of the incident cited by Marcum, the presence of mestizos in the 
MPLA unit had been the provocative factor for the Africans in 
the UPA squad.36 When accused of the interception and the 
killings the UPA denied any involvement in the incident, but 
added condescendingly that it had been foolish of the MPLA to
Pelissier, op.cit., p.203.
35. The colonial backlash against the February and March attacks 
had led to the escape of activists from the cities into the 
forest areas. Attempts were made by pro-MPLA Luandans to 
organize and operate groups in the Dembos area around 
Nambuangongo. The MPLA's common origins in Luanda were the bases 
for its attempts to link up with these groups, being able to 
claim that it maintained an active military force within Angola. 
But these groups were in direct competition with FNLA units in 
the area, and were anxious to provide evidence to the local 
population that they had access to both material and moral 
support from the MPLA. The Ferreira mission was intended to meet 
these needs.
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have sent a unit unannounced into a zone of military action in 
the first place. Typically the UPA made much of its advantageous 
access to Angolan territory and tended to publicly treat the 
Angolan war as an exclusively UPA operation. It was later 
revealed, however, that the author of the above denial, Rosario 
Neto, had not been aware that the UPA had, in fact, been 
responsible for the elimination of the Ferreira mission. The UPA 
chief-of-staff, Marcos Kassanga, on his resignation on 3 March 
1962, added to accusations that Roberto had personally ordered 
the extermination of MPLA units.37 Later, Roberto indeed 
confirmed that instructions had been given for the interception 
and destruction of MPLA units.38
In some ways, the Ferreira incident characterized the 
military and political facets of the Angolan nationalists' 
shared exile in Leopoldville: the FNLA's advantage in access to 
Angola and the irreconciliability of the FNLA-MPLA rivalry that 
was increasingly expressed with violence.
Notwithstanding the Congolese authorities' distinct 
favouritism of the FNLA, the MPLA was not completely without 
friends. The lower Congo province was administrated by members
36. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume One, p.218.
37. To these accusations Kassanga added the charge of the 
murder, earlier that year, of Joao Baptista, the UPA field 
commander, by Bakongo tribalists (Baptista was a southerner, a 
Ganguela). Kassanga held Roberto responsible for inspiring 
tribalism. D L Wheeler and R Pelissier, op.cit., p.204.
38. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume One, p.214. Roberto claimed that 
the Ferreira mission was undertaken in order to construct an
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of the Congolese Bakongo party, ABAKO. Because of their common 
ethnic constituency, the ABAKO and the FNLA were rivals. 
Consequently, when able to choose, ABAKO favoured the MPLA. In 
return, the MPLA extended its refugee relief service to the pro- 
ABAKO community.39 Another MPLA success was being granted the 
Angolan broadcasts on Radio Leopoldville, a privilege plucked 
from the expectant FNLA (while Roberto was outside the country) 
by exploiting differences within the Congolese government.40
The formation of the GRAE in 1962 was, politically, 
the single-most damaging event for the MPLA during its time in 
Leopoldville. Furthermore, the 'government-in-exile' was formed 
by the FNLA, which unlike the MPLA, was an organization that was 
made up of more than one party. Despite the fact that the 
failure to unite the MPLA and the FNLA in a common front was as
much the responsibility of one as the other, it was the MPLA
that was suddenly left on the sidelines with the creation of the
FNLA and the GRAE. Roberto was able, for some time, to use the
mixed constitution of the FNLA as evidence to back his 
resistance to the MPLA's appeals for the creation of, what he 
considered to be, another united front. The UPA leader's replies 
always stressed the fact that the Angolan common front already 
existed, in the FNLA. It was, therefore, up to the MPLA to join 
it. From here on, even among sympathetic ears, the logic of the
airfield for the delivery of arms.
39. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, p.67.
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MPLA's calls for a common front was severely weakened.
The MPLA did try to react to the creation of the GRAE. 
The movement circulated an 18-page memorandum to African states 
setting out the MPLA's case against the what it considered to be 
an unrepresentative, personalized, political vehicle for 
tribalist interests.41 In this document, the MPLA referred to 
the short-lived front created by it in April 1961, while Roberto 
was in New York (see Chapter Three), as an example of its 
commitment to unity, and demanded that the GRAE declaration be 
considered as no more than "...a diversionary manoeuvre..." that 
threatened Angolan anti-colonialism.42 But this protest did not 
lead anywhere.
By early 1963, barely twelve months after having 
established in Leopldville its first base in exile, the MPLA was 
heading for its first major confrontation with the FNLA. From 
the moment the MPLA came to the Congo, there developed a 
personal, political and even violent rivalry between these two 
movements. With two separate constitutional origins, both the 
MPLA and the FNLA were convinced of their own place at the head 
of Angolan anti-colonialism. Furthermore, by the time Neto had 
taken over the MPLA, both movements were now led by leaders 
whose somewhat authoritarian style determined the character of
40. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume One, p.207.
41. Memorandum to the African Governments on the Formation of
the So-called Provisional Government of Angola 15 April 1962.
Reproduced in R H Chilcote, op.cit., pp.239-243.
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their organizations for years to come.
In 1963, this rivalry was conditioned by one factor of 
overwhelming importance: that is, the favour the FNLA was held 
in by the Congolese government. This bias was instrumental in 
providing the FNLA with military and political advantages, which 
were already in themselves prejudicial to the MPLA, but also 
proved to be crucial in the making of the first major crisis of 
the movement which brought it to the brink of extinction. This 
crisis is one of the focuses of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE OAU AND THE ANGOLAN NATIONALISTS 1963-1976: 
CONFLICT AND RECOGNITION
(i) From 1963 to 1971
In August 1963, the African Liberation Committee (ALC) 
of the Organization of African Unity recommended to the 
assembled Council of Ministers in Dakar that the GRAE(FNLA)1 be 
recognized as the sole legitimate organization fighting for 
Angolan national self-determination, and that all funds destined 
for the support of the nationalist movements in Angola be 
directed exclusively towards Holden Roberto's 'government-in- 
exile'. The ALC2 based its recommendation on the conclusions 
reached by a fact-finding mission made to Leopoldville earlier 
in July, which had met with all the concerned parties, including 
the GRAE and the MPLA. Initially unexpected, this wholehearted 
backing of the GRAE proffered by the newly-formed OAU,3 was a
1. During this period, the GRAE and the FNLA were one and the 
same, and are thus used interchangeably throughout the text.
2. The ALC was constituted by representatives from Algeria, 
Guinea, the UAR, Uganda, Congo-Leopoldville, Ethiopia, Nigeria, 
Senegal and Tanganyika.
3. In Addis Ababa, May 22-25, 1963.
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violent blow to the fortunes of the MPLA, both in its anti­
colonial campaign against the Portuguese and in its rivalry with 
the FNLA. Although the ALC's decision was intended to force the 
MPLA to join the GRAE, the result so favoured the FNLA, without 
provoking the capitulation of the MPLA, that it altered the 
course of the political rivalry between the two movements. The 
recognition of the GRAE by the OAU in 1963 marked the beginning 
of the worst period the MPLA was to experience. By November, it 
had been chased out of Leopoldville, towards an expected 
oblivion.
By 1967, another committee of the OAU, the 
Conciliation Committee, had recommended that the organization 
withdraw its recognition from the GRAE. Despite its decision in 
1963, the ALC had, by 1964, accepted the MPLA as a legitimate 
movement and from 1966 onwards was giving it preferential aid.4
4. By 1972, the MPLA seemed to be the most favoured Angolan 
movement in the ALC. At its 19th session, the ALC earmarked //
10,000 for the movement, while the FNLA was not even represented 
(M Wolfers Politics in the Organization of African Unity [1976] 
p.190.). A significant factor, that is discernible at this 
session, is the importance of the movements in the other 
Portuguese colonies in helping to bring the MPLA international
credibility. Unlike Angola, the anti-colonial struggle in
Mozambique and especially Guinea-Bissau had managed to produce 
one dominant movement. The PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau was a 
particularly successful movement in political and military 
terms, leading General Antonio de Spinola, the Portuguese 
commander there, to confess that the war against the 
nationalists could not be won. Furthermore, the leader of the 
PAIGC, Amilcar Cabral, was much respected and venerated in,
among others, African circles. The alliance made between the
MPLA, the PAIGC and Mozambique's FRELIMO in the Congress of the 
Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP) 
became an important factor in influencing opinion in favour of 
the MPLA, by association, as it were. At the above mentioned 
session the ALC also gave # 20,000 to the PAIGC and another #
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In 1968, the OAU had cut off all aid to the FNLA and the OAU 
Secretary-General, Diallo Telli, held Roberto responsible for 
continuing Angolan disunity.5 In 1971, Roberto's movement had 
reached such a low point that the OAU withdrew its recognition 
of GRAE, although not of the FNLA. During this period between 
1964 and 1971, the OAU had shifted its support, implicitly and 
explicitly, from the FNLA to the MPLA.
These disputes over OAU recognition reflected the 
course of Angolan rivalry that eventually resulted in the civil 
war of 1975. It further reflected how the search for external 
legitimacy became essential not only in the anti-colonial war 
but particularly in the antagonism between the rival movements. 
It demonstrated how external factors were drawn into the 
internal Angolan conflict and changed its course.
During two separate periods, the OAU favoured the FNLA 
and then the MPLA, providing each movement with a significant 
diplomatic and material boost. The importance of the OAU 
recognition lay in the fact that this organization was entrusted 
with the channeling of all continental and international support 
for the anti-colonial wars in Africa.6 But in this recognition 
also lay implicit legitimacy, internal and external. It is this 
latter collateral that was being sought by both the FNLA and the
10,000 to FRELIMO.
5. J Marcum, The Angolan Revolution Volume Two, [1978], p.227.
6. The ALC was the principal conduit of aid and military 
assistance from donors that wished to support national self- 
determination in the colonies and white-minority regimes in
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MPLA. While this legitimacy had undoubted external benefits, its 
greatest capitalization lay in the effect that this had on the 
political rivalry between the movements. Thus, although the OAU 
would have argued that its acts of recognition actually sought 
to ameliorate this dispute, in fact these had the opposite 
effect, conferring an advantage on each of the movements which 
was mostly utilized in their dispute. It will be argued here 
that these acts of recognition by the OAU were drawn in by the 
Angolan nationalists to specifically affect the political 
rivalry between the MPLA and the FNLA rather than to benefit 
their respective anti-colonial colonial challenges.
From the very beginning of its existence, the OAU was 
used by the Angolan movements as a legitimizing factor in their 
political rivalry. The frantic behaviour of the MPLA and the 
FNLA in a scramble to be recognized by the ALC in the summer of 
1963 was the first expression of this competition for 
continental political legitimacy. For political and material 
benefits, the Angolan movements sought to frame their political 
legitimacy in OAU recognition. Emanating from this recognition 
was international, and perhaps even national, legitimacy. As an 
African liberation movement recognized by the OAU, the MPLA or 
the FNLA could count on assistance from Africa, Western Europe 
and elsewhere.
The OAU often sought to bring the rival movements 
together in a common front, which it believed would best 
further the anti-colonial war. In this, the OAU seemed to be
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pursuing a reasonably consistent policy with regard to Angolan 
rivalry. Both the FNLA and the MPLA responded to the 
initiatives but allowed them to disintegrate shortly afterwards. 
Neither movement wanted to be seen as the difficult party and 
thereby attract criticism. But a common front was never 
achieved, partly because each movement was able to count on an 
external source of support even when somewhat ostracized by the 
OAU. Thus, without the means to enforce the creation of a common 
front, the OAU's policy became redundant in the face of 
continuing Angolan rivalry and continuing access to external 
means of supporting this competition, and served only to 
accentuate their differences. Furthermore, the OAU seemed to 
have two identities. While, on the one hand, its organizational 
structure seemed to pursue a common front policy with regard to 
the Angolan nationalists, on the other, the prevailing tendency 
in its body of member-states came to politicize the important 
initiatives with regard to these movements. The OAU could never 
act beyond the sum of its parts.
The background to the recognition of the GRAE by the 
OAU in August 1963 reveals firstly how the advantages held by 
the FNLA in the Congo were capitalized upon to shift the balance 
of power even further away from the MPLA and towards Roberto's 
movement. Secondly, the consequences for the MPLA of this act of 
recognition reveal the impact of the OAU's action on the course 
of Angolan rivalry.
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The ALC mission to Leopoldville which recommended the 
recognition of the GRAE as the sole Angolan movement, came to 
its conclusions in an environment that was singularly 
disadvantageous for the MPLA. Despite having representatives on 
the mission from countries that would theoretically have 
supported the MPLA, and despite the fact that the MPLA itself 
was the greater proponent of a common-front policy, a number of 
incidents and conditions that occurred almost on the day itself, 
swung the ALC in favour of the GRAE. These factors were of 
varied origins but combined to give a negative image of the 
MPLA, and, conversely, gave a very favourable impression of the 
GRAE.
The rivalry between the FNLA and the MPLA had reached 
a high point during the first months of 1963. According to 
reports,7 an MPLA support unit was attacked in March, and 13 of 
its number were killed by FNLA forces. Despite MPLA protests 
over this attack, and a subsequent incident in April on the Loge 
River, the FNLA remained adamant that no MPLA forces were in 
fact active inside Angola and, therefore, it followed logically 
that the attacks on the MPLA could not have taken place. 
Intermovement rivalry continued, however, as did the FNLA's 
advantages emanating from Roberto's links with the Adoula 
government in Leopoldville.
This 'Congolese factor1, which can be said to have
Africa.
7. Cited in J Marcum, The Angolan Revolution Volume One, [1969],
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given the FNLA a 'home advantage', was crucial in leading the 
ALC to favour the GRAE. Firstly, it provided the assets which 
made the FNLA seem a more effective organization, and secondly, 
it delivered the Congo's strong diplomatic backing for the GRAE 
which the MPLA could not equal. On 29 June, the Congolese 
government officially recognized the GRAE as the legitimate 
representative of Angolan nationalism. This diplomatic act was 
crucial and formed the basis for the decision of the ALC which 
was taken after its visit, only a couple of weeks after the 
Congolese government had decided to formalize its patronage of 
the FNLA.
Despite the Congolese act of recognition of the GRAE 
this did not, on the face of it, appear to give the FNLA/GRAE a 
clear-cut diplomatic advantage. In fact, the MPLA's professed 
aim of forming a common front seemed to coincide with the ALC's 
policy of promoting a unified anti-colonial movement. 
Furthermore, if an assessment was made of which movement each 
member represented on the ALC would have been likely to support, 
it could have been concluded that the MPLA held a slight 
advantage. There were nine African states represented on the 
ALC, and with Algeria,8 it could be said that the MPLA could 
count on the support of five of these: Guinea, Tanzania and the 
UAR (Egypt) shared the MPLA's more radical postures, while
p.45.
8. Through the close association of Ben Bella and Mario de 
Andrade, the MPLA seemed to have a formidable supporter in
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Leopold Senghor's personal relationship with Mario de Andrade 
seemed to make Senegal fall into the camp of MPLA supporters. 
The other four members of the ALC, the Congo (Leopoldville), 
Ethiopia, Nigeria and Uganda would have been expected to support 
the FNLA. A number of circumstances changed this initial 
correlation.
The MPLA was not completely a victim of circumstance. 
In the course of the events that led to the OAU recognition of 
GRAE there were also internal factors to the movement that 
played an equally determinant role in these developments. The 
MPLA suffered its first major split at the same time as it was 
placed under the glaring lights of public scrutiny. The schism 
between Neto and Viriato da Cruz severely handicapped the 
movement at a time when it should have been showing itself as an 
internally cohesive and organizationally effective body. It did 
neither.
The restructuring of the leadership at the December 
Conference in favour of Neto had effectively cast aside Viriato 
da Cruz from the central hub of the MPLA, which he had been 
instrumental in creating. It seems likely that personal, and 
perhaps political, differences with Neto may have been 
prevalent. When Viriato da Cruz returned from abroad to 
Leopoldville,9 he conspired with Matias Migueis,10 Manuel Santos
Algeria.
9. Viriato da Cruz returned after having taken part in a 
conference in Indonesia, sponsored by China. It is possible that 
here, Viriato da Cruz established the backing that he required
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Lima and about 50 other disaffected members of the MPLA, to 
undermine the Neto leadership and carry the rump of the 
movement, and its name, into the FNLA and GRAE. Two days after 
the defection of Viriato da Cruz on 5 July, fighting broke out 
between his supporters and those of the MPLA Steering Committee 
(the Neto leadership). Viriato da Cruz had proposed a leadership 
contest but Neto challenged the legitimacy of this and the 
meeting was broken up. The Congolese police intervened. 
According to Van Dunem, Neto would have been defeated had he 
stood in a contest.11 At the same time, between 50 and 60 
soldiers of the MPLA's army (EPLA) are said to have turned 
against their officers in sympathy with the dissidents.12 It was 
a major split in the movement, with five ex-members of the 
Steering Committee exiting with Viriato da Cruz, and, more 
importantly, it occurred just three days before the ALC mission 
was due to arrive in Leopoldville.
The rationale behind the defection of Viriato da Cruz
is unclear but its consideration provides a number of possible
patterns which seem to run consistently through the history of 
Angolan rivalry. Certainly, at the time, he could not have known 
that the ALC would vote in favour of the GRAE. If it was
to split from the Neto leadership. M A Samuels, 'The Nationalist 
Parties', [1969], p.393.
10. Vice-president of the MPLA close to Viriato da Cruz.
11. Interview with Joao Van Dunem, London, 3 October 1990.
12. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, p.87.
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ambition for personal power that drove him, then the last thing 
he should have done was to seek admission to the personalized 
political movement that was the FNLA under Roberto. In a 
document published after his defection, Viriato da Cruz set out 
the reasons for his abandonment of the movement he created.13 
His principal criticisms focused on the 'disintegration' of the 
MPLA as a result of the internal conflicts between different 
'social' blocs within the movement.14 Marcum considers the split 
to have been an expression of the already mentioned 
black/populist versus mestizo/intellectual split in Angolan 
politics, one that also seems to have been at the root of the 
wider FNLA-MPLA schism.15 This conclusion is drawn from Viriato 
da Cruz's own words about the "panic" of the MPLA's 
intellectual-student stratum in the face of the "racist 
excesses" of the UPA. Marcum considers that this split reflected 
an African nationalist challenge to the mestizo leadership. But 
if we consider the fact that Viriato da Cruz was himself a 
mestizo intellectual who earlier had been alienated from the 
MPLA most likely due to the fact that his colour was 
inappropriate for the leadership of an African movement and due 
to the fact that his Marxist prism was too extreme for the image
13. V da Cruz, Problems of the Angolan Revolution January 1964. 
Document reproduced in R H Chilcote, Emerging Nationalism in 
Portuguese Africa: Documents [1972], pp.204-213.
14. Ibid.
15. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, pp.90-91.
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of the MPLA, it must be concluded that Marcum's assessment of 
this is not exact.
Another explanation for Viriato da Cruz's split from 
the MPLA Directing Committee is given in ideological terms. 
Manuel dos Santos Lima16 considers that the split was a 
"...reflection of the ideological cleavage between China and the 
Soviet Union."17 Certainly, Viriato da Cruz's proximity to China 
was subsequently revealed in his support for Maoist strategy and 
by following a pro-Peking line (see Chapter Seven), but it is 
difficult to assess how important this was over other 
considerations in the split. This interpretation of the schism 
in the MPLA as a reflection of the emerging Sino-Soviet split is 
challenged by an unnamed 'founder' of the MPLA cited by 
Expresso:
"The Directing Committee was influenced by the struggle 
against the cult of personality of the XXth Congress of the 
CPSU and abolished the position of secretary-general.
Viriato resisted and there came the rupture. There were no 
problems of ideology but of methods."18
So rather than being solely the result of racial 
conflict or ideological differences, the clash between the 
Viriato 'bloc' and the central Neto core may also be explained
16. The first commander-in-chief of the EPLA who abandoned the 
MPLA with Viriato da Cruz.
17. Interview in Africa (Lisbon) 17 August 1988. My translation.
18. 'MPLA: uma historia de crises' in Expresso (Lisbon) 8 
December 1990.
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as having been the result of an increasing frustration with the 
ineffectiveness of the movement. The almost exclusive military 
advantage held by the FNLA in the Congo was clearly enviable, 
and, despite the activation of a military front in Cabinda in 
January that year, the MPLA was simply not getting to the 
action. Viriato da Cruz was aware of the clearly preferential 
treatment of the GRAE by the Congolese authorities, which 
included unhindered access to the border and a well-equipped 
military base at Kinkuzu, and may have compared this to the 
feebleness of the MPLA military operations that seemed to be 
mostly in danger of attack by FNLA units, rather than from the 
Portuguese army, their enemies. Viriato da Cruz may have been 
predisposed to dilute his 'bloc' in the FNLA as long as it 
implied a better chance at striking a harder anti-colonial 
challenge against the Portuguese.
As well as providing an unwelcome picture of 
disunity, which lessened even further the credibility of the 
MPLA-Neto's case when it came before the ALC, the defection of 
Viriato da Cruz also resulted in embarrassing counter-claims 
with regard to the MPLA's military strength that were made 
public at that time. The ALC was looking to bestow favour on a 
militarily effective movement as well as one that seemed to be 
representative of Angolan nationalism. When Viriato da Cruz 
defected he rubbished the MPLA’s claims of having a 10,000- 
strong army,19 and placed the real figure at an embarrassingly
19. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, p.71.
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low 250.20 Viriato da Cruz exposed these exaggerations as being 
the result of a conscious policy designed to draw attention, 
especially from the West, to the somewhat absent military 
strengths of the MPLA.21 The result of this overpropagandizing 
by the MPLA, was the dissemination of an image of a feeble 
movement with little or no military activity.
The discrediting of the MPLA was further enhanced by a 
poorly calculated political manoeuvre on its part. The MPLA had 
announced, at the beginning of July, that it was joining a 
number of other movements in exile to form a common front, the 
Democratic Front of the Liberation of Angola (FDLA).22 
According to the MPLA, the FDLA was to form the core of all 
Angolan nationalists and eventually unite all anti-colonial 
forces. Leopoldville abounded with an array of political, 
cultural and ethnic associations vying to carve out a place for 
themselves in the pantheon of Angolan anti-colonialism.23 By
20. J Marcum, ibid., p.95 and D L Wheeler and R Pelissier, 
Angola, [1971], p.215.
21. V da Cruz, Problems of the Angolan Revolution. Document 
reproduced in R H Chilcote, op.cit.,Documents [1972], p.210.
22. Frente Democratica de Liberta^ao de Angola.
23. According to Marcum, there were as many as 58 Angolan 
movements striving for political power amongst the large 
community of Angolan expatriates in Leopoldville and manoeuvring 
for official Congolese backing. As with the MPLA and the FNLA, 
the rivalry between Angolans often took precedence over the 
fight against the Portuguese. To some of these much smaller (and 
poorer) groups, these realities signified that sometimes even 
making arrangements with the Portuguese was a necessity. One 
such group was the Movement for the Defence of the Interests of 
Angola (Mouvement de Defense des Interets de l'Angola-MDIA) 
based in the Bakongo constituency, and, therefore, a rival of
252
forming a somewhat paper front with an array of movements, 
including those that sought to represent the Bakongo community, 
the MPLA hoped to challenge the legitimacy of the FNLA and limit 
the damage done by the creation of the GRAE and its recognition 
by the Congolese government.
Behind the FDLA initiative was the Congo (Brazzaville) 
regime of President Fulbert Youlou, whose backing for the MPLA's 
front almost certainly intended to deal himself into the game of 
influence among the Angolan exiles. The rivalry between the two 
Congolese regimes cannot but be seen as reflected in this 
case.24 But the FDLA lacked credibility from the very start. 
Rather than giving an image of broad representativity and ethnic 
appeal, the FDLA smacked of MPLA domination, accentuated by the 
close affiliation of a labour organization, the UNTA, with the 
movement. On the other hand, the suspected collaborationist 
nature of two of the parties,25 did little to inspire confidence 
in the front and only served to discredit the MPLA. In what was
the FNLA. It was, however, believed that the MDIA was 
infiltrated by Portuguese agents. The MDIA was one of the 
partners with which the MPLA formed the FDLA. The other 
constituent partners were: the Angolan National Movement
(Movimento Nacional Angolano-MNA), the Ngwizako (also considered 
a collaborationist movement according to a contemporary account 
by a leader of the PDA: A Matumona, 'Angolan Disunity1 in
Angola: a Symposium, [1962], p.124), and a pro-MPLA labour
movement, the National Union of the Workers of Angola (Uniao 
Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Angola-UNTA).
24. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, p.81.
25. The MDIA and the Ngwizako. See footnote above.
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apparently a reaction of protest at the creation of the FDLA, 
Mario de Andrade, founder and first president of the MPLA, 
resigned from the movement at this time, an act which reinforced 
the negative reception of the creation of this front.
When the ALC mission arrived in Leopoldville on 10 
July the MPLA had been, barely within a week, torn apart 
internally by a major split in the leadership, discredited by 
Viriato da Cruz's parting shots which put its military activity 
in a very poor light, and to top it all off, had formed a 
totally unconvincing front with groups suspected of 
collaboration with the Portuguese. It was not the best of 
pictures to give to the incoming ALC mission that was seeking to 
unite effective and cohesive Angolan organizations.
In opposition to the internal disarray of the MPLA, a 
number of factors had combined to give a very favourable image 
of the FNLA at the Committee hearings. From the start, the host 
country's favour was very valuable, especially since the 
Committee had determined that the evaluation and opinion of the 
adjacent country's hosting anti-colonial movements, was, above 
all others, a clear guide to the strengths and weaknesses of 
these movements. The fact that the Leopoldville government had 
diplomatically recognized the FNLA's government-in-exile was a 
clear indication of its position vis-a-vis the Angolan 
movements.
Another result of the FNLA's close ties with the 
Congolese government was the privileged access its units had to
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the border with Angola. The well-trumpeted military operations 
that had arisen from this advantage gave a strong picture of 
military activity, cemented by a visit to the obviously 
impressive, relative to what the MPLA could show, Kinkuzu 
base.26 On the other hand, the MPLA had little to show in the 
military sphere. Without direct links to its partisans and the 
consistent denials on the part of the FNLA that insisted that no 
other movement was militarily active in Angola, the MPLA gave an 
image of military ineffectiveness, further maligned by Viriato 
da Cruz'a revelations of the existence of a policy of 
overpropagandization.
The ALC was also given a contrasting picture of the 
internal organization of each movement. The FNLA was, at least 
during this period, a cohesive group under Roberto's 
leadership.27 The fact that the FNLA was already a front, which 
united Roberto's UPA and the PDA, gave added weight to its 
claims that it was up to the MPLA to join them and not the other 
way around. Furthermore, the prominence of the GRAE's foreign 
minister, Jonas Savimbi, allowed the FNLA to deny MPLA 
allegations that it was merely a tribalist vehicle for the
26. M A Samuels, op.cit., p.394. Marcum state that the ALC 
Committee did not visit Kinkuzu. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, 
p.97.
27. The defection from the UPA by Kassanga, who formed, with 
Andre Kassinda, the Angolan National Union (Uniao Nacional 
Angolana-UNA) had defied Roberto's leadership, but since its
challenge had been carried outside the FNLA, the UNA became just 
another movement in exile. D L Wheeler and R Pelissier, op.cit., 
pp.206-7.
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secessionist ambitions of the Bakongo, as well as including in 
its fold one of the more popular and active of Angolan 
nationalists.
In contrast, the MPLA gave a picture of internal 
division and contested leadership. The Viriato-Neto split was 
characterized by violence and public disputations, and, to make 
matters even worse, the Viriato faction had applied for 
membership of the FNLA which only served to further enhance the 
legitimacy of Roberto's movement, while the MPLA continued to 
peddle its rival common front, the discredited FDLA. Allegations 
of collaboration with the Portuguese colonial authorities did 
the movement no good whatsoever, and the resignation of Mario de 
Andrade, one of the strongest political and intellectual figures 
in the Neto faction, had also damaged the external image of the 
MPLA.
To further the MPLA's misery, the committee hearings, 
chaired by Jaja Wachuku, the Nigerian foreign minister,28 were 
very positive for the FNLA. The Neto faction, essentially on the 
defensive from the start, was unable to present a credible 
picture of military activity. Furthermore, confirming the 
movement's essential exile character:
"Neto himself was brought to agree that the MPLA had no 
political structure inside Angola."29
28. Marcum stresses that Wachuku was a close friend of Roberto 
and that this fact cannot be discounted as having significantly 
influenced the course of the hearings. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume 
Two, pp.94-97.
29. Africa Digest Volume XI No.4, p.11.
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Reportedly, Neto's request to plead his case in Portuguese was 
refused by Wachuku. And when Neto placed a request for a second 
hearing in order to better build the MPLA's case, he was denied 
and instead Viriato da Cruz was heard. The defector chastised 
the leadership, poured scorn on its claims of military strength 
and activity and proclaimed his faction's intent of joining the 
FNLA and the GRAE. Viriato da Cruz's defection was in itself a 
blow for the MPLA, but when it was used against Neto in the ALC 
mission hearings, it proved to be crushing.
The Committee of Nine terminated their hearings and 
left Leopoldville. Despite the initial political predisposition, 
to vote in favour of the MPLA, as described above, the ALC 
mission had unanimously decided that due to the FNLA's superior 
fighting force, its 'effective' leadership of the Angolan anti­
colonial struggle should continue and be supported by the OAU.30 
The chairman's report stressed that in making its decision, the 
mission had relied "...heavily on the local 'knowledge and 
experience' of contiguous states,"31 that is to say, on the 
advice of the Congolese government. The results of the ALC 
mission were reported to the OAU Council of Ministers meeting 
held in Dakar in August. The Council accepted the Committee's 
recommendation and officially recognized the GRAE as the sole
30. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, pp.96-97.
31. J Marcum, ibid., p.97.
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Angolan nationalist movement. The GRAE then became entitled to 
all funds destined for the national self-determination of 
Angola, while states were requested not to support any other 
Angolan movement. Host member states then proceeded to 
bilaterally recognize the GRAE, Algeria being one of the first 
to do so.
Clearly, the ALC decision had been heavily influenced 
not only by the counsel of the Congolese government in favour of 
the FNLA but also by the advantages derived from its 
relationship with this government, which gave this movement had 
the ability to present itself as an attractive option. 
Militarily it was able to come across strongly because of its 
exclusive access to the Angolan border and the concession of a 
training base at Kinkuzu. Furthermore, the de jure recognition 
of the GRAE by the Leopoldville government gave the former an 
enviable and unequallable status vis-a-vis the MPLA. Despite the 
very real weaknesses of the MPLA, the FNLA's access to the 
Congo's political patronage influenced the ALC's decision and 
thus the OAU's recognition beyond what would have been a simple 
evaluation of the strengths of each movement. The use of this 
external link (Congo) by the FNLA to gain international 
legitimacy (OAU) is indicative of the consistent process by 
which Angolan rivalry was internationalized.
The OAU recognition dealt a massive blow to the 
already reeling MPLA. Internally debilitated, the movement was 
then forced to contend with the thought of complete alienation
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from the mainstream of African international politics. Marked by 
an unhelpful and fratricidal rivalry, the year of activity in 
the Congo-Leopoldville had threatened to stamp out the MPLA 
politically, if not physically. In November, supported by the 
OAU decision, the pro-Roberto Adoula government ordered the 
closure of the MPLA offices in the capital. The leadership and 
its remaining supporters were literally run out of town. By the 
end of 1963 nothing remained of the MPLA in Leopoldville.
Conversely, the GRAE was riding high on its new 
exclusivity. After the OAU recognition, Roberto's movement 
looked forward to a monopolistic control of the anti-colonial 
war, well entrenched in Leopoldville with the seal of approval 
of the OAU. Diplomatic recognition of the GRAE by most African 
and Arab states ensued, beginning with Algeria, previously an 
MPLA backer. These states did seem to have their best intentions 
in mind. With one, albeit cruel, blow, they hoped to banish 
divisive rivalry from Angolan nationalism. Press reports at the 
time reflected this confidence in the unification of Angolan 
anti-colonialism.32 For the MPLA, however, it was a policy that 
came devastatingly close to bringing about its extinction.
The MPLA seemed to have reached a low point as to 
begin to be thought of as a spent force in Angolan politics. 
Observers could be forgiven for sounding its death knell. Basil 
Davidson, an enthusiastic supporter of the MPLA, prematurely
32. Africa Digest (London) Vol. XI, No. 4, Covering events to 
January 19, 1964. p.11.
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discounted the survival of this movement:
"'initially the more influential of the two big nationalist
movements, the MPLA has fractured, split and reduced it 
self to a nullity. With Roberto Holden’s (sic) UPA 
steadily gathering strength and allies, the MPLA has 
ceased to count.' The judgement was my own, writing in 
West Africa for 14 December 1963, and it was singularly 
wrong. But that is what things looked like at the time."33
The MPLA did survive, however, and by 1971 it was 
considered the strongest and most effective Angolan movement 
fighting the Portuguese. Conversely, the GRAE, although not the 
FNLA, had had its official recognition withdrawn by the OAU in 
that same year. From 1966 onwards, the MPLA was receiving the 
greater share of the OAU funds destined for the Angolan 
nationalists while the FNLA had managed to all but alienate 
itself from continental political support. An almost mirror 
reflection of what had occurred in 1963 began to occur once the 
MPLA was able to give an image of being an effective military 
organization, based in a friendly African state and able to 
count on an array of external diplomatic support. The ability to 
benefit from political friendships was now present in the second 
OAU process of recognition, only this time it was available to 
Neto's movement. The diplomatic advantage that the MPLA did not 
have in 1963, it subsequently gained, through its relationship 
with Congo (Brazzaville) and as a result of the firm commitment 
to stand in the socialist camp it had finally made after 1964.
33. B Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm, [1974], p.207.
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The reasons behind the MPLA*s recovery are multiple. 
Firstly, the Neto faction had successfully reorganized and 
consolidated its leadership and organization in their safe haven 
in Brazzaville after having left Leopoldville rather hurriedly. 
Secondly, an array of new external backers helped the movement 
to mount a military challenge in Angola which differed 
significantly from its previous attempts. Thirdly, a tireless 
diplomatic campaign, based on these new external backers, 
brought the 'new' MPLA to African political circles. The MPLA's 
recovery was even further accentuated by the dramatic decline of 
its rival, the FNLA. Roberto's movement had not managed to 
capitalize on the OAU recognition and bolster its initial 
advantages, allowing its image to deteriorate in these same 
political circles.
For reasons which cannot be unconnected from a sense 
of rivalry between the Leopoldville and Brazzaville regimes, the 
MPLA-Neto had already found sympathy in the Fulbert Youlou 
government. But by the time the remains of the MPLA had crossed 
the river that separates the two capitals, the Youlou government 
had fallen and had been replaced by that of Massemba-Debat, who 
proceeded to establish a radical Marxist regime. From 1964 
onwards, the MPLA also began to assume a far more Marxist 
posture, which broke with its past attempts to appeal to a 
broader political spectrum of external support. This ideological 
proximity converged with an almost inherent competitive stance 
of the Brazzaville government vis-a-vis its neighbour, to create
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a very friendly environment for the MPLA. It is possible to 
claim that, for different reasons and to a different degree, the 
MPLA had an advantageous status in Brazzaville comparable to 
that which the FNLA had had in Leopoldville.
In Brazzaville, Neto was able to establish an 
uncontested structure of leadership which set about the task of 
reconstituting the organizational and military capacity of the 
movement. Without Mario de Andrade and Viriato da Cruz, Neto 
was, however, loyally supported by the hard ideological work 
done by Lucio Lara, who created an authority structure for the 
movement based on the political domination of its military 
forces. The movement's new structure and programme was 
established and implemented at a conference of all activists 
(Conferencia de Quadros) held in Brazzaville in January 1964.34
It was on the military front that things changed most 
for the MPLA. Following its clearly catastrophic attempts to run 
military sorties into Angola from Leopoldville, the movement now 
had unrestricted access to the Congolese border with the Angolan 
enclave of Cabinda, and was authorized to establish a military 
base at Dolisie. Starting with small guerrilla strikes, the 
movement managed to claim a certain amount of military 
activity.35 Since its poor military record had been one of the 
MPLA's major shortcomings revealed by the ALC hearings, the
34. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, p.121.
35. Radio Brazzaville reports an MPLA strike in October 1964 
that left 10 dead. Africa Research Bulletin (London) 18 October 
1964.
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operation of a military front, however small, significantly 
raised the political stock of the movement. Reported by The 
Times as early as November 1963,36 increasing military activity 
in the Cabindan enclave became an important factor in the MPLA's 
recovery.
By October 1964, barely a year after the MPLA had been 
run out of Leopoldville, it was reported that Mario de Andrade 
had returned to the movement.37 He had been in Rabat since 
leaving the MPLA in mid-1963, an act that seemed to reflect the 
internal collapse of the movement and the impending external 
blow. Equally, his return in 1964 mirrored the changing fortunes 
of the MPLA.
The recovery of the MPLA based on its internal 
consolidation and the operation of a military front was made 
possible by the sympathetic environment it found in Brazzaville. 
This status allowed the MPLA to concentrate on the task of 
reconstruction by allowing it to accumulate the material tools 
it required. In July 1964, the Brazzaville government authorized 
the delivery of a shipment of arms to the movement.38 The 
favourable relationship with the Massemba-Debat regime was also 
instrumental in the establishment of the MPLA's principal
36. Africa Digest (London) Vol.XI, No.4. Covering events to 
January 19, 1964. p.11.
37. Africa Digest (London) Vol. XII, No. 3. Covering events to 
November 16, 1964. p.87.
38. D L Wheeler and R Pelissier, op.cit., p.215.
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sources of external support that would help it re-emerge as a 
major Angolan anti-colonial organization and that would, in 
1975, provide the MPLA with the necessary military power during 
the civil war. It was during this period of calm that the MPLA 
was able to establish strong links with both the Soviet Union 
and Cuba. In parallel to this, the MPLA also began to take a 
much more committed posture with regard to its Marxist outlook 
and, from 1964 onwards, placed itself firmly in the anti-Western 
bloc of the cold war conflict.
Contact between members of the MPLA and Moscow had 
been established before 1964. Allegedly, there had been contact 
between the Luanda Marxists (including elements of the 
Portuguese communist party) and a member of the KGB, active in 
the Angolan capital in the 1950s.39 The main forum for links 
with the Soviet Union had been through the Portuguese communists 
(see Chapter Three), and in 1964 this continued to be so. 
Whilst in Lisbon, Neto had been close to the PCP,40 and these 
links are said to have helped him escape from Portugal in 1962. 
But it was from 1964 that the relationship between the MPLA and 
Moscow became strongly established. Allegedly through the person 
of Alvaro Cunhal, the secretary-general of the PCP, Neto went to 
Moscow in 1964.41 Marcum claims that after this trip, Soviet
39. See Chapter Seven.
40. Some sources cite him as being a member of the PCP.
41. G Golan The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements 
in the Third World [1988], p.269. and J Valenta 'The Soviet- 
Cuban Intervention in Angola 1975* [1978], p.5.
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support was resumed after having been cut off in August 1963.42 
It seems unlikely, however, that before 1964 this aid was of a 
significant level.
During his trip to Moscow, Neto managed to convince 
the Kremlin that he was in control of the MPLA and that it 
offered a fighting chance of surviving an anti-colonial war and 
becoming influential in post-independence Angolan political 
life. By proclaiming support for the cause of the MPLA in 
December 1964 the Soviet press may have revealed that such an 
act of persuasion might indeed have taken place.43 In August 
1965, Pravda published an article by an unnamed leading MPLA
figure that praised the Soviet Union's support for that
movement.44 Other reports seem to reveal that in 1964 there
occurred a noticeable coming together of the MPLA and Moscow. In 
December in New York, an unknown group calling itself the 
Movement of Free Angola (Mouvement de 1'Angola Libre) declared 
that the Soviet Union was intervening in the internal affairs of 
Africa by supporting Agostinho Neto.45
42. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, p.171.
43. M A Samuels, op.cit., [1969], p.395.
44. Africa Research Bulletin (London) August 1965.
45. Africa Research Bulletin 22 December 1964. That same month a
somewhat cryptic statement by GRAE seems related to this
approximation between Moscow and the MPLA. The GRAE declaration 
dismissed reports in Pravda that had announced the cessation of 
Soviet aid to GRAE. This, claimed GRAE, was pure propaganda as
the GRAE had never received any Soviet assistance. This incident 
may be linked to the FNLA's desire to emphasize its anti­
communist credentials but may also reveal the beginning of 
Soviet support for the MPLA through what may have been an
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According to Golan, significant Soviet aid for the 
MPLA began after Neto's visit to Moscow in 19 6 4 . 46 The total 
Soviet aid for the MPLA in the period between 1960 and March 
1975 (before the significant military input of 1975) is cited as 
being worth about US$ 54 million. Even if it is assumed that 
half of this total was provided in 1973-1975 (despite the 
interruption in 1974), the remaining amount would total US$ 3 
million a year from 1964, a not insignificant amount by the 
standards of anti-colonial movements. Soviet assistance was not 
solely material. Apart from the diplomatic and political support 
that Moscow began to provide internationally, the MPLA also 
benefited from the training and education of a number of its 
cadres in the Soviet Union from 1965 onwards.47
The MPLA's relationship with Cuba allegedly began 
during Che Guevara's African tour in 1964-1965. The 
revolutionary visited practically every radical country on the 
continent, a few where anti-colonial movements were based. While 
visiting Congo (Brazzaville) where an anti-Leopoldville movement 
of Lumumbists was based, Guevara also met Neto and leaders of 
movements in the other Portuguese colonies, united with the MPLA
attempt to bring the latter in from the cold by maligning the 
GRAE.
46. G Golan, op.cit., pp.269-270.
47. Later in Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Bulgaria. Soviet 
(and North Korean) military advisors trained MPLA guerrilla 
units in Algeria, in Congo (Brazzaville) and in Egypt.
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in the inter-territorial CONCP. In these meetings, the 
subsequently long association between the MPLA and Cuba is said 
to have been established.48 Within one year of the Brazzaville 
meeting, Cuba was supplying CONCP members with arms and 
instructors.49 According to later revelations, Che Guevara 
secretly returned to Brazzaville in April 1965 to lead a unit of 
200 'international fighters' against the Congo (Leopoldville) 
rule of Moise Tshombe. However, disillusioned by the political 
rivalry -among the Congolese rebels, and asked to rescind the 
effort by the Brazzaville government after the Mobutu take-over 
in Leopoldville, Guevara left Africa for Bolivia, leaving behind 
his fighters in Brazzaville and Conakry to help train the MPLA 
and the Guinean PAIGC respectively. In early 1966, Cuban 
presence in Brazzaville was said to number 1,000,50 providing 
not only training for the anti-colonial movements but also 
support for the incumbent Brazzaville government.
The new support of the Soviet Union and Cuba began to 
give the MPLA a markedly different international profile. At the
48. It is interesting to note that Jonas Savimbi reports a 
meeting he had with Guevara after the latter's visit to 
Brazzaville, where he claims Guevara told him: "I went to 
Brazzaville to see the MPLA, and nothing is happening. They are 
just bourgeois. From now on you are my friend. I am going to 
Fidel to make a report on you, and he will give you assistance 
through our friend Ben Bella in Algeria." cited in F Bridgland, 
Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa [1986], p.77.
49. W Leogrande 'Cuban-Soviet Relations and Cuban Policy in 
Africa1 [1982], p.18.
50. W Leogrande, op.cit., p.19.
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'Tricontinental' conference held in Havana in January 1966,51 
Neto and the MPLA were the sole representatives of Angolan 
nationalism. This international forum was an important corner­
stone in the movement's recovery. Having resolved, for the time 
being, its internal disputes,52 and having begun to operate a 
military front in Cabinda, the MPLA began to establish a more 
radical international posture that would bring it important 
political and material benefits. It did this by identifying 
effectively with the radical stream of National Liberation. Its 
relationship with Moscow helped to reinforce this 
radicalization. The Soviet Union had become the more credible of 
the superpowers in the Third World and was increasingly 
associated with in anti-colonial wars. By contrast, the United 
States, which had attempted to court anti-colonial forces in the 
early 1960s, had increasingly become identified as part of the 
neo-colonial threat, by virtue of among other factors, its 
political, economic and military association with Western 
Europe. The MPLA that emerged from Brazzaville in 1964 was much 
more clearly oriented towards the socialist bloc and the stream 
of National Liberation movements in the Third World. This much 
less ambiguous association, among other things, helped the 
movement to gain a more prominent international profile. By 
associating unambiguously with the socialist bloc, the MPLA had
51. By the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO).
52. The breakaway Viriato da Cruz faction was absorbed by the 
FNLA in April 1964.
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discovered a niche from where it could translate international 
influence into domestic political advantage and vice versa.
An important factor that had helped to bring the MPLA 
this greater attention was its activity within the 
interterritorial CONCP, that brought together the anti-colonial 
organizations of the Portuguese colonies. Derived from earlier 
coalitions, it included the MPLA and the leading movements in 
Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Sao Tome and Principe. Contrary to 
what had occurred in Angola, the anti-colonial nationalists in 
these colonies had congregated around one single radical 
movement. As a result of the personal contacts established when 
student companions in Lisbon, the leaders of these movements 
were very close, both ideologically and politically. For 
example, Mario de Andrade, Amilcar Cabral (PAIGC) and Marcelino 
Santos (FRELIMO) all knew each other very well. The advantages 
for the MPLA of this association came from being identified with 
the other movements. Thus, as FRELIMO and especially the PAIGC, 
were well established in international circles as the sole 
representatives of the anti-colonial wars in their respective 
countries, the MPLA, by virtue of its association with these in 
the CONCP, began to receive a similar level of attention. From 
the mid-1960s, through the CONCP, the AAPSO conferences and 
ceaseless campaigning in regional and international fora, the 
MPLA began to emerge as the radical voice of Angolan 
nationalism, a role it had not occupied before as unambiguously 
as it did from hereon.
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Once again, the external image of the movement was 
mostly based on its internal structure and activity. Thus, in 
1963 the internal disarray of the MPLA was in part responsible 
for what had occurred at the ALC hearings. Similarly, after 1964 
the internal reinforcement of the movement and the relatively 
successful operation of a military front was partly the basis 
for its recovery. But this internal strengthening largely 
occurred as a result of the very favourable relationship 
established with the Brazzaville regime. Furthermore, this 
relationship helped to lead the MPLA to establish very important 
links with the Soviet Union and Cuba. Similarly, the MPLA's 
relationship with the latter, the Congo (Brazzaville) and the 
other CONCP members helped it to emerge with a prominent 
international status within the socialist bloc and the National 
Liberation camp. The dynamic interplay of both internal and 
external factors seems to have been responsible for the recovery 
of the MPLA after 1964.
Another important factor in the MPLA's recovery was a 
concurrent decline of favour for the FNLA, as a result of the 
revelation of a number of the FNLA's weaknesses. Unable to 
capitalize on the diplomatic windfall that had resulted from the 
OAU recognition, Roberto's movement dithered as it suffered from 
military inertia and internal political conflicts. Seeming to 
repeat the misfortunes of the MPLA in 1963, the FNLA's 
weaknesses were exposed one by one.
Comparable in effect to the defection of Viriato da
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Cruz from the MPLA in 1963 was Jonas Savimbi's dramatic 
resignation from the post of GRAE Foreign Minister at the 1964 
OAU summit in Cairo,53 the same meeting that had been petitioned 
by the MPLA with a view to overturning the ALC recognition of 
GRAE. When Savimbi abandoned the GRAE, like Viriato da Cruz, he 
gave negative testimony, on a very public stage, of the military 
inefficiency of the movement. At the same time he cited 
Roberto's inflexible leadership as the main cause for his 
abandonment of the movement. Already an important figure in 
Angolan nationalism, Savimbi's exit did much to discredit 
Roberto.
From Leopoldville, the reports on the GRAE's activity 
were not much better. Various revolts within the undisciplined 
ELNA army cast a disappointing light over the previous year's 
enthusiasm for the military effectiveness of the GRAE. Even the 
Congolese government, hitherto its strongest card and 
responsible for much of the FNLA's advantages, was from July 
1964 in the hands of Moise Tshombe, who was not sympathetic 
towards Roberto. In place of the benevolence of the Adoula 
government, Roberto began to feel pressure from Tshombe as the 
international profile of the FNLA began to decline. Tshombe 
allowed two FNLA defectors to establish their rival organization 
(UNA) in Leopoldville.54 Divisions within the movement also
53. See Chapter Three.
54. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, p.145.
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began to show. Defection followed defection and, at one point, 
an attempted coup sought to topple Roberto.55 This internal 
break-up, the fall of Adoula and the consequent decline of the 
FNLA's international prestige threatened to extinguish the 
movement just as a similar debacle had threatened the MPLA 
barely more than a year before. The FNLA's passage into oblivion 
was largely avoided by the take-over of the Congolese regime in 
Leopoldville, on 24 November 1965, by a close friend of Roberto, 
the army strongman, Lieutenant-General Joseph Desire Mobutu.
As the MPLA began to re-emerge, it delivered a 
petition to the OAU summit in Cairo on 16 July 1964 appealing 
for the reversal of the sole recognition of GRAE. The document 
stressed that, among other things, the MPLA's "truly national 
origin" made it essential for the OAU to give it the freedom to 
act. The MPLA did not forget to pay homage to its new patron:
"...because of the understanding of the people and of the 
government of the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), the 
MPLA has been able to endure all these difficulties and 
continue to maintain itself as a nationalist movement 
committed to the attainment of national liberation.1156
The summit did not reverse its decision but did establish a 
committee with the task of seeking the conciliation of the
55. The so-called Taty putsch. Alexandre Taty, a Cabindan, 
attempted to oust Roberto, allegedly supported by, among others, 
the Portuguese. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, pp.148-9.
56. Memorandum to the Conference of Heads of State and of
Governments of the OAU 17 July 1964. Document reproduced in R H
Chilcote, op.cit., p.282.
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Angolan movements. For the MPLA, barely a year after the ALC 
mission, this was tantamount to recognition. The Conciliation 
Committee57 visited the MPLA at its new base and returned with 
very favourable testimony:
"The MPLA is a serious movement, active and capable of 
leading an effective campaign. Therefore, it deserves aid 
and assistance from the Committee of Co-Ordination [ALC]"58
From here on, the MPLA began to gain ground in the OAU. It was 
the movement itself that announced enthusiastically that it had 
been recognized at the November 1964 meeting of the ALC and was 
receiving material and technical support from the Committee.59 
By the time the next OAU summit was held in 1965, the MPLA was 
being allocated a third of ALC funds destined for Angola.60 
Subsequently, the MPLA became the most favoured movement of the 
ALC. By 1968, the FNLA was no longer receiving any funds from 
the ALC and in 1971, the OAU summit withdrew its recognition of 
the GRAE, although it continued to recognize the legitimacy of 
the FNLA.
With regard to UNITA, the OAU did nothing throughout
57. The Committee of Three was made up of Congo (Brazzaville), 
the UAR and Ghana, all countries at least friendly with the 
MPLA.
58. Report of the Committee of Conciliation between GRAE and 
MPLA Reprinted by the MPLA in Brazzaville 1964. Document 
reproduced in R H Chilcote, op.cit., p.292.
59. Radio Brazzaville, 30 December 1964, in Africa Research 
Bulletin (London) December 1964.
60. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, p.171.
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the anti-colonial period. Despite its active existence from 1966 
onwards, UNITA was not recognized by the OAU as a legitimate 
Angolan nationalist movement until after the April 1974 coup in 
Portugal. As the ALC believed that it was trying to promote a 
unified nationalist movement, and as it already had its hands 
full with the rivalry between the MPLA and the FNLA, it decided 
not to support UNITA.
According to the OAU its recognitions with regard to 
the Angolan movements were justified as they were no more than a 
reflection of reality. In 1963, the OAU saw the FNLA as the most 
powerful movement and thus chose to recognize the GRAE. 
Likewise, from 1964, the OAU began to see the MPLA as an 
increasingly important force, and conversely, considered the 
GRAE to have wasted its opportunities. Therefore, believed the 
OAU, its acts merely reflected these situations. But if the 
evaluation missions on which the OAU decisions were based, are 
looked at more carefully, a certain basic incompetence is 
revealed. That is to say, the evaluation of the movements' 
strengths by the OAU was, at the very least, incomplete if not 
actually heavily biased by the prevailing political environment.
The 1963 ALC mission to Leopoldville was fundamentally 
flawed not so much by considering the MPLA's weaknesses, which 
were apparent, but by not considering realistically the 
strengths of the FNLA, the failings of which were, subsequently, 
very quickly revealed. As Marcum puts it:
"The Leopoldville hearings had followed an easy course,
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concentrating upon the evident disarray of one movement 
without making a serious effort to plummet the real 
strengths and weaknesses of its opponents."61
Similarly, the Conciliation Committee, that was so impressed by 
the MPLA in 1965, seems to have been easily swayed by the new 
picture it was presented by the MPLA. The Committee wrote in 
its report that:
"It visited one of the bases closest to the frontier [with 
Cabinda]. The commission was invited to visit the more 
distant bases and even to go into the interior of Cabinda. 
Convinced of the seriousness of the MPLA activities, the 
commission did not feel it was necessary, in spite of the 
insistence of the MPLA 'maquisards1, to exhaustively 
investigate the other bases."62
Considering the negative assessment of the same MPLA base made 
by Savimbi that same year,63 it is possible that a more 
exhaustive investigation would have given a clearer picture of 
the MPLA’s strengths and weaknesses. This is all the more likely 
since the MPLA's military activity in Cabinda never really 
amounted to very much. From 1964, the favourable situation in 
which the MPLA found itself in the Congo (Brazzaville) gave this 
movement, as a similar situation in Leopoldville had given the 
FNLA, the benefit of the doubt. Thus, the OAU decisions seem to 
have been far more influenced by whatever favourable
61. J Marcum, op,cit., Volume Two, p.98.
62. Report of the Committee of Conciliation between GRAE and 
MPLA 1964. Document reproduced in R H Chilcote, op.cit., p.291.
63. See Chapter Three.
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relationship of political patronage each movement had been able 
to establish than by a competent evaluation of their capacities 
and potentialities.
Of course, in their early life in exile, the MPLA and 
the FNLA could not avoid utilizing external factors. The rigours 
and necessities of their anti-colonial campaigns required the 
benevolence of the government of a contiguous state from where 
each could operate a military challenge. Furthermore, the 
financial requirements of their struggles had to have been met 
by international fund-raising among those sympathetic to their 
cause. But the establishment of a close relationship between the
FNLA and the Adoula regime in Leopoldville on the one hand and
the MPLA and Massemba-Debat in Brazzaville far exceeded the 
fulfilment of these basic requirements. These close associations 
delivered important dividends that were not so much utilized in 
the anti-colonial challenge as principally directed towards the 
rivalry between them. From 1962, the root of conflict between 
the FNLA and the MPLA had been established and from that time
also each movement sought to place their rivalry on the matrix
of another political competition, in this case, that between the 
two Congos. This close patronage, achieved for different reasons 
by each movement, then became crucial, for the FNLA and later 
the MPLA, to attain internal and external legitimacy. Part and 
parcel of this process of legitimization were the recognitions 
conceded by the OAU. In this way, OAU recognition was drawn in 
to legitimize each movement's cause and the African organization
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became intimately involved, from the very beginning, in the 
conflict between the MPLA and the FNLA that led to the civil war 
in 1975.
(ii) From 1972 to the Civil War
The primacy that the MPLA had established in the OAU 
from the mid-1960s until 1971 did not last once the FNLA was 
able to mount a serious diplomatic offensive. After its 1963 
golden moment, the FNLA had entered a period of decline that 
lasted almost a decade. Like the MPLA it had essentially been 
unable to develop an effective military campaign against the 
Portuguese, but unlike the MPLA, it had also been unable to 
maintain a prestigious international image comparable to the one 
it had had in 1963 when the GRAE was recognized by most African 
states. But from 1972, the FNLA began to recover this lost 
territory, again through a process of internal consolidation 
based on the active patronage of the host government of 
President Mobutu Sese Seko, in the Congo (Leopoldville) that had 
in 1965 become Zaire.
From 1972, the FNLA was re-launched internationally by 
Mobutu and Roberto, this time without the GRAE fictional 
government-in-exile. This coincided with a period of relative 
decline of the MPLA as a result of military reverses suffered at 
the hands of the Portuguese. The start of the recovery of the 
FNLA can be dated in July 1972. It was marked by Roberto's visit 
to Algeria, nominally an MPLA supporter, to take part in a
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celebration of this country's ten years of independence.64
The principal vehicle for the FNLA's continental 
political recovery seems to have been the informal alliance made 
by Mobutu and the presidents of Tanzania and Zambia, Julius 
Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda. These three, and Marien Ngouabi of 
the Congo (Brazzaville), had been mandated by the OAU summit of 
1971 (the same summit that had de-recognized the GRAE) to 
achieve the OAU's policy of uniting all Angolan nationalists in 
one movement. The efforts of this VIP mission seemed to have 
paid off when a reconciliation agreement between Neto and 
Roberto was formally signed in Kinshasa (ex-Leopoldville), in 
December 1972.65 But without the creation of the necessary 
conditions for unity (the MPLA continued to be denied military 
access to Zaire and UNITA was excluded from the reconciliation), 
this agreement did not last long.
However, the conciliatory aim of this mission did not 
last long. Despite these attempts to forge a common front, 
Nyerere and Kaunda, until then supporters of the MPLA, were 
beginning to lose confidence in this movement and were again 
coming round to the FNLA. This turn-around was in part achieved 
by a spate of dedicated diplomatic work by the Mobutu-sponsored 
Roberto. The following account of the FNLA leader's foreign
64. J Marcum, op.cit., p.227.
65. The agreement called for the creation of a Supreme Council 
of the Liberation of Angola (Conselho Supremo da Liberta^ao de 
Angola-CSLA) designed to co-ordinate a unified military command 
and a political council. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, p.210.
278
travels in 1973, reveals somewhat the process of building up 
support for the movement in Tanzania and Zambia. In May, he flew 
to Dar es Salaam with Nyerere as they returned from the OAU 
summit in Addis Ababa. Roberto then flew on to Zambia where he 
met with Kaunda, Nyerere and Mobutu. In July, the 'triumvirate' 
again met with Roberto, this time in Lubumbashi, before the FNLA 
leader then returned to Dar es Salaam where an FNLA office was 
subsequently opened in this African capital where previously 
only the MPLA had been active.66
The immediate result of all this diplomatic activity 
was the resumption of ALC aid to the FNLA and the return of the 
movement to a prominent diplomatic status within the OAU. By 
working itself into the favours of Zambia and Tanzania, on the 
coat-tails of the Zairean president, the FNLA was able to 
recover its international position. This time, however, although 
it had come in from the cold, the FNLA never completely 
dominated the support for Angolan nationalists. The swings of 
favour in the OAU from one movement to the other that had 
characterized the previous decade, had been replaced by the 
formation of two more committed camps of support within the 
organization. The political outlook of the two movements had 
increasingly begun to define their respective supporters and, as 
shall be seen below, the OAU was roughly divided down the middle 
as to which movement to support, a division that also reflected
66. Details in J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, pp.227-228.
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the ideological bipolarity of the East-West rivalry that had 
come to dominate continental politics.
An important consequence of the closer ties between 
the FNLA and Tanzania was the former's establishment of links 
with China, in the wake of Mobutu's own overtures to Peking. 
President Nyerere's access to the Chinese is said to have been 
the conduit for both Mobutu's and Roberto's approximation to 
Peking.67 At the time before the April coup, China became an 
important source of military support for the FNLA.
By the end of 1973, the internal divisions of the MPLA 
had resurfaced, this time in the form of the Eastern Revolt of 
Daniel Chipenda,68 which had combined with the failures of its 
military forces to accentuate the relative decline in the 
international stature of Neto's organization. This was the time 
when even the Soviet Union had, according to reports, withdrawn 
its support from the MPLA.69 While the MPLA did maintain an 
array of committed backers in Africa, the more conservative 
members of the OAU began to plump for Roberto and from a 
situation of relative isolation, by the time the Caetano regime 
in Portugal was toppled in April 1974, the FNLA had managed to 
return the two movements to a near balance of continental 
political support.
67. See Chapter Seven.
68. See Chapter One.
69. See Chapter Seven.
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The role of the OAU in the Angolan civil war was far 
more significant post facto than in moulding the actual course 
of events. The organization could not stop the fighting, nor 
could it enforce a united coalition, nor prevent the 
intervention of non-African powers. Furthermore, the 
organization was not consistent in its posture towards Angola. 
In January 1975, the OAU attempted to establish a framework for 
the succession of power, one that was based on the 
implementation of the transitional accords including the holding 
of general elections. But one year later the OAU had placed this 
framework aside and, in recognizing the MPLA's state, 
legitimized the outcome of the civil war.
In the civil war of 1975, the OAU, as the expression 
of continental African politics, was unable to replace the 
international and global pressures that had been recruited to 
battle out the political conflict in Angola. In its proclaimed 
objectives of finding an African solution for African conflicts, 
the OAU failed. However, if the pattern of political cleavage 
that existed in continental politics is considered, it is 
possible to understand how and why the OAU acted in Angola, and 
consequently why it could not have succeeded in imposing its own 
'African' solution to the Angolan civil war.
After Portugal had agreed to withdraw from its 
colonial possessions, the OAU continued to adhere to its 12 year 
policy of uniting the Angolan movements in a common front; by 
this time one that included UNITA. The government of national
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unity that the OAU endorsed in January 1975 formed the basis for 
the Alvor accords signed later that month by all three movements 
with Portugal. The transitional coalition government and the 
principle of territorial integrity (which included the Cabinda 
enclave), was supported in all of the OAU's initiatives to find
a peaceful solution in Angola throughout that year, as the
fighting between the movements grew worse.
When fighting first broke out in Luanda in the spring, 
the OAU, represented by Jomo Kenyatta, brought the three
movements together again in Nakuru and a temporary truce was
agreed. But, as it turned out, the Nakuru agreement was to the 
movements, certainly to the MPLA, a purely tactical manoeuvre.70 
A working commission was then established with the aim of 
achieving a coalition government in Angola by independence day,
on 11 November. By this time, however, the war was raging and 
the political rivals had become open adversaries. The complex 
array of alliances that each had established were in place and 
the struggle for power had become absolute. The OAU was unable 
to be anything more than a despairing observer.
The question remains, however, of whether or not this 
was completely the case. Could the OAU have done more to have 
influenced the escalation of war in Angola? Six days before 
independence, the OAU Defence Commission was convened, where the
70. Jose Van Dunem, one of the four MPLA delegates at Nakuru, 
admitted this on the return from the summit. Interview with Joao 
Van Dunem, London, 23 August 1991.
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option of sending an African peace-keeping force to Angola was 
discussed. But the members of the Commission considered that the 
OAU should "...create the necessary favourable atmosphere for a 
possible political solution of the problem of Angola."71 The 
military option was thus cast aside but the 'favourable
atmosphere1 never materialized. It is argued here that rather 
than in the policy itself, the OAU's failure in Angola resided 
in the fact that its policy was never implemented. Framed in the 
Alvor accords, OAU policy towards Angola, like Portuguese 
responsibilities,72 disentegrated once this agreement was 
discarded by the Angolans.
Legum has claimed that the failure of the OAU to 
influence the course of the war and impose a political solution
was partly the result of Idi Amin's chairmanship of the OAU from
July 1975 which was at a crucial stage in the Angolan
conflict.73 This allegation is centred on the view, shared by 
the MPLA, that the Ugandan leader was Mobutu's ally and thus 
acted either in favour of the FNLA, or, at the very least did 
not implement impartially the OAU's policy. While chairman of 
the OAU and despite abstaining from voting, Amin defended the 
conservative line on Angola which was against the recognition of 
the MPLA. The full recognition of the MPLA by the OAU was being
71. C Legum, After Angola: The War Over Southern Africa, [1978], 
p.29.
72. See Chapter One.
73. C Legum, ibid., p.28.
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urged by Moscow. Amin took a stand against this recognition 
placing Uganda in a position of hostility towards the Soviet 
Union. The dependence of the Ugandan armed forces on Soviet arms 
had made Moscow understandably confident of its ability to 
persuade Amin to recognize the MPLA. But this confidence had
been misplaced. The Ugandan leader refused to tow the Soviet 
line and claimed that his country would stand by the OAU policy 
of insisting on a coalition government of all three Angolan 
movements. This divergence with Moscow led to a six-day rupture 
in Soviet-Ugandan relations.74
While Amin insisted on unity he did little to help 
achieve it, and his pronouncements lacked the impact to
influence the course of the war especially at a stage when the 
arms race between the MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA was well under 
way. Furthermore, Amin was not trusted by the MPLA as he was 
seen to be very close to Mobutu, the FNLA's backer and whose 
troops entered Angola on the side of the anti-MPLA forces. The 
MPLA did not attend a meeting with the FNLA and UNITA convened 
by Amin in Kampala on 5 November. Legum cannot conclude what 
was behind the Mobutu-Amin alliance, but infers that, had there 
been in the chair a leader more amenable to the MPLA, or at 
least not pro-FNLA, then the OAU might have been able to play a 
more active role in bringing the movements together before
74. C Legum, ibid., p.17. This incident reflected the
conflicting priorities for African states of continental African 
politics and global alignment.
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independence. But there is little to support such a conjecture. 
Certainly there may have been more talking, but a markedly pro- 
MPLA chairman would not necessarily have insisted on a coalition 
solution and might possibly have moved for an early recognition 
of the MPLA as suggested by the Soviet Union. Indeed, once it 
had became apparent that the MPLA was militarily able to secure 
its position (when the FNLA forces were routed outside Luanda in 
the weeks after independence), there certainly would have been 
no pressure on the MPLA to attempt to form a government of 
national unity. Quite the opposite was the case. After Nakuru, 
the OAU had become irrelevant to the MPLA.75 Confident of its 
own capacity to win power, the movement did not see the need to 
accomodate negotiated settlements. Therefore, Legum's criticism 
of Idi Amin's chairmanship seems to rest on the assumption that 
the OAU should have given its full and sole support to the 
establishment of an MPLA government. Whereas it can be argued 
that Amin's failure was in allowing the military conflict to 
rage outside the aegis of the OAU, while at the same time, 
failing to create the 'favourable atmosphere for a possible 
political solution.'
If indeed the OAU's failure in Angola was its 
incapacity to impose its 'African' solution then the next 
consideration is to suggest why this was the case. At the root 
of the OAU's failure in Angola was the political divide that
75. Interview with Joao Van Dunem, London, 23 August 1991.
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split the continent into two camps of 'radicals’ and 
'moderates'. As one analysis has concluded, there was a pattern 
to continental politics:
"The split vote [over Angola] exemplified a recurrent feature 
of the inter-African system...Although changes of government 
have sometimes altered national affiliations, the general 
pattern has been quite durable because it reflects two 
persistent alternative visions of African development."76
At the heart of the OAU's incapacity to influence events in 
Angola was a divergence between its member-states on which 
movement to support; a choice which reflected the dilemma each 
African state faced in combining its external alignments, its 
own developmental strategies and its position in continental 
politics.
In January 1976, the OAU met in an emergency session 
to decide what to do about the violent civil conflict in Angola 
between the MPLA and an alliance of the FNLA and UNITA, that 
pitted South African and US-backed Zairean forces against 
Soviet-backed Cuban troops. At that time, the situation in 
Angola was military, nevertheless, the resolutions of the OAU 
were important to politically legitimize whatever resulted from 
the conflict. And in fact, political factors were dramatically 
influential in determining the result.
But the OAU session did not achieve an immediate 
consensus. The split in the voting on Angola, which can be seen
76. N Chazan et al., Politics and Society in Contemporary 
Africa, [1988], p.343.
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in Table 8, seems to have been a replay of a previous divergence 
in continental politics, between the 'Casablanca' and 'Monrovia' 
groups of the early 1960s, a divergence which the establishment 
of the OAU was meant to replace.
TABLE 8
Voting on Angola at OAU Emergency Session 10-13 January 1976
Resolution calling for the 
withdrawal of all African 
and non-African forces from 
from Angola and the 
implementation of a cease-fire 
and a government of national 
unity.
Supported by:
Resolution calling for military 
aid for the MPLA "in the face 
of..incontrovertible evidence 
about the blatant interference 
of imperialist forces seeking 
to dictate to Africa."
Supported by:
Senegal Algeria
Ivory Coast Tanzania
Upper Volta Libya
Togo Guinea
Cameroon Ghana
Gabon Mali
Central African Republic Benin
Zaire Congo
Rwanda Burundi
Tunisia Madagascar
Morocco Guinea-Bissau
Mauritania Cape Verde
Egypt Sao Tome and Principe
Gambia Mozambique
Sierra Leone Equatorial Guinea
Liberia Mauritius
Botswana Comoro Islands
Lesotho Sudan
Swaziland Somalia
Malawi Chad
Kenya Niger
Zambia Nigeria
Abstentions: Ethiopia and Uganda
Most of the states that had voted for the continuation of the
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'unity' policy, that is, in favour of the FNLA/UNITA coalition 
(since at this time the MPLA was in a militarily more favourable 
position), had some sort of alignment with a Western power.77 
The MPLA supporters leaned towards the socialist bloc and were 
considered radical in their choice of political system. 
Furthermore, the MPLA now gleaned another advantage from its 
early association within the CONCP. The nationalist movements in 
the other ex-Portuguese colonies were now independent 
governments and an important source of support for the MPLA. But 
there were also a number of contingent voters, such as Nigeria, 
which supported the MPLA although it would normally have voted 
in the other 'camp1. One advantage the MPLA did have which the 
forces arrayed it did not was the declaration of independence 
made on 11 November in Luanda and the subsequent diplomatic 
recognition of the People's Republic of Angola by a number of 
African states.78 By the time the emergency session was held in 
January, 21 of the OAU's 46 member-states had recognized the 
MPLA as the government of an independent Angola.
This show of support for the MPLA, in direct 
contradiction to OAU policy, emerged for a number of reasons, as 
many certainly as there were states. The Soviet Union was able 
to apply some pressure on a number of states to show support for
77. For example, the francophone states and their allies, those 
close to Britain and the southern African dependencies.
78. Algeria, Congo, Guinea, Somalia and all the governments of 
the ex-Portuguese colonies.
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the MPLA. While others were simply sympathetic to its outlook. 
This was certainly not the case with relatively conservative 
Nigeria. The Nigerian government is said to have acted in favour 
of the MPLA, as eventually others did, for one very political 
reason: the military aggression of South Africa. The role of the
Soviet Union in backing the MPLA in Angola, was strongly
criticized by the Nigerian Foreign Minister at the time of 
independence. But only a few months later, the same Soviet 
interference was held up by General Murtala Mohammed, the
Nigerian head of state, as being "heroic", while warning against 
the attempts of the "... inhuman and obnoxious apartheid regime 
in Pretoria trying to frustrate the will of a people..."79 There 
were other reasons for Nigeria's reversal, most notably those 
said to relate to a domestic power struggle, which led to one 
side seeking to disparage the US and its association with the 
anti-MPLA forces which included South Africa. But the fact is 
that, for many African states, South African intervention, ended 
up by justifying the legitimacy of the MPLA government and the 
intervention of Soviet-armed Cuban troops in an African war. The 
military, political and diplomatic success of this joint 
operation, almost certainly helped to influence another Soviet- 
Cuban intervention later in Ethiopia. The all-important 
Nigerian volte-face was said to have been sufficient to break 
the deadlock. On 11 February, the OAU Council of Ministers
79. C Legum, op.cit., p.30.
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voted, by a simple majority, to recognize the legitimacy of the 
MPLA government.
Of course, the OAU cannot be held solely or even 
mainly responsible for the course of Angolan rivalry, nor for 
the civil war in 1975. But the Angolan search for legitimacy and 
the dynamics of continental politics allowed the OAU to play a 
role in influencing both. Benefiting from the patronage of the 
regimes in Kinshasa and Brazzaville, the FNLA and the MPLA were 
able to project themselves onto a wider stage of continental 
politics where an internal and external legitimacy was sought 
vis-a-vis each other, allowing their rivalry to be perpetuated 
and eventually to explode in the conflict of 1975. It is not 
blame that is being investigated here, so much as the complex 
dynamic of internal and external politics that was at the heart 
of the Angolan civil war.
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PART FOUR
THE GLOBALIZATION OF ANGOLAN CONFLICT 1960-1975
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CHAPTER SIX
THE INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
(i) Cuba and Angola 1965-1975: Internationalism and Intervention
Cuba became the most heavily involved international 
actor in the Angolan civil war, at least in terms of sheer 
manpower. By the end of the war, in the spring of 1976, there were 
at least 10,000 Cuban troops actively deployed in Angola on the 
side of the MPLA. The role of these troops in the success of 
Neto's movement was crucial if not central. Considering the role 
of Cuban troops in defending the MPLA's stronghold in the capital, 
Luanda, against the combined assaults of the FNLA from the north 
and UNITA from the south, it is difficult to conceive of a 
possible MPLA victory without the intervention of Cuban troops. In 
terms of effect, Cuban intervention was very much a major factor 
of influence in the Angolan conflict.
In terms of its own motivations, Cuban involvement in 
Angola has often been subjected to the question of whether or not 
Havana was acting independently, as they claim, or whether they 
acted as a proxy army for the Soviet Union, as other observers 
have contended. The truth is probably somewhere in between. It is
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argued that a long and uninterrupted relationship with the Neto 
faction of the MPLA supports the view that the Cuban intervention 
in 1975 was partly a natural progression of its policy of support 
for the MPLA as well as of its long-standing internationalist 
foreign policy. On the other hand, it is unlikely that Cuba would 
have become so deeply involved if it could not have counted on the 
Soviet Union's strategic and logistical support. The deployment of 
Cuban troops, it is argued, was partially motivated by Havana's 
own policy considerations but could not have occurred, despite a 
previous example of this in Algeria (see below), without co­
ordinating with Moscow. In this way, an independent Cuban policy 
in Angola converged with that of the Soviet Union.
Before the Portuguese Coup
According to one source, concrete Cuban military support 
for the MPLA may even have begun in September 1963 in Algeria. The 
independence of Algeria in October 1962 had precipitated close 
relations between Cuba and the North African country, and:
"An undisclosed number of Cuban military, political and medical 
advisors flocked to the recently independent state...By 
September about one thousand guerrillas from Angola,
Mozambique and Namibia received training from Algerians and 
Cubans in Algeria."1
1. N Valdes, 'Revolutionary Solidarity in Angola' [1979], p.91. 
This source claims that the MPLA's links with Cuba date to 1961. 
Valdes claims that in 1962, at least 15 Cuban doctors were active 
in MPLA-liberated territory (p.95). However, the extent of the 
MPLA's activities in 1962 were certainly insufficient to sustain 
credibly this contention.
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The close links between Cuba and Algeria will be the subject of 
attention later as they are also revealing with regard to Cuban 
foreign policy. Relevant here is the fact that Cuban military 
instruction of Angolan nationalists, undertaken characteristically 
in a third country, may have been underway by the end of 1963.
As we have seen, the major links between the MPLA and 
Cuba were established a year or so later in Brazzaville, where the 
Neto faction had established its base at the end of 1963 after the 
debacle in Leopoldville. The date of the establishment of links 
differs in the accounts, but initial contacts eventually led to a 
meeting with Che Guevara either in 1964 or early 1965. The 
following is the testimony of Jorge Risquet, a member of the 
Political Bureau of the Cuban Communist Party:
"Fidel sent Che in early 1965 to meet with the MPLA leadership 
in Brazzaville. He offered revolutionary Cuba's solidarity to 
Agostinho Neto. Soon after, Cuban soldiers began arriving in 
Cabinda to train the MPLA guerrilla front. At Comrade Neto's 
request, Cuba took charge of arming and training a guerrilla 
column that was to cross Zaire into Angola."2
During this period, the whereabouts of Guevara were 
shrouded in mystery, and it was only much later that his presence 
in Congo (Brazzaville) was officially acknowledged.3 During his
2. Quoted by J Dominguez To Make a World Safe For Revolution: 
Cuba's Foreign Policy [1989], p.131.
3. This occurred in January 1977, in a Castro-approved account of 
the Angolan intervention cited in M Halperin 'The Cuban Role in 
Southern Africa', [1981], p.31.
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African tour which began in December 1964 and ran until early 
March 1965, Guevara visited most of the radical African states 
which roughly made up the 'Casablanca1 group. He also visited 
Brazzaville where he pledged the training of a presidential guard 
for Massemba-Debat. It was in Brazzaville that Guevara is said to 
have made contact with the MPLA in a meeting with CONCP, the 
inter-territorial conference of the nationalist organizations of 
Portuguese Africa.
The revolutionary credentials of CONCP were already 
strong despite the then recent beginnings of the wars in 
Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. The popularity of Amilcar Cabral, 
and the proximity of MPLA leaders4 to leading African radicals 
such as Ben Bella and Kwame Nkrumah, might possibly have been been 
important to Guevara. According to the Ottaways, however, the MPLA 
did not impress Guevara, at least not immediately. The 
revolutionary leader felt that the organization had "not much to 
show" but nevertheless promised to provide instructors.5 It is 
interesting to note that Jonas Savimbi reports a meeting that he 
allegedly had with Guevara after the latter's visit to 
Brazzaville, when he claims Guevara told him:
"I went to Brazzaville to see the MPLA, and nothing is 
happening. They are just bourgeois. From now on you are my 
friend. I am going to Fidel to make a report on you, and he
4. In paticular, Mario de Andrade, who in 1964 had returned to the 
fold after abandoning the movement in 1963, and was co-ordinating 
the CONCP in Algiers.
5. D and M Ottaway, Afrocommunism [1981], p.101.
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will give you assistance through our friend Ben Bella in 
Algeria."6
This claim is somewhat supported by Dominguez who notes that Cuba 
also offered some support to UNITA in the late 1960s.7
The new commitment of the reconstituted and strengthened 
MPLA to operate an effective military front in the Cabinda enclave 
must have played a part in helping to attract Cuba's pledge to 
supply the movement with arms and military instructors. Within a 
year of the Brazzaville meeting, Cuba was supplying CONCP members, 
including the MPLA, with arms and instructors.8 According to 
Dominguez, "Cuba had been training MPLA 'revolutionary and 
military cadres' since 1965.119 Over 100 MPLA fighters may have 
been trained by Cuba at this time. As well as military training, 
Cuba also offered technical studies and other educational courses 
to a number of MPLA cadres, most of whom would return to occupy 
high-ranking places in the MPLA hierarchy. This marked the 
beginning of an uninterrupted alliance that provided the MPLA with 
political, financial and military support.
As has been referred above, Che Guevara secretly
6. Quoted by F Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa [1986], 
p.77.
7. J Dominguez, op.cit. [1989], p.131.
8. W Leogrande 'Cuban-Soviet Relations and Cuban Policy in 
Africa', [1982], p.18.
9. J Dominguez, op.cit., [1989], p.131. According to Khazanov, 
MPLA cadres were trained in Cuba from October 1966 onwards. A 
Khazanov, Agostinho Neto [1986], p.172.
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returned to Brazzaville in April 1965 with a unit of 100 or 200 
'international fighters' to aid a Lumumbist insurgency (led by 
Gaston Soumaliot) against the Moise Tshombe government in 
Leopoldville. During this period, according to Khazanov, Guevara 
visited 'the second politico-military district in Angola 
[Cabinda]1, where he is said to have met the legendary MPLA 
guerrilla, Hoji ia Henda.10 However, disillusioned by the 
political rivalry among the allegedly inept Congolese rebels, and 
asked to rescind the effort by the Brazzaville government after 
the Mobutu take-over in Leopoldville, Guevara left Africa for 
Bolivia, but left behind his fighters, in Brazzaville and Conakry, 
to help train the MPLA and the PAIGC, respectively.11 Despite 
eventually admitting its occurrence, at the time the Cuban 
government never mentioned this episode in early Cuban 
revolutionary policy. The very failure of Guevara's initiative is 
one reason for this omission, but another was the fact that the 
Cubans were aiding insurgents in a challenge to a legally 
constituted government and not an anti-colonial war.
According to Valdes, the failure of this African 
adventure made Havana opt instead for a more moderate dual policy 
of internationalist solidarity on the continent; a policy of which 
the objectives were:
"...to help consolidate revolutionary governments already in 
power, and to give assistance to African guerrillas without
10. A Khazanov, op.cit., [1986], p.173.
11. W Leogrande, op.cit., [1982], p.19.
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the deployment of regular forces. If some men were assigned to 
the guerrillas, they were to provide training, rather than 
engage in actual fighting."12
The military training of the MPLA by Cuban instructors 
was co-ordinated with that of the Brazzaville regime. In early 
1966, the Cuban presence in Brazzaville is said to have numbered 
up to 1,000 men;13 a force that provided not only training for the 
movements but also support for the incumbent government, thus 
conforming to the above delineation of the Cuban 
'internationalist' foreign policy. For Brazzaville, the 
association with Havana had an early pay-off. In June 1966, the 
crack troops trained by the Cubans, and some of the latter, saw 
off an attempted coup against Massemba-Debat;14 an incident that 
was almost certainly witnessed by the MPLA leadership and could 
not have failed to impress upon them the benefits of Cuban 
military force.15
Cuban support in the mid-1960s clearly helped the MPLA- 
Neto recover from its brush with extinction. With the military 
training and weapons provided by Havana, the MPLA was able to
12. N Valdes, op.cit., [1979], p.92.
13. W Durch, 'The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle East: 
From Algeria to Angola1, [1978], p.35.
14. M Halperin, op.cit., [1981], p.33.
15. The role played by Cuban troops in putting down the attempted 
coup of Nito Alves in May 1977 and securing Neto's leadership was 
not unlike that which they played in defending Massemba-Debat in 
1966.
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raise its political profile by operating militarily in Cabinda, 
albeit with limited success. Furthermore, by July 1966, thanks to 
Cuban training, the MPLA was finally able to realize one of its 
major strategic objectives: making contact with guerrilla groups 
within Angola that leaned towards its authority. In late 1966 and 
early 1967, several hundred-strong MPLA columns of heavily armed 
guerrillas managed to cross hostile Zairean territory and 
infiltrate Angola.16 Their task, which was accomplished, was to 
reach the guerrilla groups in the Dembos forest area north-east of 
Luanda and establish lines of communication and therefore 
consolidate allegiance to the Neto leadership.17 From hereon, with 
the continuing activity in Cabinda, the MPLA-Neto could claim that 
it had two guerrilla fronts against the Portuguese. And in May 
1966, a third front was opened in the east, after Zambian 
independence had allowed the MPLA to establish a presence in 
Lusaka from where it could sustain military operations into 
Angola. One source indicates that in the late 1960s, there had 
been reports of Cuban advisors on the spot in Angola, entering and 
leaving the country with reinforcement columns,18 but these 
reports have not been confirmed elsewhere.
There is little doubt, that the liason established with 
Cuba in the mid-1960s was an important part of the military
16. B Davidson In the Eye of the Storm, [1975], p.214.
17. J Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Volume Two, [1978], p.176.
18. G Golan The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in 
the Third World, [1988], p.269.
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recovery of the MPLA. This process of recovery helped to foster, 
and was in turn further reinforced by, the improvement of MPLA's 
image in international fora. In January 1966, the Cuban capital 
was the site of the newly constituted 'Tricontinental' 
organization. Bringing together the broadly anti-Western states of 
the Third World, the conference also invited National Liberation 
movements to attend. Representing Angola was the MPLA, and Neto 
himself came to Havana where he met Castro. The AAPSO conference 
of 1965,19 held in Ghana, had extended full recognition to the 
MPLA after expelling the GRAE. Clearly benefiting from its 
association with the organizations in the other Portuguese 
colonies, the MPLA had returned from oblivion and had increasingly 
become the most prestigious organization at least in the anti- 
Western camp. In 1968, the secretariat of the Tricontinental, 
based in Havana, included an MPLA member, Paulo Jorge, who later 
became Neto's foreign minister.20 In diplomatic terms as well, 
Cuba participated in the MPLA's resurgence in the mid- to late- 
1960s.
From this period until the Portuguese coup, Cuban policy 
towards Angola amounted to a uninterrupted provision of a wide 
range of assistance for the MPLA, but always fell short of direct 
deployment of significant military resources in the fight against 
the Portuguese. Thus, and again in conformity with their
19. The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) was a 
precursor to the Tricontinental.
20. J Dominguez, op.cit., [1989], p.131.
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internationalist policy of remaining within an international legal 
framework, Havana provided the Neto faction of the MPLA with 
weapons, military training, political and technical education, and 
diplomatic and financial support. During this time, however, Cuba 
did not 'export' revolution in the form of officially-sanctioned 
fighters as Guevara might have preferred. Nevertheless, a close 
and consistent relationship between the MPLA and the Cuban regime 
was established and maintained right up to the April 1974 coup in 
Portugal.
Bases for Cuba's Angolan Policy
This close association between Cuba and the MPLA 
conformed characteristically to Havana's internationalist foreign 
policy. This can be seen by considering some of the bases that 
underlay Cuba's policy in Angola in 1975. In general terms, it is 
argued that Cuba's intervention in Angola conformed to both the 
theory and the practice of Cuban foreign policy. After the general 
failure of the drive to 'export' revolution to Latin America, Cuba 
developed a high-profile policy of international revolutionary 
solidarity, otherwise known as internationalism; although 
committed in theory to stepping in anywhere around the world 
wherever 'socialism' was threatened by 'imperialism', Cuban 
internationalism had self-imposed limits. In the defence of 
socialism, Cuba would only deploy military personnel with the
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consent of the legally-constituted government. It would also 
provide training and other types of assistance to National 
Liberation movements but only to those based in friendly states. 
However, within this historically consistent framework, Cuba's 
intervention on behalf of the MPLA in 1975 can be seen as only a 
slight variation on this policy, or rather as an escalation on its 
bases. In 1975, Havana claimed to have been supporting the MPLA 
which it considered to be the legal government of Angola. In 
adapting the facts of its intervention to fit this interpretation, 
Cuba revealed that it wanted its intervention in Angola to be seen 
as the consistent continuation of its internationalist foreign 
policy.
After coming to power, the Castro regime, and 
particularly Guevara, sought to 'export' revolution to Latin 
America. This essentially comprised of supporting guerrilla and 
urban revolutionary groups on the South American continent with 
some material support but mainly with the active participation of 
Cuban fighters. The early to mid-1960s were Cuba's most idealistic 
years. During this time, and especially after 1962, the regime 
attempted to launch a socialist development programme at home, the 
ambition and idealism of which was reflected in its foreign policy 
of support for revolution abroad.
Havana sought to play a high-profile role in 
international affairs. It concentrated on elevating its prestige 
in two overlapping fora, among the socialist states and among the 
Third World states: that is, broadly speaking, the anti-Western
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camp. The inordinately difficult relationship the Cuban regime has 
had with Washington was generally speaking, counterbalanced by its 
relations with the Soviet Union. But Cuba also sought to operate 
an active and independent leading role in Third World politics. 
Much more than other socialist states, Cuba espoused an active 
doctrine of support for revolution around the globe. Its far 
broader interpretation of Marxism led it to support many different 
revolutionary groups which might have been considered bourgeois by 
the Soviet Union. Moscow's preference for Communist parties as the 
vehicle for socialist transformation was implicitly rejected by 
Cuba. But the push to support revolutionary challenges and the 
proclamations of socialist solidarity that peppered Cuban foreign 
policy were not solely motivated by ideological concerns. The
declared goal was to create 'many Vietnams' in order to spread 
thinly the 'forces of imperialism'. There were clear advantages in 
promoting the cohesion of a far wider anti-Western camp; the 
dictum of security in numbers is one that seems to apply to the 
foreign policy of small revolutionary states, such as Cuba.
However, Cuba's internationalist policy was not mere 
rhetoric. The early dynamism of the Cuban regime contrasted with
the far more cautious activity of the Soviet Union, as can be seen
in Havana's offer to send troops to Vietnam. Although the
initiative was turned down by the Vietnamese NLF, the Cuban offer 
may have been an indirect influence on the motivation that led 
Peking to make a similar offer.21 In another example (this time in
21. N Valdes, op.cit., [1979], p.88.
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Africa where it dispatched most of its internationalist 
assistance), Cuba provided support for the FLN in Algeria and 
established a military mission there until the overthrow of Ben 
Bella in 1965. Before Cuba's exit, however, there occurred an 
incident which is particularly relevant, and quite similar to 
Cuba's military intervention in the Angolan civil war in 1975. 
When fighting broke out on the Algerian border with Morocco in 
October 1963, Cuba dispatched shiploads of men and arms to aid 
Algeria. Three ships carrying 40 Soviet tanks, 4 jet fighters and 
800 tonnes of light arms, ammunition and artillery sailed for 
Algeria.22 Additionally, Cuban troops are said to have been flown 
in to Oran on an Air Cubana flight.23 However, a truce between 
Morocco and Algeria was signed within the week and, apparently, 
the Cuban contingent did not see much action.24 In a speech 
delivered two years later, Castro revealed that this international 
adventure had taken place, and attempted to establish the 
independent and internationalist nature of that Cuban operation:
"At a moment of crisis for Algeria, for the Algerian Revolution 
when they needed our help, men and arms from our country, 
crossing the Atlantic in record time, arrived in Algeria ready 
to fight side by side with the Algerian revolutionaries!...Nor 
did distance prevent us from being the first to arrive. 
Proletarian internationalism in fact, with deeds and not the 
mouthing of cheap words! Small country that we are, constantly 
threatened by the imperialists, we gave part of our most
22. D and M Ottaway, Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist 
Revolution, [1970], p.166.
23. W J Durch, op.cit., [1978], p.44.
24. Cuban casualties are said to have been suffered during 
artillery duels. W J Durch, op.cit.
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important weapons and sent them to the Algerian people."25
If this 1965 Castro speech had been delivered in 1975 and Algeria 
replaced with Angola, it is likely that little else of this would 
have changed.
According to Valdes, the evidence seems to indicate that 
the Cuban intervention in Algeria was a Cuban initiative, and the 
offer accepted by the Ben Bella leadership.26 Whatever the case, 
the capacity and the will of Havana to intervene militarily across 
the Atlantic Ocean was clearly established, 12 years before Cuba's 
involvement in the Angolan civil war.
Up until the Portuguese coup, there were other 
occasions in which Cuba revealed the internationalist streak in 
its foreign policy. In November 1970, regular Cuban troops serving 
in Sekou Toure's presidential guard fought alongside Guinean 
soldiers in defence against an attack by Portuguese-backed 
forces.27 As with the Cuban intervention in Algeria, this 
operation was carried out on behalf of a legitimate government. 
This was a characteristic that was maintained until the Angolan 
civil war. Previously, when acting in support of National 
Liberation movements or other revolutionary groups, whose
25. Speech given on 26 June 1965, quoted in M Halperin, op.cit.,
[1981], p.29.
26. N Valdes, op.cit., [1979], p.91.
27. This participation was acknowledged by the Guinean leader in a
speech delivered in March 1976. N Valdes, op.cit., [1979], p.93.
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international legitimacy was ambiguous, Cuba would either only 
provide material and political assistance in Cuba itself or in a 
friendly, third country. On the other hand, if it was 
participating with fighters as in the case of Che Guevara in the 
Congo, Cuba would not admit to its involvement claiming that it 
had been a case of private Cuban citizens unsponsored by the 
state.
It is worth mentioning here, one more case of alleged 
Cuban military involvement far from the Western hemisphere, this 
time in the Middle East. According to Israeli intelligence sources 
quoted by Valdes, "...in late 1973 there were about 4,000 regular 
Cuban tank troops in Syria as part of an armoured brigade which 
even took part in the war until May 1974.1,28 Although the number 
of troops is said to have been smaller,29, their participation in 
the October War has been commented on by the Cuban leader: "It is 
no secret at all that at a time of danger and threats to the 
Syrian Republic, our men were in Syria."30
In 1975, Cuba still believed that the same revolutionary 
solidarity that had motivated its involvement in, among other 
places, Algeria, Guinea and Syria was the principal factor in its
28. N Valdes, op.cit. [1979], p.94. Although the war did not 
continue to May 1974 it is likely that Valdes is referring to 
artillery exchanges.
29. Between 500 and 750. The discrepancy is said to have been the 
result of the smaller number of troops in Cuban tank battalions. W 
J Durch, op.cit., [1978], p.53.
30. In December 1975. Citation from N Valdes, op.cit., [1979], 
p.93.
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support for the MPLA. Again, while the consistency of its ideology 
was undoubtedly a motivation for this, it is also the case that 
Havana perceived there to be concrete rewards for its display of 
revolutionary solidarity. At the same time as Cuban troops were 
disembarking at Angolan ports, Castro was addressing a meeting in 
Havana, predicting that in the future "the prestige of our 
revolution will increase" and "we will be having more influence in 
the international revolutionary movement".31
Despite the apparent continuity in Cuban foreign policy, 
some observers have claimed that Cuban intervention in Angola was 
a result of Soviet influence: the Cuban troops playing the role of 
'Russian mercenaries1.32 According to Bender, some US officials 
and Kissinger claimed that Cuban troops, playing the part of 
surrogates, were deployed in Angola to pay off a debt worth US$ 
5.5 billion.33 Clearly, Cuba was economically dependent on the 
Soviet Union, and it is difficult to deny that there probably were 
some economic benefits for Havana of its intervention in Angola. 
It is, however, impossible to say to what extent these economic
motivations played a part in Cuba's decision to intervene in
Angola over and above the same considerations that seem to have 
dominated Cuban foreign policy since the 1960s.
31. Radio Havana 29 September 1975. Citation in J Valenta 'The
Soviet-Cuban Intervention in Angola, 19751, [1978], p.24.
32. Chinese terminology cited in J Valenta, op.cit., [1978], p.4.
33. G Bender, 'Kissinger in Angola: Anatomy of Failure1, [1978],
p. 95.
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Regardless of whether there were any material and 
political benefits emanating from the Soviet Union after the Cuban 
intervention in Angola, the history of Cuba's relationship with 
the MPLA, from the mid-1960s to the deployment of troops in 1975, 
is constant and uninterrupted, the same of which cannot be said 
for the Soviet Union.34 Furthermore, this relationship, including 
the deployment of troops is consistent with both the theory and 
the practice of Cuban foreign policy from Algeria in 1963 to Syria 
in 1973. It seems possible to claim therefore, that Cuban policy 
in Angola had, at the very least, independent bases, separate from 
Soviet interests. Its foreign policy sought particular goals for 
Cuba. Within this conclusion, a number of studies have 
successfully challenged the 'surrogate' theory.35 An ex-Soviet 
Foreign Ministry official claimed:
"[Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily] Kuznetsov told me that the 
idea for the large-scale military operation had originated in 
Havana not Moscow."36
While Cuba has not always been able to operate an 
adventurous foreign policy, it has sought to maintain the 
existence of a continuity between the dynamism of its declaimed 
revolutionary solidarity and its actual policy. Within this
34. See Chapter Seven.
35. W R Duncan, The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and 
Influences, [1985]; P Shearman, The Soviet Union and Cuba, [1987]; 
J Valenta, op.cit., [1978]; W J Durch, op.cit., [1978].
36. J Dominguez, op.cit., [1989], p.132.
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context, military intervention played a part in an ideologically 
expressed policy of internationalism, which Cuba claims it has 
attempted to operate consistently since the 1960s. Still within 
this context, Cuba sees its involvement in Angola as not so much a 
departure from this policy as a continuity of its basic tenets, 
despite some modifications. The major difference is that although 
Havana claimed to have acted, as before, in support of a 
legitimate government, the fact is that, due to the breakdown in 
the Angolan transitional process in 1975 and, as will be seen 
below, even to the timing of its intervention, Cuban support for 
the MPLA in these terms is of a dubious international legality.
The Decision to Intervene
One of the most disputed aspects of the Angolan civil 
war has been the calendar of Cuban and South African intervention. 
In an attempt to justify their respective military interferences, 
both sides have claimed that they intervened to counter the threat 
posed by the other. By characterizing their own intervention as 
having come as a response to the other, each side hoped to justify 
its actions as defensive and not aggressive. Furthermore, official 
Cuban accounts have emphasized that their military intervention in 
Angola was at the request of a sovereign and independent 
government. This justification is particularly important 
considering the context of Cuba's internationalist foreign policy 
as has just been described. Revolutionary solidarity is deemed to
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be a worthy cause by Havana but only in defence of 
incontrovertibly legitimate governments. For what it reveals about 
the dynamics of the relationship between the MPLA, Havana and 
Moscow in 1975, the Cuban decision to intervene in Angola will now 
be considered.
The Cubans have always claimed that their intervention 
was carried out in defence of the legitimate MPLA government. For 
Havana, the fact that the MPLA had already claimed sovereignty 
before the official date of independence, is considered sufficient 
to justify the legality of their intervention. Nevertheless, 
attempts were made to localize the Cuban intervention as close as 
possible to the events surrounding the date of independence, in 
order to give it a semblance of legitimacy, despite the fact that 
the intervention must have been decided upon much earlier. 
Subsequent events, in particular the recognition of the MPLA by 
the OAU, have pushed this issue aside, but it is, nevertheless, 
worth making an attempt to establish as near as possible to an 
accurate time-scale of Cuban intervention if only to draw a 
clearer picture of Cuban and perhaps Soviet policy in Angola.
Shearman believes that in the summer of 1975, Soviet and 
Cuban policies towards Angola were being implemented independently 
of one another.37 At that time, when the Cuban contingency plans 
for military intervention had to have been in the making, Soviet 
policy-makers seemed to be still considering a diplomatic solution
37. P Shearman, op.cit., [1987], p.39.
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to the Angolan crisis. In the following survey of the Cuban 
intervention, its independence can be established vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union, making it at the very least a Cuban policy option 
that eventually converged with Soviet interests rather than a 
Soviet-induced operation.
To establish the procedure of Cuban intervention, 17 
relevant sources,38 have been surveyed on the particular question 
of the time-scale of the intervention. Out of this survey emerge 
two essentially different accounts, whose divergence can perhaps 
be explained in terms of political bias. Many of the accounts have 
taken, as their starting point, Marquez's semi-official account of 
Operation Carlota. In all of these, despite some differences, the 
major military intervention by Cuban forces is seen as having been 
decided upon and implemented after the major South African 
invasion of 23 October. A smaller number of sources believe, 
however, that the Cuban intervention had to have been decided upon 
before this date, if only for logistical reasons underpinning the 
complex operation of intervening militarily across an ocean. Legum 
believes that it may have even been decided upon as early as 
May,39 well before any incursions by the South African army. 
Valenta is more forgiving and calculates that the Soviet and Cuban
38. G Bender [1978]; W Burchett [1978]; J Dominguez [1989]; W R 
Duncan [1985]; W J Durch [1978]; M Halperin [1981]; A Khazanov 
[1986]; Z Laidi [1990]; C Legum [1978]; W Leogrande [1982]; J 
Marcum [1978]; G Garcia Marquez [1977]; P Shearman [1987]; K 
Somerville [1986]; J Valenta [1978]; N Valdes [1979]; M Wolfers 
and J Bergerol [1983].
39. C Legum After Angola: The War Over Southern Africa [1978],
p.21.
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intervention was decided upon in late August or early September,40 
before the major SADF invasion in October, but already after some 
border crossings by South Africa in early August. Furthermore, the 
certain presence of a Cuban troops in Angola before independence 
also challenges the precision of the former accounts.
Without a doubt, the intervention had to have been 
requested by the MPLA. The Neto faction's particularly close 
relationship with Havana almost certainly facilitated the 
consideration of such an option. According to the Marquez account, 
Neto had a meeting with the Cuban military commander, Flavio 
Bravo, in Brazzaville sometime in May. This account admits that, 
at this meeting, the MPLA requested Cuban arms and assistance. By 
this time, there had already been serious fighting between the 
MPLA and the FNLA in Luanda. On the MPLA side, Soviet arms 
deliveries in March and April had signalled the commitment of its 
backers, while over 1,000 Zairean troops were alongside the FNLA 
inside northern Angola by this time. An absolute confrontation 
between the two movements must have seemed inevitable at this 
time.
Cuban military intervention in Angola was carried out in 
three broad phases. The first phase was probably decided upon at 
the Brazzaville meeting. A number of sources,41 refer to the 
presence of Cubans in Angola from the spring onwards. It is,
40. J Valenta, op.cit., [1978], p.13.
41. Including Joao Van Dunem, active in the MPLA in Luanda at this 
time. Interview, London, 15 April 1991.
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therefore, practically impossible to deny that a number of 
'official142 Cubans were in Luanda in these early stages of the 
civil war. It is generally accepted that 230 Cuban advisors, under 
the command of Raul Diaz Arguelles, arrived in Luanda sometime 
between May and August. Those accounts more favourable to the 
MPLA,43 have stated that they arrived only in August, while other 
sources44 tend to plump for May or June.45 Their role was a 
military one: to train the MPLA recruits and to instruct them in
the use of the Soviet weaponry that had been received by the 
movement. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that even 
taking into account the most pro-MPLA sources (which would want to 
play down the presence of Cubans at such an early date), there 
were at least 230 Cuban military advisors in Angola by mid-summer. 
By June, according to Valenta, Cubans in Cabinda were already 
handling missiles and armoured cars, while some of their 
compatriots had already been involved in fighting just north of
42. Throughout the 1960s, a number of Cubans were involved in 
insurgent activity in a number of countries. Where their presence 
would have been considered subversive (ie. where they were 
fighting incumbent governments), Havana would renounce 
responsibility by claiming they were acting in their capacity of a 
'private citizen1, see N Valdes, op.cit., [1979], p.94.
43. W Burchett, Southern Africa Stands Up, [1978]; M Wolfers and J 
Bergerol, Angola in the Frontline, [1983].
44. W Leogrande, op.cit., [1982]; J Marcum op.cit., [1978]; K 
Somerville, Angola: Politics, Economics and Society, [1986]; N 
Valdes, op.cit., [1979]; J Valenta, op.cit., [1978].
45. Durch states that they arrived in June and established
training camps at Henrique de Carvalho, Salazar, Benguela and
Cabinda. W J Durch, op.cit., [1978], p.64.
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Luanda in Caxito at the end of May.46 Certainly by August, the 
presence of Cuban instructors amongst MPLA troops had already been 
noticed.47
At this stage, the Cuban role in support of the MPLA 
differs little from its previous record of military training for 
national liberation movements despite the fact that this was 
occuring at a time when the authority in Angola was the 
transitional government of the three movements and Portugal, which 
should certainly not have allowed the training of MPLA soldiers by 
Cubans in the run-up to independence day. The Soviet Union had 
increased its arms supplies to the MPLA in March, but little else 
seemed to betray the existence of a co-ordination between the 
MPLA, Havana and Moscow. In fact, the opposite seems to have been 
the case. Duncan has referred to the decidedly "chilly reception" 
given to Neto in June upon his visit to Moscow which was aimed at 
securing a deeper Soviet involvement.48 While the MPLA was being 
provided with Soviet weapons at this time, Cuban intervention does 
not yet seem to be part of the plan. However, Durch claims that 
around the same time as the 'chilly' Moscow reception, contingency 
plans had been established between the MPLA and Cuba for the 
possible deployment of Cuban troops. Soviet and Cuban policies do 
not seem to be running in parallel at this stage.
46. J Valenta, op.cit. [1978], p.11.
47. J Marcum, 'Angola: Perilous Transition to Independence1,
[1982], p.191.
48. W R Duncan, op.cit., [1985], p.129.
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The second phase of Cuban military intervention followed 
activity by South African troops inside Angolan territory.49 
Throughout September, South African troops had made a number of 
sorties into southern Angola against SWAPO camps. The MPLA's 
response to this counterinsurgency activity involved the 
reinforcement of the Cuban presence by something between 70 and 
1,500 troops.50 Valenta does not provide a figure of the total 
troop reinforcement but claims that "...in late September...Cuban 
ships, followed by Soviet ships and aircraft, began to deploy 
hundreds of Cuban soldiers."51 Leogrande speaks of "...several 
hundred...", in late August.52 But the most detailed account of 
this reinforcement is provided by Dominguez, which indicates that 
480 military personnel, some civilian advisors, 25 mortar and 
anti-aircraft batteries, 115 vehicles, communication equipment and 
medical supplies were shipped from Cuba in late September, 
arriving in Angola in early October.53 That the Cuban supply ships
49. After entering Angola in June through its southern border with 
Namibia, forces from the South African army occupied a South 
African-financed hydroelectric project on the Cunene River a month 
later, claiming its right to protect South African investments.
50. It is difficult to say exactly how many but it is likely that 
as many advisors as were already present in Angola were deployed, 
if not more. Laidi claims that before independence there were 
2,000 Cubans fighting alongside the MPLA (Z Laidi, The Superpowers 
and Africa: The Constraints of a Rivalry 1960-1990, [1990],
p.67.). Not counting the original 230, and an equal number that 
had probably arrived periodically from Brazzaville, that would 
place the reinforcement at circa 1,500 troops.
51. J Valenta, op.cit. [1978], p.13.
52. W Leogrande, op.cit. [1982], p.24.
53. J Dominguez, op.cit., [1989], p.131.
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arrived is not denied. Marquez's account describes the arrival of 
three Cuban ships in Luanda and Huambo on 4, 7 and 11 October
docking "...without anybody's permission-but also without anyone's 
opposition."54
This troop reinforcement, which is said to have brought 
the total Cuban military presence to 1,500 by 23 October,55 was 
allegedly agreed upon after the visit of a high level Cuban 
military delegation to Luanda in late August, resulting in the 
departure of the troop ships by early September. Shearman states 
that this MPLA-Cuban arrangement came after another MPLA visit to 
Moscow in August, when Soviet arms and military advisors were 
requested. The latter request was turned down and although it may 
be possibly to conjecture that the deployment of Cuban troops was 
instead suggested, it is equally possible to claim that this 
reflected the fact that, at least at this stage, Soviet and Cuban 
policies were not yet synchronized.
The presence of a significant Cuban military element was 
claimed by UNITA to the French press on 19 October.56 The Polish 
journalist, Kapuscinski, cited by Laidi, pointed to the presence 
of Cuban military advisors in Luanda and southern Angola in 
October.57 Quoting contemporary press reports, Marcum assesses
54. M Halperin, op.cit., [1981], p.35.
55. W J Durch, op.cit., [1978], p.67.
56. N Valdes, op.cit., [1979], p.101.
57. Z Laidi, op.cit., [1990], p.71.
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that "by mid-October...probably eleven hundred to fifteen hundred 
Cuban soldiers were bolstering the MPLA11.58 Clearly, by the second 
week of October, a significant Cuban military contingent was in 
Angola alongside the MPLA. Perhaps as many as 1,000 troops may 
have been deployed at this time.
As far as the size of its total interventionary forces 
was concerned, the deployment of 1,000 Cuban troops was not a 
large-scale presence. This second phase was clearly not a major 
operation. On the other hand, this deployment may already, at the 
time, have been seen as the precursor to a much larger 
intervention by Cuban troops on behalf of the MPLA. This was the 
opinion of the head of the CIA's Angolan task force, who was 
warning in Washington, during this second phase of Cuban 
intervention, that an escalation of US involvement in Angola would 
result in the deployment of "large numbers of Cuban troops, IQ- 
15, 000. 1,59 This remarkably accurate prediction indicates that at 
the latest by mid-October, but still before the outright South 
African invasion, the option of a full-scale Cuban intervention 
was not an outlandish idea.
The third and definitive phase of Cuban intervention in 
Angola was called, by Havana, Operation Carlota. On 4 November, 
according to the official version of events, the MPLA, under 
pressure from the rapidly advancing South African invasion,
58. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.273.
59. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.273.
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requested the intervention of Cuban troops to help secure its 
control of Luanda and most of the provincial centres. The 
following day, a hastily convened meeting of the central committee 
of the Cuban communist party agreed to the MPLA’s request and 
ordered the immediate dispatch of an airborne battalion of the 
Ministry of the Interior. The first flight left Havana on 7 
November and transported 82 of the elite troops, that soon 
totalled 650 in Angola within that week.
The battalion of crack Cuban troops performed its 
function and held the capital for the MPLA allowing it to proclaim 
its sovereign government and Angolan independence on 11 November. 
After this, Cuban reinforcements and Soviet military equipment 
poured in to assist the MPLA. Valdes advances the following 
calendar of Cuban troop strengths in Angola, culled from Western 
intelligence sources:
TABLE 9
Cuban Troop Strengths in Angola 1975-1976
1975 November 15 2,000
November 20 3,000
November 30 5,000
1976 January 6 9,500
_________  February 3______14,000__________________________
(Source: Valdes [1979].)60
Heavy weapons were delivered to the MPLA from the Soviet bloc, 
including T34 and T54 tanks, PT-76 amphibious tanks, MiG-21J jet
60. N Valdes, op.cit. [1979], p.106.
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fighter bombers, MiG-17s, helicopters, rocket launchers and 
numerous armoured vehicles.61
Within a month of the arrival of the Cuban airborne 
battalion, after having come close to defeat, the MPLA had had its 
fortunes reversed. The advancing FNLA and Zairean troops, which 
had reached a point not more than 9 miles from Luanda, fled before 
the greater firepower of the combined MPLA-Cuban forces. While in 
the south, the combined South African-UNITA column, although 
superior according to some accounts,62 was sufficiently delayed by 
the new airpower of the MPLA forces for the political defeat at
the hands of the OAU to take effect.
There can be little question as to the outcome of this 
particular set of events. It is likely that the Cubans did most of 
the fighting. Certainly, the deciding military operations were 
carried out by the Cubans, and, according to Marquez:
"Castro himself 'was keeping up to date on the smallest details 
of the war ...in constant contact with the battlefield high 
command,1 and at times issuing tactical orders."63
What can be questioned, however, is the time-scale of 
the decision-making. As it has been pointed out above, it seems
very unlikely that the decision to airlift a crack battalion was
taken and implemented all within two or three days. It is much
61. N Valdes, op.cit., [1979], p.105.
62. See ahead.
63. Quoted in M Halperin, op.cit., [1981], p.36.
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more likely that the decision to intervene had already been taken, 
or prepared for as a contingency plan, needing only the final go- 
ahead at the given time. The infrastructure for the rapid 
deployment of Cuban troops and Soviet and East European war 
materiel was almost certainly well in place before the Cubans 
claim they had decided to accept the MPLA's request for 
assistance. If this was the case, then the Cuban military 
intervention in Angola was decided upon at least in the early half 
of the year, and subsequently prepared for as a contingency plan 
should the MPLA's position have ever become threatened.
One source has noted that the Cuban army undertook 
manoeuvres in July which trained the deployment of forces over a 
large area, a military operation that would have been concurrent 
with what was required in Angola.64 This assessment is also shared 
by Dominguez:
"Sometime between August 20 and September 5 1975, the [Cuban] 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the chiefs of the three 
armies and of the airforce, and other vice ministers of the 
Armed Forces Ministry were temporarily relieved of their 
posts."65
This was an unexplained interruption and these senior officers 
were soon returned to their posts. Dominguez believes that during 
this period, they were assigned to prepare and oversee the Angolan
64. N Valdes, op.cit., [1979], p.99.
65. Cited in B D Porter, The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet 
Arms and
Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945-1980, [1984], p.166.
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operation. Considering a number of facts, this belief may not be 
misplaced, at least in principle: the MPLA received, as early as 
the spring, deliveries of sophisticated weaponry it could not 
operate; all Soviet weaponry was current issue in the Cuban armed 
forces; a large number of Cuban advisors were already in Angola, 
overseeing the training and implementation of MPLA military 
operations. Additionally, according to Durch, regular units in 
Cuba were canvassed in mid-August for volunteers for Angola.66 A 
number of complementary factors seem to indicate that Cuban 
military intervention in Angola was a strategic policy possibility 
for Havana being planned for with the MPLA, by the summer of 1975, 
four to five months before the operation itself, and during a time 
when the transitional accord was still in force and civil war 
theoretically avoidable.
There are a number of other indications that support the 
assessment that Cuban intervention must have been decided quite 
early on in the conflict. These signs are also a reflection of the 
part played by political factors in Portugal in the developments 
in Angola as described in Chapter One. The support given to the 
MPLA by some elements of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), and the 
subsequent stagnation of power in Portugal has to be held 
responsible for the reasonable ease with which the MPLA was able 
to establish Cuban-manned training camps in Angola in the spring 
of 1975. Consequently, Cuba could operate its policy of support
66. W J Durch, op.cit., [1978], p.65.
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for the MPLA largely unhindered by the nominally sovereign power 
in Angola, that is Portugal. Had Portugal been able to enforce its 
authority, Cuban intervention, at all three phases would have been 
significantly affected.
During the summer of 1975, certain contacts between the 
MFA and Cuba seem to indicate that preparations for a Cuban 
intervention were underway. On 21 July, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho 
visited Havana. During this visit, according to Valdes, Otelo 
toured military installations with Commander Senen Casas, chief of 
the Cuban General Staff, who later "...had direct command over the 
Cuban forces in Angola."67 It seems perfectly natural that the top 
military leader in Portugal should liaise with the top Cuban 
military when visiting Havana. Nevertheless, the possibility that 
this encounter held more significance in terms of Cuba's 
subsequent intervention in Angola cannot be completely ruled out. 
In late August, Rosa Coutinho, also during a visit to Cuba, 
publicly praised the MPLA. The contention is that an axis clearly 
existed, linking the MPLA, the Portuguese hard left and Cuba; this 
was an alliance that prepared for, and succeeded in ensuring, the 
MPLA's accession to power in Angola.
The above consideration of Cuban intervention has 
focused on the fact that there is sufficient evidence to claim 
that it was the result of an independent policy determined by 
Havana and the MPLA, within the context of long-standing and
67. N Valdes, op.cit., [1979], p.99.
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consistent Cuban support for that movement. This was in itself 
consistent with the theory and practice of Havana's 
internationalist foreign policy.
Convergence
It has been argued that Cuba's intervention in Angola 
was merely an escalation of its long-standing support for the 
MPLA. In this way, the partly independent origin of Havana's 
Angolan policy can be determined. Eventually, however, Cuban and 
Soviet policy do converge, both in their aims and in their 
implementation. The Soviet Union's capacity to project military 
power was crucial to provide the weaponry for the airlifted Cuban 
battalions. Furthermore, Soviet Antonov aircraft were used in the 
transportation of troops. But the more important aspect of Cuban- 
Soviet policy in Angola is the convergence of goals. In fact, what 
is argued is that Cuba's close association with the MPLA is also 
influential in 'bringing in' the Soviets.
Cuba's military support of the MPLA provided the Soviet 
Union with an option for a flexible response in its own Angolan 
policy. While Moscow's commitment to the MPLA can be seen to have 
been less than totally dedicated,68 Cuba's was not. A high-profile 
Soviet military support for the MPLA during the summer of 1975 
would have threatened detente with the United States. Havana had
68. See Chapter Seven.
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far more freedom to act. In this way, the Soviets managed to
maintain a stake in Angola without actually incurring the risks of
operating a more committed policy of support for the MPLA. And 
when it had become clear that the United States was unable to act 
further because of Congressional restraint in the wake of 
revelations about its covert operations in Angola,69 Moscow could 
thus escalate its support and score an important foreign policy 
success. Moscow had its cake and ate it.
It is true to say that Cuba and the MPLA were dependent 
on Soviet weapons for the former's intervention in Angola, and 
certainly Cuba expected to be supported by Moscow in its
internationalist duty. But it may be equally true to say that had
the MPLA and Cuba not established their association in the 1960s, 
and consequently had Cuban intervention not been a policy option 
in 1975, then the Soviet Union might have been more circumspect in 
its own policy towards Angola especially if it had decided to 
maintain detente as a foreign policy priority. That is to say, 
Soviet support for the MPLA was partly a function of the latter's 
relationship with Cuba. In this way, this association, became 
crucial to the MPLA's political and military victory, in ways that 
exceeded the fact of Cuban intervention itself.
A major factor, that sets apart Cuba's involvement in 
the Angolan civil war from its previous adventures, was the fact 
that in this case its role converged with that of the USSR. Before
69. See Chapter Seven
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1975, this had not always been the case. Cuban foreign policy 
seemed to be far more coherent in its willingness to support all 
revolutionary anti-Western manifestations as opposed to the Soviet 
Union's rather more dogmatic policy of support for communist 
parties only. In Angola, Shearman believes that:
"It was Moscow, not Havana which moderated its behaviour, and 
Moscow which after initial doubts came round to accepting 
Havana's strategy in Angola - not the other way around."70
It has already been shown, that an analysis of Cuba's 
role in Angola as a Soviet surrogate does not hold easily. But it 
is also equally true that total independence of action cannot be 
claimed. Had the Soviet Union opposed the intervention, as Cuba's 
arms supplier it could have pressured Havana to keep out of the 
conflict altogether. Cuba's economic and military dependence on 
the Soviet Union makes it difficult to state categorically the 
independence of its foreign policy. But one analysis of Soviet- 
Cuban relations has centred on a view of influence in which it is 
moving in both directions: from Moscow to Havana, and vice versa, 
a matrix which may be appropriate in the case of Angola.71 While 
Cuban troop deployment in Angola was almost certainly an indirect 
influence in Moscow's policy of support for the MPLA and while 
there may even have been direct influences in the form of requests 
from Havana to Moscow, Duncan argues that Cuba also acted under a
70. P Shearman, op.cit., [1987], p.37.
71. W R Duncan, op.cit., [1985].
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number of assumptions: a) the Soviets would not oppose the build­
up of troops in Angola, b) that Moscow would support Cuba if 
necessary and c) that the convergence of Cuba's policy with 
Moscow's interests would bring the former rewards.72 In this view 
of dynamic influences and interests, Soviet and Cuban action in 
Angola converged, rather in the manner of two allies, as Valenta 
has described their actions.73 This assesment is apparently 
shared by General Vernon Walters, the CIA Deputy Director at the 
time, who said in 1985:
"I believe that...Castro was pursuing his own aims-which 
happened to be, in large part, convergent with those of 
Moscow."74
In concrete terms, the convergence of policy objectives 
also brought benefits of an operational nature. It has often been 
pointed out that Cuban troops were all the more essential to the 
MPLA due to the fact that the majority of the movement's guerrilla 
units were unable to operate the sophisticated military equipment 
that the Soviet Union had provided. As most of the weaponry was 
standard issue in the Cuban armed forces, there ensued a double 
advantage: initially, the MPLA could be trained in the use of the 
weapons by the Cubans, while at a later stage the arms shipments 
would constitute an arsenal compatible with the airlifted Cuban
72. W R Duncan, ibid., p.130.
73. J Valenta, op.cit., [1978], p.25.
74. J Dominguez, op.cit., [1979], p.132.
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battalions. Again, this constitutes another reason for claiming 
that without Cuban intervention, the MPLA would almost certainly 
not have received the necessary military force to resist attack as 
Moscow would not have deployed Soviet troops.
It is argued here that the MPLA established a very close 
relationship with the Cuban regime, one that remained unbroken 
from its establishment in the mid-1960s up to the intervention of 
Cuban troops in the Angolan civil war. It is further argued that 
this relationship conformed broadly to the general bases of Cuban 
foreign policy of support for revolutionary socialism. In this 
way, the MPLA secured the support of an external backer that not 
only provided it with the necessary military forces to resist its 
adversaries, but can also be seen to have been instrumental in 
securing the commitment of the Soviet Union as the civil war 
became caught up in the superpower conflict. In 1975, the MPLA, 
Cuba and the Soviet Union converged in their policy aims.
(ii) South Africa in Angola: Regional Power Politics
The major international forces that confronted each 
other directly in Angola were those of Cuba and South Africa.
There is little exact information about the battles between the
Cuban expeditionary force and the South African Defence Force
(SADF) that took place between November 1975 and the withdrawal of
the latter starting from January 1976. Certain accounts have 
claimed that in their few encounters, the SADF showed itself to be
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militarily superior to the Cuban forces.75 It can be pointed out, 
however, that despite their inferiority the Cuban-MPLA forces did 
manage to hold up the SADF-led column outside Luanda, allowing the 
MPLA's claims to sovereignty to gather credence especially after 
independence day.
The overwhelming significance of the intervention of 
South African forces in the Angolan civil war is not military but 
political. There can be little doubt that Operation Savannah, the 
intervention of South Africa on the side of the anti-MPLA 
coalition, had the negative effect of discrediting the latter, 
while at the same time diverting the negative political impact of 
the Cuban intervention. Certainly to most African states, even the 
most conservative ones, the airlift of Cuban troops onto to 
Angolan soil comes a distant second to South African intervention 
on a list of reprehensible acts. As Coker points out:
"...Nigeria's decision to recognise the MPLA 15 days after the 
transfer of power and within days of the arrival of Cuban 
troops should have warned [Kissinger] that the Africans were 
not prepared to fight communism with Pretoria as an ally."76
75. J Seiler, 'South Africa's Regional Role', [1981], p.107. 
According to Bridgland who cites South African claims, the SADF 
took on an entire battalion of 1,000 Cuban troops at the 'Battle 
of Bridge 14' during three days from 9 to 12 December, losing only 
4 South Africans and killing 200 Cubans, including the commander 
of the Cuban expeditionary force, Raul Diaz Arguelles. F 
Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa [1986], pp.149-150. This 
version of events is supported by Durch: "Cuban and South African 
forces clashed...in what has come to be known as the Battle of 
Bridge 14. By all accounts, the Cuban forces were severely 
mauled." in W J Durch, 'The Cuban Military in Africa and the 
Middle East: From Algeria to Angola' [1978], p.68.
76. C Coker, NATO, the Warsaw Pact and Africa, [1985], p.240.
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Even sectors within the South African regime, such as the state 
security organ, BOSS,77 and the Foreign Affairs Department, 
recognized this political factor and argued that:
"this military intervention was being used against South 
Africa and alienating many African and Western governments 
that earlier had not been particularly sympathetic to MPLA or 
a Cuban presence in Africa."78
It may be possible to go so far as to say that the outcome of the 
conflict in Angola might have been altogether different had South 
Africa not sent in its army. In 1975, the decision-makers in 
Pretoria may have ingenuously chosen exactly the opposite policy 
to that which might have achieved their implicit objective of 
denying the MPLA power. Conversely, the MPLA's success may lie 
partly in this unsuccessful intervention, and more particularly in 
its adverse political consequences.
It is argued that South Africa did not have a cohesive 
policy toward Angola in 1975, one which was defended unanimously 
within the power structure, and, consequently, its intervention 
was ill-defined and only implemented half-heartedly. This lead to 
the creation of a certain number of misperceptions with regard to 
the Angolan conflict: namely the strength of the commitment of the 
United States in Angola and the negative political impact of the
77. Bureau of State Security.
78. K Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics, 
[1986], p.90.
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SADF intervention on the course of the civil war.
The background of South African foreign policy will be 
looked at briefly here in order to place its Angolan intervention 
in context. The foundations and strategies of South Africa's 
foreign policy will be traced and will be seen to be inexorably 
linked to the unique structure of the white minority regime in 
South Africa. In this way, the motivations behind South African 
intervention in Angola in 1975 may be seen more clearly. Of more 
direct relevance to this thesis are, however, the consequences of 
this intervention on the political and military struggle between 
the rival Angolan movements. The South African intervention helped 
to redefine the political parameters of this struggle, shifting 
the relative strengths of the MPLA and its rivals, and, 
consequently affecting the outcome of the civil war far beyond 
whatever military influence the intervention itself may have had.
South African Foreign Policy: Objectives, Bases and Strategies
The security of the white minority regime in South 
Africa has been the predominant priority of Pretoria's foreign 
policy. Accordingly, the defence of South Africa has been 
inextricably linked to its domestic policies of maintaining white 
power. This, claims Geldenhuys, is one of the first and foremost 
characteristics of Pretoria's search for security.79 A second
79. D Geldenhuys, South Africa's Search for Security since the 
Second World War, [1978], p.1.
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characteristic of South African post-war policy has been the 
search for allies in the fulfilment of this task, a search that 
has been more accentuated here than in other states by virtue of 
South Africa's physical and, more importantly, political 
isolation. Since 1948, Pretoria had sought to frame South Africa's 
very particular interests as being closely tied to those of the 
West, in particular, to those of NATO. At the very beginning of 
the age of modern African nationalism and anti-colonialism, South 
Africa's rulers were aware of the threat that their structure of 
authority faced from self-determination. They attempted thus to 
equate nationalism in Africa with communism in order that they 
might express their resistance to self-determination as the 
resistance to communism. For the Nationalists, then in power, 
communism was the multi-threat, both internal and external. By 
attempting to stand with the West against the Soviet Union in a 
wider context, Pretoria was transposing the Cold War between East 
and West onto its own domestic power struggle to retain white 
minority rule.
"...this perception of international politics as essentially a 
communist - anti-communist struggle would remain fundamental 
to South African thinking."80
Consequently, the Malan (1948-1954) and Strijdom (1954-1958) 
National Party governments developed a defence strategy that was 
predicated on this linkage with the East-West conflict: firstly,
80. D Geldenhuys, op.cit., [1978], p.3.
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tackle communism as far away from South Africa as possible; 
secondly, attempt to associate South Africa with a formal Western 
defence alliance; and finally, land the West's commitment to South 
Africa's defence.81 In this way, the government in Pretoria hoped 
to tie the West to the survival of the white minority regime. 
These defence and diplomatic policies sought somewhat to expand 
on, but also to transcend, South Africa's strategic ties with 
Britain that had been developed by the pro-British Smuts.
In 1955, Britain and South Africa signed a bilateral 
agreement on naval co-operation around the previously British 
Simonstown base. According to the terms of the agreement, Britain 
and its NATO allies would have access to the base, and, in return, 
promised the supply of vital arms.82 But the greater significance 
of this agreement seems to be almost psychological. Geldenhuys 
claims that to the South African strategists the agreement implied 
Britain's acceptance of Pretoria's own assessment of its strategic 
importance to the West. The corner-stone of this alleged strategic 
value was the Cape route, crucial to the shipping of oil to the 
West. But despite this obvious importance, especially in the face 
of unpredictable access to the Suez Canal, the British Labour 
government in 1967 distanced itself from naval co-operation with 
South Africa implying that it no longer considered the Cape route 
important;83 or at least that it seemed less important than to be
81. L Mangasarian, 'influences on South African Strategic 
Thinking' unpublished paper.
82. D Geldenhuys, op.cit., [1978], p.5.
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seen to be loosening ties with South Africa, especially military 
ones. For in the intervening period, South Africa had entered its 
period of increasing political and diplomatic isolation.
The Sharpeville massacre of 1960 had propelled the 
apartheid regime to international infamy and set in motion the 
long campaign to isolate South Africa. The clear intention of the 
regime not to reform was demonstrated by the efficient suppression 
of what had been its most serious internal challenge to date. When 
in 1964 the US and Britain subscribed to the UN 1963 embargo on 
the sale of arms to South Africa, any real possibility of South 
Africa ever forming part of the Western defence alliance was 
effectively put aside. But at the time, this was not immediately 
apparent, and at the end of the 1960s, NATO's reawakened interest 
in the Cape route raised unwarranted expectations in the South 
African regime.
Under Joseph Luns, the Atlantic Alliance began to 
consider the possibility of including the Cape route in the 
organization's defence perimeter despite the recognized fact that 
military co-operation with South Africa was increasingly difficult 
in the prevailing negative political climate.84 But the strategic 
importance of the Cape route (the recognition of this importance 
by the West was in itself a South African objective) seemed to be 
obvious. The sheer quantity of daily oil tonnage and other 
trade,85 that was shipped around the Cape pointed overwhelmingly
83. C Coker, op.cit. [1985], p.76.
84. C Coker, op.cit., [1985], p.83.
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to its importance and, therefore, to its vulnerability if faced
with a Soviet threat. According to Coker, delegates at a NATO
conference in October 1969 were told that the Soviet navy could 
inflict severe and possibly fatal damage to allied shipping in the 
area within a matter of hours.86 In an attempt to tie NATO to the 
defence of South Africa, Pretoria argued that to counter this 
Soviet threat, a massive Western air and naval presence in the 
Indian Ocean was required, which would inevitably lead South 
Africa, it was hoped, to some form of association with NATO. As it 
happened, the political pressure against any form of military co­
operation with South Africa, even if it had been in the interests 
of the Alliance, was just too strong to resist. To do so would 
have risked alienating countless governments in Africa and Asia. 
This constraint on Western governments was perhaps not understood 
by South Africa, but whatever the case did not please Pretoria:
"An important underlying reason for South Africa's disgust at 
Wilson's actions [stopping the sale of arms] was that it was
perhaps reflecting a downgrading of the Cape route's
strategic importance and a devaluation of South Africa's role 
in the Western defence system - two notions very dear to 
South African strategists and politicians."87
To South Africa it had slowly become clear that its foreign policy 
strategies would have to change. Its isolation had also become
85. Half a million tonnes of oil every day: roughly, 3,300 fully- 
laden tankers. The route accounted for approximately 25 % of all 
trade with northwestern Europe. C Coker, op.cit., [1985], p.82.
86. C Coker, op.cit., [1985], p.82.
87. D Geldenhuys, op.cit. [1978], p.6.
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painfully clear to policy-makers. They continued, however, to 
place South Africa's objectives and interests firmly with those of 
the West, expressing them almost in terms of a moral crusade:
"South Africa was determined to defend itself and the free 
world to the utmost of its ability, even if the free world 
should continue denying South Africans the arms to do so."
B J Vorster 197388
"If the non-communist world would not support South Africa as 
a strategic ally, it would have to defend the Cape route 
alone, for its own and the free world's sake, whatever the 
sacrifices."
P W Botha 196889
In parallel with this, the attention of policy-makers in 
Pretoria also concentrated on developing South Africa's regional 
role. The white minority regime in South Africa became wary of the 
colonial powers apparent weakness of resolve to remain in Africa 
in the face of what it saw to be a communist threat and not the 
expression of national self-determination. As they saw it South 
Africa had to stem this threat, and as far away from the country 
as possible. This because the non-white South African population 
was considered to be "...a very fertile field for communist 
propaganda and agitation."90 The strategy which was developed 
sought to establish a cordon sanitaire, forming a buffer zone that 
would separate South Africa from the nefarious influences of 
communist-inspired change.91 In accordance with this strategy,
88. D Geldenhuys, op.cit. [1978], p.7.
89. D Geldenhuys, op.cit., [1978], p.7.
90. D Geldenhuys, op.cit., [1978], p.3.
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Pretoria sought, from the mid-1960s onward, to strengthen its 
relations with the white regimes in Rhodesia and Portuguese Angola 
and Mozambique to form an alliance designed to insulate itself 
against the onslaught of international communism and African 
nationalism, which were promoted as being one and the same. These 
regimes co-operated to a large extent in various sectors, 
including security and military operations. The South African army 
operated freely in southern Angola as it searched for SWAPO 
targets, while, in return for this freedom to roam, it would also 
strike against the Angolan anti-colonial movements it came across 
in the region.92 To the regime in Pretoria, it was all part of the 
same fight:
"I know of no terrorism in southern Africa which,in the final 
analysis, is not directed against South Africa...The ultimate 
aim of all terrorists is to take South Africa away from us."
Vorster, September 1970.93
As it strengthened its regional role, the regime in
Pretoria began to simultaneously develop its military power. After 
the implementation of the UN arms embargo, this had become a 
priority for the white regime. A 1960 defence review had concluded 
that the state had a "a practically obsolete defence force."94 
This led to the implementation of a very successful programme for
91. D Geldenhuys, op.cit., [1978], p.8.
92. J Marcum, The Angolan Revolution Volume Two, [1978], p.266.
93. Citation in J Barber and J Barratt South Africa's Foreign
Policy: The Search for Status and Security 1945-1988, [1990],
p.139.
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military modernization. Within four years, the Minister of 
Defence, J J Fouche, could arrogantly cast aside any potential 
external threat to South Africa, claiming that all of its military 
requirements could be met.95
This militarization was carried out during a period of 
strong economic growth in the country between 1961 and 1965. The 
South African economy had already reached an advanced stage of 
industrialization, one that had gone beyond simple import- 
substitution and was beginning export-led growth. But despite 
being in this advanced industrial phase, the South African economy 
also tended to occupy a role similar to that of a colony in 
international trade. That is, a role characterized by the export 
of raw materials, principally minerals, in exchange for 
manufactured goods. But this economic structure became threatened 
by South Africa's political isolation, which placed markets out of 
reach, both for the sale of raw materials and the purchase of 
manufactured goods.96 Furthermore, the non-white population did 
not provide a market sufficient for the needs of the South African 
economy. The material benefits of industrialization were not 
passed on as a result of deliberate policy to enforce segregation. 
In this way, and in detrimental terms to the South African 
economy, apartheid became a constraint on domestic demand. For 
these reasons, and combined with negative world economic
94. D Geldenhuys, op.cit. [1978], p.5.
95. J Barber and J Barratt, op.cit., [1990], p.103.
96. T Shaw 'South Africa, Southern Africa and the World System',
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conditions, the South African economy had to search for markets 
elsewhere. Eventually, other pariah states did form trading 
partnerships with South Africa. But it was the Southern African 
region, however, that represented the best means with which to
satisfy these requirements. Both at the level of diplomatic and
strategic needs as well as at that of economic reason, Southern 
Africa became a priority in South Africa's external policies.
South Africa invested heavily in tying the region to its
own economy. Co-operation with the Portuguese colonial regime in 
regional development led to the establishment of substantial 
stakes in the hydroelectric project on the Cunene river in Angola, 
and in the huge Cabora Bassa dam in Mozambique. The long-standing 
flow of labour, for mineral extraction and other labour intensive 
work, from Mozambique and other countries in the region to South 
Africa, further reinforced the latter's role as the economic motor 
of Southern Africa. In this way, an extremely rigid and 
longlasting structure of economic dependence was established. This 
form of regional co-operation with Portugal and the outlaw Smith 
regime in Rhodesia, allayed South Africa's greatest fears of being 
confronted with hostile 'communist' forces along its borders. 
Fearful of internal challenges to the white minority regime, 
Pretoria attempted to maintain directly along its borders, a 
boundary of politically benevolent states, that would in their 
view, sterilize the internal South African conflict by excluding 
external (read 'communist') instigation. Pretoria's illegal 
government in Namibia was part and parcel of this strategy.
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But the peace of mind offered by this buffer zone was 
shattered when the Portuguese regime was overthrown by the army in 
April 1974. As Barber and Barratt put it: "...the outlook for 
Pretoria had become threatening.1,97 When, in the course of that 
year, it had become clear that Portugal would eventually leave 
Africa, South Africa's strategic ring was broken. But even more 
threateningly, it appeared that this ring would, according to 
Prime Minister Vorster, be replaced by "...a string of Marxist 
states across Africa from Angola to Tanzania."98 The deployment of 
the Soviet Navy off the coast of Guinea in 1970 had raised the 
spectre of Soviet presence in Africa. Not that South Africa feared 
an outright invasion by the Soviet Red Army, but Pretoria 
understood that radical regimes on its border would threaten its 
own survival. The South African military believed that if external 
(Soviet) assistance to (nationalist) insurgency were denied, then 
the internal South African conflict could be won. Radical regimes 
along its border would make the infiltration of guerrillas and a 
full support for a challenge to white supremacy from a contiguous 
state a very real possibility.
The first challenge to Pretoria was Mozambique. The 
FRELIMO-dominated transitional government established in September 
1974 could certainly have been perceived to have been a security 
threat to South Africa as well as to neighbouring Rhodesia, which
[1983], p.54.
97. J Barber and J Barratt, op.cit., [1990], p.176.
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was heavily dependent on Mozambique's ports. The collapse of 
Portuguese power in Mozambique was received optimistically by 
anti-apartheid opposition in South Africa, while the certain 
advent of the Marxist FRELIMO represented the encroachment of the 
Soviet Union in the region and announced the possibility of ANC 
bases not far from South Africa's border. But FRELIMO voiced 
realism, aware of its own dependence on South Africa and Rhodesian 
traffic through its ports. In the case of Mozambique, Vorster's 
government decided on non-intervention, despite insistence from P 
W Botha and the security apparatus." Angola was altogether a 
different matter.
Intervention in Angola
Officially, Pretoria justified initial small-scale 
military intervention in Angola throughout the summer of 1975 in 
terms of protecting its investments in the Cunene River 
hydroelectric project, and of deflecting "...the effects of the 
Angolan civil war from the northern border of South West 
Africa."100 Eventually it was revealed, that South Africa had 
intervened much more extensively in the Angolan conflict with the 
objective of supporting the FNLA-UNITA coalition in its war 
against the MPLA.101 South Africa's intervention was a small-scale
98. C Legum After Angola: The War over Southern Africa, [1978], 
p.37.
99. J Barber and J Barratt, op.cit., [1990], p.180.
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operation, with only a couple of hundred or so SADF officers and 
NCOs leading the circa 2,000-strong 'Zulu' column of motorized 
armour that joined the UNITA-FNLA offensive in the west of Angola 
on 23 October 1975.
The objective of this first major offensive operation 
seems unclear.102 Had the SADF wanted to drive north to Luanda 
before the stipulated date of independence, they would almost 
certainly have employed a stronger force backed by airpower. 
Initially, therefore, it seems that the purpose of the
intervention was only to bolster UNITA's positions on the
battlefield. According to a report in the Sunday Telegraph in 
February 1977, the original South African 'directive' had been for 
the SADF columns to take back as much UNITA territory as possible 
before the date of independence and then withdraw.103 The
objective was then to strengthen UNITA's position when the time 
came to negotiate a coalition government. Either because 
negotiations seemed unlikely, or for another reason connected to a 
re-evaluation of what they could achieve, South African strategy 
changed during the course of the intervention. According to claims
100. D Geldenhuys, op.cit., [1978], p.10.
101. In The Washington Post 22 November, 1975, Bridgland 'names' 
South Africa as the origin of the 'white soldiers' that had
intervened in Angola. F Bridgland, op.cit., [1986], p.142.
102. The 'Zulu' column advanced up the coast and met an inland
column, 'Foxbat', after taking Novo Redondo, 275 kilometres south 
of Luanda. Another column, 'X-Ray', advanced toward Luso (where 
the 'gendarmes' from Katanga were hitting UNITA hard), which it 
eventually took in December. F Bridgland, op.cit., [1986], p.144.
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made by Bridgland, Savimbi 'found out', on a trip to Pretoria on 
10 November when he talked to Vorster for the first time, that 
South Africa had reversed its original plan of withdrawing by 11 
November and was at the time pushing towards Luanda to support the 
US- and Zaire-backed FNLA's challenge from the north.104 These 
allegations, of a South African-United States plan to install the 
FNLA in Luanda by independence, implied that UNITA would have 
played at most a minor role in a Roberto-dominated regime. A South 
African academic has concluded that there was "...no co-ordinated 
South African-American plan to capture Luanda."105
What emerges from a look at South Africa's intervention 
in Angola is a sense that Pretoria did not have a consistent 
policy from the start. Essentially it acted in response to 
perceived opportunities as the conflict in Angola escalated. This 
view is supported by a look at the South African intervention in 
phases. Firstly, it acted to exploit whatever advantages it could 
gain vis-a-vis SWAPO as a result of the chaos that was being 
unleashed inside Angola. Then, during a second phase, it acted to 
support UNITA's consolidation of territory in the south. Finally, 
it faced the Cuban-backed MPLA in an attempt to take Luanda for 
the FNLA. This 'stagist' look at South Africa's strategy in 
Angola must lead to the conclusion that the regime in Pretoria did 
not a have a calculated and co-ordinated policy to achieve its
103. F Bridgland, op,cit., [1986], p.145.
104. F Bridgland, op.cit., [1986], p.145.
105. D Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African
342
aims there, and, it is in this fact that partly lies the 
responsibility for failing to avoid the result Pretoria most 
feared: an independent, Moscow-backed MPLA government in Luanda.
According to one analyst of South African policy, the 
white regime hoped to help "...produce a moderate government in 
Angola which, in turn, might deny SWAPO bases and retain Angola as 
part of the cordon sanitaire."106 This seems to have been one of 
the principal motivations behind intervention in Angola. The means 
of achieving of this were, however, not as clear. According to 
Grundy, "Pretoria did not appear to know what it wanted to do 
largely because no clear-cut policy direction was established.1,107
Apparently, the Department of Foreign Affairs did not 
know about the first major SADF offensive into Angola until the 
South African embassy in Lisbon was handed a note of protest from 
the Portuguese government. This seems, at the very least, to 
suggest that intervention in Angola was not deemed to be an
incontrovertible policy option, if it does not infer the 
possibility that there was a division within the white regime over 
the merits of this policy.
Grundy has claimed that were it possible to identify
this divergence over Angola so clearly, the Department of Defence,
Foreign Policy Making, [1984], p.77.
106. D Geldenhuys, op.cit., [1978], p.10. Simpson has concluded 
that Pretoria believed that a UNITA-FNLA coalition in Luanda would 
not provide bases for SWAPO, as a result of Savimbi's comments 
wherein he considered an armed struggle in Namibia to be
unneccessary. M Simpson, The Soviet Union and Afro-Marxist 
Regimes: The Path to the Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation 
[1989], p.205.
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led by its minister, P W Botha, and the SADF itself, would be
considered 'hawks', while the security organ, BOSS, and the
Department of Foreign Affairs, for separate reasons, took the
'dovish' line.108 The Foreign Affairs Department was principally 
concerned about what intervention in Angola might do to South 
Africa's already fragile international position, while BOSS 
favoured a clandestine operation (which it would implement) rather 
than a direct military intervention. These different postures 
served to delay Vorster's decision in favour of one cohesive
policy for Angola.109 This debate was, however, only carried out 
"...within a restricted government circle while the Cabinet was 
not kept informed of what was happening and was not involved in 
the decisions."110 According to Grundy, the two principal
decision-makers in South Africa's Angolan policy were B J Vorster
and P W Botha.
According to this same source, the SADF prepared a
policy paper on Angola outlining the options available to South 
Africa, which it delivered to Vorster via Botha in June 1975.111 
No decision to act was taken until October,112 and yet in July, 
the SADF forces positioned along Namibia's border with Angola
107. K Grundy, op.cit., [1986], p.89.
108. K Grundy, op.cit., [1986], p.89.
109. J Barber and J Barratt, op.cit., [1990], pp.192-193.
110. J Barber and J Barratt, ibid., p.192.
111. K Grundy, op.cit., [1986], p.89.
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entered the country where they clashed with MPLA and, apparently, 
UNITA forces.113 The purpose of these raids seems to have been to 
search and destroy SWAPO guerrilla units in Angolan territory. 
The fact that these offensive actions did take place at this time 
is somewhat confirmed by Botha himself in parliament when he gave 
details of South African casualties in Angola as having been 
suffered between 14 July 1975 and 23 January 1976.114 In August, 
SADF forces moved into Angola and occupied the installations of 
the dam project on the Cunene River, an act that was held up to be 
the protection of South African investments. It seems likely that 
the objective of deploying the SADF along the northern border of 
Namibia and in southern Angola in the summer of 1975 was in order 
to exploit the situation in Angola to move against SWAPO. 
According to Barber and Barratt:
"...there is no evidence that Pretoria had specifically 
authorised the military to do more than protect the Cunene 
project and take necessary action against SWAPO."115
If this was the case, then the South African military's 
intervention on behalf of the anti-MPLA alliancej was initially 
unintended. In the absence of a concrete policy, P W Botha, after 
consulting with Vorster, had instructed the SADF forces in 
northern Namibia and southern Angola to drive off MPLA forces if
112. J Barber and J Barratt, op.cit., [1990], p.193.
113. C Legum, op.cit., [1978], p.36.
114. C Legum, op.cit., [1978], p.36. Savimbi also claimed that 
South African raids had taken place in July.
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attacked, in what amounted to, as Geldenhuys has put it, a
political decision that opened the door to offensive military 
operations in Angola.116 Despite the fact that no policy had
reportedly been decided upon, the SADF was already acting in
Angola, an indication of the possible confusion that existed at 
the heart of Pretoria's Angolan policy. While the political
considerations had not yet been completely evaluated, the fact 
that the military was already on the ground may have provided an 
impetus that eventually determined South Africa's action without a 
proper input as to the political consequences of its intervention 
which eventually led to its failure in Angola.
The background motivations for South African 
intervention in Angola were clearly based around the objective of 
denying power to the Soviet-backed MPLA. Fears that an MPLA- 
governed Angola would represent a direct threat to South Africa's 
position in Namibia, and indirectly, to the security of the white 
regime in South Africa itself, were expressed, and undoubtedly 
experienced, by policy-makers in Pretoria. At the time, what South 
Africans feared most from a possible MPLA success was, they 
claimed, the strategic threat that a Soviet presence represented 
to Western interests. According to P W Botha:
"South Africa is playing a limited role in Angola because 
Russia is involved in a campaign of militaristic imperialism 
in that country...We were prepared to leave it to the people 
of Angola to solve their own problems, but the Russians 
interfered because they want to control the sea route around
115. J Barber and J Barratt, op.cit., [1990], p.191.
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the Cape of Good Hope and because they want to exploit the 
wealth of Angola."117
While this may well have been the case, Pretoria’s fear of Moscow 
seems to be less related to the world-wide struggle against 
communism than to its fears of the effects of a strong, unfriendly 
actor in its hitherto sole sphere of influence. The independence
that Moscow's backing would confer to an MPLA government and the
consequences of this on Pretoria's own security, would signify for 
it a loss of relative power in the southern African region. 
Independence would have (and has) signified a drastic reduction in 
Pretoria's leverage leaving the South African government powerless 
should the radical Angolan government have decided to support 
challenges to the white minority regime in both Namibia and South 
Africa, through its support for SWAPO and the ANC respectively. In 
addition to this external support, the independence of an anti- 
South African regime in Luanda would also be drawn from oil
revenues. Not only would a radical regime in Luanda be free to act 
independently of Pretoria but as a rival pole of attraction, it 
might have weakened the state of dependence of the rest of
southern African on the South African economy. This factor of 
independence of action may partly explain why South Africa chose 
to intervene in Angola but not in Mozambique. The latter had very 
little scope for escaping dependence on South Africa.
As it turned out, Pretoria's fears were not unfounded.
116. D Geldenhuys, op.cit., [1984], p.79.
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Therefore, it is not unreasonable to claim that these may have 
have been part of the motivation for its decision to intervene. 
The white minority regime in South Africa had almost always shown 
itself to be aware of what threatened its regional hegemony.
South Africa has claimed that it acted in Angola only 
after a number of governments had urged it do so, and after UNITA 
had, in turn, requested an escalation to Pretoria's support for 
its challenge in the south. As stated above, the initial South
African escalation was intended to help UNITA. Savimbi, the
movement's leader, eventually admitted that he had decided to 
"...seek South African assistance at the end of September when he 
realised UNITA needed help against the Cubans."118 According to 
Savimbi:
"If you are a drowning man in a crocodile-infested river and 
you've just gone under for the third time you don't question 
who is pulling you to the bank until you are safely on it."119
It is not clear when South Africa began to support UNITA. 
According to one source, a request for aid made by Savimbi in
March 1975 was turned down by Pretoria.120 Marcum states that
Savimbi "...had already met with South African officials..." 
before early May.121 It is, therefore, not unreasonable to assume
117. Cited by C Legum, op.cit., p.37.
118. C Legum, op.cit., [1978], p.36.
119. Citation in F Bridgland, op.cit., [1986], p.142.
120. Moss in Die Burger (Cape Town), 8 February 1977. J Barber and 
J Barratt, op.cit., [1990], p.190.
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that some contact with the South Africans had been established 
before the summer of 1975. The rebel MPLA leader, Daniel Chipenda, 
(who had in the meantime joined the FNLA) visited Windhoek in May 
and July 1975. In the Namibian capital he met the head of BOSS, 
General van den Bergh. As the situation developed, the possibility 
of South African support must have been discussed at these
meetings. In late August, the SADF established a training camp for 
UNITA and one for Chipenda's FNLA forces.122 At the end of
September, a team of 18 South African instructors led by a SADF
officer and a small consignment of arms were sent to UNITA.123 By 
the beginning of October, these military advisors were
participating in clashes between UNITA and the MPLA.124 At this
time also, the CIA's covert operation of support for the FNLA and 
UNITA was gathering pace.
For South Africa, UNITA represented an appropriate
recipient of its favour. The fact that its political roots were in 
the south signified that a pro-South African UNITA would provide a 
buffer between Namibia and a hostile Angolan government.125 
Futhermore, when the Americans also turned to UNITA in June,
Pretoria must have believed it to be in line with Washington's
Angolan policy. Decades of longing to stand in the Western camp
121. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.268.
122. J Barber and J Barratt, op.cit., [1990], p.190. J Marcum, 
op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.269.
123. D Geldenhuys, op.cit., [1984], p.76.
124. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.269.
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left a blinding legacy in Pretoria. One additional benefit of 
supporting UNITA, according to US intelligence sources cited by 
Marcum, was that in return for South African help, Savimbi 
provided information on the location of SWAPO bases.126
A number of sources have claimed that South Africa's 
intervention in Angola was motivated in part by the encouragement 
given by certain African governments, namely those of Mobutu in 
Zaire and Kaunda in Zambia, as well as those of other leaders such 
as Houphouet-Boigny, Senghor and Nyerere. According to Barber and 
Barratt: "The position of these African leaders significantly 
influenced Pretoria's approach to the Angolan War."127 Both Zambia 
and Zaire were included in Pretoria's diplomatic strategy of 
'dialogue' which sought to establish closer relations with African 
governments. According to this interpretation, Pretoria acted in 
Angola in such a manner as to oblige its 'dialogue' partners. It 
is claimed that both Kaunda and Mobutu were concerned over an MPLA 
take-over in Angola; one which might threaten the access of their 
vital copper exports to the Atlantic coast ports via the Benguela 
railway. These leaders must not have relished the thought of 
becoming dependent on a Moscow-backed MPLA government which would 
have been able to affect the flow of their principal foreign 
revenue earner. This may certainly explain part of the motivation 
behind Zaire's direct support for the FNLA and that of Zambia for
125. J Barber and J Barratt, op.cit., [1990], p.191.
126. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.271.
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UNITA. But the contention arises when it is suggested that these 
leaders encouraged Pretoria to intervene in order to help displace 
the MPLA. Surely they must have been aware of the probable 
consequences of South African intervention in an African conflict. 
Possibly, they hoped the presence of the SADF in Angola could have 
been kept secret, although this was certainly an unrealistic 
expectation. According to Heimer, the SADF was, after its initial 
incursion, ordered to hold back until 11 November in order to 
maintain their identity secret.128
It still remains uncertain at what stage of South 
African intervention this Zambian-Zairean encouragement was given. 
Some sources129 have inferred that this occurred before their 
military commitment had been made, possibly leading Pretoria to 
believe that it had the support of some African governments. 
Claims have been made by Savimbi that seek to excuse Pretoria's 
intervention, by saying that South Africa had acted with "painful 
correctness", and which also emphasized that South Africa had 
acted with the approval of African governments "...such as Zaire, 
Zambia and the Ivory Coast."130
In other accounts,131 it has been suggested that secret 
Zairean and Zambian overtures on Pretoria came only after the SADF
127. J Barber and J Barratt, op.cit., [1990], pp.188-189.
128. F W Heimer, The Decolonization Conflict in Angola, [1979], 
p.77.
129. Seiler states it categorically: "...both Zambia and Zaire
asked the South African government to intervene against the MPLA."
J Seiler, op.cit., [1981], p.104.
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had intervened in Angola to secure territory for UNITA in support 
of its claims for a share in a possible coalition government. In 
this interpretation, the Zairean and Zambian governments make 
known their approval, tacitly or directly, of South African 
military operations that were already being carried out against 
the MPLA. The difference between the two possible scenarios being 
that were the latter to be the case, Pretoria could not claim that 
it had been spurred into action by requests from Zaire and Zambia. 
If approval came afterwards, it cannot be considered to have an 
input into the decision-making process.
The principal motivating factor behind its intervention, 
claimed Pretoria, was the United States. An unanswered question in 
the Angolan civil war is the extent of US collusion with South 
Africa against the MPLA. The South African government has claimed 
that Washington encouraged, if not incited, Pretoria into 
intervening:
"To the question of whether Washington had 'solicited' South 
African involvement, Prime Minister Vorster subsequently 
responded that he would not call anyone who said that a 
'liar'."132
According to Vorster:
"...South Africa would never have intervened had it not been 
assured that its forces would be resupplied if they 
encountered major opposition...it had only intervened at all 
on the express understanding that the US would continue to 
arm the SADF if it suffered heavy losses."133
130. C Legum, op.cit., [1978], p.38.
131. F Bridgland, op.cit., [1986], p.145
.132. Newsweek 17 May 1976. Citation in J Marcum, op.cit., Volume 
Two, [1978], p.271.
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For its part, the US denies having given any such guarantees to
Pretoria:
"'Some charge that we have acted in collusion with South 
Africa,1 [Kissinger] said before the Senate Africa 
Subcommittee. 'This is untrue, We had no foreknowledge of 
South Africa's intentions and in no way co-operated with it 
militarily.11,134
The US had been unwilling to admit to any form of partnership with 
Pretoria, especially with regard to anything so sensitive as 
supplying arms to South African troops fighting in Angola.
"As a [US] government official135 told Congress, no American 
government could undertake to resupply South African forces 
during a conflict in which its own forces were not directly 
engaged. He even underlined the fact by reminding it that the 
US had scrupulously adhered to the arms embargo throughout 
the conflict.136
Clearly, the South African government had been aware of the 
clandestine support Washington had been giving the FNLA through 
Zaire. According to John Stockwell, the CIA operative responsible 
for the US covert operation in Angola, the South African regime 
was kept informed through "...voluminous intelligence reports and 
detailed briefings..." offered by the agency's station in 
Pretoria.137 On this information, it is possible to infer that the
133. New York Times 5 and 7 February 1976. Citation in C Coker, 
op.cit., [1985], p.96.
134. A Gavshon, Crisis in Africa: Battleground of East and West, 
[1981], p.243.
135. John Reed, the Director of the Africa Regional Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defence.
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South Africans may have taken for granted the US commitment to the 
anti-MPLA forces and decided to 'help out1 in the fight. In this 
way, "...South Africa hoped to demonstrate its commitment to the 
free world against communist expansionism. Angola seemed the ideal 
opportunity to do so."138
When it joined the US in the ranks of the FNLA's and 
UNITA1s external backers, it is possible that Pretoria believed 
that by identifying the nature of the intervention as 'anti­
communist1, this would prevail over any negative political 
consequences of its own involvement. Overconfident of its own 
identity, the South African regime may have been unable to 
correctly calculate what effect its support for UNITA and the FNLA 
would have on the political conflict of these movements with the 
MPLA. When it eventually discovered that its support represented 
the 'kiss of death1 for the anti-MPLA coalition, the regime turned 
on Washington for what it believed to be the Americans1 lack of 
resolve in seeing through the fight against the 'communists1. 
Pretoria had obviously different reasons than Washington for being 
in Angola. Their objectives, the denial of power to the MPLA, did 
coincide, but even the nature of their intervention was different. 
Furthermore, South Africa's political and military objectives did 
not match. The SADF's military operations on the ground ended up 
by compromising an efficient evaluation of South Africa's 
political objectives. It can be said that the South Africans were
136. C Coker, op.cit., [1985], p.96.
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blaming Washington for what had essentially been their own
miscalculations, both in relation to their own intervention as 
well as with regard to overestimating American willingness to 
enter the Angolan conflict overtly, something which, incidentally, 
the Soviet Union seemed to have managed to evaluate correctly.139
The revelation of the presence of the SADF on Angolan 
soil represented the beginning of the end of the civil war. 
Despite the fact that others had also been involved, and somewhat 
incomprehensibly to itself, South African intervention largely 
became the most reviled act of the civil war. Allegedly in
response to the intervention of South Africa, Nigeria, hitherto a 
UNITA sympathizer revised its posture on the Angolan civil war in 
support of the MPLA, both financially and diplomatically. Legum 
suggests, however, that there may have been another reason behind 
this reversal, one that had more to do with Nigerian domestic 
politics and the United States, than with Pretoria's intervention 
in Angola.140 Nevertheless, international public opinion raged 
against the South African intervention far more than the criticism 
that was directed against the Cuban intervention. Eventually, it 
was Pretoria's involvement in the conflict, that pushed the OAU 
and then the UN to recognize the legitimacy of the MPLA and in
this way put an end to the civil war of 1975.
It has been shown that South African intervention in
137. J Stockwell In Search of Enemies, [1978], p.181.
138. D Geldenhuys, op.cit., [1978], p.10.
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Angola was intimately tied to its strategy of regional hegemony. 
The threat of a radical regime in Angola independent of its 
pressures led South Africa to risk a military operation that
sought to deny victory to the MPLA. These were the motivations
behind its involvement. But South Africa was also drawn into the
conflict. The convergence of South Africa's interests with those
of the FNLA and UNITA, who as vdrowning men1 sought a saviour to 
pull them ashore, became the entry point for South African 
military intervention in the civil war. Again, the dynamics of 
external and internal politics were mixed, and created an effect 
that exceeded the purely military nature of the intervention.
(iii) Zaire and Angola: The Search for Influence
The role played by the Zairean regime of President 
Mobutu Sese Seko in the Angolan civil war was of an important if 
not determinant nature. Apart from those of South Africa and Cuba, 
it was the only other government to send its own troops into 
Angola to intervene directly in the civil war. The influence of 
Congolese/Zairean politics on the Angolan conflict had already 
been long-standing by 1975. The Adoula government's sponsorship of 
the GRAE in 1963 taken up by Mobutu in 1965 resulting in the 
intervention of 1975, can be seen to have been an expression of 
the same policy of support for Roberto's movement. This commitment 
to the FNLA could be said to parallel, in terms of effect although 
perhaps not of nature, that of Cuba's association with the MPLA. 
From this point of view, the FNLA's very close relationship with
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Mobutu led not only to the latter's intervention in the movement's 
favour but also to the support provided to the FNLA by the United 
States; to a point where the question may be raised as to whether 
Washington's behaviour during the civil war might have been 
altogether different had Zaire not provided one of the lenses 
through which the United States viewed the conflict.
The Mobutu regime seems to have played the part of 
linch-pin, holding together the anti-MPLA coalition with its 
external backers. This was certainly the case with the United 
States. It is argued that not only did Zaire provide the conduit 
for the US covert assistance to the FNLA but also influenced the 
determination of US policy towards the Angolan conflict. This was 
also the case with China. As the Mobutu regime warmed to Peking in 
1973, the FNLA, based in Zaire, gleaned the rewards in terms of 
arms and instructors. As one of the major African states, Zaire's 
overtures to South Africa, which are said to have incited 
Pretoria's intervention, would in all probability have been used 
as a political justification, however miscalculated, for the 
'hawkish' policy pursued by the South Africans. Had the Mobutu 
regime not played such a prominent role in its support of the FNLA 
it is conceivable that the level of the internationalization of 
the Angolan conflict would have been significantly affected.
The principal pillar of Zaire's association with the 
FNLA seems to have been the personal relationship between Mobutu 
and Holden Roberto. This association was also predicated on a 
Zairean domestic political consideration: the importance of the
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large Bakongo-speaking community, in which the FNLA was based, 
which straddled both Angola and Zaire. From almost the very 
beginning of the FNLA's existence to its eventual dissolution, its 
fortunes were intimately tied to Zairean power, and especially to 
that of President Mobutu.141 It may be argued that the FNLA showed 
itself to have been completely dependent on Zaire. Mobutu's regime 
provided the FNLA with finance and weapons, a military base at 
Kinkuzu, diplomatic support and an operational advantage by 
denying the MPLA access to Angola along its long border. Even in 
its internal workings, the FNLA, or rather Roberto, seemed to rely 
on the Zairean government. When Roberto's leadership was 
challenged from within, it was the Zairean army that came to his
rescue, putting down an ELNA142 mutiny in 19 7 3.143 Perhaps
because of this close association, Legum talks of the 
'‘inevitability' of Mobutu's regime being drawn into the Angolan 
conflict once the FNLA had made its challenge for power.144
When the FNLA believed it to be possible to challenge 
the MPLA, its association with Mobutu was undoubtedly called upon. 
However, in its intervention in Angola in 1975, Zaire was actively 
pursuing its own agenda. Specifically, Zaire's objective in Angola
139. See Chapter Seven.
140. C Legum, op.cit., [1978], p.35.
141. During Tshombe's government in 1964, Roberto and the FNLA
had not been favoured. See Chapter Five.
142. The FNLA's army. The Army of the National Liberation of 
Angola (Exercito de Liberta^ao Nacional de Angola).
143. S Weissman, 'The CIA and US Policy in Zaire and Angola',
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in an attempt to influence the succession of Portuguese 
colonialism was to establish a favorably-disposed government in 
Angola. The range of acceptable alternatives for Zaire seem to 
have run from, at an early stage, the participation of the FNLA in 
a coalition government to, eventually, the total take-over by the 
FNLA. In achieving any of these objectives, Zaire failed 
completely and in February 1976 the Mobutu regime 'normalized1 
relations with the MPLA.
What were Zaire's objectives in Angola in 1975? 
According to Legum, Zaire was "...pursuing particularist 
interests...".145 The desire to avoid the establishment of a 
leftist regime in Luanda seems to have stemmed from a number of 
considerations made by Mobutu's regime, of a strategic, economic 
and political nature. An independent and hostile government in 
neighbouring Angola would have threatened an array of perceived 
interests. In general terms, these interests can be linked to 
Mobutu's desire to carve out a role for Zaire as a regional 
hegemon in central Africa and as a continent-wide leader.
In 1973, strong world prices for its abundant mineral 
resources and an increasingly prominent role in continental 
politics had made Zaire an influential actor in the area. This 
despite the negative image given as a result of the close 
association of Mobutu's regime with the US; a result of the 
alleged role played by the CIA in the rise and consolidation of
[1978], p.403.
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Mobutu's power and the strong presence of Western investments in 
the Zairean economy, especially in its copper production. 
Furthermore, this negative association had been considerably 
offset by the development of close relations with China from the 
end of 1972 which served to bolster Zaire's image in the Third 
World generally.146 Domestically, Mobutu was unchallenged and had 
attempted to ameliorate the charges levelled at him regarding the 
prominent position of Western capital in the Zairean economy by 
implementing a partial programme of nationalization. The 
apparently rising international prestige of Zaire was part of the 
most golden period of Mobutu's regime. It did not, however, last 
long.
According to Young,147 the regime's relationship with 
the United States had, in 1975, reached its lowest point as a 
result of a number of issues which had led to friction between the 
two countries. The United States had not been pleased with 
Mobutu's diplomatic coup against Israel nor with his increasingly 
good relations with China. In mid-1974, the new US ambassador to 
Zaire was appointed after a clearly reproachful period of delay, 
and never really managed to gain favour with Mobutu. Furthermore,
144. C Legum, op.cit., [1978], p.32.
145. C Legum, op.cit., [1978], p.10.
146. Mobutu's regime also gained much respect, particularly in 
the Arab world, with its bold, antecipatory and preemptive break 
with Israel two days before the 1973 October war."Once the 
October War began, many African states followed suit, but the 
Zairian initiative brilliantly outmanoeuvred them - especially 
Nigeria, a major rival for African leadership." C Young, 'The 
Portuguese Coup and Zaire's Southern Africa Policy' [1980],
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the Zairean authorities had seized the distribution and retail 
facilities of a number of Western oil companies, causing further 
irritation in Washington. The deterioration in US-Zairean 
relations reached its culmination in June 1975, when the CIA was 
accused by Kinshasa of having conspired to overthrow Mobutu. The 
reasons behind this alleged plot relate to the investigations 
being made in the US by the Church Senate committee into the 
activities of the CIA. With the alleged plot dominating the press, 
Mobutu may have hoped to distract attention from any damning 
revelations made by the Senate investigation. Despite the 
possibility that this may have been a tactical manoeuvre by 
Mobutu, US-Zairean relations were sufficiently cool in mid-1975 
for there to have been a perceived need to revive the partnership 
or risk diverging from Washington. For this and other reasons, 
Mobutu began to project Zaire as standing in Africa as 
Washington's champion against communism and the Soviet Union. 
Challenging the Moscow-backed MPLA in Angola would have clearly 
conveyed Zaire's allegiance to Washington.
The desire to regain Washington's favour was but one of 
the considerations that underlied Zaire's intervention in Angola. 
Foremost among the other reasons was Zaire's testy relations with 
the Congo (Brazzaville). Relations between Kinshasa and 
Brazzaville, across the river, had been difficult ever since the 
radicalization of the Congolese regime under Massemba-Debat from 
1963. The new Brazzaville regime made clear its posture vis-a-vis 
Kinshasa by giving haven to and supporting the Zairean leftists in
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the National Liberation Committee (CNL).148 By giving support to 
the CNL, which fought initially for the overthrow of Tshombe, and 
subsequently Mobutu, Brazzaville was effectively alienating itself 
from Kinshasa. Congolese support had also been extended to the 
MPLA after its expulsion from Zaire by Adoula in 1963. The FNLA's 
operations had provided a counter to both the activity of the CNL 
and the MPLA, a fact which had allegedly won Kinshasa valuable aid 
from the Portuguese.149
It is argued that this rivalry between US-backed 
Kinshasa and Moscow-backed Brazzaville was yet another external 
matrix that was superimposed on the internal Angolan conflict, as 
was apparent in the mid-1960s in the competition between the MPLA 
and the GRAE, and emerged once again during the Angolan civil war. 
Thus, Brazzaville provided a basing point for the MPLA and served 
as a conduit for the flow of Soviet weapons to the movement as 
well as forming a crucial communications link between the 
Angolans, the Cubans and the Soviets. Against this, in an 
inescapably quasi-symmetrical way, Kinshasa deployed troops on the 
side of the FNLA and served as a channel for the flow of US 
weapons to Roberto's movement while at the same time linking the 
FNLA to its external backers. While inevitably conforming to the 
global competition between the superpowers that paralleled the
p.201.
147. C Young, op.cit., [1980], p.208.
148. Comite National de Liberation.
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Brazzaville-Kinshasa rivalry, and while partly providing the means 
with which each movement was able to externalize their internal 
conflict, the Congo-Zaire rivalry was itself also expressed in the 
Angolan civil war.
One facet of this regional competition was the issue of 
the oil-rich Angolan enclave of Cabinda. The territory is 
separated from Angola by Zaire in the south and is bordered by the 
Congo in the north. While the separatist tendencies in the enclave 
met with little success, they became tied to both Congolese and 
Zairean politics as rival wings found support in the rival 
capitals. In mid-1975, while Cabinda was under effective MPLA 
control, the Luis Franque faction of the Cabindan separatists, 
based in Kinshasa, declared the independence of Cabinda in August 
1975, while the N'Zita Tiago wing of FLEC that had formed a 
'Provisional Revolutionary Government' was temporarily supported 
by Brazzaville.150 Momentarily in 1975, the strange situation was 
created wherein Brazzaville supported both the anti-separatist 
MPLA and FLEC, while Kinshasa supported both the equally anti­
separatist FNLA and the anti-Brazzaville faction of FLEC. This was 
a complex system of alliances that illustrates the presence of the 
Congo-Zaire rivalry in the course of the Angolan civil war. It 
also reveals how the enemies of a potential ally seem to be far 
more significant in determining an association than other 
considerations.
149. According to Lucio Lara cited in C K Ebinger, 'External 
Intervention in Internal War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the 
Angolan Civil War1, [1976], p.674.
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The annexation of Cabinda has been identified as an aim 
of both the Kinshasa and Brazzaville regimes,151 providing one of 
the major reasons for their involvement in the Angolan civil war. 
The overriding objective for both regimes seemed to be to either 
gain influence in Cabinda or to deny their rival from achieving 
any advantage here. An executively independent Cabinda, 
economically dependent on Zaire was, according to many 
observers,152 the policy option preferred by Mobutu. Accordingly, 
he encouraged self-determination in the enclave and established 
contact with one wing of the separatist FLEC. The Zairean 
government declared that it believed that a referendum in Cabinda 
should determine its future. Mobutu's foreign minister drew an 
analogy between Cabinda and Bangladesh,153 with Zaire clearly 
wanting to play the role of India. In late November 1975, while 
the conflict raged on the mainland of Angola, Zaire supported an 
attempted invasion of Cabinda by FLEC.154
As well as the Kinshasa-Brazzaville rivalry, Zaire's 
intervention in Angola was also motivated by other factors. In 
economic terms, mid-1974 had seen a deterioration in Zaire's 
previously expansive situation. The benefits of its vast mineral
150. Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents
1975-1976, [1976], pp.B427-428.
151. "Youlou supported FLEC [Front de Liberation de 1'Enclave de
Cabinda] as part of his design to eventually annex Cabinda onto
Congo-Brazzaville." C K Ebinger, op.cit., [1976], p.676.
152. C Legum, op.cit., [1978], and C Young, op.cit. [1980].
153. C Legum, op.cit., [1978], p.33.
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resources were being rapidly eroded with the drop in world copper 
prices in April which only a year before had brought in roughly 
half of the government's revenue.155 The 1973 oil crisis had 
brought further misfortune to the already mismanaged Zairean 
economy. Increasingly, this negative economic picture began to 
feed internal resentment against the regime. Young concludes that 
Mobutu had to act in some way to alleviate a tense social 
situation. In this way, intervention in Angola acted as a 
diversionary political act that sought the reinforcement of 
domestic Zairean authority.
There were also economic reasons for intervention in 
Angola. Over half of Zairean copper exports156 left the country 
through the Angolan ports on the Atlantic via the Benguela 
railway. Highly accentuated during a period of recession, a threat 
to this transportation route would have weakened the government's 
position even further. This consideration (similar to the one 
shared by the Zambian leadership) may have led the Zairean regime 
to believe that a radical and independent MPLA regime in Luanda 
would have threatened its copper exports route.
Finally, two other factors played an important role in 
motivating Mobutu to intervene more heavily in the Angolan 
conflict. The Katangan separatist force of gendarmes, supportive 
of Moise Tshombe, had been maintained in Angola by the Portuguese
154. C K Ebinger, op.cit., [1976], p.691.
155. C Young, op.cit., [1980], p.200.
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colonial authorities as a form of pressure on Kinshasa since the 
defeat of Tshombe's attempted secession in the mid-1960s. In 1975, 
this force became active on the side of the MPLA in the south 
against UNITA and the FNLA-Chipenda forces. It was in Mobutu's 
interest to neutralize this armed force which was consistently 
threatening to his own authority in Zaire. Secondly, Mobutu had to 
consider the presence of a large, potentially explosive, 
expatriate Angolan community in Zaire, which had swelled to nearly 
a million with the refugees that had abandoned Angola after the 
beginning of the civil war in 1975. For all these reasons, 
intervention in Angola may have been unavoidable.
Having established a number of possible motivations for 
Zaire's intervention in Angola, and having already pin-pointed the 
association between Mobutu and Roberto's FNLA as the conduit for 
Zairean interference, it is essential to identify the direction of 
influence. According to Ebinger:
"[Mobutu]...used the FNLA as an effective instrument of foreign 
policy in relation to (1) his growing ideological dispute with 
the Brazzaville...and (2) his desire for a wide range of 
options vis-a-vis Angola and Cabinda."157
While the FNLA may well have represented such an instrument to 
Mobutu's regime, it must be stressed that Zaire can be viewed 
equally as an instrument of the FNLA in the sense that the Mobutu 
regime gave the Roberto the necessary opportunities for his anti- 
MPLA challenge. Thus, the FNLA drew Zaire into the conflict to
156. C Young, op.cit., [1980], p.201.
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support its challenge; while Zaire pursued its own interests, it 
also linked the FNLA with its two major external backers, the US 
and China; at all times expressing the Angolan civil war as a 
wider ideological struggle while keeping its own very 
particularist interests in sight.
Concretely, Zaire provided the principal channel for US 
covert involvement in Angola in 1975; and as will be seen later, 
it is also more than likely that Zaire was one of the major
influences in the formulation of US policy in Angola in 1975.158 
Aside from being the main influence on Kissinger's Angolan policy, 
the CIA in Zaire was used to implement US covert support for the 
FNLA. As the civil war developed, concrete objectives, now 
specific to Angola, did replace US strategic interests in Zaire as
the bone marrow of Washington's policy of support for the FNLA.
Zaire then became important for logistical reasons. The overriding 
need to maintain US involvement secret led to Zaire's increasing 
importance as a conduit for the flow of arms to the anti-MPLA
forces. Although some of the shipments of US arms were provided 
directly to the FNLA, the rest were provided to Kinshasa as
157. C K Ebinger, op.cit., [1976], p.674.
158. Despite the presence of American diplomats in Luanda, the 
intelligence assessment of the situation in Angola was carried 
out principally by the CIA station in Kinshasa. The account of 
the CIA's involvement in Angola given by Stockwell has portrayed 
the Kinshasa station, via the agency, as being the main, if not 
sole, source for the decision of the Forty Committee to 
reactivate US covert funds to the FNLA. According to an official 
on the Forty Committee, the approval given for funds for the 
FNLA in January 1975 was predicated on the "basic concern" to 
demonstrate support for Zaire, rather than directly linked to 
the internal Angolan situation (S Weissman, 'The CIA and US
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replacement to arms supplied by Zaire (and, to a lesser extent, 
Zambia): "We are only sending arms to Kinshasa to replace
equipment Mobutu is sending into Angola from his own stocks."159 
In this way, the role of the US as the main arms supplier of the 
anti-MPLA challenge might be shielded.160
The effect that the US covert policy of support for the 
FNLA and UNITA might have had on Zaire's own intervention must 
also be referred to. Comparable to what Pretoria may have gleaned 
from US support for the FNLA, Kinshasa's own participation in the 
Angolan civil war may have been psychologically bolstered by this 
US posture. It may be possible to consider Zaire as having, like 
South Africa, fallen victim to a sense of overconfidence in the 
global hegemony of the United States, and thus unable to predict 
the constraints, self-imposed or otherwise, that defeated the US 
in Angola.
Policy in Zaire and Angola', [1978], p.404).
159. CIA official quoted in J Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 
[1978], p.37.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE GLOBAL ACTORS
(i) The United States and Angola before the Portuguese Coup
Countering Soviet influence was the central focus of 
American policy in Angola. This is true of US post-war policy 
elsewhere, but it is a remarkably consistent characteristic of 
its involvement in this country. Washington's postures towards 
Angola were inserted into a wider context of how best to contain 
and roll back Moscow's influence in Africa. But before the April 
coup in Portugal, Washington's Angolan policy was also 
influenced by its relations with Lisbon, which were, in turn, 
carried out within a NATO context and therefore also part of a 
wider policy of American containment. In its first relevant 
phase of Angolan policy, roughly between the beginning of the 
anti-colonial challenge in 1961 practically to the very day of 
the April coup in 1974, Washington seemed to believe that both 
Salazar's and Caetano's regimes were firmly established both 
within Portugal and in its colonial territories. This led 
American policy-makers to conclude that, in general, good 
bilateral relations with Lisbon would best prevent Soviet 
inroads in Africa.
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Before Kissinger
Clearly, US policy-makers did not fear a communist 
take-over in Angola in the 1960s. The intransigence of 
Portuguese colonialism seemed to place the possibility of a 
radical government in Angola out of the question. For the most 
part, from the Kennedy administration to that of Nixon, US 
policy towards all Portuguese African territories, was dominated 
by ties with Lisbon. Relations with Portugal were, in turn, 
primarily determined by US military interests on the Azores 
islands.
The Lajes base was described by Dean Acheson as "the 
single most important we have anywhere".1 In 1949, a CIA report 
prepared for Truman pointed out that:
"The use of the air and naval facilities on the Azores would 
be extremely desirable in case of war with the Soviet 
Union."2
The logistical importance for the military traffic between the 
United States and Europe of the airbases on these mid-Atlantic 
islands was crucial. Their importance had been demonstrated 
during the Berlin crisis in 1961 when a rapid deployment of 
troops was required. The primary and back-up airbases on the 
Terceira (Lajes) and Santa Maria islands respectively, handled
1. Citation in C Coker, Nato, the Warsaw Pact and Africa, 
[1985], p.63.
2. J Freire Antunes, Kennedy e Salazar: o Leao e a Raposa, 
[1991], p.31.
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14,000 departures in 1961 (more than 40 flights a day). This 
weight of traffic underlined the bases1 importance in a general 
airlift of US troops.3 Furthermore, the US facilities on the 
strategically located island chain enabled the tracking of 
submarines within a radius of 1,000 miles. The Pentagon saw this 
facility as essential to counter the burgeoning Soviet navy. The
Azores also provided the United States with a useful naval base,
midpoint between the Sixth Fleet stationed in the Mediterranean 
and its major supply depots on the American eastern coastline.4 
According to a memorandum sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 
the State Department in 1963:
"Loss of the Azores would seriously degrade the 
responsiveness, reliability and control of major US 
forces."5
With such a clearly established value to the US 
military, the Azores bases were used by Portugal to press 
Washington for concessions. As Freire Antunes has concluded, the 
Azores bases acted as "a sort of security belt for the New State 
within a cold war context, and [which] guaranteed Portugal 
automatic American protection."6 Until 1971, the lease for the 
bases was only renewed on a yearly basis, which effectively
3. C Coker, op.cit., [1985], p.63.
4. C Coker, op.cit., [1985], p.63.
5. Citation in C Coker, op.cit., [1985], p.64.
6. J Freire Antunes, op.cit., [1991], p.31.
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provided Lisbon with an inordinate amount of political leverage 
with the United States and consequently, within NATO. At a time 
when Portugal was growing increasingly isolated as a result of 
its colonial intransigence, the United States helped Portugal to 
remain in NATO,7 largely as a result, it can be assumed, of the 
military value of the Azores bases. From these US interests, 
Lisbon was also able to withdraw other economic and political 
benefits. Perhaps reluctantly, Washington was encumbered with an 
unwanted ally.
In the early 1960s, however, these policy constraints 
came up against other wider American diplomatic interests. 
Somewhat aware of the new world that was taking shape, the 
United States wanted to establish its influence among the new 
African nations that were emerging from European colonialism. 
This general initiative was somewhat compromised by the US's 
association with Portugal, that stubbornly refused to even 
consider the possibility of the independence of its territories. 
But, recognizing the growing political importance of the Afro- 
Asian group of states, both in the United Nations and in the 
East-West struggle for influence, Washington decided to place a 
priority on establishing its role in the Third World. The 
Kennedy administration took a strong stand in support of self- 
determination. This US president wrote in 1960: "We cannot
7. Towards the end of the 1960s, the expulsion of Portugal from 
NATO was often called for and was a topic of discussion in 
Europe, Canada and the US. C Coker, op.cit., [1985], Chapter 3.
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continue to think of Africa solely in terms of Europe."8 Mostly 
in the United Nations, Washington attempted to play the part of 
the benevolent, pro-nationalist, but liberal superpower.
Lisbon refused to comply with the liberal stands of 
the West and hunkered down, especially with regard to its 
colonial empire. Increasingly from the 1950s onward, Portugal 
headed for the international pariah status that was also 
occupied for many years by South Africa. Because of US interests 
in the Azores and especially because of Portugal's membership of 
NATO, the United States was somewhat tainted by this 
association. If Washington wanted to befriend the more moderate 
states of Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Asia, it 
had to take a stand against Portugal. This it did.
In April 1961, in the wake of the anti-colonial 
uprising and the colonial backlash in Angola, the United States 
voted in favour of a General Assembly resolution [1603(XV)]9 
that called upon Portugal to establish the right of its 
dependent territories to self-determination. At the time, the US 
vote was rather surprising when compared to its record during 
the Eisenhower administration which had abstained on all 
resolutions concerning colonial independence. In December of 
that same year, the United States had approved a resolution
8. J Freire Antunes, op.cit., [1991], p.51.
9. The voting records cited are drawn from P Wohlgemuth, 'The 
Portuguese Territories and the United Nations', [1963)], pp.60- 
66.
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[1699(XVI)] that condemned Portugal's non-compliance with the 
terms of Chapter Eleven of the United Nations Charter.10 In the 
Security Council, the United States approved in June 1961, a 
resolution [S/4835]11 that condemned Portugal's repression of 
the February-March uprisings in Angola. Here was Washington 
publicly criticizing Portugal, a fellow NATO member.
The United States went beyond criticism. The Kennedy 
administration wanted to stand for the new nationalism. During 
the 1960 presidential election campaign, the victorious 
candidate had set out his view of the "wind of change":
"...I defend an Africa where countries are free to choose 
their own national trajectory without outside pressures or 
coercions."12
According to a US congressman travelling through Africa, a great 
enthusiasm for the young president had been whipped up on the 
continent.13
The Kennedy administration decided to act beyond the
10. This Chapter relates to obligations incurred by states' 
administrations of non-self-governing territories, and the 
obligation to inform the UN of conditions in such territories. 
Resolution 1699(XVI) reproduced in R Chilcote Emerging 
Nationalism in Portuguese Africa: Documents, [1972], p.539.
11. Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1961 (New 
York, NY: UN Official Records).
12. J Freire Antunes, op.cit., [1991], p.57.
13. "Whenever our presence was noted, anxious crowds would call
out 'Kennedy, Kennedy'...For the first time, our country was
being identified with legitimate African aspirations." Frank
Church. Cited in J Freire Antunes, op.cit., [1991], p.58.
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fora of the United Nations assemblies. The US government wanted 
to support an anti-colonial movement against the Portuguese. 
Robert Kennedy considered that Angolan independence was "just 
and inevitable" and supported the establishment of direct links 
with the nationalists.14 Holden Roberto, the FNLA leader, had 
by the end of the 1950s, established a wide range of contacts in 
the United States. Furthermore, in 1961, due to its northern 
uprising, the UPA (FNLA) was the Angolan nationalist movement 
with the most international exposure. Washington decided to back 
its anti-colonial posturing with acts and authorized the CIA to 
extend support to Roberto and UPA. The exact substance of this 
support is unclear. One source has indicated that it consisted 
of "several million dollars" of military and financial 
support.15 On the other hand, Morris has reported that the CIA 
financed Roberto "...during most of the 1960s at the paltry rate 
of US$ 10,000-US$ 20,000 a year...".16 Still another source has 
claimed, without attributing the information however, that the 
FNLA received US$ 1 million a year.17 Whatever the amount of 
money Roberto may have received from Washington during this 
period, it was, however, insufficient to be decisive in the
14. J Freire Antunes, op.cit., [1991], p.132.
15. H Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto: US Foreign Policy 
Toward Africa Since 1960, [1982], p.58.
16. R Morris, 'The Proxy War in Angola: the Pathology of a
Blunder1, [1976], p.20.
17. Z Laidi, The Superpowers and Africa: The Constraints of a
Rivalry 1960-1990, [1990], p.61.
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political and military anti-colonial campaign of the FNLA.
How long this support for the FNLA lasted is equally 
unclear. One source has cited US Congress investigators that 
claimed the possibility that Roberto may have received small 
payments from the CIA throughout the whole period between 1961 
and 1975.18 Another source, however, claimed that aid to the 
FNLA was halted in 1969.19 Morris believes the money was stopped 
by the Nixon administration in 1970 as a gesture to Portugal.20
Roberto's response to this transformation in American 
policy did not hide his satisfaction. At a press conference held 
in Tunisia after the US voted against Portugal in the Security 
Council in reaction to the March violence in Angola, the leader 
of UPA, declared:
"We wish to take this opportunity to pay a ringing tribute to 
the new American administration and its young and dynamic 
chief, John Kennedy. Our country will be proud to have 
helped solidify the sharp change in American policy 
concerning Africa and decolonisation".21
The Portuguese response to Kennedy's pro-nationalism was 
markedly different. Anti-American demonstrations broke out in 
Lisbon and Luanda, while Salazar waited until a ministerial
18. C Legum, After Angola: The War Over Southern Africa, [1978],
p.10.
19. G Bender, 'Kissinger in Angola: Anatomy of Failure', [1978], 
p.69.
20. R Morris, op.cit., [1976], p.20.
21. J Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Volume One, [1969], p.182.
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meeting of NATO was held in Oslo on 8 May 1961 to express 
Portugal's wrath. According to Marcum, Lisbon privately 
threatened to leave the alliance.22
The United States was, however, unmoved. It further 
complemented its anti-Portuguese diplomatic posturing and covert 
support for the FNLA with other measures:23 it created a 
scholarship programme for African students from the Portuguese 
colonies; it reviewed that year's US military assistance 
programme for Portugal, cutting back from the originally 
intended US$ 25 million, and delivered only US$ 3 million-worth; 
it imposed a ban on commercial sales of arms to Portugal, a ban 
activated in mid-1961; and it supported the prohibition on the 
use of NATO war materiel in Africa. These measures were not 
extensive nor very effective. The ban on the use of NATO 
weaponry in Angola (and later in the other colonies), was 
impossible to verify and anyway clearly flouted by Lisbon. But 
they nevertheless reflected the attempts made by Washington to 
tread a thin line between supporting the aspirations of the 
colonized while, at the same time, meeting the requirements of 
the NATO alliance. Marcum's term to describe US policy toward
Portugal at this time: "benevolent neutrality"24 is a pertinent 
one.
22. J Marcum, op.cit., [1969], p.183.
23. J Marcum, op.cit., [1969], p.184.
24. J Marcum, op.cit., [1969], p.184.
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But the Kennedy administration's posturing against 
Lisbon did not last long. The regime in Lisbon successfully used 
the expiry of the American lease for its Azores' bases in 
December 1962 to reel Washington back in. The President 
reportedly sent a memorandum to the State Department in July 
1963 notifying that all anti-Portuguese initiatives by the US 
government were to be called off. Already by the end of 1962, 
the US had revealed its new priorities when in December it had 
voted against a General Assembly Resolution [1807(XVII)] that 
condemned Portugal.25 The military and political considerations 
of the Azores bases and Portugal's membership of NATO, had 
evidently prevailed over the desire to push for influence within 
the anti-colonial camp. There is evidence that the US military 
had pressured the Secretary of Defence in July 1963 to protect 
American-Portuguese relations. In a memorandum sent by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff,26 it was stated that, should concessions have 
to be made to African opinion, it was preferable to sacrifice 
American interests in South Africa rather than threaten US 
interests in the Azores. Despite Kennedy's alleged determination 
to resist ceding to Portuguese pressure, Washington returned to 
a close relationship with Lisbon.27 Despite adhering to UN
25. J Marcum, op.cit., [1969], p.268.
26. Refered to in Z Laidi, op.cit., [1990], p. 18.
27. According to one of his advisors, Kennedy would rather have 
given up the Azores bases altogether than to have allowed 
Portugal to dictate his African policy. T Sorenson, Kennedy 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1965), p.538. note 3.
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resolutions concerning the arms embargo on Portugal and 
providing some support for the FNLA for its anti-colonial war, 
the US essentially reverted to conveying to Lisbon economic, 
diplomatic and, reluctantly perhaps, moral support.
When it gave in to Lisbon, the United States 
effectively lost part of its credibility as a pro-decolonization 
power. From 1963 onwards, rather than as a champion of self- 
determination, the US played only a cold war role in Angola. 
Just over a year before the US's return to Portugal's side, in a 
letter to a Republican critic, Roberto defended the US vote 
against Portugal which had placed Washington and Moscow side by 
side on the Security Council, and asked:
"Why then cannot the issue [of Angolan nationalism] be 
isolated from the Cold War and judged on its merits?".28
A year later, the US and NATO, began to be seen in Angola as the 
essential support for Portuguese colonial authority. Cold war 
considerations had eventually outweighed the issue of Angolan 
nationalism.
As US military interests prevailed in Washington, 
Lisbon simultaneously attempted to show, much as South Africa 
had done, that the West's interests, particularly in Africa, 
were tied to those of Portugal. The Salazarist regime 
consistently held itself up to be not only the defender of 
Western interests in Africa but also the upholder of its values.
28. J Marcum, op.cit., [1969], p.183.
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According to Lisbon, the nationalist challenges in the colonies 
were part of an international conspiracy, directed by 'Communist 
Russia1, that planned to gain footholds in Africa from where the 
Soviets would destroy Portugal and get to Europe through its 
'soft underbelly’.29 Because of this, argued Lisbon, its own 
resistance to anti-colonialism, or as the regime might have put 
it, its fight against the communist conspiracy in Angola, would 
be tantamount to aiding the global containment of Soviet power.
This campaign extolling the anti-communist virtues of 
Portugal was carried to the United States itself. The work of 
the pro-Lisbon Portuguese-American Committee for Foreign Affairs 
did not tire in describing what was happening in Angola as a 
communist-organized and instigated insurgency. Apparently well- 
funded,30 the Committee, working through a New York public 
relations firm, Selvage and Lee, targeted the Press, the White 
House, Congress and the State Department in an effort to sully 
the nationalists’ cause and restore favour for Portugal in 
Washington. The Committee was based in the substantial 
Portuguese-American communities in Massachusetts and thus 
targeted that state's representatives on Capitol Hill appealing 
to, among other things, their vote-collecting nature. On 4 and 5 
October, twelve Massachusetts congressmen (including the Speaker
29. J Marcum, The Angolan Revolution Volume Two, [1978], p.21.
30. In 1962, over US$ 200,000 was spent by Selvage and Lee on a 
campaign to disseminate the image of "the communist invasion of 
Angola". J Marcum, op.cit., [1978], p.272.
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and a former Speaker of the House) made speeches in the House of 
Representatives praising Portugal as a faithful and 
indispensable NATO ally, and condemning Angolan nationalist 
insurgency as communist-inspired terrorism.31
The ideological conflict between East and West was 
creeping into the struggle for independence in Angola via 
relations with Portugal. Whereas in the early 1960s the US had 
been considered a source for anti-colonial support, as was 
demonstrated by the MPLA's clear attempts to conceal its 
ideological leanings before 1964, after the United States was 
perceived as having nailed its colours to the Portuguese mast, 
Washington became less and less a stop-over point on fund­
raising tours carried out by the Angolan nationalists.
The FNLA and the United States before 1975
In a letter to Kennedy in 1962, Roberto praised the 
inspiration that he had received when they had met in Washington 
in 1959:
"The vivid memory of the ideas to which you exposed me 
allowed me to transmit to my people the certainty of your 
understanding and sympathy for our struggle.1,32
In an interview with Freire Antunes in 1991, Roberto
spoke less formally about that meeting with Kennedy:
31. J Marcum, op.cit., [1978], p.272.
32. J Freire Antunes, op.cit., [1991], p.52.
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"I spent two hours explaining to Kennedy the meaning of our 
struggle in Angola. He told me that the United States had an 
anti-colonial tradition and could not continue to support 
the regime of slavery in Angola. We agreed that it was 
necessary to do something to stop the communists taking over 
the liberation movement in Angola."33
In public speeches, Holden Roberto, tended not to 
refer to the United States directly or to its assistance for his 
movement. He would generally outline the case against Portugal 
and then appeal to "...democratically minded people of the whole 
world...to help end the oppression of 4.5 million people."34 
Until 1964, Roberto's speeches had appealed for the 
implementation of the UN Security Council and General Assembly 
resolutions pertaining to the self-determination of Angola. But 
after the United States had returned to supporting Portugal as a 
rule, the FNLA leader did not conceal his criticisms of 
Washington. In a speech delivered in Leopoldville on 27 March 
1964,35 Roberto revealed his disappointments. After paying 
homage to the support of the Congolese (Leopoldvillle) 
government, Roberto addressed the failure of the UN to 
unanimously condemn Portugal. He then turned on the American 
ambassador in Lisbon who "...dared to say that Angola is 'an
33. J Freire Antunes, ibid.
34. Press Statement distributed in English by the American 
Committee on Africa in New York, dated 15 March 1961. Reproduced 
in R Chilcote Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa; 
Documents, [1972], pp.70-73.
35. 'On the Third Anniversary of the Revolution'. Document
reproduced in R Chilcote, op.cit., [1972], pp.87-89.
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oasis of peace'". Characterizing the ambassador's declarations 
as "a defiance of African opinion", Roberto said, however, that 
he would like to believe that this was a personal position 
"...which in no way bind(s) the attitude of the United
States."36
In this same speech, Roberto also referred to NATO. 
Earlier, in a statement delivered in Libreville in 1962,37 
Roberto had drawn attention to the conclusions of the UN Special 
Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration,
according to which a large part of the arms and equipment used
by the Portuguese in Africa was supplied by NATO countries.
Emphasizing that the use of NATO equipment had broken Portuguese 
promises, Roberto appealed for the attention of "...the Atlantic 
Pact members, particularly the United States, to this serious 
situation...". In his Leopoldville speech in 1964 referred to 
above, the FNLA leader declared that he hoped that those 
countries that had "...voluntarily or involuntarily armed 
Portugal..." were revising their policies. Claiming that he was 
not threatening these countries with blackmail, he said, 
however, that:
"...the situation could become seriously complicated... We 
are Angolans and Africans and nothing else. We want to be 
free...We will not overlook any opportunity: we will even 
ally ourselves with the devil, if necessary..."38
36. Ibid.
37. Memorandum to UAM September 1962. Document reproduced in R 
Chilcote, op.cit., [1972], pp.146-149.
38. 'On the Third Anniversary of the Revolution'. Document
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It is not exactly clear to what Roberto is referring. The 
statutes of the UPA and the FNLA both state that the movement 
may obtain "...without compromise, all the moral and material 
aid that the fight for liberation requires."39 It is 
conceivable, therefore, that, here, Roberto was threatening the 
West that unless they showed greater enthusiasm for his 
nationalist struggle in Angola, he would approach the Soviet 
Union, or indeed China, for backing. After it had become 
apparent that US policy was reverting back towards Portugal, 
Roberto felt the need to seek other, which may have included 
communist, sources of aid. The FNLA made certain that the US 
would hear of Roberto's dissappointment. The US embassy in 
Leopoldville informed Washington of what one of Roberto's 
advisors had stated to it:
"Since Roberto's recent return from New York he had found 
him [a] changed man...completely disillusioned with 
western, and specifically US policy on Angola. He was 
convinced that the US would never jeopardise its military 
ties with Portugal and that...it was US military aid to 
[the] Portuguese that enables them to hold Angola".40
The life of an anti-colonial movement depended
reproduced in R Chilcote, op.cit., [1972], pp.87-89.
39. Statutes of the UPA. Document reproduced in R Chilcote, 
op.cit., p.101.
40. US Embassy in Leopoldville to State Department, 30 December 
1963, quoted in S Weissman, op.cit., [1978], p.401
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primarily on funds. Once the US commitment to the FNLA had begun 
to weaken, necessity dictated the procurement of support 
elsewhere. Despite his previous proclamations of anti-communism, 
Roberto sought aid for the FNLA from Moscow and, eventually with 
success, from Peking. But despite the fact that for the FNLA, 
funds may have been funds, regardless of where they came from, 
it is more than likely that Roberto emphasized at all times the 
anti-communist nature of the FNLA. This must surely have been a 
necessary condition of the CIA's interest in the movement. As 
Stockwell has suggested, Roberto may have been:
"...wise enough to know that competition between his 
'conservative' movement and the ominously Marxist MPLA would 
gain him sympathy in the United States."41
After Jonas Savimbi's resignation from GRAE in Cairo 
in July 1964, the FNLA began to lose its continental support. 
One of the principal charges that Savimbi had levelled against 
Roberto is that of being closely tied to the United States. In 
October, Savimbi explained his resignation.42 He claimed that 
"American imperialism" within UPA and GRAE had been partly to 
blame for the incapacity of the movement and his consequent^ 
resignation. In the 'explanation', the future leader of UNITA 
listed Roberto's ties to the United States: Roberto "hired Mr
41. J Stockwell, op.cit., [1978], p.116.
42. In a document printed by the MPLA in Algiers, 'Ou en est la 
Revoltion Angolaise'. Document reproduced in R Chilcote, 
op.cit., [1971], pp.155-161.
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Muller, an American citizen and in charge of public relations in 
the Adoula government, as a personal advisor"; "likewise took as 
a personal advisor, John Marcum...advisor to Averill Harriman on 
the question of Portuguese colonies"; "participated, late in
1963, in meetings organised by Adoula and also attended by 
Averill Harriman and Bahri (of Tunisia)"; "had eleven Angolans, 
who will soon create his personal security guard, trained by the 
counter-espionage service of Israel"; "hired Bernhardt Manhertz, 
in April of 1964, to lead the ELNA [FNLA army]. This officer 
served in South Vietnam in the American army". There was also 
"the creation of a section, at the American Embassy in 
Leopoldville, charged with the Angolan question and directed by 
Messr. Heatter and Devnis...due not to change but to these men's 
personal contacts with Holden Roberto."43
The charges made by Savimbi seem to reveal already in
1964, the close association between a number of Americans in 
Leopoldville, linked to the US embassy and the CIA, Holden 
Roberto and Congolese political circles. This triangle, as shall 
be seen, emerged again later on in 1975 when Kissinger decided, 
upon CIA recommendations, to provide covert support for the 
FNLA.
Aware of the damage a close association with the 
United States may have caused, particularly among African 
states, the FNLA denied that such a link existed. A GRAE
43. x0u en est la Revoltion Angolaise'. Document reproduced in R 
Chilcote, op.cit., [1971], pp.155-161.
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document of 1965, in an attempt to counter Ghanaian claims that 
the FNLA "was an instrument of the Americans", suggested 
ironically that "the Americans, true masters of Angola, would 
hardly need four, five or six years (or more) of armed fighting 
against themselves to substitute Angolan puppets for Portuguese 
fascists".44
The Kissinger Era
When Henry Kissinger joined the American 
administration in the late 1960s, he commissioned a major review 
of US policy toward Southern Africa. This review, the National 
Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 39,45 he presented to President 
Nixon in early January 1970, along with his recommendation that 
the US adopt a policy based on 'Option Two'.46 This 'option' 
recommended that the US establish a dual policy of public 
opposition to racial repression on the one hand while quietly 
relaxing the political and economic isolation of the white 
states (Portugal and South Africa) in Africa on the other. The 
conclusion favoured by Kissinger was that "the whites were here 
to stay".47 It was, therefore, in Washington's interest to work
44. La revolution angolaise dans le contexte africain et extra- 
africain Leopoldville, 15 March 1965. Document reproduced in R 
Chilcote, op.cit., [1971], pp.165-170.
45. Reproduced in full in The Kissinger Study on Southern 
Africa, [1975].
46. The Kissinger..., [1975], pp.66-69.
47. The Kissinger..., [1975], p.66.
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for constructive change in the region through these minority 
regimes, while paying lip service to international opposition to 
South African apartheid, Rhodesian minority rule and Portuguese 
colonialism.
It is important to mention NSSM 39 because, under 
Kissinger, it formed the basis for US policy toward Angola in 
the early 1970s until the Portuguese coup. The assessments made 
in the study: that Portugal in Africa, as a 'white state1, was 
stable; that the anti-colonial movements were unrealistic 
alternatives; and that "a black victory at any stage'1 was 
impossible,48 were essentially faulty. They led, however, to the 
formulation of a policy that was, at least unprepared if not, 
unable to deal with the crisis in Angola when it erupted.
By the end of the 1960s, US policy towards Portugal 
was even more orientated towards its repercussions within a cold 
war context than before. Thus, the formulation of policy options 
such as those in NSSM 39 reflected much more the desired state 
of affairs within Washington's global strategy than the reality 
of the situation in Portugal and Africa. Certainly, the 
conclusion that the "whites were here to stay" in 1970 
contrasted sharply with the considered opinion of the US 
Ambassador to Lisbon in 1960:
"Portugal clearly does not have sufficient power to maintain 
these vast territories."49
48. G Bender, op.cit., [1978], p.69.
49. J Freire Antunes, op.cit., [1991], p.37.
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The immediate result of the more relaxed US approach 
to Portugal was an accord over the Azores bases, replacing the 
ad hoc process renewal that had been in practice since 1962. In 
December 1971, Portugal extended base rights to the US right 
through until 1973. The regime in Lisbon (Marcello Caetano 
having succeeded Salazar in 1968) felt that the United States 
and Portugal were "...allies once again".50 The strategic 
importance of the bases was again demonstrated during the Arab- 
Israeli war in October 1973. Portugal had authorized the use of 
the bases in the US operation to supply Israel; other Western 
European states had refused to allow the American aircraft to 
refuel on their territory. Without these other facilities, the 
Azores became crucial to support the long-range reach of US 
airpower. In return for conceding the ever more important 
military facilities on the Azores, Portugal was offered a US aid 
packet.51
Despite the fact that Washington was, on the face of 
it, still adhering to the UN arms embargo, Portugal benefited 
from the United States in other forms of military assistance: 
supplies of heavy transport vehicles, jeeps and helicopters. All
50. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.236.
51. This included US$ 30 million in agricultural commodities, 
drawing rights on up to US$ 5 million worth of non-military 
equipment and eligibility for US$ 400 million financing at the 
Export-Import Bank. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], 
p.236.
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of which was equipment that clearly had a dual purpose, both 
military and civilian.52 Furthermore, Portuguese officers and 
pilots benefited from training at US military facilities in West 
Germany and Panama,53 while an estimated 100 were being trained 
in the United States at any given time. In early 1971, Nixon 
authorized the sale of four Boeing 707 jet transporters directly 
to TAP, the Portuguese state airline, whose promise to limit 
their use to commercial flights was shown up by the ferrying of 
troops to and from Africa aboard the same 707s.54 Not covered by 
the embargo was the sale of defoliants and herbicides which was 
made to the Portuguese who used them in Africa in 
counterinsurgency warfare. If the April 1974 coup had not 
intervened, the US would even have illegally supplied arms to 
Portugal. According to reports, during a visit in December 1973, 
Kissinger thanked Lisbon for conceding the use of the Azores 
during the October war and agreed (apparently unaware of the 
embargo)55 to meet Portuguese requests for arms.56
In addition to these financial and military benefits, 
Portugal also earned revenue from the United States in other
52. G Bender, op.cit., [1978], p.70.
53. Reportedly, a group of Portuguese officers underwent 
counterinsurgency training at the US Army Jungle Warfare School 
at Fort Gulick, Panama Canal Zone, in T Szulc, 'Lisbon and 
Washington: Behind the Portuguese Revolution', [1975], p.21.
54. T Szulc, op.cit., [1975], p.21.
55. G Bender, op.cit., [1978], p.71.
56. J Marcum, op.cit., [1978], p.236.
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forms. By 1972, the American Gulf Oil Corporation, having 
discovered oil off the coast of Cabinda in the late 1950s was 
contributing more than US$ 60 million each year to the Angolan 
treasury, this before the soar in oil prices in 1973. Further 
American contributions to the Portuguese treasury were made 
annually in: tourism (US$ 80 million); Azores' base operations 
(US$ 13 million); and coffee imports from Angola (US$ 100 
million).57
Marcum argues that, in this way, the United States 
played some part in keeping Portugal fighting in Africa. Marcum 
sets a total of just under US$ 400 million in US contributions 
to Portugal's receipts in 1973 against Portugal's yearly 
military-security budget: just over US$ 400 million.58 In the 
face of this equation, Marcum, and others,59 believe that it is 
difficult to refute the claim that the United States was
effectively important in maintaining the means for Portugal to 
continue waging its colonial wars, and was certainly perceived 
to be so by opponents of Portuguese colonialism.
The overthrow of the Caetano regime on 25 April 1974, 
apparently caught the Americans by surprise. Seemingly unable to
57. J Marcum, op.cit., [1978], p.237.
58. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.237.
59. Laidi concluded that from the increased proportions of
Angolan contributions (swollen by Gulf Oil Corporation fees) to
the Portuguese war budget, it is possible that "...Gulf Oil
backed sixty per cent of the Portuguese war effort in Angola on 
the eve of decolonisation." Z Laidi, op.cit., [1990], p.52.
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imagine the collapse of a clearly anachronistic power structure 
drained by costly overseas wars, Washington had not foreseen the 
need for a change to its policy towards Portugal, and, 
consequently, towards Angola. Subsequently, the instability that 
reigned in Portugal after the coup, dominated Washington's 
approach. Kissinger feared a communist take-over which he 
believed would seriously imbalance the US-Soviet power ratio in 
Europe.
Towards Africa, however, Washington, or rather 
Kissinger, initially did nothing. When Donald Easum, the 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, attempted to 
change US policy in order to court the future independent 
governments in the ex-Portuguese territories, he was cast aside. 
Despite having engineered a meeting with FRELIMO, the radical 
Mozambican movement, and established a favourable position for 
American influence, Easum's maverick initiatives displeased 
Kissinger. The Secretary of State fired Easum barely two days 
after his return from Africa.60
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, US policy 
towards Angola seemed to be a 'hands off' one. Between April 
1974 and January 1975, Washington did not intervene in any 
significant way in Angolan political affairs. The State 
Department's view was that the forces in Angola (the MPLA, the 
FNLA and UNITA) were balanced. Furthermore, it was known that
60. G Bender, op.cit., [1978], p.71.
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the Soviet Union had suspended its support for the MPLA just 
before the coup in Lisbon, following the evidently negative 
report of Victor Lewin to Moscow on the chaotic internal 
dissarray of the MPLA.61
In mid-January 1975, at roughly the same time as the 
Alvor accords were signed between Portugal and the three Angolan 
movements, a secret meeting took place in Washington that 
changed the direction of US policy toward Angola. At the meeting 
of the Forty Committee (convened by Kissinger to discuss US 
covert activities) the CIA proposed the reactivation of its 
assistance programme for the FNLA, largely interrupted since the 
late-1960s apart from a retainer of US$ 10,000 annually for 
"intelligence collection".62 According to Stockwell, however, 
the CIA had already been funding Roberto secretly since July
1974 without Forty Committee approval:
"...small amounts at first, but enough for word to get around
that the CIA was dealing itself into the race".63
The amount proposed by the CIA at the meeting with Kissinger was 
US$ 300,000; sufficient, the agency argued, to signal to the 
FNLA's principal backer, Mobutu, that Washington was sympathetic 
to Zaire's position.64 Despite the movement's record of military
61. G Bender, op.cit., [1978], p.69.
62. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.237.
63. J Stockwell In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story, [1978], p.67.
64. G Bender, op.cit., [1978], p.75.
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incapacity and political corruption, the CIA argued that the 
FNLA would provide the "most stable and reliable government".65 
Kissinger accepted the CIA's arguments and "routinely approved" 
the CIA's request to fund the FNLA with the relatively small sum 
of US$ 300,000.66 With this decision, the United States had, 
perhaps unknowingly, entered the Angolan civil war.
Bases for US Policy Toward Angola before 1975
The rationale behind American involvement in Angola is 
not uncomplicated. There is reason apparent in three separate 
but overlapping motivations. Firstly, the US intervened in 
Angola to counter perceived Soviet influence. This mattered not 
so much because of Angola itself but because Washington believed 
a Soviet advantage would have wider repercussions in US-Soviet 
relations, particularly after Vietnam and Watergate. Secondly, 
the US also viewed Angola through a prism of its relations with 
Zaire, its principal black African ally. This perspective
allowed the CIA's Kinshasa view to significantly dominate
initial US policy. Lastly, there is evidence that US policy­
makers made a linkage between the Angola and events in Portugal,
65. R Morris, op.cit., [1976], p.20.
66. The CIA's request to grant US$ 100,000 to UNITA, was turned 
by the Forty Committee. S Weissman, 'The CIA and US Policy in 
Zaire and Angola', [1978], p.404.
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a NATO country that was apparently 'going' communist.
These foreign policy motivations were formulated under 
a series of domestic political factors. Firstly, after the 
debacle of Watergate, the US administration wanted to reassert 
the power of the Presidency vis-a-vis Congress. Secondly, after 
the failures in Vietnam, there was a desire to restore American, 
or, more precisely, governmental confidence in foreign policy, 
particularly with regard to the global superpower competiton 
with the Soviet Union. Finally, in the wake of negative 
revelations about its foreign and domestic covert activities, 
the CIA wanted to regain the inititive and win a policy success.
It is argued that this set of domestic factors and 
foreign policy motivations 'explain', to a certain degree, US 
involvement in Angola. That is to say, how and why Washington 
entered the conflict.
But 'whose' policy was it? Considering that US policy 
toward Angola during the civil war was at all times covert, the 
number of policy-makers was reduced primarily to the 
administration: the CIA, the African Bureau of the State
Department and Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State. At this 
time, Kissinger's control of American foreign policy was at its 
peak, ironically when policy successes were thinning. As 
demonstrated by the dismissal of Donald Easum in November 1974, 
Kissinger did not readily accept a separate policy stance on the 
part of the African Bureau in the State Department. This section 
of the State Department had a poor opinion of Holden Roberto and
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the FNLA, and, according to Bender,67 tended to consider the US 
position on the African continent as a whole, rather than from 
the point of view of the East-West conflict, as Kissinger saw 
things, or than from the perspective of whichever CIA station- 
chief happened to gain favour. The State Department position was 
demonstrated in June 1975, before the major escalation, when it 
recommended that the US stay out of Angola. Eventually, the 
State Department's lack of influence in the policy-making 
process led to the resignation of Nathaniel Davis (the 
'scoundrel of Chile1 who had replaced Donald Easum as Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs). Davis disagreed 
completely with Kissinger over US policy towards Angola.68 As 
the Africa Bureau could not impose its view, this left Henry 
Kissinger and the CIA as the principal US policy-makers towards 
Angola. But according to Brenda MacElhinney, the CIA Angola Desk 
Officer in 1975 who had reopened the Luanda station for the 
Agency:
"...don't put all the blame on Kissinger, the CIA led the 
United States into the Angolan mess".69
What the CIA was able to do was to frame US policy 
choices in Angola in terms of competition with Moscow. The
67. G J Bender, op.cit., [1978].
68. Davis did not resign noisely. He took a post in Switzerland 
and only much later did he explain why he had resigned: N Davis 
'The Angola Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir', [1978].
69. J Stockwell, op.cit., p.67.
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decision to support Roberto was taken under the belief that the 
Soviet Union was attempting to further its influence in Angola 
by helping the MPLA come to power. When the case was made before 
Kissinger in January 1975, the Soviet Union had resumed its flow 
of aid to Neto's movement.
At this time, US-Soviet relations were at the tail- 
end of its phase of detente. In 1972, the Nixon administration's 
policy of detente had been consolidated by an arms agreements 
with the Soviet Union reached at in the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT I). A new era of diplomacy between the 
superpowers had been announced, wherein conflict would be 
avoided rather than sought as a result of the potential 
catastrophe of a nuclear war. But what the SALT agreement also 
implied was that the Soviet Union was on a par with the United 
States. The treaty was between equals. This effectively and very 
publicly gave the Soviet Union superpower rank. After the 
perceived humiliation of the Cuban missile crisis, the Kremlin 
had embarked on a rapid weapons development programme in order 
to reach parity with the United States. The SALT agreement 
confirmed that this had been achieved.
In 1973, according to Laidi,70 other sources of 
authority in Washington did not perceive a high level of Soviet 
involvement, nor indeed interest, in Africa. An American 
congressional mission sent to evaluate Moscow's African policy,
70. Z Laidi, op.cit., [1990], p.49.
concluded that Soviet aid to liberation movements was limited to 
maintaining open lines of communication, and that even more 
substantial links, such as military aid or training programmes, 
did not amount to a significant level of commitment on the part 
of Moscow.71
But by the time the Forty Committee took the decision
to reactivate the FNLA in January 1975, there was some evidence
that the Soviet Union was intent on supporting the MPLA. Moscow 
had resumed its support for Neto by the autumn of 1974,72 albeit 
at approximately similar levels to those before the Portuguese 
coup. Like the CIA's own support for the FNLA, it can be argued 
that while this payment was intended to ensure that the US 
retained influence regardless of later developments in Angola, 
it also acted as a signal, particularly intended for Moscow,
that Washington was 'dealing itself in'. Macfarlane believes 
that Kissinger was acting under a fear that believed the Soviet 
Union was intent on exploiting American weaknesses in the post- 
Vietnam era.73
Even within the narrow parameters that led to the
decision to support the FNLA, this choice was was made more as a 
result of a 'historic relationship' between the movement and the 
US, as referred to during the Johnson administration, rather
71. Z Laidi, ibid.
72. In October or November. G Bender, op.cit., [1978], p.76.
73. S N Macfarlane, Intervention and Regional Security [198.],
p.12
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than by an evaluation of its potential.74 Certainly, the FNLA 
was, in internal political terms, the weakest of the movements. 
As Marcum puts it, the Forty Committee decision was apparently 
motivated by "...an irrepressible habit of thinking in terms of
'our team' and 'theirs' ,f.75
While it cannot be said that Kissinger's decision to 
fund the FNLA was a substantial act in itself, it did set the US 
on a policy track from which it did not later withdraw and 
eventually led nowhere. It can be argued that that relatively 
minor grant of US$ 300,000 to the FNLA was the first step of the 
same single policy that was pouring US arms into Zaire for the 
FNLA by the end of the summer of 1975. This policy was designed 
to set up a mechanism to set US power against Moscow. As 
Kissinger told a Senate subcommittee:
"The Soviet Union must not be given any opportunity to use 
military forces for aggressive purposes without running the 
risk of conflict with us."76
According to a contemporary report, the Forty Committee payment 
to the FNLA in January provoked a reaction in Angola almost 
immediately:
"American officials deny rumors, now very prevalent in 
Luanda, of heavy continuing CIA support for the FNLA.77
74. S Weissman, op.cit., [1978], p.402.
75. J Marcum, 'Lessons of Angola', [1976], p.414.
76. Testimony of Secretary of State before the Subcommittee on 
Africa, Comittee on Foreign Affairs, US Senate 29 January 1976. 
Citation in J Marcum, op.cit., [1976], p.408.
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It may be possible to argue that, despite the covert nature of 
theaid, it was intended to send a signal to Moscow.
Laidi believes that the US$ 300,000 had a much more 
concrete objective in helping the FNLA "...reach its primary
objective: to dislodge the MPLA from the capital city before the 
pivotal date of November 11, 1975".78 However, at that stage of
the conflict, when the transitional government was still 
sitting, it seems unlikely that this was the objective of the 
fund. It was a sum that fell well short of what would eventually
have become necessary for the FNLA's military requirements.
Kissinger argued perhaps more convincingly than he intended, 
that the January aid to the FNLA was good only "... to buy
bicycles, paper clips etc ", and that it was essentially not
for military purposes.79 But as Bender has pointed out, and 
perhaps this may have been the intended effect, the aid 
established the United States1 commitment to the FNLA at a time 
when the movements were acting within the structure of coalition 
of the transitional accords.80
It is worth noting that US policy in Angola seems to 
have been hardly motivated by an interest in countering Chinese
77. K Adelman 'Report from Angola' [1975], p.568.
78. Z Laidi, op.cit., [1990], p.66.
79. G Bender, op.cit., [1978], p.76.
80. G Bender, op.cit., [1978], pp.76-77.
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involvement. Peking's involvement in Zaire, both with Mobutu and 
the FNLA did little to dissuade US interest, and may have in 
fact helped to strengthen the CIA's case when it proposed 
funding Roberto's movement to Kissinger. The FNLA's military 
predominance at the beginning of 1975 was certainly a factor in 
its favour in Washington. This strength had been achieved, as 
will be seen, in great part due to Chinese training and arms 
supplies that ensued to the FNLA after the Zairean president 
visited Peking in 1973.
While the prime motivation for Kissinger's decision to 
reactivate Roberto and the FNLA in January 1975 has been shown 
to have been a desire to rival the Soviet Union, the formulation 
of this decision was influenced primarily by CIA interests in 
Zaire. From the evidence, it seems clear that the CIA managed to 
express US policy options in Angola almost exclusively in terms 
of US relations with Zaire. Of course, Zaire was at the time, 
strategically more important than Angola and it was the US's 
principal ally in central and southern Africa. American economic 
and political interests there far outweighed those in any other 
African country. Furthermore, there was a historical precedent. 
Washington's success in helping to repress the Lumumbist 
tendency in the anti-Kinshasa CNL, which had been supported by 
the Soviet Union and Cuba, had left a legacy of covert 
intervention in Zaire. As Jackson has concluded:
"...the assistance to the FNLA confirmed Washington's 
intention of repeating its alliance-seeking strategy which 
had produced such success during the Congo crisis."81
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Almost without a doubt, Colonel Mobutu's coup in 1965 
was carried out with the aid of American intelligence agents if 
not actual support.82 Mobutu's rule in Zaire depended almost 
exclusively on American patronage, and, conversely, the US 
depended on Mobutu "... to protect and maintain American 
interests in his country".83 This patronage also extended beyond
Zaire's borders. According to Weissman, " Kissinger was
reportedly banking on Mobutu 'to oppose Moscow's interests' in 
Africa generally...".84 Substantial US economic interests85 in 
Zaire added to its strategic value, making the stability of 
Mobutu's regime a foreign policy objective of the US.
For a number of reasons, Mobutu wanted Roberto in 
Luanda and this relationship was extended to Washington. 
According to Bender, the CIA argued before Kissinger that the
81. H Jackson, op.cit., [1982], p.66.
82. "According to three informed individuals— a US official then 
in Washington, a Western diplomatic Congo specialist, and an
American businessman who talked with the CIA man Devlin— the
CIA was involved in the second Mobutu coup of November...1965." 
S Weissman, op.cit., [1978], p.394.
83. H Jackson, op.cit., [1982], p.44. American investments in 
Zaire totalled approximately US$ 800 million. J Marcum, op.cit. 
Volume Two, [1978], p.262.
84. S Weissman, op.cit., [1978], p.395.
85. "...Three-quarters of a billion dollars in US investments, 
loans... and our access on favorable terms to Zaire's mineral 
resources." in S Weissman, op.cit., [1978], p.395.
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aid to the FNLA:
"...would signal to President Mobutu... that Washington was 
sympathetic to his position...Zaire was always a primary 
consideration in all American decisions concerning covert 
aid to the FNLA".86
It can be argued that when presenting the case for conceding US 
covert funds for the FNLA, the CIA was able to draw upon these 
significant Zairean factors to further influence Kissinger in 
the direction of a positive response. The Agency had wanted to 
regain favour in the wake of the revelations being made by 
Congressional investigations. The CIA wanted a success and, when
the Kinshasa station suggested the financing of the FNLA, for
all the reasons that made it "compelling"87 to Kissinger, the 
Agency took on and defended the option of a covert intervention 
programme. Clearly, the CIA perspective was heavily influenced 
by the view in the Kinshasa station, close to Roberto, which was 
working in the context of Zairean interests in Angola. 
Therefore, it may be argued that the interests of the very close
ties between the Mobutu regime, CIA officials in Kinshasa and
Roberto himself, may have been behind the CIA's proposal to the 
Forty Committee in January, rather than an evaluation of the 
situation in Angola as a whole.88
86. G Bender, op.cit., [1978], p.75.
87. G Bender, op.cit., [1978], p.76.
88. Stockwell, the CIA task officer in charge of the Angola 
programme, argues as much in his book. J Stockwell, op.cit., 
[1978].
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Another factor that was said to have influenced US
policy in Angola was the situation in Portugal after the 
overthrow of Caetano. Testifying before a Senate subcommittee,89 
Kissinger claimed what had provoked US involvement. The:
"overthrow of the Portuguese government in April 1974, and 
the growing strength of the Portuguese Communist Party, 
apparently convinced Moscow that a revolutionary situation 
was developing in Angola. The Soviet Union began to exploit 
this situation in the fall of 1974 through the shipment of 
arms and equipment to the MPLA".90
As well as laying the blame at Moscow's door, the Secretary of 
State also seemed to be linking the volatile situation in 
Portugal with the political succession in Angola. Kissinger 
feared that a radical government in Lisbon, capital city of a 
NATO member, could assist in the MPLA's challenge for power in 
Angola. In a sense, Kissinger wanted to invert this and proposed 
to counter Soviet influence in Angola, an act that would, he 
seemed to believe, help to stem the advance of the left in 
Portugal.
As was mentioned above at the start of this section, 
Washington's Angolan policy was formulated under a series of 
domestic political constraints. This was at a time when, despite 
having decided to extricate the US from Vietnam, the 
adminstration could not dissolve the sense of defeat that was
89. US Congress Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Angola: 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs 94th 
Congress, 2nd Session.
90. Citation in H Jackson, op.cit., [1982], p.64.
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felt in relation to this conflict. While Kissinger's policy 
strategy seemed to be based almost solely on how best to balance 
the superpowers and tended to subsume all relevant factors the 
conflict of interests between Moscow and Washington, the general 
conclusion that the US's Southeast Asian policy had been a 'lost 
cause' could not be avoided. After Vietnam, there was a yearning 
from within the administration for some sort of foreign policy 
success. Furthermore, conservative critics of Kissinger were 
beginning to gain credence in their disparaging of detente. 
Unwilling to accept the superpower parity that was implied in 
the consolidation of detente, they claimed that it allowed the 
Soviets to take advantages in certain situations that under 
other circumstances would have been resisted by the US. 
Eventually, Kissinger himself seemed to express this view. The 
possibility of scoring a policy success against the Soviets in 
Angola must have been tempting to Kissinger. Bender believes 
that this critical domestic environment was frustrating for 
Kissinger who:
"...was almost desperate to demonstrate that it was still 
possible to carry out a decisive and coherent foreign 
policy in this 'climate of recriminations'".91
At the same time, the White House was already 
beginning to feel Congressional attempts to curb the 
administration's domination in the making of foreign policy.
91. G Bender, op.cit., [1978], p.75.
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After the Watergate scandal, Congress was able to intervene in 
the process with far greater ease. Investigations on Capitol 
Hill had revealed the extent of the CIA's activities not only in 
foreign destabilization campaigns, such as Chile, but also on 
the domestic front where it had been covertly monitoring the 
activities of over 10,000 American citizens.92 In a general 
climate of antagonism toward the administrative branch of 
American power, a source present at the January meeting of the 
Forty Committee believed that:
"...Kissinger saw this [Angola] as the place to find out if 
you could still have covert operations".93
In the civil war, US policy in Angola derived from the 
US$ 300,000 given to the FNLA in January 1975. After that, there 
was no significant change in the nature of its strategy as US 
funding increased and was spread to UNITA as the situation in 
Angola worsened and the arms race between Moscow and Washington 
entered into full swing. After January 1975, US policy had 
become essentially reactive and inflexible, responding to the 
stimuli of Soviet weapons deliveries and FNLA-Zairean requests 
for more support. Thus, the context of this first Forty 
Committee decision can be seen to have been the immediate
origins of the Angolan policy of the United States.
By virtue of the long-standing political association
92. G Bender, op.cit., [1978], p.74.
93. R Morris, op.cit., [1976], p.21.
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with the Mobutu regime and the local CIA agents, the FNLA was 
able to bring the United States into the conflict in such a way 
that precluded anything but an escalation of violence in Angola 
as a result of the competition between the United States and the 
Soviet Union.
(ii) The Soviet Union and the MPLA 1964-1974
In the decade before the Portuguese coup, Soviet 
policy towards Angola was almost exclusively based around a 
relationship of support for the MPLA. This consisted of some 
financial and military assistance, complemented with diplomatic 
support. Before the coup, however, Moscow never really provided 
the MPLA with the necessary means to seriously challenge the 
Portuguese. To have attempted to arm the MPLA to win the anti­
colonial war would more than likely have led to a confrontation 
with the West. Portuguese membership of NATO seemed to have 
restricted Soviet support for the MPLA to a minimum, necessary 
perhaps just to maintain it alive and viable. Only when the 
collapse of the Portuguese regime created a fluid situation in 
both Angola and Portugal did Moscow venture to significantly 
increase its level of support, to a point where the MPLA was 
able to establish control of Luanda. But the Soviet Union's 
policy of support for the MPLA cannot be said to have only 
developed bilaterally. Other sources of influence played a 
determinant role in defining its strategy.
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When Soviet policy-makers looked at Africa they saw, 
in the words of a Soviet academic, 'a blank sheet of paper'.94 
The Soviet Union had little or no historical ties with the 
continent, and yet it by the mid-1970s it had become a major 
international actor in Africa. Despite whatever strategic, 
economic and political objectives Moscow may have had, whatever 
real increases in its capabilities it may have benefited from 
and whatever advantages it may have drawn from a temporary 
hesitation by the US in international politics, perhaps the most 
overwhelmingly important factor contributing to Soviet success 
in Angola was that, somewhat ironically, history was on their 
side. It can be argued that the process of national self- 
determination against European colonial structures and the needs 
of newly independent, but weak, states in the Third World, 
converged coincidentally with the Soviet ability to offer 
military, and some economic support. For the Soviet Union, 
however, Africa represented an area of low priority. In fact:
"Africa is a place where the USSR's basic ends all
essentially transcend the local setting Moscow therefore
deals with Africa as fundamentally an arena in which to 
further broad international objectives."95
According to Albright, the general view of Soviet policy-makers
94. V Vassiliev 'Soviet Foreign Policy in the Third World' 
Lecture at LSE March 1991.
95. D Albright, Soviet Policy Toward Africa Revisited, [1987], 
p.3.
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during the 1960s and 1970s, was that neither Moscow nor 
Washington had vital interests in Africa, only legitimate
ones.96 Without intrinsic benefits for Soviet interests, and 
representing a low level of risk in superpower competition, sub- 
Saharan Africa figured practically last in Moscow's list of 
geopolitical priorities; after Europe, East Asia, South Asia, 
the Middle East, North Africa and maybe even Central America. It 
can be considered then, that in very general terms the Soviet 
Union believed that whatever happened it had little to lose and 
much to gain from an active policy in Africa.
Generally far and away the most influential factor on 
Soviet foreign policy, East-West relations, and in particular 
the superpower rivalry, also figured predominantly in Moscow's 
Angolan posture. Before 1975, Moscow's policy towards Angola 
conformed neatly to Soviet thinking on intervention in Africa 
generally. While Portugal, a NATO member was in full control, 
Moscow provided only relatively minor levels of assistance, 
mostly covertly; this was intended to maintain the movement 
active and to give access to its influence but to avoid any 
potential conflict with Lisbon, which was a member of the 
Western Alliance. This was the case elsewhere:
"...wherever the neo-colonial influence of other European 
powers emerged less strongly the Soviet Union was more 
easily able to take advantage of the tensions and conflicts 
between African states and Western powers."97
96. D Albright, op.cit., [1987], p.4.
97. Z Laidi, The Superpowers and Africa, [1990], p.7
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In this way, Guinea's dramatic rupture with France in 1958, 
created the necessary political space for an offer of Soviet 
patronage.98 On the other hand, those former colonies that 
retained close links with the metropolis were considered out of 
bounds. Despite the ideological context in which Moscow placed 
its relations with Guinea, and also with Ghana and Mali in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, the role of the Soviet Union was 
only possible because they sought to break political and 
economic links with the West. Although this does not strictly 
apply in the case of Angola, the underlying general rule of not 
coming up against direct Western interests does. The fact that 
Portugal was intent on decolonizing was a necessary condition 
for the Soviet escalation of its support for the MPLA.
In its early phase, this support was extended within a 
wider context of Soviet foreign policy which support wars of 
National Liberation in the Third World. On 6 January 1961, 
practically coinciding with the start of the anti-colonial war 
in Angola, Khrushchev addressed a Congress of the Soviet 
communist party (CPSU) in Moscow, where he emphasized that 
support for wars of National Liberation was the main means of 
advancing the world communist revolution in the nuclear age.99
98. Incidently, Moscow's posture toward Guinea may have been 
influenced by Sekou Toure's links with the French Communist 
Party (PCF). Another example perhaps of the route that took 
African Marxists to Moscow via the metropolitan communist 
parties.
99. R Falk 'intervention and National Liberation', [1984],
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After Krushchev, however, Soviet policy towards Africa became 
far more pragmatic. Unwilling to face losing influence as 
immediately as it did when the radical leaders of its African 
allies were overthrown in the mid-1960s, Moscow began to
streamline its policy. It was to consist of concrete relations 
with African regimes, relations that were not solely based on 
ideological affinities. After the Cuban missile crisis, Soviet 
policy was faced with the choice between activism in the Third 
World, or the pursuit of strategic parity with the United 
States. The latter was seen to be the priority and, it was
argued, was also seen to be necessary to achieve successes in
the former. The Soviet Union's failure to militarily support its
allies in the Congo in the period 1960-1962, and the climbdown 
by Krushchev over the missiles in Cuba, helped to convince the 
Kremlin leadership,100 that strategic parity with the US in
terms of nuclear inter-continental (ICBMs) and submarine- 
launched ballistic missiles was necessary in order to back 
Soviet global influence. To be able to project this influence, 
it required the necessary military capacity.
During this period of strategic build-up, support for 
National Liberation, the third basic task of Soviet foreign 
policy,101 was a relatively low-risk strategy for the Soviet
Union. Offending practically only the semi-isolated white
p.119.
100. The 'triumvirate1: L Brezhnev, General-Secretary of the
CPSU; A Kosygin, Prime Minister; N Podgorny, Head of State.
411
regimes in Africa, Moscow maintained links with National 
Liberation movements in Southern Africa which, as a consequence, 
helped to reinforce the Soviet Union's revolutionary credentials 
within the socialist camp, as well as within the burgeoning 
anti-imperialist group of states. This was particularly 
important during its bitter schism with Peking. China accused 
the Soviet Union of not being sufficiently active in the pursuit 
of revolutionary international communism. Moscow's relations 
with the MPLA between 1964 and 1972 are carried out within this 
wider context.
The necessary ideological credentials required by 
Moscow for support can be summed up in the term 'anti- 
Westernism' . Studies of Soviet relations with the Third World
and with National Liberation movements have shown that Moscow's 
policy was essentially pragmatic, led mostly by whatever 
immediate or mid-term advantage it could gain vis-a-vis the 
West, and more particularly, the United States. But preferably, 
this advantage should be seen to be coinciding with the 
furthering of the interests of international communism. But if 
it did not, that was merely unfortunate, as, for example, the 
Egyptian communist movement found out. For reasons of global 
strategy, Moscow considered that courting Nasser was of 
paramount importance in its policy towards Egypt, and,
therefore, turned a blind eye to Cairo's repression of the
communist opposition.
In the case of Angola, the Soviet Union was not faced
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with this dilemma. The MPLA was the only major movement that 
claimed to be Marxist, and said to have in its origins an 
indigenous communist party. Furthermore, both its ideological 
and political credentials were reinforced by the movement's 
close links with Portuguese communists. Despite any ideological 
affinities they may have shared, Soviet policy towards the MPLA
did, however, reflect a semblance of pragmatism. Before the
actual date of independence, Moscow did not concede to the MPLA 
the ideologically important official status of sole 
representative of the Angolan people.102
As we have seen, the MPLA began to receive significant 
military and financial contributions from the Soviet Union after 
Agostinho Neto's visit to Moscow in 1964. After being run out of 
Leopoldville in the aftermath of the ALC's decision to support 
GRAE, the MPLA regrouped in Brazzaville. Neto had managed to 
maintain a core structure of the movement in the Congo 
(Brazzaville) which provided it with a safe haven from where he 
proceeded with the movement's political and military 
reconstruction, this time as its uncontested leader.
There had been Soviet links with the MPLA before 1964.
When the OAU set up the ALC in 1963 to support anti-colonial
movements in Africa, Moscow is said to have contributed some 
funds to the Angolan movements through this committee. Previous
101. R Edmonds Soviet Foreign Policy 1962-1973, [1975], p.53.
102. G Golan, The Soviet Union and National Liberation
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to this, however, it is difficult to assess exactly what links 
there had been. In the mid-1950s, according to one source, 
Viriato da Cruz and other elements of the future MPLA, had come 
into contact with a Soviet in Luanda, allegedly a member of the 
KGB.103 This was at a time when no overt nationalist challenge 
had been made and the PIDE had not yet been deployed in Angola. 
As with contacts made later between Moscow and the MPLA, this 
link with the alleged KGB agent is said to have been made 
through the Portuguese Communist Party. Portuguese communists, 
such as Angelo Veloso, active in the Angolan Communist Party 
(ACP) and the Angolan Committee of the PCP, bridged the gap 
between the metropolitan communists and the Luandan 
nationalists. But it is unlikely that these links at this time 
led to anything more than the provision of reading material and 
incentives on organization along communist party lines.
While studying in Portugal, Neto had established 
himself within the PCP. Imprisoned a number of times for 
activism in the MUDJ (a youth group comprising PCP members), he 
was allegedly helped to escape Portuguese prison through Morocco 
by the PCP. At that time, the PCP was clearly the better 
organized of the anti-Salazarist groups. The strong links- Neto 
had established with the clandestine PCP in the late 1950s, were 
Movements in the Third World, [1988], p.308.
103. Interview with Joao Van Dunem, London, 3 October 1990. 
Possibly referring to the same Soviet, Marcum cites Portuguese 
sources that indicated "...that as early as 1952, an effort was 
made by a Soviet agent, one Feld Matvin, to unite these diverse 
organisations into a Conselho de Liberta^ao de Angola". J
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the conduit through which the MPLA was later, in 1964, able to 
approach Moscow and garner the latter's support for it as it 
attempted to ressuscitate itself in Brazzaville. Neto's trip to 
Moscow is undocumented, but is understood to have been arranged 
by the PCP, more specifically by its General-Secretary, Alvaro 
Cunhal. Cunhal's capital in Moscow was very good. Throughout his 
leadership, the PCP had been one of the most loyal European 
communist parties to the Kremlin.
After the violent explosion in Angola in February- 
March 1961, the MPLA leadership reconstructed its organizational 
history and consolidated itself into a movement. It joined the 
UPA in public denunciations of Portuguese colonialism and 
appealed for international assistance in its downfall. In June 
of that year, when the UN Security Council was discussing the 
revolt in Angola, Khrushchev expressed confidence in an ultimate 
MPLA victory.104 This Soviet pledge is probably in response to a 
telegram sent to Khrushchev in March by Mario de Andrade who 
claimed that his movement was counting on the Soviet 
government's support.105 It is unclear, however, whether this 
expression of support by the Soviet leader reflects the 
existence of Soviet patronage at this early stage, or whether it 
is merely part and parcel of general Soviet pronouncements on 
anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. Furthermore, as has been 
Marcum, op.cit., Volume One, [1969], p.29.
104. Pravda 16 June 1961, cited in J Valenta 'The Soviet-Cuban 
Intervention in Angola 1975', [1978], p.6.
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discussed above, when Neto took over the MPLA in 1962, the 
strategy of the movement was to cast as wide a net as possible 
in the search for international backing. This led to the playing 
down of the MPLA's Marxist tendencies. Only in Brazzaville, from 
1964 onwards, did the MPLA embrace the socialist bloc 
completely.
From 1964 onwards, Soviet material assistance 
consisted mainly of: small arms and other lightweight war
materiel; military training and education for hundreds of MPLA 
cadres; and grants, used to finance the day-to-day running of 
the movement, such as airline tickets. The total amount of this 
aid is uncertain. One source is quoted as claiming that Soviet 
military aid to the MPLA before 1975 amounted to US$ 54 
million.106 Marcum advances figures given by the American State 
Department that placed the total of this assistance at US$ 63 
million.107 Yet another source, "...Western intelligence 
guestimates..." quoted by Legum, fixed the figure at UK// 27 
million.108 Whatever the exact total of aid conceded between the 
mid-1960s and 1974, it is generally seen to have been relatively 
low, affording minimum operations, but never providing the 
movement with the means to prevail against the Portuguese.
105. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.130. Footnote 28.
106. P Vanneman and M James cited in C Stevens 'The Soviet Role 
in Southern Africa', [1981], p.47.
107. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.229.
108. C Legum, After Angola: the War over Southern Africa,
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Nevertheless, as has been argued above, Soviet assistance at 
this time was one of the crucial factors that allowed the MPLA 
to return from what at the time had already been considered its 
oblivion. By the mid-1960s, Moscow became the movement's 
principal backer. According to Davidson, Soviet sources provided 
70 to 80 per cent of all MPLA arms.109
It seems likely that Neto was the principal link with 
Moscow. The Angolan leader visited Moscow in 1964, 1966, 1967,
1970 and 1971, attending CPSU conferences, and commemorations 
such as the 50th Anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution and 
Lenin's 100th Birthday.110
From 1965 onwards, MPLA cadres were trained in the 
Soviet Union and later in other Eastern bloc countries, while it 
is possible that Soviet instructors were involved in MPLA 
training in Algeria, the Congo (Brazzaville) and Egypt.111 For 
the remainder of the decade, Soviet arms and financial aid 
helped the MPLA to establish itself as military force inside 
Angola, and as the favoured 'progressive' movement among anti- 
Western and Socialist bloc countries. In 1966, the MPLA opened a 
military front in eastern Angola and headquarters in Lusaka. 
This internal reinforcement of the MPLA resulted in the 
strengthening of the movement's international profile, reflected
[1978], p.19.
109. Cited in M and D Ottaway, Afrocommunism, [1986], p.103.
110. A Klinghoffer The Angolan War; A Study in Soviet Policy in 
the Third World, [1980], p.17.
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in the concession of ALC funds and eventually, in 1968, as has 
been shown, the reversal of the OAU decision to recognize the 
GRAE exclusively. In 1970, the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies considered the MPLA the liberation movement 
offering the most effective guerrilla resistance to the 
Portuguese.112
Soviet-MPLA relations were not, however, untroubled. A 
decade after the debacle of 1963, the MPLA was stricken once 
again by military ineffectiveness, internal divisions and a 
distancing by its main external backer as has already been 
referred to. The Eastern Revolt, led by the MPLA eastern 
commander, Daniel Chipenda, rebelled against Neto's leadership 
and coincided with a significant break in the MPLA's military 
fortunes. According to Legum, in 1973 and early 1974, the Soviet 
Union shifted its support to Chipenda during the schism in what 
is said to have been an attempt to foster a more useful movement 
than that of Neto.113 While it is more than likely that Moscow 
did reduce, if not cut off,114 the flow of arms to Neto during 
this period, it is not as certain that this support was 
transferred to Chipenda.
The difficulty Moscow is supposed to have had with 
Neto may have been overstated as the motivation for the cut in
111. G Golan, op.cit., [1988], p.269.
112. Cited by B Porter The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet 
Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945-1980, [1984], p.148.
113. C Legum, op.cit., [1978], p.11.
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Soviet aid, being mistaken perhaps for Moscow's pragmatism in 
its policy of support for the MPLA. Following the military 
successes of the Portuguese and the apparent political disarray 
in the leadership, Moscow probably decided it was not about to 
throw good money after bad until it could reasonably predict the 
development of the situation on the ground. According to the 
following report, this assessment may be reasonably accurate. 
Once it had became clear that Chipenda was not going to succeed 
in ousting Neto, Moscow apparently wanted to return to backing 
Neto, and allegedly mended bridges by informing the MPLA leader 
during a visit to the Soviet capital that Chipenda was planning 
to have him assassinated.115 This visit took place in January 
1973. In Moscow, Neto:
"...met with Boris Ponomarev, a Central Committee secretary 
and candidate member of the Politburo, who assured him that 
'the USSR would continue to support the MPLA against the 
Portuguese', meaning, no doubt, Neto's wing of the 
party."116
According to other reports, however, Moscow only resumed support 
for Neto in the Autumn of 1974,117 once his leadership had 
become secure.118 It seems likely that the Soviet Union was
114. G Golan, op.cit., [1988], p.270.
115. This information apparently led to an attempted attack on 
Chipenda in Lusaka. C Legum, op.cit., [1978], p.11 -
116. B D Porter, op.cit., [1984], p.156.
117. Bender assumes October or November 1974. G Bender, op.cit., 
[1978a], p.76.
118. According to Van Dunem, Moscow resumed support to Neto once
419
merely applying caution rather than searching to undercut Neto 
in favour of Chipenda.
By the time the April coup in Lisbon had successfully 
overthrown the Caetano leadership, the MPLA had managed to lose 
ground to the FNLA. But once the internal leadership crisis had 
been resolved and Neto was able to show Moscow that his MPLA was 
a viable actor in the ensuing process of decolonization, the
Soviet Union resumed its support.
By the end of 1974, the MPLA had benefited from 
approximately 10 years of support from Moscow. This included 
arms deliveries, financial aid, diplomatic support and political 
backing. It was not a massive programme of assistance, nor was
it a significant one if judged on the basis of its effectiveness
in the MPLA's anti-colonial war. It did, however, lay the roots 
of association. An association that the MPLA could turn to when 
it had decided to take power.
The MPLA and the Soviet Union
Before 1964, the MPLA had apparently more or less 
shared the FNLA's conviction that it was the aid and not the 
donor that mattered. According to the MPLA programme, the 
movement had to:
"...struggle, by all available means, for the liquidation of 
the Portuguese colonial domination in Angola and of all
he had succeeded in regaining control of the movement by walking 
out of an MPLA conference in Lusaka with the support of an 
internal MPLA faction (from the First Military Region) against 
the Revolts. Interview with Joao Van Dunem, London, 23 August
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vestiges of colonialism and imperialism..."119
The movement had tried to garner the widest possible array of 
backers, drawing attention mainly to the anti-colonial nature of 
its activities. In 1963, it had received, through the ALC, minor 
levels of support from both China and the Soviet Union. Neto's 
tour in 1963, attempted to court Washington by playing down the 
MPLA's radicalism. This attempt did not reap its rewards but did 
manage to influence the US perception of the movement.120 The 
MPLA certainly tailored its discourse according to its 
audience. While it heavily curtailed its Marxist discourse when 
in the United States, the same cannot be said when it addressed 
sympathetic audiences. An article by Mario de Andrade, published 
in Pravda in September 1961, contained references to an 
"underground Marxist group" and "anti-imperialistic forces" 
involved in "the revolutionary struggle", that would be 
guaranteed by the "support of all progressive humanity", which 
were clearly intended to speak in Soviet ideological terms.
In its early documents, statements and articles, the 
MPLA does not refer to the Soviet Union directly, nor does it 
credit Moscow with providing the means of its support.121 Before
1991.
119. Statuts et programme in R Chilcote, op.cit., Documents,
[1972], p.228.
120. As referred to in Chapter Three, in 1963, the US State
Department circulated a memorandum to its African missions
stipulating that the MPLA was not to be alienated. J Marcum,
op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.16.
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1964, MPLA leaders continuously insisted on the movement's non- 
aligned posture:
"During this phase of the national liberation struggle, 
there is no question of pledging our policy to either of 
the two blocs dividing the world. The only promise we make 
to the two blocs is that we will honestly seek to exclude 
attempts at establishing a cold war climate among the 
Angolan nationalists and to prevent the implications of 
international intrigues in the Angola of tomorrow."122
Practically the same words are used in a report on the MPLA's 
First National Conference,123 which was held in December 1962, 
and in an appeal to the ALC,124 signed by Neto, and published in 
August 1963. According to its programme, the MPLA would pursue 
an "independent, peaceful foreign policy" that would include 
"nonalignment with military blocs."125
The situation changed after the debacle in 
Leopoldville. Neto's visit to Moscow in 1964, followed by the 
military and political strengthening of the movement marked the 
beginning of the very close relationship established between the 
MPLA and the Soviet Union. In December 1964, an article in
121. 'Freedom Shall Come to Angola, Too' Pravda September 6 
1961, reproduced in R Chilcote, op.cit., Documents, [1972], 
p.195.
122. Mario de Andrade speaking at the 32nd meeting of the UN 
Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration 
held in Leopoldville on May 24 1962. Reproduced in R Chilcote, 
op.cit., Documents pp.198-199.
123. Document reproduced in R Chilcote, op.cit., Documents, 
[1972], p.256.
124. 'Memorandum to the African Liberation Committee of the 
Organization of African Unity' August 1963 Dakar, reproduced in 
R Chilcote, op.cit., Documents p.271.
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Pravda declared the USSR’s support for the MPLA,126 and in 
August 1965, the same newspaper published an article by a 
leading MPLA figure which payed tribute to Soviet support for 
the MPLA which, it says, "...helped expose Roberto's neo­
colonialist character."127 From here on, the USSR became the 
principal support for the MPLA:
"Our people, the fighters representing the vanguard of the 
anti-colonialist struggle in Angola, feel the friendship 
and support of the Soviet people. We regard the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union as one of the main forces we rely 
upon in developing our liberation struggle."128
After coming to power, Neto confirmed the importance of this 
support during his visit to the Soviet Union in October 1976:
"Soviet aid has been the key factor in our historical 
development, in achieving independence and in the country's 
reconstruction."129
Clearly, the MPLA did have ideological affinities with 
the Soviet Union. A number of its leadership, including 
Agostinho Neto, Lucio Lara, Mario de Andrade and Viriato da Cruz 
were avowedly Marxist despite their denial that the movement as 
a whole was such. They would insist that although they had
125. 'Statuts et programme' reproduced in R Chilcote, op.cit., 
Documents p.235.
126. M A Samuels, 'The Nationalist Parties1, [1969], p.395.
127. Africa Research Bulletin (London) 10 August 1965.
128. Agostinho Neto at the 24TH CPSU Congress, Pravda April 7
1971. Quoted in R Ulyanovsky National Liberation: Essays on 
Theory and Practice (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978) p.365.
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Marxist sympathies, the MPLA was a broad front that united a 
number of postures. For fund-raising purposes, the Marxism in 
the movement's ideology was, therefore, played down. Only after 
independence, on the proclamation of the People's Republic of 
Angola and the transformation of the MPLA into a Marxist- 
Leninist vanguard worker's party, was its ideological posture 
proclaimed.
Like other anti-colonial movements in the 1960s and 
1970s, the ideologues of the post-1963 MPLA, principally Mdrio 
de Andrade and Lticio Lara, held Marxism to be the political 
basis for their anti-colonial struggle. The resilience of the 
Portuguese state and its inability to accept self-determination 
for its colonies had made negotiated and peaceful independence 
impossible. For many, Marxism had "...become a vehicle for 
radical nationalism in non-industrial societies."130 As one 
point of view has it, despite the theoretical dictates of the 
historical phases of orthodox Marxism, Third World nationalists 
wanting to break with the West, took it as a political 
statebuilding model.131 According to Rostow, in the struggle 
against the traditional order in the Third World (that is 
colonialism), the communists enter this struggle as "scavengers 
of modernisation" proposing "techniques of political
My emphasis.
129. R Ulyanovsky, op.cit, [1978], p.374. My emphasis.
130. G White "Revolutionary Socialist Development in the Third 
World: an Overview', [1983], p.3.
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centralisation and dictatorial control as the basis for rapid 
economic progress."132
The MPLA activists, like other anti-colonial 
nationalists, also claimed to have found inspiration in the 
example of wars of National Liberation in China, Algeria and 
especially Vietnam. The successes of radical or Marxist 
movements in these countries were seen to be encouraging to 
those fighting what they considered to be the same struggle in 
Angola.133
"The Vietnamese armed struggle was very human, a blend of 
political and military action which became our model. In 
drawing up our MPLA programme, we were strongly influenced 
by the Vietnamese experience. Obviously we also studied 
their military tactics, their concepts of people's war."134
The MPLA believed it could draw political and ideological 
lessons, as well as a military example from the experience of 
the Vietnamese that were seen to be engaged in an unequal 
conflict with 'imperialism', comparable to the fight against 
Portuguese colonialism. Similarly, the perceived success of the 
FLN in Algeria had proven that a nationalist front could force a 
stubborn European colonizer to withdraw from Africa.
Anti-colonial ideology had become increasingly radical
131. Argument developed in J Copans 'The USSR, Alibi or 
Instrument for Black African States' in Z Laidi The Third World 
and the Soviet Union, [1988], p.25.
132. Citation in R Falk 'intervention and National Liberation', 
[1984], p.121.
133. G Therborn 'From Petrograd to Saigon1 in New Left Review
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towards the end of the 1960s. The development of a loose body of 
National Liberation thought increasingly characterized the anti­
colonial fight as a kind of global 'class struggle1. In this 
doctrine, the Third World was considered to be the 'working 
class' of the world, and had to fight to free itself from the 
ruling imperialist domination. Maoism proposed that the 'world 
city1 had to fall to the assault of the 'world village.'135 In 
January 1969, at a joint conference held in Khartoum by the 
CONCP movements, Agostinho Neto refered to the stubborn 
persistence of the Portuguese people in continuing to serve 
"...as cannon fodder in the defence of Portuguese and foreign 
monopolies."136 An MPLA pamphlet stated that:
"...the voluminous and constant support that Imperialism 
provides and continues to give to fascist Portuguese 
colonialism, has equally placed our people in the front 
line of the struggle against imperialism."137
Colonialism and capitalism were seen to be two sides of the same 
coin. The fight against one was considered necessarily a fight 
against the other. In Liberation theory, Marxism pervaded, and 
at the time, the tide seemed to be in favour of radical self- 
determination: the expulsion of both colonial and imperialist
48.
134. Lucio Lara, MPLA ideologue, September 1976. Citation in K 
Brown 'Angolan Socialism1, [1979], p.301.
135. R Edmonds, op.cit., [1975], Soviet Foreign Policy 1962— 
1973: Paradox of Superpower, [1975], p.49.
136. A Neto, A Cabral and E Mondlane 'A Voz dos Povos em Luta'
PeclaraQoes a Voz da Liberdade (Algiers: FPLN Pamphlet, 1969?)
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forces was deemed to be a worthy and achievable goal for 
nationalists in the Third World.
A socialist outlook was also linked to the MPLA's 
conception of an Angolan nation. The movement's ideologues often 
referred to the inherent dangers in tribalism and racialism, 
claiming that their fight was not against whites but against the 
"unjust colonial system."138 As argued before, the ethnically 
diverse and urban leadership of the MPLA may have found in 
Marxism the ideal prism with which to establish their political 
and social objectives.
This ideological proximity precluded the MPLA turning 
for assistance to anywhere but the socialist bloc. The MPLA 
believed that the progressive brotherhood of socialist man would 
act in solidarity and assist its own anti-imperialist struggle 
in Angola. But to which pole should it have turned? To Moscow or 
to Peking?
While there is no firm evidence that this was the 
case, the MPLA may have been split by the Sino-Soviet rivalry. 
According to the MPLA military comander at the time,139 Viriato 
da Cruz's challenge to Neto's leadership in July 1963 was made 
along the dividing line between Moscow and Peking. Neto's 
preference for a closer association with Moscow contrasted with
My translation.
137. MPLA 'Tenth Year of the Armed Struggle' in MPLA 1970 
(Liberation Support Movement Pamphlet, 1970?) p.17.
138. A Neto in a speech delivered on 4 February 1970. reproduced
in English in MPLA 1970 (Liberation Support Movement Pamphlet,
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Viriato's admiration of the Maoist experience, which may have 
fed on his anxiety to increase military action. This view may be 
supported by the fact that Viriato's challenge was made after 
having returned from a Chinese-sponsored Asian-African 
Journalists' Conference in Indonesia.140 While it is impossible 
to be certain, it is possible that some links were made here 
between Viriato and Peking. Having failed to take over the MPLA, 
Viriato joined the FNLA, which later became the recipient of 
Chinese assistance. Viriato eventually ended up in the Chinese 
capital, where he died embittered and far from Angola. Neto 
established his leadership and from 1964 onwards established 
strong relations with Moscow.
In 1972, during Chipenda's challenge to Neto, he is 
said to have looked to Peking for support.141 However, if this 
was the case, it contradicts those reports that claim that the 
Soviets supported Chipenda during his challenge. Repeating the 
experience of Viriato ten years before, after failing to 
displace Neto within the MPLA, Chipenda joined the FNLA, which 
at that time was already receiving arms and military training 
from China. It is difficult to claim it with certainty, but 
there is some indication that Peking and Moscow may have became 
rival poles for political competition within the MPLA. In 1968, 
before his split with Neto, however, Chipenda denies that this
1970?) p.12.
139. Interview with Manuel Santos Lima (MPLA National Political 
Council 1962), Lisbon, 14 January 1991.
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was the case, albeit unconvincingly:
"When people say the ideology of the MPLA is Moscow- 
orientated and the ideology of UNITA is Peking-orientated, 
they not only help the imperialists confuse things, they 
are simply wrong. The divisions which have emerged within 
the Angolan liberation struggle have not come about because 
of the split between China and Russia...The Chinese 
continued to support the MPLA in 1962, even after...we 
expelled our general secretary, Viriato da Cruz, from the 
Steering Committee of the MPLA. It was this man who 
went to China and spread his poison that the MPLA was pro- 
Russia, anti-Chinese, and so on. That is when our 
difficulties with the Chinese began.142
It can be argued that there was a definite ideological 
base for the relationship that the MPLA came to develop with the 
Soviet Union. But this was essentially only a base. Eventually, 
the political factors of this relationship far outweighed the 
ideological link. When, for the MPLA, Moscow became a means of 
fighting its internal rivals the ideological communality became 
just another political factor for the Soviet Union in its policy 
towards Angola.
Bases for Soviet Foreign Policy toward Angola
By the end of the 1960s, the Soviet Union was close to 
achieving rough numerical nuclear parity with the United States. 
This had been, after all, the Kremlin's major objective after 
Khrushchev. With strategic parity, the Kremlin believed it had 
the means to act globally, in the defence of its interests.
140. J Marcum, op.cit. Volume Two, [1978], p.87.
141. M Simpson, op.cit., p.191.
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According to Edmonds, the defence build-up and the backing of 
the armed forces gave the Brezhnev leadership the necessary 
stability and clout which allowed it to pursue a different 
dialogue with the US: detente.143 The leadership undoubtedly
continued to equate Soviet gains with Western losses, but the 
status of superpower conceded by the recognized parity implicit 
in the SALT agreement, coincided with a search for a less 
confrontational posture with Washington. The promise of mutual 
massive nuclear destruction seemed paradoxically to relax 
relations between the superpowers, reducing tension and 
conflict. But this applied only to the realm of what amounted to 
US-Soviet bilateral relations. The Kremlin purposefully kept 
detente from its other spheres of foreign policy, namely the 
Third World. In Soviet policy towards this region, strategic 
parity and detente actually made Moscow more active, and less 
inhibited.144
But confidence in its own enhanced capacity cannot 
surely be the sole explanation of why Moscow decided to arm the 
MPLA to assist this movement to take power. There had to have 
been a risk that the US would have called Moscow’s bluff and 
decided to overtly back the FNLA-UNITA coalition, even including 
the deployment of US troops. How could Moscow have been sure 
that intervention in Angola would not have led to a direct
142. D Barnet and R Harvey The Revolution in Angola: MPLA, Life 
Histories and Documents, [1971], p.259.
143. R Edmonds, op.cit., [1975], p.43.
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confrontation with the West? Some observers,145 have claimed 
that the Kremlin shrewdly antecipated that, after Vietnam, a 
war-weary American people and a vindictive Congress would 
effectively paralize the US administration's ability to go 
beyond covert operations. It, therefore, proceeded with a policy 
of support for the MPLA, somewhat secure in the knowledge that 
the US would be unable to respond. In this analysis, Soviet 
policy was not taking risks, and merely benefited from a correct 
analysis of American politics.
Somewhat within this same context, Valenta assumes 
that Soviet decisions to intervene in Angola were taken as part 
a medium-risk strategy to test the US's responsiveness after 
Vietnam.146 But from this point of view, Soviet policy in Angola 
was applied in steps and responded only to the situation on the 
ground rather than in accordance with a larger picture which 
predicted a result. In this analysis, the Kremlin capitalized on 
its historic association with the MPLA to intervene in a 
political vacuum (after the withdrawal of Portugal). But had the 
US overtly challenged this policy, the Soviet Union would, in 
all likelihood, have stopped short.
Whatever the case, the MPLA presented the Soviet Union 
with an opportunity to gain influence in Angola. Clearly, Moscow 
was aware that the FNLA was being supported by the United States
144. M Bowker and P Williams, Superpower Detente: A Reappraisal, 
[1988], p.114.
145. M Bowker and P Williams, op.cit., [1988], p.122.
431
through the CIA which leaves little doubt that the Soviet 
policy-makers placed their action in Angola within the context 
of their rivalry with Washington.
A number of analysts, however, have advanced another 
explanation for Soviet involvement:
"The animosity between China and Russia over Angola exceeded 
anything either may have felt about US and other Western 
intervention."147
Legum's thesis is that Soviet involvement in Angola sought to 
undermine China's influence in Africa rather than to help the 
MPLA for its own sake or to weaken Western influence. 
Accordingly, Moscow would have intervened regardless of what 
Washington did. Legum's analysis of intervention in the Angolan 
civil war has been taken up by a number of other analysts:
"What Washington failed to realise was that it had stumbled 
into a Sino-Soviet dispute."148
By 1963, the rivalry between the two largest communist 
powers, had come out into the open, somewhat to the relief of 
many in the West who had had nightmares about a mono-polar 
communist bloc. This rivalry was also played out in the Third 
World where China challenged Moscow for the role of the major 
ideological and political pole of anti-Westernism. China took 
upon itself the task of unmasking the Soviet Union's
146. J Valenta., op.cit., [1978].
147. C Legum, op.cit., [1978], p.22.
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revisionism, by, it believed, proving that Moscow's dialogue 
with the West disqualified it from speaking in the name of the 
Third World.149 In 1964, Premier Chou en-lai's tour of Africa 
marked the beginning of Chinese policy in the Third World. But 
during this early period, China's Third World policy was 
essentially an ideological assault on the primacy of Moscow. It 
was within this context of ideological conflict that the Soviet 
Union emphasized its policy of support for the MPLA within 
support for National Liberation generally. Moscow sought to gain 
uncontested leadership of the anti-imperialist group and this 
was reinforced by support for anti-colonialism. In communist 
fora, Moscow sought to reinforce its revolutionary credentials, 
while Peking sought to disparage them.
By 1970, after the inward-looking period during the 
Cultural Revolution, Peking had returned to an active role in 
the Third World, this time with concrete support for its 
ideological challenge. Its financing of the Tanzania-Zambia 
railway in the order of US$ 400 million,150 showed that it could 
provide an alternative source of aid to both the West and the 
Soviet Union. With Maoism elevated to a status of parity with 
Marxism-Leninism, China provided an important, albeit low- 
budget, pole of attraction to both radical states and national 
liberation movements. This competition with Peking within its
148. M Bowker and P Williams, op.cit., [1988], p.118.
149. Z Laidi, op.cit., [1990], p.25.
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ideological backyard is said to have been a principal motivation 
for Moscow's active policy in Angola which led it to accept the 
MPLA's requests for assistance.
The arrival of Chinese advisors at the FNLA's base in 
Zaire at the end of May 1974 is said to have triggered the 
resumption of Soviet aid for the MPLA in the autumn of that same 
year. But as we have already seen, the motivations behind the 
fluctuating Soviet commitment to Neto1s leadership of the MPLA 
were based at least as much on the internal disarray of the 
movement as on any external stimulus such as Chinese support for 
the FNLA. Furthermore, Chinese assistance had already been in 
place since the previous year, and yet had not prevented Moscow 
from cutting back its aid for Neto in the first place. 
Nevertheless, despite these inconsistencies, it is difficult to 
state that the 'Chinese factor1 was totally absent from the 
considerations made by the Soviet policy-makers. It is possible 
to argue that Peking's military assistance for the FNLA may have 
partly led Moscow to respond to the MPLA's solicitations for 
weapons in August 1974.
But according to Vassiliev, China did not in any way 
provide the major strategic motivation for Soviet foreign policy 
in the Third World.151 This Soviet academic's view is that the 
West has always been Moscow's principal adversary in the Third 
World and that this was also the case in Angola. Thus, while
150. R Edmonds, op.cit., [1975], p.49.
151. V Vassiliev 'Soviet Foreign Policy in the Third World'
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China may have wanted to challenge Moscow by supporting the 
FNLA, it is probably not the case that when supporting the MPLA, 
the Soviet Union was primarily preoccupied with denying Peking 
influence in Africa. Moscow may certainly have used Angola in 
its ideological conflict with China, as Legum points out.152 
Despite these objections, it can be argued that weakening 
Chinese influence may have have been a partial objective, and 
thus a partial influence on Soviet foreign policy toward Angola.
In 1974 and 1975, the MPLA was able to convince Moscow 
that the Soviet Union would benefit from an escalation in its 
support for this Angolan movement. On this process of influence 
other factors were also active, as it has already been argued. 
The Portuguese communists, Cuba and the Congo (Brazzaville) 
combined to further reinforce the case for the MPLA. It was an 
internal political conflict that was successfully expressed in 
terms of a wider global competition. Clearly, the Soviet Union 
saw it could gain something, especially in its competition with 
the United States.
Lecture at LSE March 1991.
152. "Russia and China both used Angola to justify their 
allegations that the other was intent on world domination. C
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(iii) China and the Angolan Movements
According to its own view, China behaved in a proper 
and correct fashion with regard to the civil war. While Peking 
tried to promote unity among the Angolan movements, Moscow was 
accused of deliberately instigating the civil war in an attempt 
to gain influence in the resource-rich country:
"It is the Soviet social-imperialists themselves that have 
kindled the flames of war in Angola but, to cover up their 
criminal deeds, they resort to their customary dirty trick 
of a thief crying 'stop thief1 and cranking their propaganda 
machine to attack and slander China and African countries. 
But the Chinese people’s stand of consistent, resolute 
support for the Angolan people's efforts to fight in unity 
for national independence is known to everybody.11153
Indeed, a survey of the official publication Peking Review does 
not reveal an expressed preference for any of the Angolan 
movements and seems to support this view of the conflict: that
Peking helped the anti-colonial struggle in general up to the 
point when unity was achieved between the movements under the 
auspices of the OAU. It then proceeded to point to the dangers 
of external "meddling" especially on the part of the Soviet 
Union.154 In Peking's view, Moscow attempted to "...fish in 
troubled waters."155 The Soviet Union:
Legum, op.cit., [1978], p.23.
153. Peking Review 31, 1 August 1975, pp.8-9.
154. Peking Review 6, 7 February 1975, p.4.
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"...took no notice of OAU's equal treatment to the three 
organisations and the agreement reached among themselves 
[Nakuru]. Instead they made a distinction between the three 
organisations...and with an ulterior motive, classified them 
into revolutionary, non-revolutionary and even 'counter­
revolutionary1, interfering in the Angolan people's affairs 
and stirring up antagonisms among them."156
But does a consideration of China's involvement in the civil war 
stand up to this characterization?
China did not intervene very deeply in the civil war. 
In fact, by the time the conflict had escalated in November, 
Peking had withdrawn its support for the FNLA. But, its de facto 
alignment with the United States and South Africa, caused untold 
political damage to China's prestige in African states, despite 
this early withdrawal from the conflict. Furthermore, with the 
eventual victory of the MPLA, the Soviet Union had shown itself 
to be a much more capable and worthwhile backer to have. From 
here on, China's previously prominent presence in Africa was 
considerably scaled down. But why had Peking commited such a 
significant mistake in Angola? Certainly in its previous 
undertakings in Africa, China had shown itself to be an able and 
sensitive actor. The answer to this must lie in the fact that 
opposing the Soviet Union seems to have been by far and away the 
predominant preoccupation of Peking in its Angolan policy, even 
if this led to it supplying arms to the CIA-backed FNLA, an 
association Peking later realized it could ill-afford:
155. Peking Review 35, 29 August 1975, p.6.
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"We made mistakes in Angola, perhaps because we simplified 
the issue, reacted blindly, without proper analysis, to the 
position taken by the Russians. As the Angolan civil war 
went on, the affair became for us more and more of a 
fiasco. "157
For Peking, its involvement in the Angolan civil war, beyond the 
purely ideological returns it sought, was essentially an 
exercise in gamesmanship.
The direct repercussions of Chinese involvement on the 
process and outcome of the civil war itself were very limited, 
aside from the concrete fact that Chinese military support for 
the FNLA bolstered this movement's potential. The belief 
maintained by the FNLA's other backers in Zaire (the CIA station 
and Mobutu's regime) that Roberto's movement was capable of 
challenging the MPLA must be seen to have been one of the 
serious miscalculations that were made in the Angolan civil war. 
The military and organizational capacity of the FNLA was vastly 
overrated and when the challenge for power came to a head, in 
the battle for Luanda, this movement's weakness gave the MPLA an 
advantage which the latter was able to exploit on the political 
and diplomatic fronts. It can be argued that the most important 
repercussions of China's involvement in Angola were in causing 
reactions in other external actors. China's support for the 
FNLA, from 1973 onwards, might have led Washington to believe 
that Peking considered the movement to have potentialities.
156. Peking Review 31, 1 August 1975, p.8.
157. Unidentified Chinese diplomat in A Gavshon, Crisis in
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While forming an asset for the FNLA in this way, China, as has
been referred above, was also said to have been one the major
incentives for Soviet policy in support of the MPLA.
Since the mid-1960s, China had sought to play in 
Africa the role of anti-colonial patron. The Chinese Communist 
Party's (CCP) ideological and historical context emphasized, in 
its own experience, the struggle against the imperialism of the 
Western powers, and held up its own revolution as a model to be 
emulated in the colonial Third World. Like the Soviet Union,
China attempted to frame world politics in an ideological 
context of a struggle between socialism and capitalism, between 
East and West. Unlike the Soviet Union, however, the Chinese 
also emphasized the struggle between the developed and the
underdeveloped worlds, between North and South. In this context, 
China placed itself squarely in world politics as the champion 
of the Third World.
Chinese foreign policy in Angola seems to have been, 
like its US counterpart, mainly motivated by one consideration: 
that of rivalry with the Soviet Union. This characteristic 
conformed to China's more general outlook to the continent, 
which was brought clearly to the foreground during Chou En Lai's 
African tour of 1963 and 1964:
"The Chinese leader made it plain that Africa would become a
region of competition not only against the west but also 
against what Peking took to be the sacrifice of
revolutionary principles by the Soviet Union for the sake of
advancing its state interests."158
Africa: Battleground of East and West, [1981], p.139.
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Peking was not averse to advancing its own interests as a by­
product of the main objective of its policy: countering Soviet 
influence. Certainly, Chinese involvement with Tanzania and 
Zambia in the mid-1960s, and later Zaire, sought to demonstrate 
its ability to compete with the Soviet Union in Africa. But this 
involvement often also had an economic facet. Short of copper 
itself, China's construction of the Uhuru railway, which sought 
to ease Zambian dependence on the Benguela railway and South 
African routes, secured copper sales to Peking.159 Nevertheless, 
despite these and similar conditioning factors, it is clear that 
Sino-Soviet rivalry dominated Chinese foreign policy in Africa, 
and, more specifically, in Angola.
China's political interest in Africa, as elsewhere, 
undoubtedly helped to spur on Moscow's own pursuits. Anxious to 
dispel accusations of revisionism, and to see off the Chinese 
challenge to its leadership of the communist bloc, the Soviet 
Union sought, somewhat against its ideological instincts, to 
prove its revolutionary zeal by a more active role in the 
support of anti-western, but nationalist, regimes and of 
national liberation movements. In fact, the prominent place of 
national liberation movements in the socialist grouping owes 
much to the CCP, that developed a theory and practice of anti­
colonial struggle that allowed it to form part of Marxist
158. A Gavshon, op.cit., [1981], p.130.
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political ideology.
The influence of China on the Angolan nationalist 
movements is, curiously enough, first noted in the MPLA. The 
first secretary-general and leading theorist of the movement, 
Viriato da Cruz, is said to have become very enthusiastic about 
the application of Maoist guerrilla warfare to the anti-colonial 
war in Angola in the early 1960s. One source claims that Viriato 
da Cruz was an actual recipient of Chinese aid.160 Further to
this, during the immediate run-up to the 1963 split Viriato 
apparently defended a close relationship with Peking, with an 
idea to the latter possibly becoming the MPLA's principal 
backer. By then, however, the Netoists had already become very 
close to Moscow. This Sino-Soviet divide is said to have been 
largely responsible for the defection of Viriato da Cruz.161
Allegedly driven to despair by the MPLA's military incapacity, 
Viriato da Cruz moved to the FNLA with a number of his followers 
hoping that this movement's access to the border and its better 
international profile would be more successful in the fight 
against Portuguese colonialism. According to some reports 
Viriato da Cruz continued to defend a pro-Chinese line within 
the FNLA. In time, the FNLA also disappointed Viriato da Cruz, 
who eventually moved to Peking, where he died in 1973, 
reportedly bitter and disillusioned with the process of Angolan
159. A Gavshon, op.cit., [1981], p.134.
160. B Larkin, China and Africa 1949-1970, [1971], p.189.
161. Interview with Joao Van Dunem, London, 3 October 1991.
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national liberation.
The first major direct link made by China with an 
Angolan movement was with UNITA. Seeking to establish, after 
1964, a rival movement to that of the MPLA and the FNLA, Jonas 
Savimbi required a major source of financial, military and 
political backing. As has been shown above, his acrimonious 
break with Roberto and the FNLA was made under allegations of 
the presence of "US imperialism" within the movement. This 
posture effectively excluded the West as a potential source for 
what was to become UNITA. Savimbi turned then to the communist 
bloc and, in 1964, undertook a fund-raising tour, reportedly 
organized by Ben Bella,162 to, among other countries, China163
Judging by the results of this tour, it seems clear
that the MPLA was well established in the Moscow camp, leading
the Angolan leader to turn to its rival, Peking. According to
Bridgland, Savimbi "...was received icily in Eastern
Europe..."164 but did achieve a measure of success in China.165 
According to this account, Peking promised to train UNITA 
elements in guerrilla warfare at the Nanking Military Academy 
and contributed cash funds to help Savimbi’s followers who had
Interview with Manuel Santos Lima, Lisbon, 14 January 1991.
162. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.160.
163. See Chapter Three. F Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to 
Africa [1986], p.82.
164. F Bridgland, op.cit., [1986], p.82.
165. The communication channel between China and Savimbi was 
held allegedly through Co Liang, a Chinese 'agent' working out
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been stranded in Brazzaville after the break from Roberto. A 
follow-up trip to China was undertaken by Savimbi in early 1965, 
during which he allegedly received US$ 15,000, the first 
donation received by UNITA.166 Between July and November 1965, 
Savimbi himself received instruction in guerrilla warfare at 
Nanking, where he was joined by a number of commanders-to-be.167 
Later, in 1967, Savimbi returned to China where he is said to 
have had an hour-long meeting with Mao Tse Tung himself and was 
promised arms.168 Peking did continue to provide UNITA with 
money and training in China but no weapons, allegedly due to
difficulties in transit through Tanzania and Zambia.169
With a contrasting opinion, however, Marcum believes 
that the Chinese "...could not trust him...", because of 
Savimbi's opposition to Viriato da Cruz's entry to the FNLA 
while the UNITA leader was still in Roberto's movement.170 
Savimbi had allegedly counseled Roberto against allowing Viriato 
da Cruz into the movement because of the ex-MPLA Secretary- 
General *s pro-Chinese stance. Further casting doubt on this 
association with China are references in Stockwell to training 
received by UNITA at this time in North Korea and not China.171
of Ghana, and later Tanzania. F Bridgland, op.cit., [1986],
p.74.
166. F Bridgland, op.cit., [1986], p.83.
167. Known as the 'Chinese Eleven', F Bridgland, op.cit., 
[1986], p.84.
168. F Bridgland, op.cit., [1986], p.94.
169. F Bridgland, op.cit., [1986], pp.89,96.
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Whatever the case, it seems clear that any association between 
China and UNITA at this stage was not substantial in terms of 
arms or even politically. In overall strategic terms, it was a 
slight relationship of little consequence.
It is, however, revealing to look at the motivations 
behind this relationship. It is difficult to conclude what led 
the Chinese to back Savimbi at a time when UNITA was not an OAU- 
recognized Angolan movement. Granted, the reported level of 
support was low-risk, and Savimbi's much-praised personality and 
admirable intention to move the anti-colonial fight inside 
Angola may have convinced the Chinese that his was a cause worth 
supporting. Further evidence to the irrationality of this 
association is the fact that there does not seem to have been a 
substantive ideological affinity between Peking and UNITA as 
there was between Moscow and the MPLA. Despite accepting many 
aspects of guerrilla warfare that may have been shared with the 
Chinese, and the use of many similar terms, Savimbi was clearly 
not either a Marxist or a Maoist. In fact, UNITA publications 
later candidly dismiss, with some flippancy perhaps, its early 
association with Peking:
"During the Portuguese colonial era, the movement's 
literature was full of revolutionary Maoist rhetoric, but 
this was more with a view to cultivating material assistance 
from Red China than a sincere reflection of UNITA's 
ideological beliefs - Savimbi himself would be the first to 
admit that during the early years of its existence UNITA 
sometimes had to be pragmatic in order to survive."172
170. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978], p.160.
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With no obvious ideological affinities, it may be argued that 
the association between UNITA and China in the mid-1960s 
conformed to the pattern established by the other Angolan 
organizations and their respective backers. That is to say, 
Peking saw UNITA as a player with potential and, seeing as both 
the United States and the Soviet Union already had their own 
favourites, wanted to put in its own bid. Of course, if indeed 
this was the case, this consideration must not detract from 
UNITA's own responsibility in this association. Apart from 
consciously overplaying their ideological proximity, as they 
claim above, UNITA may also have presented itself to Peking as a 
clear opportunity to challenge both Moscow and Washington.
It is, however, equally possible that these early 
links with UNITA were more the result of a general, perhaps 
almost arbitrary, policy of support for national liberation 
movements which led to the granting of aid and training to many 
groups, some being more successful than others, rather than of 
an astute evaluation of UNITA's capabilities. The factor that 
does, however, emerge is Peking's liability to approaches made 
by competing movements in an anti-colonial war.
"With very few exceptions China's choice of movements to 
support, and her actions towards these and other groups, 
have been dictated by the need to challenge, surpass or 
embarass the Soviet Union."173
171. J Stockwell, op.cit., [1978].
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The most important association made by China in Angola 
was with the FNLA. As it has been argued above, the
establishment of these links with the FNLA were strongly 
influenced, if not actually determined by the latter's 
relationship with Zaire. From 1973, after Mobutu had established 
close relations with Peking, Roberto and the FNLA also moved to 
request and received Chinese aid, which was provided in training 
and the shipment of weapons. Interestingly, in Bridgland's 
account, Roberto was said to have been anti-Chinese,174 having 
refused an earlier suggestion made by Savimbi to approach 
Peking. This contrasts with Marcum's suggestion cited above that 
claims it was the UNITA leader who was anti-Chinese.
Nevertheless, in December 1973 an FNLA delegation visited China 
and secured a meeting with Deng Xao Ping.175 From this point 
onwards, Holden Roberto accepted Chinese aid. China provided 
direct military assistance to the FNLA from early 1974 until 24 
October 1975, one day after the major South African military 
incursion into Angola.
The arrival in Zaire of Chinese advisors to train the 
FNLA was not kept secret. On the contrary, it was announced in a 
press release. According to Stockwell, 112 military advisors,
172. UNITA [1984], p.25.
173. A Hutchison, China's African Revolution, [1975], pp.232- 
233.
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led by a Chinese army major general, arrived on 23 May 1974.176 
Although not in strictly contradictory terms, Bridgland states 
that "...the last of its 120 instructors arrived in August 
[1974] with 450 tonnes of weapons..."177
Mobutu's close relations with Peking were without a 
doubt partly responsible for Chinese backing for the FNLA. 
Kinshasa's approval was essential for the deployment of over 100 
military advisors in Zaire. Some reports have attributed China's 
involvement with the FNLA as being the result of an initiative 
by Nyerere, who had apparently requested assistance from Peking 
personally.178 The Tanzanian leader reportedly suggested that 
Peking's assistance be delivered by the transfer of Chinese 
military instructors based in his country to the FNLA's base at 
Kinkuzu.179
The importance of Chinese aid in bolstering the FNLA 
may have played a part in the movement's favour with the United 
States, although this could not have been one of China's 
motivations. Much more likely is, as Marcum suggests, that:
"...Chinese assistance for the avowedly non-socialist FNLA 
[was] apparently motivated by a desire to humble Leonid 
Brezhnev, and to please Mobutu and acquire influence as they 
had done in East Africa."180
174. F Bridgland, op.cit., [1986], p.74.
175. E K Lawson, 'China's Policy in Ethiopia and Angola', 
[1980], p.174.
176. J Stockwell, op.cit., [1978], p.67.
177. F Bridgland, op.cit., [1986], p.148.
178. Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents
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Although fighting between the movements had broken out 
by the late spring of 1975, and China continued to support the 
FNLA, Peking did not shut out the MPLA nor UNITA. The UNITA 
military commmander, Samuel Chiwale, flew to Peking on 20 March, 
apparently to request military support.181 According to a 
subsequent report, this mission was not very successful.182 In 
late May, Lucio Lara of the MPLA, a figure very close to Neto, 
was received in Peking at the invitation of the Chinese 
government.183 While the civil war was going to pit China 
against the Soviet Union, this would be achieved in an indirect 
alliance with the United States and South Africa. Before this 
had become clear, Peking maintained its support for the FNLA. 
When in August 1975, the Peking Review alleged that:
"...the Soviet social-imperialists, under the signboard of 
'support1, stirred up a civil war in that area in an attempt 
to fish in troubled waters,"184
1974-1975 [1975], p.B537. J Marcum, op.cit., Volume Two, [1978],
p.228.
179. E K Lawson, op.cit., [1980], p.173.
180. J Marcum, 'Lessons Of Angola1, [1976], p.413.
181. AFP report in Facts and Reports [Vol. 5, No.7, 5 April 
1975], p.17.
182. Afrique-Asie 19 May 1975. Reproduced in full in Facts and 
Reports, op.cit.
183. El Moudjahid (Algiers) 29 May 1975. Reproduced in full in
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a similar allegation could be made of China's own involvement. 
Despite the rhetoric, China's role in the Angolan civil war 
differed little from that of other external actors.
The motivations for Chinese support of the FNLA almost 
certainly revolved around the Sino-Soviet rivalry, as well as 
the search for influence in the Third World, both in relation to 
Moscow and Washington. Therefore, when the FNLA was able to tap 
Peking for weapons and military training, by virtue of its 
association with Zaire, it was these competitive motivations 
that were drawn upon. Once again, external matrices of conflict 
were superimposed on the internal Angolan war.
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CONCLUSION
The Angolan civil war of 1975-1976 was a brutal con­
flict that seriously damaged the country's economic infrastruc­
ture and fragile fabric of society. It led almost immediately to 
another civil war between the MPLA and UNITA that was to last 
fifteen years. After standing as equals at Alvor in January 
1975, these two movements then faced each other in a grinding 
war of attrition, this time as government and rebel movement. 
Almost continously, Angola lived with war for 30 years. In 1991, 
the prospects for peace and a negotiated settlement looked good. 
Political differences between the adversaries had not been 
resolved, but they had agreed to attempt the electoral route of 
competition. Although there were many reasons why in 1991 the 
Angolan adversaries signed a peace agreement, it is difficult to 
avoid believing that it was related to the end of the cold war. 
Deprived of external rivalries to support the internal conflict, 
the Angolans had to find another way to compete and settle their 
differences. Earlier, in 1975, these external factors had per­
mitted war to be fought. In 1991, they allowed peace to be made. 
In one sense at least, events in Angola in 1991 were intimately 
related to what had occurred in 1975.
Speaking during a seminar on decolonization in 1992, 
Brigadier Pezarat Correia set down his assessment of what had
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occurred in 1975.1 According to him the United States, the 
Soviet Union and unnamed regional African powers had been 
"largely responsible" for the outcome of Portuguese 
decolonization.2 The non-fulfilment of the Alvor accords and the 
war in Angola were, according to Pezarat Correia, the result of 
"intrigues by foreign interests during the heyday of the cold 
war."3 As has been shown, the Angolan civil war of 1975-1976 did 
involve a number of external actors, including those mentioned 
by Pezarat Correia. There can be little doubt that the interven­
tion of the superpowers, Cuba, South Africa, Zaire and China had 
an overwhelming effect on the course of the war; as did events 
in Portugal, especially in creating the opportunity for such in­
tervention. But to view the Angolan civil war merely as a 
product of East-West rivalry or of South African attempts at 
regional hegemony is to misunderstand or to deny the real nature 
of the origins of the conflict.
The external dimensions of the civil war were un­
doubtedly significant in initiating, perpetuating and, even­
tually, ending hostilities in Angola. But these international 
facets were built upon an internal structure of conflict that 
had been erected under colonialism and defined during the anti-
1. Brigadier Pezarat Correia was a member of the MFA and was 
stationed in Angola as Admiral Rosa Coutinho's deputy at the end 
of 1974.
2. Report in Publico (Lisbon) 13 Februaury 1992.
3. Ibid.
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colonial challenge. The rivalry between the Angolan movements 
drew in foreign interests as the nationalists looked outwards 
for sources of support. In this way, external rivalries and con­
flicts were superimposed on Angolan antagonism. The accruing of 
these international dimensions undoubtedly helped to determine 
the violent nature of the conflict in 1975. Conversely, the
withdrawal of these dimensions of tension in the late 1980s, as 
a result of the convergence of the superpowers, encouraged the 
turn away from war in Angola, towards another form of political 
competiton. Nevertheless, to consider the Angolan civil war of 
1975 (as well as that of 1976-1991) solely in terms of interna­
tional intervention and cold war intrigues is to omit the impor­
tance of the internal dynamics at the core of the origins of 
that conflict.
This thesis has located the origins of the Angolan
civil war on a continuum that links international politics and 
internal change. It has looked at both the national and interna­
tional factors that created the conditions for the war, and has 
been unable to draw a clear line of responsibility that 
separates one set from the other. In the case of the Angolan 
civil war, a complex dynamic of interaction between internal and 
external actors led to the development of hostilities. Con­
sequently, while each intervention by an external power was but
one of the inputs of the conflict, the internal rivalry at the
core of the war was the necessary spark for the entire dispute. 
This trellis of political interaction is at the core of the An-
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golan conflict of 1975-1976.
The rivalry between the Angolan nationalist movements 
emerged from the formative influences of both colonialism and 
anti-colonialism. The particularities of Portuguese colonialism 
had an important part to play in the development of this 
rivalry. Firstly, the social conditions that resulted from its 
colonial policies, such as the racial and educational gap be­
tween certain sectors of colonial society, went far in determin­
ing a constant state of hostility between the less-educated 
Africans in the FNLA and the intellectual mestizos in the MPLA. 
On the other hand, the privileged core of colonial society came 
to expect the rewards of prosperity, especially after the period 
of economic expansion in late colonialism. When denied, this 
class represented a source of support for the anti-colonial cur­
rent.
Secondly, the colonial regime's intransigence towards 
the development of Angolan nationalism limited the options for 
its expression. The authoritarian regime in Portugal had been 
partly erected on the colonial empire, politically, economically 
and ideologically. Lisbon could not, therefore, decolonize; not 
because it could not neo-colonize but because the regime itself 
would expire if it did so. Thus, the development of a broad 
movement of nationalist expression in the colonies was put out 
of the question. Eventually, in 1961 only a violent oppostion to 
Portuguese colonialism was possible. In turn, this eradication 
of choice was conducive to the prevailing of committed
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nationalist organizations that were either radical in outlook 
(MPLA) or heavily personalized (FNLA).
Of course, these movements were also shaped by their 
own endogenous development and were also affected by conscious 
political choices made by their protagonists. The ideological 
development of the MPLA in Luanda, the micro-nationalist affir­
mation by the FNLA in northern Angola and Zaire, and the cham­
pioning of the unrepresented south by UNITA were, although over­
lapping, separate streams of political expression in Angola. 
Their constituencies and political spheres were different, al­
though all three movements had the same objective both in the 
anti-colonial as well as the civil wars: to capture the Angolan 
state and establish their respective structures of government.
As the three movements developed their anti-colonial 
challenges, they found themselves on trajectories that brought 
them into conflict not only with the colonial regime but with 
each other. The context within which movement emerged helped to 
influence the subsequent intransigence towards the creation of a 
common front, and the perpetuation of a belief that each would 
be able to succeed Portuguese rule. The FNLA believed that its 
original challenge against the Portuguese in 1961 and its legit- 
mization by the OAU was sufficient to give it the edge. The MPLA 
looked to the other Portuguese colonies where friends had 
emerged at the head of a single unchallenged movement, wanting 
to repeat the pattern in Angola. Despite, or at the root of, its 
preference for elections, UNITA knew that it represented the
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single-largest ethnic group in Angola. From the interaction be­
tween colonialism and anti-colonialism emerged also the conflict 
between the Angolan nationalists.
In dispute with colonialism, Angolan animosity also 
sought other levels of expression for their own internal con­
flict in order to legitimize their respective positions as the 
sole representative of Angolan nationalism. For each movement, 
the competition for backers was facilitated by appealing to the 
political whim of a potential benefactor. This was often 
achieved by not only extolling the virtue of its anti-colonial 
objectives but by also pointing out that the benefactor's rival 
(or rivals) was backing the other movement. In this way, they 
were able to enlarge the significance of their conflict from 
mere factional strife to superpower competition, once the 
colonial regime had fallen away in 1974. Through this transfor­
mation in the nature of the conflict, the Angolan nationalists 
internationalized the civil war. Rather than being mainly a case 
of external intervention within the context of the cold war, the 
Angolan civil war was primarily a domestic conflict which was 
internationalized with consciousness and purposefulness by the 
Angolan rivals.
Here, Little's 'pull theory', referred to in the In­
troduction, seems to apply adequately.4 This approach to inter-
4. R Little, Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars, 
[1975] p.3. Opposing the 'pull theory1 is the 'push theory' of 
intervention. In the latter, only two actors are considered: the 
intervening and the target state. Furthermore, the intent of the 
intervening state is considered to be the overwhelming deter-
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national intervention in internal wars interprets these situa­
tions as a complex model involving both internal and external 
actors. Intervention by the latter is seen as a response to the 
former, rather than as an active initiative independent of the 
internal situation. External rivalries are drawn in by the 
parties to a civil war in order to enlarge the latter's 
capacities. In this perspective, international intervention in a 
civil war is seen as a situation that is created by the interac­
tion of parallel national and international levels of conflict; 
this is a perspective that this thesis shares with regard to the 
Angolan civil war.
Having established this dynamic, it is nevertheless 
important to keep in mind that international intervention in the 
Angolan civil war was also the result of specific motivations on 
the part of the external actors. While the opportunity for in­
tervention was created by the deliberate appeal to do so on the 
part of the Angolan movements, the will and interest of the in­
terveners was equally necessary for this to have occurred. The 
process by which the internal conflict was internationalized was 
only one of the inputs of the decision-making process of the ex­
ternal powers when considering intervening directly in the war. 
Thus, while South Africa was confident that the shared objective 
of anti-communism would align its interests with those of the 
United States, Pretoria's decision to intervene in Angola was 
the result of a complex interplay of strategic objectives and 
domestic politics. Similarly, Cuban intervention was influenced
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by an internal political and ideological logic quite apart from, 
although converging with, Soviet interests, and from its long­
standing relationship with the MPLA. While acting as the 
linchpin for the anti-MPLA coalition, linking the interests of 
the FNLA with those of the United States, Zaire also saw in the 
Angolan civil war an opportunity to emerge more powerfully in 
the region.
In the case of the global actors, the United States
and the Soviet Union, and to a lesser degree, China, motivations
were less the result of particularist interests than the product 
of the wider context of their respective rivalries. The balance 
of forces between East and West was a constant preoccupation of 
policy-makers in both Washington and Moscow. In Peking, the 
relative prestige of China and the Soviet Union in the communist 
and developing worlds was a significant factor in the elabora­
tion of Chinese foreign policy; this was a preoccupation that 
was equally shared in the Kremlin. Thus, the intervention of the 
Soviet Union and the United States in particular, as well as
China, was motivated by an assessment of what this would have
signified in terms of their respective rivalries. Having estab­
lished direct and indirect relationships with Angolan movements 
the US, the USSR and China acted with regard to each other.
The result of the drawing in of these rivalries was 
the accumulation of a number of layers of conflict on the foun­
dations of the Angolan dispute between the movements. In this 
way, the development of the civil war reflected the clash of
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left and right in post-coup Portugal, the regional rivalry be­
tween Congo and Zaire, bloc politics in the OAU, the Sino-Soviet 
split and the East-West conflict. For different reasons, the 
above external conflicts emanated outwards from the competition 
between the Angolan movements as the latter attempted to bolster 
their respective positions. For example, the relationship be­
tween the Angolan dispute, regional rivalry between Brazzaville 
and Kinshasa, and the superpower competition between Moscow and 
Washington can be arranged in the following manner:
Level of Conflict East - versus - West_________________
National MPLA - versus - FNLA/UNITA
v v v
Regional Brazzaville - versus - Kinshasa
v v v
Global Moscow - versus - Washington
In this perspective, the dynamic of conflict flows simul­
taneously outwardly from the internal civil war to the interna­
tional rivalries, as well as from one side to the other at each 
separate level. The communality between the allies on each side 
is thus determined not only in ideological terms, which in the 
case of Marxism on the MPLA side would join the three actors 
vertically, but also in terms of political competition at the 
horizontal level. Thus, while Brazzaville shared common values 
and backers with the MPLA, one motivation for its support of 
this Angolan movement was the fact that the MPLA's rival, the 
FNLA, was supported by its own rival, Leopoldville. In other
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words, 'my enemy's friend is also my enemy1. In the case of the 
links between Portuguese politics and the Angolan dispute, a 
similar pattern can be invoked:
Level of Conflict________ East - versus - West__
National MPLA - versus - FNLA/UNITA
V V V
Portuguese Radical Left - versus - Moderates
v v v
Global USSR - versus - USA
Of course, the wider global conflict between East and 
West did provide the context for this internationalization of 
conflict in Angola, especially with regard to the ideological 
expression of the civil war as a conflict between communism and 
anti-communism. But, in one sense, this contextualization was 
the result of a purposeful attempt on both sides to make it seem 
as if the dispute in Angola was part and parcel of a historical 
global conflict and not the result of an internal dynamic. Sub­
sequently, in 1991, the East-West conflict was no longer avail­
able to be imported into local and regional conflicts that 
expressed themselves as part of this ideological competition. 
This led to the resolution of a number of these conflicts such 
as that of Angola.
However, internal conflicts that lead to civil wars and 
other violent disputes of authority did not disappear with the 
end of the cold war. In certain situations, they were able to
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seek an electoral form of conflict, as in Angola. In others they 
found new expression in latent nationalisms, as in Yugoslavia 
for example. Thus, while the end of the cold war brought the end 
of certain internal conflicts, it did not eradicate war as a 
form of communal political competition. Having acted as an ex­
ternal structure of support for many internal conflicts, as in 
Angola, the cold war will almost certainly be substituted by 
other similar structures which will allow conflict to continue. 
These external structures may be on a different scale than that 
of the cold war but could be brought into internal conflicts in 
a similar way to the manner in which international rivalries 
were drawn into the Angolan civil war.
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APPENDIX
EXCERPTS FROM INTERVIEWS
Interview with Manuel Santos Lima [MPLA 1961-1963, War 
Commander]
Lisbon January 14 1991
Manuel Santos Lima was in the Portuguese Army before taking on 
the task of organizing the training of the first military force 
of the MPLA in Morocco in 1961. When the MPLA established its 
head-quarters in Leopoldville, he was its military commander. 
Manuel Santos Lima left the MPLA in 1963 in the aftermath of the 
split in the movement between Agostinho Neto and Viriato da 
Cruz. At the date of the interview, he was leader of MUDAR, a 
small party that intended to compete electorally in Angola.
Question:
If we could turn to the history of the MPLA as emerging from 
the manifesto drawn up by Viriato da Cruz in Luanda in 
December 1956...
Answer:
That manifesto does not exist. The origins of the MPLA, the 
origins of nationalism are enveloped in a fog, that due the 
conditions under colonial repression, there was not, in actual 
fact, the drawing up of the manifesto on which the launching of 
the political struggle was based. There existed a general 
dissatisfaction, while a sense of nationalism and a posture of 
rebellion towards the colonial authorities...this was something 
we learnt at home, with our parents, at the dinnertable. The 
injustices were daily, and so bare-faced that we assimilated our 
parents' sense of revolt. In Luanda, which was always a centre 
of a number of activities...comercial, literary, political...In 
Luanda under these circumstances, meetings were held at a number 
of residences for years, without ever producing a manifesto. 
Exactly as there is today a denial of the MPLA, of the current 
government in Angola, so it progressed amid families. Families 
were dissatisfied, people were dissatisfied...they talked about 
it, at home, in small groups of extremely trustworthy people, 
but they did not draw up a manifesto, living under the
authority of repressive forces as they were. Under these 
circumstances, Viriato da Cruz was uncontestably one of the 
pillars of the MPLA, there were others...Ilidio de Machado, for 
example, Antonio de Oliveira..Mario Antonio... and many others. 
People would get together in small groups, exchange thoughts, 
they would talk...and for example, the attack on the jails on
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the dawn of the 4th to the 5th of February [1961], cannot 
honestly be considered [to have been] a political action 
decided upon by the MPLA...it was spontaneous. People had had 
enough, they took up arms, later they would pick up sticks and 
stones...At this point, for the Angolans that were outside the 
country, and this is where others, particularly Mario de Andrade 
came in, it was a question of capitalizing on that 
revolt...give it a direction, and to try to achieve outside, 
internationally, the maximum support possible so that the revolt 
had political credibility. And for it to have political
credibility, it was necessary to give it a political programme, 
a manifesto...what happened was, the MPLA claimed that revolt, 
that attack on the jails, a spontaneous revolt, which,
incidentally, failed totally both strategically, and in terms 
of political and military assault. Nevertheless, based on that 
name, Mario de Andrade, who at that time was already based in 
Paris, exploited this as the first political gesture of Angolan 
nationalism...but that is not what it was. With a lot more 
political substance was the action by the FNLA, or UPA at the 
time, launched on 15 March [1961]...it had a tribal, racialist, 
regionalist etc. character, but the fact is that they obeyed a 
general order to unleash their massacres, and this they did. 
From here on, Angolan nationalism, more specifically, the MPLA, 
lived through a time of great political activity, always
claiming that it had a clandestine presence inside Angola for
obvious reasons, but outside the country, it was necessary to 
give maximum publicity to this nationalism. Mario de Andrade, 
who had a platform from where to speak (which was Presence 
Africaine in Paris), from here on as much as he can, wrote 
articles, alerting international public opinion to the situation 
in Angola, and not only Angola but also in the Ultramar 
[Portuguese overseas territories] generally. So much so that, he 
had as peers all those that were leaders of the liberation 
movements in the Portuguese colonies. Amilcar Cabral, who had 
been a year in Lisbon, when Mario de Andrade arrived...Marcelino 
dos Santos, Pedro Pires, for Guinea [Bissau], and from Sao Tome, 
there was Miguel Trovoada...Because of the necessity of 
inclusion in the list of liberation movements in the Portuguese 
territories...and at the foundation, in Rabat, of the Conference 
of the Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies 
[Conferencia das 0rganisa£6es Nacionalistas das Colonias 
Portuguesas], CONCP, Sao Tome was, naturally, represented. 
Trovoada became a figure of low profile, in the wake of the 
MPLA, and the MPLA becomes the great engine of the struggle for 
liberation in the Portuguese colonies. Later, Amilcar Cabral 
joined the conference, and we all worked together...for example, 
all the military plans that,I would draw up for the MPLA (as I 
was responsible for the military affairs of the MPLA) would be 
duplicated, and the second copy would be for Amilcar 
Cabral...and later I would make three copies, one for Mandela, 
with whom I worked in Rabat...at that time, more precisely, in
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1962, Nelson Mandela wanted to turn to armed action...we worked 
together because he was versed in the rural guerrilla tactics of 
the Chinese, but it was important to transit to urban guerrilla 
warfare, so he turned to us as well as the Algerians in the FLN. 
So, at this time we were operating in the context of the 
"corrected11 nationalism, of Mario de Andrade, until Agostinho 
Neto's escape from jail, in which were involved, the English, 
the Portuguese Communist Party...
Q:
Which English were these?
A:
An English action group. There has always been a mystery
surrounding this...the English looked for it...
Q:
Were they from the Labour Party...?
A:
Very possibly. I cannot state it categorically, but it is
possible. What is certain is that the English were involved in 
Neto's escape.
Q: In 1961, the attack on the jails in Luanda in February, 
precipitated for the exiles, the formation of a movement that 
could embody or represent that struggle that Mario de Andrade 
believed had been begun...
A:
As I see it, when the attack on the jails took place, the exiles 
had to admit that the people were moving faster than they were. 
We were intellectuals, students, moving in environments outside 
the country...and inside the country, people felt the necessity 
to turn to action. In order not to he left behind, it was 
necessary to transform that spontaneous movement and give it a 
voice, and a direction. This is what happened. It [the attack] 
was not launched as a result of orders...because Mario de
Andrade himself hesitated considerably before taking the option 
of armed struggle. When this was talked about in terms of 
political speculation, I remember Mario de Andrade until 1960, 
Mario was very hesitant...because Mario himself was not a person 
of physical courage. For Mario picking up a weapon was a 
terrible thing... taking a shot...I'11 tell you about an 
incident: our soldiers were trained by the Algerian FLN
according to a programme stipulated by myself...at that time I 
was the only military element in the MPLA...a soldier, desertor 
from the Portuguese commandos, and therefore versed in counter­
guerrilla techniques, and the Algerians were experienced in 
guerrilla warfare. The programme proscribed the Popular Army for
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the Liberation of Angola [Exercito Popular para a Libertagao de 
Angola] EPLA, from which emerged the FAPLA [Formas Armadas 
Populares para a Libertagao de Angola]. The programme was drawn 
up jointly, taking into account the counter-guerrilla techniques 
of the Portuguese and the guerrilla techniques of the Algerians 
and the Chinese. Our soldiers were instructed in these tactics. 
We were principally near Mellila, in Morocco... and on one 
occasion, Mario de Andrade, who was Interim President of the 
MPLA at that time, came to visit, to evaluate the progress made 
by our first 300 soldiers. And naturally since our movement was 
dedicated to a path of armed struggle, our young soldiers wanted 
our president to take some shots at a target. Mdrio de Andrade 
refused and I had to [laughs] convince him...so Mario closed his 
eyes, shot twice, and returned his gun, horrified...this was in 
1962. Mario de Andrade was essentially a man of culture, a 
peaceful man, who abhorred physical violence. Therefore, Mario 
de Andrade could not...I do not see Mario de Andrade as having 
conciously subscribed to the armed struggle, saying, for example 
"let's go to war now", and taking up arms; in fact, neither 
could Agostinho Neto. If you look at the MPLA propganda pictures 
of the time, you see Agostinho Neto with a gun across his 
shoulder, holding it more like a farming implement than a 
weapon.
Q :
Taking into account the fact that the attack on the jails in 
1961 was not a result of an MPLA plan...
A:
That is the way I see it.
Q :
Can it be concluded then, that the MPLA was not implanted in 
Angola, or, at least, was not operating in Angola at this 
time?
A:
The MPLA did not operate in Angola as the MPLA. There were a 
number of dissatisfied people that later accepted the 
designation of Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
[MPLA]; these people were, after all, well known to each 
other...and so when the name MPLA first appeared, and the name 
MPLA first appeared much later, I would say that as a 
designation, as a name, the MPLA, in fact, only appeared for 
the first time in 1961, as a response to the attacks on the 
jails. It was necessary to organize something...thus the MPLA. 
And later, in the same mould, the Popular Army [EPLA]. The EPLA 
was formed in 1962.
Q :
Who constituted the MPLA before the Neto presidency in 1962?
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A:
Basically Mario de Andrade, brother of Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, 
and friends and family. This profile of Angolan nationalism is 
maintained until today. That is, there are about 25 families in 
Luanda that are involved in all that occurs, good or bad, in 
that country. For example, the Van Dunem family, that were 
slaves in the 17th century. Van Dunem came from Holland; the 
slaves then took the name of the master. In the 18th Century, 
the Van Dunems were slave traders, and slave masters. In the 
19th Century, they were in the civil service, and were guides 
for the columns of repression in the aftermath of the Berlin 
Conference [1884-5] to ensure that Portugal kept its colonial 
territories. And in the 20th Century, the Van Dunems were in the 
professions during the struggles for liberation. Come 
independence they were in government. During the coup attempt 
[May 1977], there were Van Dunems who died on both sides, on the 
side of the plotters and on the governmental side. And today, 
they are in the cemeteries, they are in government, at least 
three in the government, they are in exile, they are in UNITA, 
in MUDAR [Lima's party in 1991]. Put this family, Van Dunem, and 
cross them with the Vieira Dias, the Mingas and so on, they end 
up all being related: cousins, godchildren, uncles, brothers 
etc. Now, from this point, it is not difficult to understand how 
an idea that is taken by one Van Dunem, for example, is spread 
throughout a group, and this group will tend to monopolize that 
idea...it works as a sort of fiefdom [laughs]. So they are, 
simultaneously, the 'power' and the 'anti-power' for this 
reason. Jose Eduardo dos Santos [Angolan President 1979-] is 
related to a number of people...it is difficult to determine 
where family ties end and political alliances begin.
Q :
Where did the Comite Director [Directing Committee], the
first leadership of the MPLA, begin its operations?
A:
It began to operate in Morocco, in 1961. At that time, Mario de 
Andrade passed through Morocco: he was a sort of Foreign
Minister. There was Reverend [Domingos da] Silva who was exiled 
in Leopoldville. Viriato da Cruz was in Guinea (Conakry), with 
Lucio Lara. Matias Migueis was also in Leopoldville, and I was 
in Rabat. The MPLA left its great supporters in Morocco and
moved from Rabat to Conakry, and from there to Leopoldville.
This was a victory. Because to open an office in Leopoldville
[was important]. The FNLA, UPA, Holden Roberto was rooted in 
Leopoldville, was linked to the Congolese government, to
Kasavuba, apparently he was second secretary to Lumumba. It was 
his territory and he had always resisted any attempts by other 
nationalist movements to establish a base in Leopoldville. But 
from 1961, towards the end of 1961, it was possible to open an 
office on the Rue Tambeur de Tabora, number 52, I believe. We
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all went down [to Leopoldville], at that time we were preparing 
the EPLA. I returned to Morocco to organize that army, and when 
Agostinho Neto escaped and reached Rabat, he witnessed the 
swearing in of...the first 300 soldiers of the EPLA. They were 
uniformed, under a military code of discipline (...during a 
stop-over at the airport in Tunis of fifteen hours I had a 
suitcase with 30 kilogrammes of explosives...), and [had a good 
degree of] weapons usage. Agostinho Neto was astonished. [For 
him], one thing had been that clandestine activity, between 1956 
and 1961, and the spreading of ideas heard here and there, on 
the BBC, on France International, or an article published here 
and there, and passed on by word of mouth. Another thing was, 
however, being at a point of the materialization of the 
liberation struggle, with offices and the administration of a 
budget - an organization that was established. And this was all 
done without Agostinho Neto. Agostinho Neto returned and was 
floating in the MPLA without knowing exactly what to do. Mario 
de Andrade was the Interim President. [But] he did not want to 
be president, he did not like to be president. Mario felt 
himself to be more inclined towards contacts as a Foreign 
Minister. Mario de Andrade wanted to leave his presidencial role 
in the movement in order to resume his old job. Viriato da Cruz 
is secretary-general, and from the very first meeting of the 
whole Directing Committee, in Congo Leopoldville, with Agostinho 
Neto already empowered as president. But it imediately became 
clear to all the Directing Committee that Agostinho Neto was out 
of his depth. He no longer was master of the situation. A 
serious problem presented itself to us. We had invested 
everything to turn Agostinho Neto into a charismatic figure. 
Because the liberation struggles needed a charismatic leader, 
martyrs and heroes; we did this also to save Agostinho Neto from 
possibly being eliminated by the PIDE, but, as it turned out, 
Agostinho Neto did not meet our expectations. The Algerian FLN 
had had a number of presidents, and for us also the question was 
the substitution of Agostinho Neto. Of all the Angolan leaders I 
have worked with, the one that most impressed me in terms of 
political leadership was Viriato da Cruz, without a shadow of a 
doubt he outclassed Agostinho Neto and even Mario de Andrade. 
Mario de Andrade was not a leader, Mario de Andrade was an 
intellectual in politics. But Viriato da Cruz was a political 
animal. And the inevitable occurred. Viriato da Cruz and 
Agostinho Neto were locked on a collision course— a clash of 
personalities. This conflict was exacerbated by another factor. 
Viriato da Cruz was a mestizo, Agostinho Neto was black. One of 
accusations levelled at the MPLA by Holden Roberto's UPA was 
that the MPLA was a movement of mestizos. In fact, this same 
allegation survives to this day and the MPLA is [still] 
considered [to be] a movement of mestizos. Agostinho Neto had 
his political ambitions, and never was a democrat, and felt that 
Viriato da Cruz was his enemy and that he needed to eliminate 
him. Very much behind the scenes, he began to campaign against
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Viriato da Cruz making people believe that the latter was 
dispensible...Viriato da Cruz, who was a very intelligent man, 
decided to throw Neto a banana skin. He proposed to distance 
himself voluntarily from the movement in order that the UPA be 
unable to use the issue of race against the MPLA. In truth, 
Viriato da Cruz did not intend this. Viriato da Cruz was one of 
the great motors behind the MPLA. He had an enormous capacity 
for work...he was an extraordinary man. He was perfectly aware 
of what was going on inside the movement in a way that Agostinho 
Neto was not. The fool that he was, Agostinho Neto accepted 
Viriato's proposal. Viriato da Cruz then went to live in a room 
400 metres from the MPLA headquarters. But Viriato's room turns 
into the MPLA's second headquarters. Before leaving the MPLA, 
Viriato da Cruz handed over the MPLA's briefs to a number of 
young men, among whom was the current president of Angola, Jose 
Eduardo dos Santos, but who were unprepared for those tasks. 
They were youngsters far more preoccupied with playing guitar 
and being well-dressed than anything else. They spent their time 
in a bar in front of the MPLA bureau...They led the good 
life...In fact, Leopoldville was city of good times. People 
would spend their weekends in the bar, both parents and their 
children, getting drunk and sleeping in the bar. Consequently 
they were unable to implement the briefs and a path was beaten 
to Viriato da Cruz's room, where they would ask: "Does Comrade 
Viriato know about this...or about that." Somewhat cynically, 
Viriato da Cruz would see those people, hand out instructions 
while laughing, [enjoying the fact that the situation was] 
demonstrating that it was not sufficient that you be black to be 
in a liberation movement but that you needed ability also. He 
felt vindicated. At the same time as he handed out instructions 
he would insinuate that Agostinho Neto was not a leader of 
suficient stature for what was required. The conflict became so 
bitter that the MPLA became split in two, more so once the 
personality conflict was worsened by the schism in the communist 
world. There were the pro-Soviets and the pro-Chinese. Viriato 
da Cruz had been to China, and was interested in China, as is 
today Gentil Viana, of the Maoist faction of the party. 
Agostinho Neto, Mario de Andrade and the others were pro-Moscow. 
They had been in the Portuguese Communist Party, in the MUD 
Juvenil, which operated in Portugal where Maoism was known but 
was far away. From that point on, Viriato da Cruz began to move 
away from the movement. Even more so after the First National 
Conference in exile confirmed Agostinho Neto's leadership, and 
rejected, naturally, Viriato da Cruz. We were then presented 
with a serious dilemma. We knew that with regard to a number of 
things, Viriato da Cruz was right. But we knew also that the 
MPLA could only progress with Agostinho Neto, and that it did 
not have much of a future under Viriato da Cruz. Agostinho Neto 
was the figure in which everything had been invested. So we 
decided to continue to support Agostinho Neto. Even more so 
after a horrible act of Viriato da Cruz which to this day I have
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yet to understand why he did this: How could a man of Viriato's 
calibre, who was an enemy of Holden Roberto, who had requested 
of me, in my capacity as war commander, the elaboration of plans 
and scenarios that sought the abduction or the physical 
elimination of Holden Roberto? How could Viriato da Cruz, out of 
enmity towards Agostinho Neto, leave the MPLA and join the FNLA? 
Holden Roberto thought it too good to be true and was 
suspicious, particularly as he had his own complexes vis-a-vis 
those in the MPLA whom he considered intellectuals. As both an 
intellectual and a mestizo, Viriato da Cruz made Roberto feel 
threatened. Viriato da Cruz's passage through the FNLA was 
short, so he ended up by sullying himself unnecessarily. He 
degraded himself in our opinion.
Q :
What was the influence of Viriato's switch to the FNLA on the 
African Liberation Committee of the QAU that came to 
Leopoldville to impel the unification of Angolan 
nationalists?
A:
They insisted on unity. But this was not achieved. The OAU was 
divided, and would remain so until 1975. The OAU, and others, 
including the Algerians believed that it was important for a 
liberation movement to operate militarily in such a way that 
would justify its activity and the help that was proferred to 
it. Now, the MPLA, from 1963 onwards no longer maintained this 
military activity because its political organ was in crisis. I 
left in 1963, and without modesty, the EPLA was the MPLA organ 
that was best organized, both EPLA and CVAAR Corpo de 
Voluntarios de Auxilio e Assistencia aos Refugiados [Volunteer 
Corps for Aid and Assistence to Refugees], of Americo Boavida. 
The MPLA entered a period of crisis, and imediately the FNLA 
took advantage of this. It appealed to the Congolese authorities 
for the expulsion of the MPLA from Congolese territory. They 
approached the Algerians who supported the MPLA and the former 
began to hesitate. The MPLA entered a crisis from which it does 
not recover until 1968. During that period between 1963 and 
1968, many strange things occurred. Even Lucio Lara was 
preparing himself to abandon the MPLA. He ran from the MPLA to 
Accra, on his way to Germany, before Hugo de Meneses (a Sao 
Tomense who was with us and had always lived in Angola) forced 
him to turn back, threatening to denounce him. Luis de Almeida 
also cut links with the MPLA. In fact a number of people left 
the MPLA at that time. Mario de Andrade also left at the same 
time as I did. In 1963 he drew away from politics, dissappointed 
etc., but he returned later.
Q:
What happened to the EPLA during this period?
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A:
Who took command of EPLA was Mendes de Carvalho, the EPLA man 
with most qualifications after myself-he had the 5th year of 
secondary school [about equivalent to '0' Levels]. The 
remainder, 95 per cent of EPLA, did not even have the 'Quarta 
Classe' [end of primary school]. To study in Angola at that time 
was an enormous economic strain. Normally, blacks did not have 
the opportunities to do so. Where I came from, Vila Teixeira de 
Sousa, known today as Luau, I still remain, after 55 years,the 
only one with university qualifications. EPLA kept on going, 
under Mendes de Carvalho and then Iko Carreira. The MPLA needed 
to execute military actions. There was no money, however. We had 
many difficulties with African countries that would not help. Oh 
yes, they would promise us, with grand speeches extolling us in 
English as "freedom fighters"; the french-speakers would cry 
"mon frere la liberte!" etc. blah blah blah, but they were poor 
countries and remain so today. Morocco would help us, not so 
much with money, but with passports, houses etc. Holden 
exploited this and when the OAU committee came [to 
Leopoldville], he had the support of the Congolese, who had only 
accepted the presence of the MPLA in Leopoldville under 
pressure, because we threatened to denounce them publically if 
they did not give us the same facilities that they had given 
UPA. So when [the ALC] arrived], in the meantime the FNLA had 
mounted a series of actions. The FNLA soldiers had been trained 
in Tunisia. If the MPLA sent 50 lads for training, the FNLA 
would send 60 or 70, in order to able to say that they had sent 
more. The conflict sets in between the two movements and 
culminates in the fratricidal war [of 1975-6]. It is the FNLA 
that initiated the fratricidal war, that led to the first 
Angolan civil war. The FNLA exploited the fact that the MPLA was 
clearly in crisis before the OAU committee, which leant towards 
the FNLA, towards recognizing the FNLA as the sole legitimate 
movement representative of the Angolan people fighting against 
Portuguese colonialism— which was not true.
Q :
Is it possible that Viriato da Cruz might have predicted that 
the FNLA would be favoured by the OAU and consequently might 
have become the strongest if not sole Angolan nationalist 
movement, and thus making a switch a logical move despite the 
fact that he did not have political affinities with either 
Roberto or the FNLA?
A:
In my opinion, the single and strongest reason for Viriatofs 
switch was revenge. We in the MPLA were all agreed that it was 
necessary to unite [with the FNLA]. The Algerians had always 
told us: achieve unity, either through peaceful means, or
otherwise. This was their own experience. All the movements 
opposed to French colonialism in Algeria, including the Algerian
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Communist Party had been smashed by the FLN. The FLN was the 
only representative of the armed struggle. Throughout 1962, the 
pressure was in favour of unity between the MPLA and the FNLA. 
Viriato switched out of revenge. He knew that it was not easy to 
create a united front. Holden Roberto had his political 
ambitions - he wanted to be president of Angola in the Congolese 
manner - and then Agostinho Neto came along, and he too wanted 
to be president. There was an inflation with regard to 
presidential candidates. I do not think that Viriato had 
political reasons for sacrificing himself. He returned to Peking 
and he died embittered, ostracized even from the Chinese. With 
Viriato out of the way, it became necessary for the MPLA to take 
military action. They requested that Mendes de Carvalho prepare 
a military action against Portuguese troops, to once again bring 
attention to the MPLA, to the fact that it continued to fight. I 
remember the Cubans. They said: take some men out to the bush, 
simulate combat, shoot away and take pictures. Publish them in 
Prensa Latina...everyone will believe you are in action. But we 
said: you cannot do this, this is a lie...we will mount a real 
attack. To me, a dilemma presented itself: I could have carried 
out a coup, and I had at my disposal all the means to do so; 
those soldiers followed me. I could have neutralized the whole 
structure of authority in the MPLA, and imposed whomever I
wished. But, as a democrat, I placed this out of the question.
And I retired from the scene. I presented my resignation to 
Agostinho Neto, who accepted it without even blinking, as this 
made him even stronger. After this, came the threat from 
Chipenda (the Eastern Revolt) who is said to have had 3,000 men, 
but I do not believe this, certainly not 3,000 of the same
calibre as those original 300 trained by myself. This was
followed by the political challenge, the Active Revolt. The MPLA 
always existed in this manner, in the middle of crises, almost 
cyclical crises.
Q :
Agostinho Neto always survived these crises. How did he do
this?
A:
It is true. He always survived. He was the president. He never 
accepted differences of opinion. The MPLA accepted this. He was 
the charismatic figure, known internationally: the great poet, 
the great leader. To defeat Holden he resorted to a dirty 
manoeuvre which was the establishment of a front that only 
existed on paper, the FDLA (Frente Democratica de Liberta^ao de 
Angola). It was established in Leopoldville in 1963, during 
which I was only present at one meeting, between the MPLA and 
the representatives of those very vulgar, reactionary movements, 
Ngwisako, Nto-bako, FLEC, and others who at the time were with 
the PIDE. It was said to be important in order to galvanize 
Angolan nationalism, especially since attempts at unity with the
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FNLA had failed, and thus present ourselves as a front. But they 
were such vulgar movements that I refused to continue to have 
anything to do with it. This front did not survive. It was so 
unequal, such an intellectual difference. But Agostinho Neto 
said it was necessary to defeat Holden Roberto. To me, one of 
the victims was Mendes de Carvalho, whom they ordered to attack 
Portuguese barracks. Of course, most never returned, including 
Mendes de Carvalho himself. They made him a hero. Another victim 
was Deolinda Rodrigues, president of the Angolan Women's 
Organisation (Organisagao das Mulheres de Angola) that at that 
time existed in an embryonic phase. But Deolinda was considered 
a splitter, linked to Viriato da Cruz. Matias Migueis, Graga 
Tavares, Jose Miguel all linked to Viriato da Cruz. These were 
considered enemies of the MPLA. Agostinho Neto pretended to 
forget or forgive Deolinda's association with this faction and 
sent her on a mission to the interior of Angola, with two other 
girls. They had to cross the FNLA's zone. The FNLA killed them. 
They were raped, tortured and killed. The same thing happened to 
the first EPLA unit when entering Nambuangongo, where they were 
attacked by the FNLA. Between 1963 and 25 April 1974, the FNLA's 
mission became almost exclusively the obstruction of the MPLA in 
its quest to reach Luanda, its natural power base.
Q :
What military operations did EPLA carry out under your
command?
A:
First it was imperative to test those soldiers. An awful thing 
occurred. They were operational as of 1962: they had been
trained and were ready for action. They went to 
Leopoldville...but there were no weapons! We had no guns. This 
despite the fact that Bulgaria had sent us, I'm not sure if 50 
or 60 tonnes of weapons, that had been held up at the docks, in 
a warehouse in Casablanca, but we had no money to recover these 
weapons. I had to convince the Moroccan authorities to deliver 
us the weapons without paying the 15 million dinars that was 
owed to customs. We finally managed to do this. We packed them 
with tins of milk and when they arrived at Pointe Noire [Congo- 
Brazzaville], one of the crates fell on the ground and the 
weapons were confiscated.1 So we were almost a year without
1. Later, Manuel dos Santos Lima, gave an explanation of this 
incident: "Moroccan aid for us was kept absolutely secret. We 
acted very closely with General Katani, a Moroccan general of 
great status. General Katani had us under his protection because 
according to the co-operation accords between France and 
Morocco, we could have been controlled by the French secret 
services. So, General Katani would give us strict orders which 
we would follow rigorously. When we arrived in Casablanca, we 
would wait inconspicuously for an army truck to pick us up. We
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seeing any military action. So we wanted to test the capacity of 
our army, that had softened in the meantime in and out of bars 
in Leopoldville, leading that awful, easy life, it was in fact 
very difficult to keep it going. We had a clandestine base, 
underground with weapons, which we would buy from the Congolese. 
So we executed our first military action in Cabinda. In Cabinda 
we dug the first MPLA arms cache. It was there that we had our 
first clash with the Portuguese. We had been preparing support 
bases when we were betrayed by one of those scoundrels you find 
everywhere, who are prepared to sell themselves cheaply. He 
revealed that there were strangers in the area. The Portuguese 
came and we ended up fighting them..this was in 1963. This was 
one of our military actions. We lost one, and purely by chance, 
a lost bullet. The other operations we executed in Cuando 
Cubango, small actions, some shooting. During a third operation, 
we were caught by the Congolese. They attacked us thinking we 
were part of the Jeunesse Lumumbiste. They wanted to hand us 
over to the Portuguese. This type of trading was common. The 
Congolese customs authorities would go over the border to Angola 
and buy everything they wanted merely by signing a bill (which 
the traders would later cash in with the PIDE) in exchange for 
which the Congolese would report to the traders all the 
movements of people in the area. Sometimes they would hand over 
maybe 60 people. We also believed they wanted to eat us. Oh, 
yes. And don't have any doubts! The women danced around us, 
shouting 'kill them...kill them!'...'the jindungo, the piri-piri 
is ready’. No doubt about it. In fact, a UN aeroplane had fallen 
somewhere, a few months earlier, and when the rescue services 
arrived, they only found the remains of the aeroplane. Not a 
person in sight. And it had not been animals who had been 
eating. However the military operations did not continue once 
the MPLA's internal crisis had broken out. I then left. No one 
took over until 1968, when Mendes de Carvalho, under the 
influence of [Lucio] Lara (a sinister man!) managed [to take 
control].
Q :
The MPLA's hurried exit from Leopoldville was such that the
movement came close to oblivion...
A:
Oh yes. Already in 1963, exploiting the [MPLA's] crisis, the
would only travel by night. This was in 1961-62. In 1972, I was 
already in Canada, when the Lockheed scandal broke out, and what 
was my surprise when General Katani was held to be a CIA agent 
[laughs]. The CIA always knew what we were doing. We never 
suspected General Katani. So the CIA and the French secret 
services knew what we were up to. The crate of guns that fell on 
the ground in Pointe Noire was no accident [laughs].
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FNLA created the GRAE, the Revolutionary Government of Angola in 
Exile, that was recognized by the Congo and a number of other
countries Including Algeria Yes. From that point, the MPLA
lost all political legitimacy, and so everyone put their money 
on GRAE. They were the more dynamic ones, in truth the ones that 
on the ground, delivered. So, for this reason, the MPLA went to 
Brazzaville, and then to Mayonde, Pointe Noire and there it 
stayed. It continued to exist but it was not a great movement. 
From a certain point until the 25 April [1974], the MPLA 
remained in this way. Both the MPLA and the FNLA were completely 
shaken, and on the ground. In my opinion, Portugal lost the 
colonial war in Guinea [Bissau], and fearing that this would 
spread to Angola and Mozambique, the coup d'etat [in Portugal] 
was executed and the situation was altered. But there were a few 
strange things in the Angolan process: I believe it was the only 
example of the colonial power that had been victorious on the 
ground inviting the belligerent movements to unite in order to 
be given independence. It is also the only case I know where 
brothers of the same creed, the Marxists, the Soviets and the 
Chinese end up forging alliances against their natures: the 
Chinese allied themselves to the Americans against the Soviets. 
Also during that war in Angola there were mercenaries: white, 
black and yellow...there were some strange things in that Angola 
[laughs]. And of course, UNITA, the creation of the Portuguese 
authorities as a counterbalance to the pro-American FNLA (the 
American Committee on Africa) and the pro-Soviet MPLA. And so a 
Portuguese facet was needed, and Costa Gomes who was in fact 
behind the birth of UNITA...it is not an alternative, nor was, 
or is Savimbi a democrat.
Q: Tell me about links with communist powers and organizations.
More specifically, when were the first contacts between the
MPLA and Moscow?
A:
The first contacts were held in 1960. In 1960, Mario de Andrade 
went to a conference in Taskent [elswhere, date of conference 
has been given as 1958].2 From 1960, the axis of the liberation 
struggle in Africa ran between Rabat, Cairo, Accra and Conakry. 
These four countries competed for the primacy of the support fos 
the liberation struggles in Angola and the Portuguese colonies. 
Firstly, with the charismatic Nkrumah in Accra. Then Nasser 
called us, promised us help and placed machine guns at our 
disposal, this in order to move this influence from Accra to 
Cairo. Then Hassan II also decided that Morocco could not be 
left behind, and called us to Rabat. Then came Sekou Toure, who 
believed that Guinea, as a country in black Africa should take
2. M A Samuels 'The Nationalist Parties' [1969], p.391.
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the leadership, and he too called us. And behind all these 
progressive leaders and governments, except perhaps Morocco 
(which had a bad domestic policy, compensated by a good foreign 
policy), there was always Moscow. Because during the cold war, 
the Soviets exploited everything that could pester the United 
States and the West. Although we were not totally convinced, 
because the Americans were much more efficient in their aid to 
the FNLA. The American was much more practical: 'on such a day 
at such a time1, and he would show up. The Soviet, with all his 
bureaucracy...as an example, the daughter of Amilcar Cabral had 
to wait two years before going to Moscow [to study]. It was at 
the Tashkent conference that Mario de Andrade judged that a 
military situation was approaching etc., and began to 
prepare,.., once the Portuguese government had refused all 
dialogue, for armed struggle. On what we could count on, if they 
were prepared to support us...this was a constant. But then, the 
aid that is given to us by the Soviets is the formation of 
politico-military cadres in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, these two 
countries above all. Some went to study there, and China also 
offered places to a certain number. The Soviets had very good 
relations with the leaders of the movements of the ex-Portuguese 
colonies. They showed themselves to be very willing to help. At 
the time of the [Sino-Soviet] split, they demanded a greater 
commitment to the protectors and a greater degree of hostility 
to the Chinese. Around 1962, all the Left in Africa took their 
positions, aligning themselves with one or the other. But the 
Soviets got the better of it, because, although they were 
bureaucratic, they had had a longer coexistence. The Chinese 
were quite distant. After all China was Mao Tse Tung. After 
reading the book they were impenetrable...Somebody told me once 
about some fellows who were being trained in China, who ate 
badly and had poor facilities...and one day, one of them poured 
forth his frustrations on the wall of the urinal. The Chinese 
copied the phrase and went half way around the world asking for 
the exact translation of the graffito [laughs].
Did Neto have a special relationship with Moscow, relative to
other figures in the MPLA?
A:
No. Mario de Andrade was the great architect of all the policies 
and all the contacts of the MPLA. Out of loyalty he never wanted 
to show himself as superior to Neto, the president. As far as I 
know, Mario de Andrade was extremely loyal to Neto, and it was 
Neto who stabbed him in the back. But not Mario. Mario prepared 
everything for Agostinho Neto. After Mario de Andrade had left 
the MPLA, Agostinho Neto was alone in power, and he did not 
accept the sharing of that power.
...Neto ruled the MPLA as a chief of his own domain. When the 
Soviets decided to help [in 1975], they turned to the Cubans in
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order to cut a low profile. The FNLA turned to Congolese 
[Zaireans], that are black. If they did not open their mouths 
nobody would know if they were Angolans or not, and the Cubans 
also brought blacks, a majority of blacks in its army, to pass 
unnoticed. There were few whites, East German advisors, Soviets. 
Whites were few and not very visible.
Q :
It has been suggested that on a number of occasions (from the 
first crisis with Viriato da Cruz in 1963, through the 
'Revoltas' of 1973-4 to the Nito Alves attempted coup in 
1977) the Soviet Union considered loosening its ties with 
Neto, or actually did so, in an attempt to flush out a more 
amenable leader to them in the MPLA. Do you think this was 
so?
A:
I am convinced that it was not difficult to see that Neto was
not...he was not a pacient man, [he was] incapable of taking big
decisions, he was apathetic. So much so that out of the 
three...Holden Roberto, a sinister man behind dark glasses, 
Neto, humourless, and Savimbi, a cheat, Savimbi came out on top. 
I think the Soviets when comparing the performance of Amilcar 
Cabral and the PAIGC with that of Neto in Angola, came to doubt 
Neto, to doubt that he was a worthwhile horse to back...but they 
had no other option. When Chipenda appeared during the Eastern 
Revolt, he also did not have the weight...he appeared as a 
plotter.
...With regard to 1977, I have heard contradictory versions, 
that the Soviets at first supported Nito, only to drop him at
the last minute. In another version, its origins quite serious,
eyewitnesses hold that the Soviet Union, at a crucial point when 
South Africa was a few days away and the FNLA and Roberto were a 
few kilometres from Luanda, Neto had an aeroplane ready to 
escape, and that it was only at this point that the Soviet Union 
rendered assistance on a large scale. Why? It is held that that 
was when the Soviet Union obtained greater guarantees [from 
Neto]...even during my time with him, while he was pro-Soviet, 
he did not demonstrate a wild enthusiasm for...he was more of a 
Marxist due to personal convictions than to subordination to the 
Soviet Union. One of his sayings used to be: "we must not sell 
ourselves to the United States, nor spread our legs for the 
Soviet Union." The aid that they provided in 1975 was in bad 
faith: apparently only one in five machine gun chambers was 
useful. So Agostinho Neto multiplied his desperate appeals for 
help from the Soviet Union. And when they [the anti-MPLA 
coalition] had reached a point 20 kilometres from Luanda, the 
Soviets dictated their conditions. Agostinho Neto accepted them 
all unconditionally...
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Q:
What were these conditions?
A:
Political conditions referring to the future of Angola. They 
would help but Angola had to identify itself clearly as Marxist- 
Leninist. It seems that it was under these dramatic 
circumstances that there was the Soviet airlift, and on the eve 
of 11 November 1975, while the Portuguese were withdrawing, the 
Soviet ships were coming in to unload material...It seems that 
this was how it happened.
Interviews with Joao Van Dunem [Press Office of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces of the MPLA (FAPLA) 1975]
London October 3 1990 and April 15 1991
Joao Van Dunem was active in the MPLA in Luanda, and in 1975 
worked in the Press Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the 
MPLA's army, FAPLA. In October 1975, Joao Van Dunem left Angola 
for Cuba. At the time of the following interviews, he was a 
journalist in the UK considering a return to Angola. His 
brother, Jose Van Dunem was the Political commisar of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff during 1975 and was close to Nito Alves. After 
the failure of their attempted coup on 27 May 1977, Jose Van 
Dunem, Nito Alves and many others were shot.
Question:
When did the Soviet Union begin to support the MPLA?
Answer:
The Soviet Union began to support the MPLA through the PCP. The 
MPLA was formed, as I have told you before, at the end of 1962, 
or the beginning of 1963 in Accra, by a group of people that 
managed to stay out of gaol. This group included Mario Pinto de 
Andrade, Lucio Lara, Eduardo dos Santos (Agostinho Neto's 
doctor), Hugo de Menezes, these were at the core. Manuel Santos 
Lima, was at the periphery of this group, for he was an 
individual of military formation, he had been an officer in the 
Portuguese Army, the Rangers, from which he was a desertor. He 
founded the EPLA. Well, as I was talking of the links between 
the Soviet Union and the MPLA. These links were not established 
with the MPLA as such, but with the Angolan Communist Party 
(PCA). Why was this? Soviet theory at the time stipulated that a 
workers' party in Europe should be linked to a liberation 
movement in the colonies. One front: the same struggle, to form 
a front against imperialism. This was the policy of the Third or 
Fourth International. In Angola, a group of people linked to the
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PCP joined what may be called an Angolan intelligentsia and 
formed the PCA: The PCA was a party that was basically formed by 
four or five people: among them Humberto Machado, his brother 
Ilidio Machado, who was considered to be a founder of the MPLA, 
but Ilidio himself told me that he was not a founder of the 
MPLA, because the MPLA had been formed abroad.
Q:
And when was the PCA formed?
A:
The PCA was founded in 1954. But because of the Cold War, the 
PCA believed that it should adapt...its support should be made 
up of Angolans from all social groups to fight against 
Portuguese colonialism. And that it should not be known as a 
communist party because in fact, at the time, the bourgeoisie, 
low, middle and even high Angolan bourgeoisie...or semi­
bourgeoisie. . .was naturally anti-communist. As a principle, 
communism implied the end of private property..the end of 
certain privileges that the bourgeoisie had and that the 
bourgeoisie wanted to hold and maintain...is that not so? And so 
they knew, that as communists, they would be driving away from 
their base of support sections of the Angolan bourgeoisie and 
semi-bourgeoisie. For tactical reasons, they created PLUA, the 
Party for the United Struggle of the Africans of Angola (Partido 
de Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola), in 1956. But as well as 
PLUA, other small organizations were formed: MINA, Movement for 
the National Independence of Angola (Movimento para a 
Independencia Nacional de Angola). And then there was an 
association in the south of Angola. The core of this association 
were people linked to the PCP: Socrates de...Julieta
Gandara...people linked to the PCP, people linked to Angelo 
Veloso, who is today an important figure in the PCP. Maria da 
Luz Veloso, who was Angelo Veloso's wife...who were at that time 
in Angola, and who were linked to that group of people. There 
were a number of separate groups, each one of which claimed to 
be the leadership of, and to represent the aspirations of 
Angolans.
Q :
Was there an interaction between this political activity in
Angola and students in Portugal?
A:
Yes there was. In Portugal there was something called the Home 
for Students from the Empire (Casa dos Estudantes do Imperio), 
and then there were the Angolan sailors [merchant navy], at the 
head of whom was an uncle of mine, Mario Van Dunem: he was a 
sailor, my uncle, my parents' brother, the so-called 'black 
sheep' of the family.
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Q:
Were the sailors a transmission cable between Luanda and 
Lisbon?
A:
Yes they were...Agostinho did in fact have a place among the 
sailors, not surprisingly if only due to his social origins. 
Agostinho Neto was not part of the so-called Angolan 
aristocracy: he was a son of a Protestant clergyman. I am not
sure if you are aware of this but a black Protestant pastor at 
that time was a person without status. Agostinho Neto connected 
with Angolan sailors, but also formed a bridge between the 
sailors and the students, with whom he was friendly. The axis 
was, therefore: Mario Pinto de Andrade (students), Agostinho 
Neto (sailors), Ilidio Machado and Viriato da Cruz (in Angola).
Q :
Had the PCP played a part in creating an Angolan Committee of 
the PCP in Angola before the PCA?
A:
It had. At that time, the communist parties defended the thesis 
that sections of the metropolitan party should be established in 
the colonies to fight against the colonial regimes. But this was 
a temporary state of affairs. The Angolans, namely Ilidio 
Machado, Americo Machado, brother of Ilidio (the latter being in 
fact the thinker in the PCA), who did not subordinate themselves 
to the PCP. There was also at this time, a Soviet in Angola, who 
did form a link between the CPSU and the Angolan 
communists...There was in fact a Soviet, somebody who was seen 
negatively, by the Angolan communists at the time, as being a 
KGB agent, but also seen positively, on the other hand, as a 
saviour from Portuguese colonialism.
Q:
What was the substance of the links between the PCP and the 
PCA? Was it solely an ideological dialogue, or was there 
something else? Was there, for example, a co-ordination of 
strategy in terms of obtaining funds from Moscow?
A:
No there was not. Initially, activity centred around the 
theoretical formation of the Angolan communists. At the start, 
this was the PCP's major concern. But there was not an exchange 
at that level, at the logistical level. There was only the 
supply of books which might provide the Angolans with the 
necessary theoretical tools to become communists. There was 
little more than this.
Q :
If I could just return to the issue of the MPLA leaders in
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Portugal...Particularly their role in the MUD Juvenil?
A:
The MUD Juvenil [Movimento de Unidade Democratica (Movement of 
Democratic Union-Youth)] was a sort of front for the PCP, its 
electoral movement. Neto and Lucio Lara were both members of MUD 
Juvenil. Why was this? Because being in Portugal at the time, 
they believed that by helping the communist struggle, the
class struggle, in Portugal they would be helping in some way 
to advance the liberation struggle in the colonies. And so they 
joined the MUD Juvenil. They were in fact quite active in the 
MUD juvenil. Neto was arrested for distributing pamphlets.
Q:
With regard to the foundation of the MPLA, the generally 
accepted version is that despite divergences on the role and 
dating of its communist precursor, the PCA, the MPLA in itself 
is founded in Luanda in December of 1956. Present at this 
launch was Amilcar Cabral.
A:
I can tell you the following. Amilcar Cabral had been in Angola. 
Amilcar Cabral was a member of the PCA. [But] Amilcar Cabral's 
links with Neto were in the 1960s. Not during the 1950s. During 
the 1950s, Amilcar Cabral's great friend was Viriato da Cruz. He 
was Amilcar Cabral's great teacher. He was everbody's great 
teacher. At the age of 18, that man drew up the Angolan 
Communist Party's manifesto, under the aegis of Humberto 
Machado...They believed, according to the thesis of the 
Communist International, that there should be unity among the 
movements fighting colonialism...that the peoples of the so- 
called colonies should unite...and it was in Conakry in Guinea 
that they had the environment to act...because until 1962, the 
MPLA had not been formed...
Q :
The MPLA did not exist in name before 1962?
A:
The only thing that had existed was a document of the Angolan 
Communist Party, which then became the Party for the United 
Struggle of the Africans of Angola [PLUA]; a manifesto, which 
stated that 'the Angolans should unite in a broad movement for 
the popular liberation of Angola'. The 4th of February took 
place, undertaken by a group of people which were in fact 
workers, humble people, but also undertaken with the consent of 
others who were aware that the presence of the liner Santa Maria 
and the [anti-Salazarist] campaign of Henrique Galvao and 
Humberto Delgado, would result in bringing the world's attention 
to the Angolan problem. They asked Canon Manuel das Neves, a
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tutelary figure at the time, if they should act to free the 
prisoners of the 'trial of the 50'.
Q :
Was Viriato da Cruz not involved at this time? Or Joaquim
Pinto de Andrade, Mario de Andrade, or Agostinho Neto?
A:
At the time all of these were either in prison or outside the 
country. In Luanda there was only Canon Manuel das Neves. When
people are repressed they search for release in church...and
Father Manuel das Neves was believed in because he was a figure 
of unity, who called people's attention to the exact moment, who 
appealed for common sense. People went to him and he listened. 
The PIDE in Luanda had made arrests because of the distribution
of pamphlets that referred to the necessity of challenging
Portuguese colonialism. At the time, it was Ilidio de Machado 
and others who had delivered, through PLUA, documents to the
Portuguese government in Angola calling for the independence of 
Angola, calling for the discussion of Angola's autonomy in 
Portugal. But this had been rejected. The Intelligence Police (a 
precursor of PIDE), which was aware of the movements of the
nationalists, arrested a number of people.
...PLUA was animated by a musical group called Ngola Ritmos, 
which threw parties, at the head of which was, Liceu Vieira Dias 
(an 'historic' figure!), and played music for the Angolans. The 
Civil government and the Police decided that Ngola Ritmos was 
subversive and began to censor their material and performances. 
So the Ngola Ritmos had to sing their songs for the police 
agents before their live performances. But the agents in Luanda 
did not have the intellectual capacity to decifer the deeper 
meaning of meaningless phrases such as, I remember from one
song: "Eat, and don't ask what you're eating". So they did have
a good time with the police, and they played very well. They 
would sing songs in Kimbundu, and also Portuguese songs, which 
would entertain the police agents.
...People were organized in two or three groups, without unity. 
They believed that to fight against Portuguese colonialism all 
was needed was a conspiracy on the part of intellectuals. They 
believed that all people needed to do was to get together in 
somebody's house one day, and the next day, colonialism would 
collapse. When in 1959 the arrests began, it became clear that 
this would not be the case. In 1961, after two years of 
imprisonment, a sense of revolt and frustration set in. The 
imprisonments touched everbody, the cream of the Angolans. So, 
in 1961, the remaining people, believing that the Santa Maria 
was coming, ask Canon Manuel what to do. And he replied that it 
was necessary to do something: grab spades, pickaxes, blades and 
do something to coincide with the arrival of the Santa Maria in 
Angola. And they attacked the prison. The attack was decimated. 
Those who attacked, Sottomaior, Paiva Domingos da Silva,
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Imperial Santana and others, were people linked to the nursing 
profession, they worked in the musseques [slums] in Luanda, 
looked on with respect. And during the attack (and for you to 
have a clearer idea of the fact that nothing [of the MPLA] 
existed at that time), [although] PLUA and MINA were known to 
some intellectuals, the battle cry was: 'UPA...UPA!!". The major 
reference for those who attacked the prisons of Luanda on the 
4th of February was the UPA.
Q :
So those who led the attacks were not linked to any of the
Luandan groups, such as PLUA or MINA, or the PCA, or the
nucleus that would become the MPLA?
A:
Yes. But for reasons of clandestinity, groups tended to not 
refer to their acronyms. That is why PLUA and MINA were not 
known. UPA, on the other hand, was outside the country and could 
be referred to. Those people who participated in the attacks 
were people of humble origins, from the musseques, having 
themselves had no contact with the Angolan bourgeousie, apart 
from through the nurses. They did not know anything but the UPA.
Q ;
What was the relative importance of Angola's ethnic makeup on
the emergence of the national movements?
A:
The UPA, as you know, certainly comes from UPNA, the association 
of the peoples of northern Angola: the Xikongo, the Bakongo. The 
Congress of Berlin did not recognize the ethnic makeup of the 
colonies that were divided between the European powers. The 
UPA's idea was in part the dream of re-establishing the ancient 
kingdom of the Kongo. The MPLA, and PLUA etc., were groups of 
intellectuals, and there were only intellectuals in the 
'feitorias1,3 of Luanda and Benguela. And who were those from 
Benguela? People that have family ties in Luanda. Some are of 
Ovimbundu origin, but with a great influence of Kimbundu, with 
great family ties with people from Luanda. So PLUA and MINA were 
groups of intellectuals who conceived of the independence of 
Angola, and adhered to a principle of territorial integrity, but 
who, in fact, did not represent other Angolan ethno-linguistic 
groups. You do not see in the formation of PLUA or MINA, the 
presence of people of Ganguela origin or Lunda-Chokwe. They were 
considered to be backward. You should not say this but they were 
not considered able to grasp the intellectual nettle of 
liberation. They did not have, incidently, spokesmen. Apart 
from, Godfrey, who was Ovambo, and was linked to PLUA, and
3. Colonial commercial zones.
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Ilidio de Machado, PCA etc.
Q:What was the reaction of the 'exiles' to the attacks on the
Fourth of February?
A:
Mario de Andrade...at the time president of the MPLA, in fact he 
was the MPLA: He and Lucio Lara were two Angolans that advocated 
the creation of a broad liberation movement, which did not yet 
exist but which they wanted to create...Mario de Andrade claimed 
the attack for the MPLA, and showed his face, in the name of 
the MPLA, in the name of the attack. This he admited in a 
number of interviews. Mario de Andrade was linked at the time to 
Presence Africaine, a much more moderate publication than say 
The Spark, and claimed the attack in the name of the MPLA.
Q :
It is claimed that Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, imprisoned at the
time, was the MPLA's honorary president from the late 1950s
onwards.
A:
This was not the case. Joaquim Pinto de Andrade was only 
honorary president from 1964. At the time, it was Ilidio de 
Machado. The MPLA did not exist. But from the moment that Mario 
de Andrade appeared in the press claiming the 4th of February 
for the 'Angolans united in a broad liberation movement1...Mario 
Pinto de Andrade, Viriato da Cruz, Lucio Lara, Meneses, Eduardo 
Santos, all asked themselves how they were going to react, how 
they were going to present themselves. So they decided on the 
acronym that was derived from the manifesto of the PLUA and the 
PCA, but there was no movement before that. So, in fact, the 
MPLA was derived from something in 1956, but that something was 
just a call for action. There was no movement as such until
after the February 4th attack in 1961. In that year, Mario de
Andrade appeared as the external relations of a movement which 
is at that time formed by necessity. It was important later to
locate the origins of the MPLA inside the country, in Luanda,
and earlier in 1956. But in fact, in 1956 there was no MPLA in 
Luanda. There was political activity from PLUA and MINA, and a 
rebel section of the Portuguese Communists in Angola, in Huambo, 
the Socialist Organization (Organisagao Socialista do Huambo). 
Ilidio Machado told me that should the origins of the MPLA ever 
be investigated it was important to focus the influence of the 
socialists of Huambo, he said: they meant a lot to us. In
ideological terms, providing literature. A white Angolan 
visiting Portugal would be able to bring back books, as they 
were not searched: the PCP manifesto, Marx's Capital, the works 
of Mao Tse Tung. This went on well into the 1970s. We would pass 
the books on to each other. Whites would be able to do this
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because the PIDE's conception of the anti-colonial war was that 
it was a black's struggle, so a white could pass much more 
easily. Ilundino Vieira, Antonio Jacinto etc. were considered 
black sheep, but the rest of the white population were 
considered pro-colonial. But there were many whites envolved in 
the whole thing.
Q :
In an interview given in 1962, Mario de Andrade contradicts 
the stated origins of PLUA in 1956 by claiming this movement 
had existed since 1953. Is this an attempt to hide the roots 
of the MPLA in the Angolan Communist Party?
A:
Mario de Andrade was not a founder of PLUA. Mario was a young 
activist in the PCA. In the PCA at that time were, Ilidio 
Machado, Humberto Machado, Amilcar Cabral...who was working in 
Angola at the time as an agronomist. They would say: 'Amilcar is 
a fine fellow, an extraordinary person. But there is one thing, 
he is a communist1; my father and others would say this, people 
who due to class origins were fervent anti-communists.. .MeLrio 
was just a young man at the time. Mario was more of an MPLA man, 
which he founded, than a PLUA man, which he did not, and of the 
PCA, where he was only marginally. People recognized he was 
bright and promising, but he was not even militant. Mario's 
prestige emerged in Lisbon, at the Casa dos Estudantes do
Imperio. And he wrote very well. But he was just a boy compared
to the veteran Machado brothers. From February on, Mario de 
Andrade and Viriato da Cruz were organizing the MPLA. Viriato 
was the great organizer, and was secretary-general. Mdrio was 
the spokesman, and became president of the movement that was, 
only then, coming together, without any troops. They began to 
form their first cadres in Accra in 1962, to where they moved. 
They do not come from Conakry. The first group of fighters was 
formed by three ex-servicemen of the Portuguese Army. Manuel 
Santos Lima, Africano Neto and Zeca Ferreira. The movement then 
moved to Leopoldville, I'm not sure exactly when, but I believe 
in December 1962. Manuel Lima went to Accra in 1962, then moved 
to Leopoldville. By then Neto was out of prison. He went to 
Accra and he replaced Ilidio de Machado as honorary president, 
because he was a much-talked-about figure, and because of his
links to the PCP. It was the PCP that helped Neto escape prison,
and he came to Accra. Here he oversaw a military parade of 
about 200 MPLA fighters led by Manuel Lima. Neto saw that they 
were more organized than he had thought. They established 
contact with Leopoldville, where they had sympathizers, and 
decided to move there. Neto's image was launched 
internationally by the PCP, as a poet and doctor, making him 
very popular. So he came to the front of the movement. Viriato 
da Cruz's handicap was that he was a mulato, and Neto was 
black. At the first conference of the MPLA, held in the Congo-
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Leopoldville in December 1962, there was Neto, coming from the
PCP, and MUD juvenil, and here there was, for the first time the
expression of the Sino-Soviet conflict in the movement. On the 
one side, there were those, like Neto, who supported Moscow
claiming that China did not have the capacity. On the other, 
there was Viriato, who claimed that the Soviets did not
understand any part of their struggle, and that only the Chinese 
understood, because the Angolan struggle was similar to that of 
the Chinese struggle. This divergence paralleled the internal 
struggle caused by the honorary president's (Neto) wish to 
occupy the leading role in the MPLA, and this wish being 
challenged by the secretary-general (Viriato). But Mario de 
Andrade, wanting to stay out of what became a personal fight, 
made way for Neto.
Q :
So it was Neto who brought the Moscow link to the MPLA?
A:
Yes. Neto, the PCP and MUD Juvenil. From that point, the MPLA 
takes a pro-Soviet line. Our links are with Moscow. China moved 
to UPA. The great difference between the MPLA and UPA was based 
on the latterfs limitations in representing the north of Angola. 
And despite dropping that designation from their title they 
remained fighting solely in the north. The MPLA wanted to 
include all of Angola. At that time, the UPA was already 
supported by the United States, through the CIA. Incidently, 
Ghana, at the time, had strong links with the US. Many students 
who left Portugal in the 1960s: John Kakumba, Augusto Bastos. 
They got to Accra, where they were taken, kidnapped to the US to 
study. Augusto Bastos, my cousin, was Roberto's personal 
secretary for years. He, like other Angolan students, went to 
Accra, considered the leading light of the African revolution, 
and there made contact with the US ambassador, and was given a 
scholarship to study in America. The Americans then imposed 
Bastos on Roberto as a personal assistant.
Q :
It has been said that had the Alvor accords been maintained
and elections held in 1975, UNITA would have won by virtue of
its large ethnic support.
A:
This would not have been the case. It is not enough to win that 
you have a large ethnic pool of support. You also need to be 
organized. And those who were organized in the interior of the 
country were not even the MPLA. They were people who defended 
and associated themselves with the MPLA (Neto) but were not a 
product of this organization. And who were organized from the 
north and the south. The victory of the MPLA came as a result of 
numerous groups throughout the country who claimed to be of the
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MPLA. Groups which had conducted a resistance and then joined 
the MPLA, not knowing many times who was who in the MPLA. UNITA 
was handicapped by the fact that people believed it had acted 
with the Portuguese, as a buffer against the MPLA. There are 
documents provided by sources close to the Portuguese 
administration that testify to this collaboration. From Correia 
Jesuino to Rosa Coutinho. You win the war in Luanda and you win 
the war in the rest of the country. There was a fear at the 
time, that Zaire would move in the north of Angola, to recover 
the so-called Kongo kingdom.
...Relations between the MPLA and Cuba were not brilliant. Che 
Guevara, when he visited Angola had made severe criticisms of 
the MPLA. He asked, how can you consider yourselves to be a 
liberation movement, if your largest base is in Brazzaville, and 
not inside your country? He criticized Neto severely. Neto went 
to Cuba, and Fidel Castro handed him a Makarov pistol and told 
him to dismantle the weapon. Neto did not know how to do it. Who 
did dismantle it in the end was Hoji ia Henda, a symbolic hero 
for Angolan youth today. He dismantled and reassembled the 
pistol. And Castro said: "I'm glad I’ve seen this. The leader of 
the MPLA should not be you but him, who is a great guerrilla 
leader who can assemble that pistol. How can you expect to be a 
military leader." And Neto left Havana, furious with Fidel 
Castro from whom he had come to request support. This was in 
1965. When Guevara was in Angola in 1966 he tried to deal with 
the MPLA on the basis of: "we know what we are doing." But Neto,
a stubborn man, resisted and claimed: "no, you know nothing, we
know because we are Angolan." And Guevara would criticize 
asking: "what type of movement did not have a base inside the 
country? Why don't you go into your country and fight from 
there? Sierra Maestra is inside Cuba, we were surrounded by sea, 
and yet we fought. You have this massive border, and you are 
fighting from the outside. What are you afraid of? Of dying? 
Focos need to be created inside the country." So you see, 
relations with Cuba in 1964, 1965, were terrible. Who did
convince the Cubans to support the MPLA, were the Soviets, who 
could not be seen to have been overtly involved in Angola. The 
Soviets provided the bridge between Cuba and the MPLA. In August 
1975, the Cubans arrived in Angola to form the MPLA. Moscow 
informed Cuba that the MPLA was interested in contacting the 
Cubans. And Angola then sent a delegation to Cuba to discuss
details. This was in July 1975. Fidel Castro considered the
request, and called an individual, whom I know, Papito Cerquera, 
a revolutionary commander who had obtained experience in the 
Algerian war, especially in the Ben Bella-Boumedienne crisis, he 
was Cuba's ambassador to Algeria. He is an extraordinary person, 
who is at the head of something called the Cientro de Estudos 
para la Europa Ocidental in Cuba. [He] told me: "Angola, we are 
going to bet on it." So they sent men to Angola. First to form 
Angolan cadres. And to provide security for a number of top MPLA
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leaders, Neto etc. My brother [Jose Van Dunem, Political 
Comissar of the Joint Heads of Staff] did not use them. He was 
young, he felt he did not need a Cuban guard. The Cubans began 
to arrive. There was, at the time, a belief that there existed a 
co-ordinated strategy to oust the MPLA; an American strategy to 
remove the communists from power. And since at the time we 
believed we were communists we said: "this could not happen." So 
the Cubans were there to help. The Soviets could not show their 
face publically. They did send military advisors. For example, 
Yuri, was my brother's advisor and a high-ranking Soviet 
officer. He was in Angola, in October 1975. At this time he was 
one of no more than thirty Soviets in Angola.
...By the beginning of October (I left for Cuba on 3 October), 
the South Africans had entered the country, they had taken 
Lubango and had reached Benguela. In fact, at the time I was 
carrying out an investigation of the MPLA Army Chiefs in 
Benguela who had abandoned the city in the face of the advancing 
South African army and had [deliberately] exploded an arms 
depot, and ran away to Luanda. The South Africans came close to 
Benguela. I was in Benguela investigating this incident at the 
very beginning of October, before I left for Cuba. The South 
Africans entered Angola in mid-September.
Q :
Why did you go to Cuba?
A:
I was an MPLA man. The intense relations with Cuba required 
there be somebody in Cuba to supervise a certain number of 
things. Furthermore, they wanted to form a number of activists 
in advanced military courses. So, I was there firstly, to 
represent the interests of Angola and secondly to attend a 
course in military command and aeronautical engineering.
Interviews with Joao Van Dunem
London August 23 and 24 1991
Q :
A number of sources have claimed that Daniel Chipenda's split 
with the MPLA was motivated by the Chinese, whereas others 
have pointed to the fact that the Soviets interrupted their 
aid to Neto at that time as evidence of Moscow's support for 
Chipenda and displeasure with Neto. Which do you consider to 
have been the case?
A:
Moscow always had an ambiguous attitude towards the MPLA. On the
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one hand they believed the MPLA was the movement they should 
support during the cold war, while the United States supported 
the FNLA. Moscow claimed to be the patron of the national 
liberation movements in the colonies. It believed that the 
worker's struggle should be linked to the anti-colonial 
struggle. For this Moscow needed an instrument and this 
instrument was the MPLA. But in an ambiguous manner. I remember 
that in 1972, when some intellectuals began to, once again, 
question Neto's leadership [Active Revolt], when things began to 
heat up. This was a very complicated period for the MPLA, known 
as the 'readjustment movement1 (movimento de reajustamento), 
similar to the movement of rectification in China, wherin the 
leadership would descend to the grassroots to discuss problems 
with the grassroots. This movement was developed, based on 
documents of the Chinese rectification movement, by Gentil 
Viana. I remember that, at the time, Agostinho Neto visited a 
number of zones in the north of the country, the so-called 
'liberated zones' of the MPLA in the north and the east. In the 
east, the struggle had retreated completely. The Portuguese had 
just undertaken an operation called 'Operation Sirocco* that had 
pushed the MPLA guerrillas all the way into Zambia. The leader 
of the MPLA in the Eastern Zone, Daniel Chipenda, was in fact 
the only person known in that region. He was a very charismatic 
chief. Neto was criticized. He was even attacked during the 
debates for the movement of readjustment. A peasant got up
during the talking and hit him physically, saying he did not 
recognize Neto, did not know who he was and did not recognize 
his authority to be at the head of the movement. Chipenda, in 
effect a charismatic leader, already in the MPLA leadership and 
commander of the Eastern zone, and perhaps taking advantage of 
the fragility of the MPLA, decided to claim control.
Furthermore, Chipenda was an Ovimbundu, who have always been 
heavily underrepresented in the MPLA. Chipenda took advantage of 
all this and put himself forward as a figure able to lead the
Eastern Revolt. Chipenda had rural roots with a good base in the
East. And despite the Portuguese victories...Chipenda, joined 
the general challenge to Neto's leadership and claimed that he 
too challenged Neto. And the Soviets supported Chipenda at this 
time. The Soviets believed that Agostinho Neto did not represent 
firstly the unity of the MPLA, and secondly, was not known in 
the interior of the country. The Soviets had, at the time, a man 
in Brazzaville by the name of Putilin, the Soviet charge 
d'affaires. He was a very active man, who knew the MPLA well, 
and who was who. Putilin must have advised Moscow to support 
Chipenda. In 1974, when the MPLA was taken by surprise by the 
coup of April 25, it was split in three major factions.
Q :
Did the Soviets give money to Chipenda and inform Neto of
their support for Chipenda?
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A:
No. The Soviets did not do that. The Soviets never did that. 
They would never go up to a leader and say "we are now 
supporting your challenger." The Soviets would stimulate the 
dissident to claim authority and to take power. But there was a 
clear cut in the Soviet line. Neto and those around him gathered 
that the Soviets were supporting Chipenda. But they did not
break radically. As Stalinists, they did not break with a 
superpower, which could help. But there was a cooling of
relations. So there were three groups: Neto, supported by nobody 
outside; Chipenda, supported morally by the Soviets, I stress, 
morally. I do not know if he got any money. Nobody knows where 
he received funds from. Then there was Gentil Viana's group: 
Gentil Viana, Mario Pinto de Andrade. The ideologue of the group 
was Gentil Viana, who spent ten years in China. A man who, even 
today, is very close to China. He opposed Viriato da Cruz (who 
died in China) when he criticized the Chinese Communist Party. 
Gentil Viana defended the CCP, and the two men parted ways.
Q :
Did the Chinese ever support the MPLA-Neto?
A:
The Chinese were never very far away, because they knew they
could win people over. For example, the small, tiny, manuals 
that we studied were made in China. And that resulted in many of 
the younger MPLA, that would later became part of the
leadership, looking towards the Chinese revolution with a 
certain amount of respect. And the Chinese knew this. They would 
always stay alert to make use of any gap that was created. And 
the MPLA did fight with Chinese arms, with guns made in China. 
Although from the time of the Viriato break in 1963, the Chinese 
had made a clear alliance with the FNLA, and supplied them with 
materiel and money.
Q :
When did Cuban aid for the MPLA begin to increase from the 
basic levels established in the post-Guevara links in 
Brazzaville?
A:
I believe that early Cuban aid was in truth only symbolic. [The 
relationship between] Che Guevara and Angola was a
disaster...with the MPLA. The only thing that Guevara gained 
from contacts with the MPLA was that the MPLA had intellectuals, 
and valid ideas. But he criticized the MPLA: 'why do you remain 
in Brazzaville instead of going into the heart of Angola'. He
believed that the Cuban revolution, on an isolated island, had 
been carried out from the Sierra Maestra, inside the country. He
criticized the MPLA for this. At this time, despite the fact
they thought the MPLA were a group of intellectuals, and since
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Guevarism and Castroism held the participation of the peasantry 
in the struggle to be all-important, they criticized the MPLA 
for not having any peasants. So they turned to Savimbi to see 
what he could do. They did give the MPLA some support, but I 
consider it to have been symbolic. They trained a few people in 
Cuba...Henrique Santos Onambwe, who [later] was deputy head of 
the state security, a member of the Politiburo of the MPLA, an
historic figure and linked to the 27 of May [1977], in the
vetting of people...also in Cuba studied the ex-Angolan Foreign 
minister, Paulo Jorge. Many of those who died in the 27 of May
affair were in Cuba, Saidy Mingas, finance minister. A
significant number of Angolans did go to Cuba. But in 1975, I 
don't think the MPLA had had more than 50 people trained in 
Cuba, and I do not consider the training of 50 people to have 
been significant in terms of liberation movements. Many were 
formed in Korea, in China, like Gentil Viana, in camps in 
Brazzaville...It was in 1975 that everything changed. Why? 
Because the MPLA believed that the FNLA had a very powerful army 
supported by Zaire. And as you know, there was a very large 
Angolan community exiled in Zaire after 1961, and they speak 
Kikongo, they are the Ikongo, in the north of Angola. The 
Congress of Berlin dissolved the Kongo kingdom, but this was not 
recognized by the Kikongo, they did not recognize frontiers, 
they were in Angola, in Zaire and in Congo-Brazzaville. In my 
opinion, the American strategy was to install Zairean army 
elements in the FNLA. There are family ties between Holden 
Roberto and Mobutu Sese Seko. When the FNLA arrived in Luanda, 
armed, the spectre [of a possible strategy] was created. These 
fellows were powerful and [it was believed] that they might take 
power by force. In fact, I would like to confirm that there was 
a certain arrogance on the part of the FNLA people. They held 
the weapons and claimed to know how to fight, challenging 
somewhat the fragility of the MPLA which was a group of 
intellectuals. This is what had happened in Angola, something 
rather complicated: in the interior of the country, in 1974 
after the 25 April coup, there were people who were thinking 
about a 'Rhodesian' solution [UDI]. This was supported by a 
number of people in society like the Portuguese taxi drivers, 
the 'ultras'. There then occurred a number of incidents between 
taxi drivers and black Angolans which created a situation of 
conflict. The taxi drivers armed themselves and went to the 
musseques to kill in revenge. They claimed to be the authority- 
they wanted a 'Rhodesian' solution. This led to the organization 
of self-defence committees by the internal groups of the MPLA in 
the neighbourhoods, armed with weapons, some stolen from the 
Portuguese army. This situation worsened and people were killed 
in clashes. Then at a certain point, a group of about 10,000 
soldiers (NCOs, sargeants and officers) from the Portuguese army 
(Angolans, white, black and mestizo) in uniform demonstrated 
outside the military High Command in Angola saying: "from now 
on, we patrol the musseques." The High Command had hitherto
489
ordered the patrol of the musseques by military units to avoid 
fighting between the taxi drivers and the population, already 
minimally armed with stolen weapons. These patrols had been 
manned by troops that came from Portugal, the so-called 
metropolitan troops. The demonstrators demanded, however, that 
they Angolans wanted to patrol the musseques. Only in this way, 
they believed, would they be able to guarantee that the 
population would not massacred, that there be no tacit accord 
between the army and the taxi drivers to continue to decimate 
our population. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in 
Angola at the time [concurred]. These Angolan soldiers in the 
Portuguese army did this. When the FNLA came into Angola and the 
spectre of a strong army was raised, these soldiers joined the 
MPLA en masse. And it was they that began to form cadres. So the 
conflict was created. There were two armies being created. At 
the time, UNITA had no military expression. There were two 
armies: one, of the FNLA with people supposedly from the Zairean 
army, and then this one, the FAPLA, an embroynic army, a 
guerrilla force, with little or no capacity. Out of the city for 
20 years, FAPLA did not know Luanda, and it was essential to 
know the ins and outs of the city in order to make war. We had 
established the Luanda Operational Command (Comando Operacional 
de Luanda - COL). My brother [Jose Van Dunem] was head of COL, 
and we did a few things.
...After Alvor, Neto had returned to Luanda on 4 February 1975. 
The movements that were represented in the city were armed and 
they patrolled Luanda. The MPLA patrolled, as did the FNLA, and 
when these met there was shooting. There was no independent 
authority to control this fighting. The Portuguese army kept on 
the sidelines. It had given support to the MPLA during the time 
of Rosa Coutinho, this it did. Rosa Coutinho claimed he was 
neutral, but he told the MPLA that he was with them. After this, 
Silva Cardoso said that they were not there to die.
...The coexistence of these two armed forces [the MPLA and the 
FNLA] was impossible. Today it is impossible to reconstitute the 
events and determine who fired first. The shots that were fired 
served to define a strategy. The strategy that the MPLA defined 
was: "we must take power." We signed Alvor and we knew that the
High Commissioner would be in Angola until the lowering of the 
flag [on 11 November]. We saw that the Portuguese army were not 
acting. In Portugal, the Left was in power, and we were left- 
wing.
Q :
So, there was a conscious strategy of the MPLA to take power
in Angola?
A:
Yes. There was a strategy to neutralize the FNLA and UNITA
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before independence.
Q:What of Alvor, the transitional government, the elections?
A:
No. Alvor was shaky...A government of coalition was only
possible if the MPLA wished it...There was an incident in April
1975: a clash during which the FNLA used weapons. There were
many casualties, some dead and wounded. I was working for 
Angolan Television and went to cover the incident (I was 
cautioned by the High Commissioner for this). We used this 
incident as the great justification for the definition of our 
strategy. We had the men to take power, so let us take it. We 
created a number of CIR Centres for Revolutionary Instruction to 
prepare them politically and militarily. From here on the MPLA 
had a far more solid armed force than the FNLA. During clashes
with the FNLA we could tell that these could be beaten. And
UNITA was nothing. We knew we could win the war.
...In Nakuru, in June, an agreement was reached to return to 
Alvor. But I remember when I returned to Angola, my brother told 
me: "the agreement was tactical." [We intended to implement a
strategy to take power] and on the other hand, knew that the US 
and Chinese aid for the FNLA had been increased...For the MPLA, 
the OAU was irrelevant, a group of corrupt heads of state, whose 
quaint Third World ideas were outdated.
Q:So the MPLA requested Cuba's aid?
A:
[Before mid-October], solely for the training of cadres...When 
it had become clear that it was a war between two armies: the
South Africans and the Angolans...the MPLA requested Cuban aid 
directly from Havana. Havana suggested that there be a co­
ordination with the Soviets, initially in logistical terms but 
after this there arrived Soviet military advisors for the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff [of the MPLA]... Before independence there were 
no more than 5 Soviets based in Angola.
Q:Was the MPLA strategy co-ordinated with the Soviets and the 
Cubans?
A:
No it was not.
Q:
Where were the weapons to come from?
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A:
The weapons all came from Soviet and Cuban ships.
Q :
Did you in the MPLA tell the Soviets that you were going to 
take power?
A:
It was not said. It was insinuated. The Soviets wanted us to 
take power.
Q :
Who were the military leaders of the MPLA at this time?
A:
The Minister of Defence, Iko Carreira, who was lazy and never 
did anything, never should up for meetings, except for those of 
the Political Bureau. There was Joao Luis Neto...Head of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. There was my brother, Jose Van Dunem 
[political commissar]. There was Monstro Imortal (Jacob 
Caetano), Vice-head of the JCS. Bula Natari, head of logistics, 
and Verissimo da Costa, head of military intelligence. And 
Agostinho Neto.
...In the meantime, the Cubans had begun to arrive. They arrived 
from the end of June, beginning of July onward. They stayed at 
Corimba, an area of beaches in Luanda. They were mestizos, a 
group of about 20, and joined those that were providing military 
training for the MPLA.
...The initiative to bring the Cubans came in from the MPLA.
...Immediately before 11 November, there were...8,000 Cubans in 
Angola. Between mid-October and Independence day was the period 
during which the Cubans began to arrive en masse...The military 
reinforcement by the Cubans was in response to the invasion of 
the country by South Africa...and the Zairean-FNLA column...The 
Cubans and the Soviets were needed to help in the conventional 
war.
...There were those in the MPLA that believed that the presence 
of Cuban troops on Angolan soil was perferable to the presence 
of Soviet troops. These latter, belonging to a superpower would 
have been very complicated. But Cuba was a Third World country.
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